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

JOSEPH M. BAERNREITHER

FRAGMENTS OF A POLITICAL DIARY

BY

JOSEPH M. BAERNREITHER

EDITED AND INTRODUCED
BY
JOSEPH REDLICH

WITH PORTRAIT

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PREFACE

On his death on September 19th, 1925, Dr. Joseph Maria Baernreither, the Austrian statesman, nominated in his will as legatees of his literary remains: Dr. Karl Urban, ex-Minister of Trade in the Imperial-Royal Government; Dr. Joseph Redlich, ex-Minister of Finance, and Dr. Oskar von Mitis, ex-Director of the Austrian State Archives. At the same time, our departed friend laid upon us the task of publishing his reminiscences of the latter years of his life, under the title "Fragments of a Political Diary." The substance of his narrative consisted of a long series of diaries, written in his own hand, which were all found among his papers. In writing his recollections, Baernreither drew largely on letters from friends, both political and personal, on memoranda and on other important sources of the history of his own time.

At the request of my friends Mitis and Urban, I undertook the duty of preparing the following volume for publication, and prefacing it with a brief sketch of the life of the author. This volume comprises only that part of Baernreither's recollections which deals with the development of the South Slav question in Austro-Hungarian politics, and particularly with foreign policy in South-Eastern Europe in the years immediately preceding the world war. It is the belief of the editor and of his friends that they have best met the obligation laid upon them by beginning with the issue of this portion of the recollections. Baernreither's long intimacy with the political leaders among the South Slavs, and with South Slav society generally, marks him out as best fitted to make clear, for later generations, the whole problem presented by the South Slav question as part of the general policy of the old Danubian Monarchy, and from his close familiarity with persons and events, to delineate the course and origin of the crisis through which it passed in the years between 1907 and 1914—a crisis fatal to the Habsburg realm.

Throughout, Baernreither's narrative has been left to speak entirely for itself. For that reason, there are practically no notes appended to his text. Only, wherever this seemed necessary, such dates as serve to clarify the context are added to the index of proper names.

I am convinced that our departed friend has raised an enduring monument to himself in these recollections, which demonstrate both the wealth of his intellect, the abundance of his knowledge of the nature of a genuine European policy, and the authentic humanism by which the service of his whole arduous life was inspired.

In editing this volume of my late friend's memoirs in English translation, I wish to express my deep appreciation to the publishers, Macmillan & Co., for the readiness with which they made it possible.

JOSEPH REDLICH.

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS,
September 1929.

JOSEPH M. BAERNREITHER

A Biographical Sketch

By JOSEPH REDLICH

The Editor believes that he has performed a necessary task in prefixing the following brief narrative of the life of Joseph M. Baernreither. The manuscript of his "Fragments from a Political Diary," composed and carefully corrected by himself, begins with the events of the year 1897: a fact that makes it imperative to acquaint the reader with the main facts in the development of his literary and political career, at least up to that point. The fact, moreover, that the first instalment of his papers covers that portion of his political diaries, dealing largely with one of the last important periods, into which his activities are divided—namely, the period beginning in 1907 and lasting down to the outbreak of the war—makes it seem desirable to preface it with an account, necessarily exceedingly compressed, of the life of the author of the "Political Diary."

There is here, of course, no intention to attempt an exhaustive biography of this distinguished man. That would imply something in the nature of an estimate of his personality, of his achievements in the realms both of literature and of pure knowledge, and of his many-sided political activity. All that can be done here is to indicate in barest outline, the astounding fullness of this life: there is no attempt at full biographical treatment. I shall only try to relate so much of the course of his life and education as is needed for the reader to have an acquaintance with the main traits of Baernreither's personality as a man and as a statesman. It should be mentioned, in passing, that the autobiographical material left by Baernreither among his papers—in very abbreviated form—has been made use of at many points.

Joseph M. Baernreither was born in Prague on April 12th, 1845, the son of Joseph Baernreither, factory owner, and his wife, Josefa Antonia Stelz. On his father's side, he belongs to Vienna, where his grandparents were still living at the time of his birth: "Andreas Baernreither, merchant and tradesman, and Elizabeth, *née* Hartmann, of Vienna," as it is stated on his birth certificate. His mother, Josefa Antonia Stelz, of Prague, is there described as a "daughter of Wilhelm Stelz, Controller of Military Supplies and Agent to G.H.Q., and of Josefa, his wife, *née* Mossmann, of Schramberg." Thus, Baernreither's maternal grandparents came from the old Habsburg provinces in South-west Germany ceded under the Treaty of Lunéville. Actually, therefore, he was the genuine offspring of authentic Germanic strains: as was indeed suggested by the tall figure and commanding presence—faithful embodiment of the best Germanic type—which few who ever met him in life are likely to have forgotten. In him, strains derived from old German Vienna, pre-1848 Prague, and the primitive racial elements of the Alemannic stock fused to form a potent personality: and this basic Germanism is the unchanging substance both of his fertile and lively intelligence and of his definite character and temperament.

The circumstances of his childhood and early youth were of the happiest. His father, a naturally energetic and effective person, had, first as factory proprietor, and, later, as a large landowner, a very comfortable position in Western Bohemia, where he was one of the early founders of the beet-sugar industry. His mother, greatly interested in the arts, particularly music, was a person of much charm. She it was who wakened in the mind of the gifted boy that swift response to and comprehension of art which was to be a source of keen and pure delight to him all his life. An excellent education, together with the fact that he grew up in conditions of complete economic security, helped to give his bearing that definitely patrician stamp that fitted so well with his tall figure, masculine beauty of face, and air of assured serenity, never lost even when his speech and expression were most animated.

His personal habits were always austere, and he never permitted himself any of the luxury which wealth connotes to the average mind: latterly, indeed, he came to deprecate anything of the sort; at the same time the surroundings of his early days were those of an ample and easy comfort. Indeed he grew up and was educated very much on the lines of a scion of the British landed gentry at the period. This was common enough in aristocratic families in the Austria of the '50's and '60's, but not in the middle class. Rarely does it happen that an education directed from the outset not to the idea of preparation for earning money but of giving scope to inner vocation falls to the lot of one who has the intellectual bent and the political interest which constitute such a vocation. Such, however, was the lot of the eldest son of the industrialist and landowner, Joseph Baernreither. At this time, the patrician middle-class, which rapidly developed in Germany in the middle of the 19th century, as a by-product of modern industrial expansion, was hardly in existence in Austria, but the Baernreither family was a perfect example of a social class of the highest importance for German Austria. In Baernreither himself there was a strong strain of bourgeois pride: so strong, indeed, that he set his face absolutely against ennoblement—so often the paltry goal of Austrian bourgeois ambition in the 19th century. What made this feeling of respect for the high tradition and lofty cultural standards of the pre-'48 German bourgeoisie the more notable and characteristic in him was the fact that social position and inherited acres brought him into constant contact with the Bohemian nobility; politically, he started as a representative of the Liberal German landowners of Bohemia and retained that standpoint to the end of his career.

His first school was the Kleinseitner Gymnasium in Prague, whence, in 1863, he graduated, with distinction. A year later, he went, for two years, to the University of

Heidelberg, then continued his studies in law and jurisprudence at the University of Prague until 1869, taking his Doctorate in both branches at the Carolo Ferdinandea in December 1871. Within a month he was at work in the Prague Commercial courts, where he also served as a law apprentice, while from 1873 he was active in the Criminal courts. In a section of his Recollections, in which he deals with the great reform of Austrian civil procedure, he reviews the years he spent in Prague and, later, in Reichenberg. These passages show that his experience aroused in him a lasting interest in the great problems of the code of civil procedure, and so paved the way for the creative work he was to do in that direction. One or two characteristic passages may be quoted.

"I spent a whole year in the commercial court at Prague, and despite the haste, not to say scramble, with which cases were conducted, got a good deal of satisfaction out of the work. In the winter of 1872 I used, one or two mornings in the week, to ride in the Riding School of the Estates of Bohemia before going to work, removing my spurs when I entered the office. I did so since I found they had no feeling for that kind of exercise there. In summer, I lived in my mother's country house at Bubenč, where there was a lovely garden, in which I had spent all my summers as a child. Since I generally finished my official work by 1 o'clock, I used to spend the afternoons on papers, or, often, on other reading. Thus I worked right through the summer under the most agreeable conditions.

"In addition to this professional activity, I sought for other mental food. Chance made me acquainted with Dr. Durdik, later Professor of Philosophy at the Czech University of Prague, and this acquaintance developed into a close friendship with a man who aptly represented the great process of intellectual assimilation then going on in the Czech world. Durdik was steeped in German philosophy, an admirer of Kant, but specially drawn to Leibniz and Herbart, and transmitted to his Czech students his own admiration for the treasures of philosophic ideas he had derived from the Germans. Durdik was, in fact, a German scholar translated into Czech. Had we possessed statesmen who could think, relations between the two races in Bohemia would probably have been far different.

" We soon came to an agreement that he was to give me lessons in modern philosophy from Descartes on. I retained enough Greek philosophy from my Gymnasium days to have a sort of foundation. Durdik would often come to me as early as 7 in the morning, so that I spent the hour before going to work sometimes in this mental exercise, sometimes in the Riding School. Our philosophic studies, which grew gradually more profound, were continued during the summer on memorable afternoons in the lovely Bubenč garden.

" Thus I was properly prepared to enter on the study of Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason.' We read it very conscientiously: he expounding to me as we read, and we then discussing, section by section. This lasted on into the summer, and we then read Hegel's 'Phaenomenology' and Herbart's 'Introduction to Philosophy.' I shall always be grateful to Durdik for giving me a firm and solid grasp of Kant. Many years later, I had the opportunity of hearing Kuno Fischer in Heidelberg lecture on Kant, and the ease with which I was able to take in what he—master of lucid exposition as he was—had to say, showed me how just my hold was on the main lines of Kant, and how profoundly they had impressed themselves upon my mind.

" Late in the autumn of 1872 I applied for long leave of absence. I had decided to make a journey to the East. As companion, I took Professor Velissky, my former teacher, who, being a "classic," was a most agreeable travelling companion. My journey—of which the details were worked out as we went along—took me through Vienna to Bázias and thence via the Danube to Rustschuk: thence by train to Varna and by sea to Constantinople—Smyrna, Rhodes, Cyprus, Beyrout, Port Said, Alexandria, Cairo: then, via Corfu, Athens; and so by sea to Trieste. Before and after I read widely on Oriental history, policy and art." Baernreither kept a full diary of his journey, on which he drew largely for the Recollections he composed in the evening of his days.

On November 26, 1872, he returned to work in the commercial courts at Prague and at once began to prepare for his judicial examination. To this end he had first of all to go through the prescribed course in criminal jurisprudence. That behind him, he was transferred to the Provincial Court of Bohemia in civil cases, being assigned as assistant to Judge Baron Spens-Boden—a circumstance which he described, half a century later, as a real stroke of luck, since their official relationship developed into a friendship that lasted all his life. He also acquired a thorough knowledge of the old Austrian civil procedure, dating from 1781.

" Work in the civil courts in Prague was quite different from that in the commercial ones. The cases were carefully prepared and under President Ludwig—ambitious and vain, but thoroughly honourable and full of knowledge—justice was scrupulously administered. The transactions were in the main in German, and there was no trace of any national antagonism among the judges, a number of whom were Czechs. If there had not been such a mass of written material, the conduct of the court could hardly have been better, from the point of view of dignity and propriety. But, once again, I found myself submerged under the mass of papers and exhibits, the ballast of statements and appended proofs: and I determined to get into contact with the sources of a living verbal procedure. During the summer I studied the Hanover code, then regarded as a model: the French *code de procédure civile*, and, above all, the Geneva procedure, accounted the purest verbal form. When the summer of 1873 was over, I again got leave, and went to Geneva, to study on the spot. An advocate there, Mr. Martin, was good enough to instruct me, indicating to me the essential points in the Geneva procedure, and taking me to the courts, where I occupied myself assiduously in gaining a clear view of the order of procedure and of execution. For many weeks I regularly spent the mornings either in Martin's chambers or in court. In the afternoons, I enjoyed the glorious October weather which was casting a golden glow of autumn magic over the whole region of Lake Leman. Vividly do I recall a visit to Voltaire's château at Ferney in November 1873—a superb autumn day. Before one reaches the gate in the fence surrounding the park, which is laid out in the French style, there is, on the left, a small church, with the rubric, in large letters, "Deo erexit Voltaire"—a lapidary brevity highly characteristic both of the man and the period.

"The winter of 1873–4 found me, once again, busy in the Prague provincial court, but I made time to go through and organise all the material I had collected at Geneva. By New Year 1874 I had it more or less in shape for publication. Then, however, came my transference to Reichenberg, in the capacity of a 'provisional judge assessor.' At first, I was not much elated by this, but soon reconciled myself to my fate, for there was much to be seen and learned in a great industrial district like this.

"Life in Reichenberg was very pleasant and also highly instructive. Once again I got a new view—large scale industry with modern factories, international trade penetrating into this corner of Bohemia, and the labour question. All this was reflected in the courts. Handloom weaving was still fighting a hopeless battle with the big concern: the small cloth-maker still fought to maintain himself against the big man: the condition of the factory worker was still quite primitive. I shall never forget the sight one saw at midday round about the big factories—the men camping in the open to eat their midday meal, spending the interval right on the pavements. I saw a good deal of all classes of the population in Reichenberg. There were sharp class distinctions—the 'High and Mighty,' as I called the big industrialists, had the town government entirely in their hands, but a new class was beginning to spring up, despised and ignored, until, a few years after this, it got the reins into its own hands. Of a conscious labour movement there was no sign. Yet something of the sort must have been stirring in these days. How easy it would have been, then, for the big employers to win the confidence of the men—but how little was done in this direction ! "

Meantime, Baernreither had taken certain steps which were to remove him from Reichenberg permanently, and even from Bohemia. The *Allgemeine Oesterreichische Gerichtszeitung* for October and November 1874 contained a series of articles by him on the Geneva procedure.

"In these articles," he relates later, "I was concerned to get to grips with the essence of a verbal procedure, and dissected the processes of establishing the case, passing judgment and proof, not only in the light of the Geneva procedure and Belot's classic commentary upon it, but from the standpoint I had acquired in contact with Mr. Martin and in the courts. What particularly appealed to me in this procedure was the position of the judge: the large freedom of action that enabled him to conduct an individual case in the light of his own insight and sense of equity. In Geneva, too, I realised something else: the importance not merely of the form of procedure but of the organisation and arrangements of the court, of the assessors, of the chancery and judicial executants, and of the education and authority of the judge and of the advocate. The contrast between what I had seen and heard in Geneva and the lifeless and mechanical rustling of papers that went on with us stirred me to such an extent that I was converted heart and soul to a purely verbal and direct form of procedure. Therefore, in my propositions, I always had the practical purposes of a given action-in-law in mind.

"In working out the propositions, I had used Leonhardt's exposition of the Hanover procedure as a basis of comparison, and also endeavoured to make myself familiar with the general literature on procedure. I was keenly aware of the imperfection of my knowledge and how much it needed completing in systematic fashion. I therefore conceived the idea of preparing myself for the position of an academic teacher, and writing a thesis on the principles of verbal procedure. My judicial work in Reichenberg, however, did not leave me free to make the necessary preparations for this, and I consequently applied to the

Ministry of Justice for long leave in order that I might enter formally on the task of academic teacher. The reply to my request was a summons to the staff of the Ministry. There a draft civil procedure, worked out by Councillor Harrasowsky, was actually under consideration. After a temporary delay, and a short period of service in the Prague Provincial Court, I entered the service of the Ministry of Justice in Vienna in January 1875. Joyfully did I seize this opportunity of co-operating on the draft of a verbal procedure, and the idea of an academic career lapsed."

Occupied at first on the discussion and completion of the Harrasowsky draft, Baernreither remained at work in the Ministry of Justice. As he relates later, in a survey of this period of his life, "I became acquainted with the administration of justice in Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and the other provinces; I was concerned with prisons, and was occupied—in the latter years, exclusively occupied—with legislative work and with elaborating legal opinions: I saw much and learned more in this period."

Later, he was to describe the high officials of the Ministry, in which he served for more than a decade, in terms of warm affection. He gives an admirable character sketch of the venerable head of the administrative section in the '70's and '80's, Benoni, last of the old Austrian High Law Officers of the "Italian school"—men of whom the great Joseph Unger used to say that they were responsible for the finest flowers of Austrian jurisprudence. Among the younger members of the service was a man, then swiftly coming to the front, who had a brilliant political career before him—Dr. Emil Steinbach. Steinbach, who later succeeded Dr. Dunajewski as Finance Minister in the Taaffe Government, had undoubtedly the most powerful intelligence of the men with whom Baernreither worked at that time. The friendship that soon grew up between the two young men was a source of lasting stimulus to both. "I was," says Baernreither, "on terms of intimate friendship with Steinbach, worked side by side with him for years, and discussed every aspect of law, art, and literature with him." There was no breach in their friendship until 1893, when

Steinbach introduced a parliamentary franchise Reform Bill aimed against the German Constitutional Party. In later years, Baernreither constantly recurs, in his writings, to Steinbach's remarkable personality—one of the most difficult to estimate correctly. In his own development, Steinbach played an important part, particularly when he, long an adherent of Conservative social reform, became the centre and most influential advisor of the whole circle of Catholic politicians and, after the formation of the Taaffe Government, their leader and spokesman in both Houses. This was the period when the new Catholic Conservative group, founded by Baron Vogelsang in Austria, was making its most successful attacks on Liberal ideas and Liberal legislation and drawing encouragement from the new Bismarckian policy of State Socialism and workmen's Insurance.

If he was influenced on one side by Steinbach, Baernreither had, ever since college days, been in close touch with the new school of economics and finance, the so-called "Arm-chair Socialists," who came to the front both in the Universities and in the Civil Service in Germany after 1871. A home background of sturdy Liberalism, followed by training in the atmosphere of Austrian Liberalism, both in Prague and Reichenberg, made it natural for Joseph Baernreither to find himself in independent sympathy with the strong current of ideas and endeavours for social reforms, rising in these days. Thus he ripened into the typical Social Liberal whom advanced politicians and academic economists were to value so highly.

The first literary fruit of this period was a thorough and first-hand study of certain legislative attempts to safeguard the property of the peasant in Austria and in Germany, published in 1882. About this time, too, he began an intensive study of social and economic conditions in, and the literature of, the country by which, ever since the opening of the 19th century, Germany had been most powerfully affected, both economically and politically—England. After years of work, and numerous lengthy visits and thorough investigation on the spot, he published, in 1886, his book on "English Associations of Working Men." This first volume was speedily translated into English and widely read. Unfortunately, the second volume was never completed, although extensive preliminary studies for it were made; Baernreither entered active politics at home, and never found the necessary time. In 1883, he was elected to the Bohemian Diet, by the electoral college of the great landed proprietors, to which he belonged in virtue of the estate of Lünz, in the Marienbad district, inherited from his father. When the elections for the new central parliament, the Reichsrat, came round, he was sent up to the Imperial Parliament in Vienna, and withdrew from service in the Ministry of Justice. He returned to legal activity as a judge in the Vienna courts, and for two years attempted to combine this work with the claims on his time and strength made by his parliamentary duties. These claims, however, soon became so serious that, after two years in the civil courts, he left the bench, and so, finally, the State service.

Baernreither's entry into active politics meant a definite change in his career, but one to which his mind had been set from very early days. The bitter disappointments of 1848 notwithstanding, the ideal of constitutional parliamentary government was still present to the mind of the generation to which he belonged; in Austria, the disasters of 1866 had actually given a powerful stimulus to the revival of Liberalism in State and Society. When he entered parliament, the second decade of the Liberal constitution of 1867 was drawing to its close, and although the status of parliament had fallen greatly since 1873, and resistance to parliamentary government in Court and Society circles had greatly increased, the middle classes in Austria, and especially the educated Germans, retained their traditional Liberalism, and believed that its principles, developed in conformity with the spirit of the age, constituted the best guarantee both of the welfare of the people and of the authority of the State. Baernreither's youthful development and education had been such as to implant political ambition deep within him: yet, at the crucial moment, he was presented with a tempting chance of promoting, primarily as a theorist, that strong interest in Constitutional Law and Political Science that soon was actually to carry him out of the juridical and legal into the parliamentary sphere. Baron Gautsch, then Minister of Education, offered him a Professorship of Political Economy at the University of Vienna, apparently after consultation with Professor Lujo Brentano, who then held the chair of Economics there. Baernreither, in his later Memoirs, says that the temptation was a real one at the time, and that, later, he felt that he had erred in rejecting it:

"I had had many a fight with Gautsch by this time, and was to come into collision with him often in the future, but his view of me was always entirely unprejudiced. At this period, he realised more clearly than I did what I needed. I ought to have concentrated, co-ordinated my theoretic studies of political economy, and cleared my mind—in which case I should have been able, a couple of years later, to be much more effective as a politician. At worst, I should have avoided much of the friction I actually had with my colleagues, in the next few years: should have delivered my challenge in an occasional speech in the House, and kept my powder dry."

These words, written by Baernreither in his late '70's, with the many disappointments of political life behind him, show how potent was the urge that took him into politics a quarter of a century earlier—at a time when he was in the hey-day of life, barely forty, had a wide reputation as a writer on sociological topics, possessed a handsome fortune of his own, and was, both in Vienna and in Prague, *persona grata* in the highest social circles. This being so, it is small wonder that a well-founded ambition drew him into the fray, for which he was fitted by his gift of eloquence, clarity of diction and a wealth of ideas and impelled by the inner conviction that it was there that a patriot could render his country and his nation the most effective service.

His parliamentary rise was rapid. By the end of his first term he had achieved a front rank position, not only in his own club and in the great constitutional party, but in the whole German Left Wing. His manifold interest in legislative and administrative questions, his encyclopædic knowledge of social and economic problems, and his constant and intense concern in all German-Bohemian issues —notably the language and school questions—made him, from the very beginning, a leader whose work in committee and debate was followed with interest both by the Government and the parties. In 1890, the possibility of a German-Czech Compromise began to be mooted, both in the German Left Wing and in the Imperial Government, and Baernreither was thus brought into contact with the central, and the most difficult, problem in Austrian domestic policy. By this time, too, he had had plenty of the unexhilarating experiences from which no German politician in Austria was immune. The keen zest of his parliamentary interest lost something of its edge as he grew familiar with the exasperating rivalries between the various prominent men in the great German Liberal party; saw its rapid disintegration under the independent claims of the separate parties composing it; watched the greedy clutch on their own ascendency with which the older leaders met the newer fresh forces coming up in the younger generation, and himself met a jealousy of his own proud, independent and, at times, a trifle intransigent personality, that assumed quite detestable forms upon occasion. For him, therefore, it was a positive piece of luck to have the Taaffe Government, in 1893, putting before the House the great scheme of judicial reform—a parliamentary task which, in its comprehensive ambit, and its vast importance for the whole of Austria, was bound to be of the first interest to Baernreither, the more that his own judicial studies had, as we have seen, been addressed precisely to this issue. "The proposals were laid before us," so he records, later, "in the most dreary period politically: the period of *rapprochement* between the Taaffe Ministry and the Left: a period which offered me neither political scope nor satisfaction." Here, however, was a vast work into which he could and did throw himself: a work which he could understand and appreciate better than anyone save the gifted draftsman of the bills, Franz Klein, in the Ministry of Justice.

By spring he began his study of the bills, in company with his friend Count Chorinsky, the distinguished jurist and President of the Court of Appeal in Vienna. Their scope was gigantic, for they aimed at making the verbal civil process a reality, and overhauling the entire structure of the Austrian judicial system in this sense. That this reform—unique in scope and significance—was actually carried through all its stages in both Houses of the Reichsrat, after being most thoroughly discussed in committees and commissions, and then, at once, put successfully into operation, was wholly and solely due to the co-operation between Franz Klein and J. M. Baernreither. No one knew this better or proclaimed it more loudly than did Franz Klein, the memorable creator of the new Austrian procedural system.

Baernreither's political life touched its zenith in the speech in which, as *rapporteur*, he was able to record the magnificent result of three years of hard work, into which he had put the whole force and drive of his personality, and that without exhausting it. With this achievement he was established in an unique position among Austrian parliamentarians. He was not merely a potential Cabinet Minister; he was one of the few real hopes of Austrian public life.

Any hopes of fruitful parliamentary activity were, however, soon to be extinguished. The wretched collapse of the Windischgrätz Coalition Government of German Liberals, Poles and Conservative-Catholics was followed by a long period of instability in government and parliament, and, above all, by the appalling outburst of obstructionism in the Lower House provoked by the Language Ordinances issued by the Badeni Government in April 1897. Political control passed from the leading statesmen in the contending nations and parties to the loudest-voiced and most irresponsible nationalists in the various political parties, and any sort of effective legislative activity was ruled out. An attempt was made by the two parties among the Bohemian landowners to bridge over the apparently irreconcilable animosities dividing, primarily, the races inhabiting the

Sudetic lands, by forming a Ministry composed in part of officials, in part of parliamentary representatives of Poles, Germans, and Czechs, under the premiership of Count Francis Thun. This, however, very soon came to naught. Baernreither, who had taken over the Trade portfolio in the Government, as spokesman of the Constitutionalist landowners, felt compelled to resign, at the end of seven months, by resolution of his Club. By this action, the landowners once again specifically ranged themselves on the side of the other German Liberal and National parties, into which the old German "united Left" had decomposed, and in sharp antagonism to the Catholic Conservatives and Slavs who continued, for another year, to support the Thun Ministry. That Ministry failed, however, in its principal task—the parliamentary renewal of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise for the next decennium. Baernreither, during his short term of office, worked with great energy and effect on this most thorny task. His resignation saved him the responsibility of carrying on the Compromise, originally effected by Badeni and Bilinski, at the price of great concessions to Hungary and a serious weakening of the basic idea of Dualism.

In the next few years, Baernreither took an active part in political work in the Diet and Reichsrat, and in the constant conferences between parties both in Vienna and Prague. But the decay of parliamentary institutions in Austria, under persistent obstructionism, began to cause even him to feel something like despair, and increasing anxiety about the future of the whole realm. His temper, however, had a marvellous elasticity; during this period, his political activities actually widened their scope. He was active in fostering relations, now of long standing, between himself and leading men in Hungary, and showed and met lively sympathy from the numerous notable personalities thrown up in Hungary since the establishment of a parliamentary *régime* there in 1867. On the Delegations, and on the occasion of other visits to Budapest, he met Koloman von Széll, Dr. Wekerle, Count Albert Apponyi, and Count Andrássy, and maintained friendly relationships with all these men: holding, justly enough, that in so doing he could be of service to Austrian interests when it came to handling matters of common concern and the whole "Compromise" situation. Doubtless, he looked to future developments in Austrian domestic policy such as would give the parliamentary statesman a fair share in the conduct of high policy in the near future. Meantime, under a system of government by high officials, which the Emperor had recently installed with the aid of his Prime Minister, Ernest von Koerber, there was practically no hope, to Baernreither's sense, of any recovery in general political conditions in Austria, or of any happy outcome of the Compromise discussions, of which Koerber made a mess. No one perceived earlier or more clearly than did Baernreither the ruin bound to be brought, and, progressively, being brought, upon the whole social and political structure of the realm by this system of government by bureaucrats as ministers—based, as it was, on unlimited Press manipulation and "the spell-binding arts of unscrupulous secretaries of leading statesmen."

The combined effect of all this was to cause him, between 1900 and 1905, to confine his political activity mainly to Bohemian affairs, where, despite his disbelief in Koerber's political genius, he supported his efforts to establish a national Compromise. But, as he used to say later, it was his habit, in these years, to devote part of his time, and particularly the summer months, to work remote from these more and more sterile political conferences and negotiations. His interest in knowledge for its own sake had revived in full force, and now afforded him a way of escape from the wretched tangle of Austrian politics. The problem that preoccupied him now was one to which his mind had been addressed when he was working as a young man in the Ministry of Justice—that of the youthful offender. He considered a sound treatment of juvenile delinquency as an indispensable element in any modern social system, and as involving the development of a specific code and a specific attitude on the part of the judge towards the youthful criminal. He had long been aware that the existence of this problem had been recognised in Western Europe not merely by philanthropists but by statesmen and administrators, and he now set to work to familiarise himself with the results, as embodied in legislative enactments, and set out in the literature on the subject. True to his previous practice, he carried his studies to the next stage of visiting the various countries, and for that purpose made protracted journeys to Germany, Belgium, France, and Switzerland. Next, he went to England, and, finally, to the United States, to study the remarkable system of general and criminal provision for the young in existence there. The friendly reception he everywhere met with had, in the Anglo-Saxon countries, a special warmth, since his earlier work had made him well known. As a result of these journeyings, he acquired an all-round knowledge of his subject. The outcome was the great book he published in 1906, "The Care of the Young and the Juvenile Offender in the United States."

In his Preface, he describes the plan of the work as follows:—

"My original intention was a comparative study of institutions and legislation in France, Germany, England, and the United States—not because I underestimate what has been done in this regard in other European countries, but because my own studies have mainly been confined to them. External circumstances unhappily prevent my completing this more comprehensive task at the moment, and I have therefore decided to publish that part of my study which deals with the United States. A further reason prompting me to take this course is the fact that the system of provision for the young and for the juvenile offender as developed to-day in the United States has not yet been made known in Europe through any comprehensive study."

There was, of course, a close connexion between this work of his and what he did in the practical sphere in the way of pressing for the establishment, in Austria, of institutions, local and national, such as are now grouped under the title of child welfare. There, well-meaning optimists had greeted the new century (not much more than ten years before the opening of the world war !) as the Era of the Child. Baernreither threw himself into the task of organising the first Child Welfare Congress at Salzburg in 1907—the point of departure for a whole series of new efforts for the protection of children and of the young generally.

Meantime, the one great change that was still to take place under the Habsburg *régime* had been accomplished. At the beginning of 1907, after more than a year of parliamentary struggles and most difficult negotiation, the bill establishing universal, equal, and direct suffrage had been put through, under personal pressure from the aged Emperor. Baernreither, from the first, made no secret of the fact that, Austria being what it was, a mass of various and contending nationalities, this " leap in the dark " into complete democracy seemed to him of more than questionable wisdom. He foresaw that the result would be not, as the Emperor and his advisers imagined, a mitigation of ruinous nationalist conflict but the precise opposite—an appalling intensification of national and social antagonisms. There, as we know, he was only too right. Of course, it was not his way to offer factious opposition to the Bill as it finally emerged from the discussions between Baron Beck, the Prime Minister, and the great national parties. In an admirable memorandum drawn up for his Club, the German constitutionalist wing of the great landowners, he makes it clear that nothing was further from his mind than any effort to uphold the privileged franchise of the landlord at any cost. What he would have liked to see, as a transition to complete democratisation, was the introduction of something like the Belgian system of universal suffrage with plural voting. Even on this he was no doctrinaire ; when the Dissolution was succeeded by a General Election on the new, universal suffrage basis, he stood in his home constituency, for the Marienbad division. Support came to him from all sides, but owing to the German Nationalist campaign against him he was defeated. Since, however, he was at once nominated to the Upper House, he remained in parliamentary life for the remaining decade of the Habsburg monarchy.

As a member of the constitutional left in the House of

Peers, he threw all his energy into an effort to end the strife between the nationalities in Bohemia, which had revived in full force when the German Nationalists launched their obstructionist tactics in the Prague Diet. He soon saw, however, that although the landowners and the Governor of Bohemia, Count Franz Thun, had been thoroughly in earnest in starting the negotiations, they met with no support from the Bienerth Cabinet in Vienna, and, so at all events many persons believed, were being secretly opposed by the Court. Realising this, he lost all hope of success in the efforts at political pacification in his native land to which he had devoted thirty years of his life. For long Baernreither had stood as the living embodiment and symbol of the desire of the moderate German parties for racial peace in Bohemia based on the fullest recognition of the rights and achievements of the Czech race: for long he had occupied a position there above both parties to the battle, since the Czechs were fully convinced of the absolute fairness of his mind. Because he knew how great the harvest was that might, even now, have been reaped, had the Emperor come forward as strongly for national peace between the two strongest peoples in Austria as he had done for the democratic idea of universal suffrage, the demonstration of Francis Joseph's indifference to the Bohemian nobles' last attempt at compromise forced him to abandon all hope of anything being done to save Bohemia or the realm as a whole, so long as the Emperor sat on the throne. He saw the effort for peace and reconciliation, to which he had been so long and so disinterestedly devoted, shattered to the ground. His disillusionment was profound. But he was neither disgruntled nor resigned.

On the contrary, with an amazing and positively youthful elasticity, he aligned the whole of his superb energy on to foreign affairs, and made the "common concerns" of Austria and Hungary his primary interest. As a standing member of the Delegations, throughout the years up to the outbreak of the war, he devoted himself, heart and soul, to a policy of consolidation for the Dual Monarchy, the cultural and political development of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the maintenance of Balkan peace, and of the Triple Alliance. Here, the pivot in his activity was the fact that he recognised, earlier and more clearly than did any other Austrian statesman of his day, the vital importance of finding a solution to the Southern Slav question. He further realised that there was no permanent solution short of one which, by uniting the entire Southern Slav race, approximated to the Jugo-Slav ideal of national unity. It seemed still possible that such a solution could be reached with Austrian co-operation. On the other hand, it was clearly incompatible with Dualism and the absolute preponderance of Magyarism in the Monarchy. In the '90's, Baernreither had taken a lively interest in the occupied territories. He had admired and supported what he regarded as the great administrative work of Benjamin de Kállay, the Minister for Bosnia and Herzegovina for many years. Since 1900 his interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina had grown, year by year. When, as a result of the Turkish Revolution, the "occupied" provinces were actually annexed, he had long been regarded as an authority upon their conditions and as a loyal friend, not only in the Reichsrat and in the Delegations, but even by the leading Serb, Muslim, and Croat politicians in Sarajevo. Unlike Aehrenthal and Burián—who succeeded Kállay as responsible Minister for Bosnia and Herzegovina —and unlike the overwhelming majority of German and Magyar politicians in the Delegations, he realised that the problem of Bosnia could only be understood and handled as part and parcel of the South Slav problem as a whole. Every year he went, not only to Sarajevo and Mostar, but also to Agram, Ragusa, and Spalato, where he came into contact with all sections of the Croat, Bosnian, and Dalmatian population. He established friendly relations with representatives and leaders in the various parties, and so obtained a thorough and unprejudiced familiarity with the present conditions and past history of the whole region. So, not unnaturally, he found ready sympathy for his endeavour to get to know the life, the needs, the ideas, and ideals of the South Slav race, and the utmost willingness to meet him.

At the same time, he began to occupy himself with the Jugo-Slav problem in the centre of the South Slav race, namely, the Kingdom of Serbia. His journeys extended to Belgrade and beyond, and he got into touch with the leaders of the various Serbian parties, who, in turn, would visit him in Vienna, keep him informed, and frequently appealed to him to use his good offices for them at the Ballplatz. On this important aspect of his political work there is no need to dwell: the portion of his literary remains here selected is that which covers, pretty fully, the story of his activity, political and personal, in Serbia and Croatia, Bosnia, and the Balkans generally. He further strove to gain a hearing for his views on Balkan policy, outcome as they were of his special knowledge, in Germany; above all, to impress statesmen and publicists in Berlin, and the Kaiser himself, with the importance of the problem and make clear to them the dangers already latent there to the peace of Europe and the political future of the Central Empires. He was profoundly perturbed by the outbreak of the Balkan War, the defeat of Turkey by the Christian Allies, and, above all, by the disastrous course of events after the outbreak of Serbo-Bulgarian antagonism, culminating in the Treaty of Bucarest, which put the seal on the downfall of Bulgaria and the triumph of Rumanian and Serbian policy. Actually, of course, the rapid rise of Serbia demonstrated the accuracy of the view, constantly stressed by Baernreither in speeches and at conferences, that the popular movement for national unification of the entire Jugo-Slav race was a force which must be recognised and could not be held back. For at least ten years, he had been crying that the South Slav problem threatened the very life of the Monarchy; incidents arising out of Magyar policy in Croatia, incidents in the Austrian Reichsrat and in the Delegations, afforded only too eloquent justification for this view. He was shaken to the soul by the murder of the Archduke and the armed conflict between Austria and Serbia that developed with frightful rapidity out of that crime. No one had juster grounds for apprehending the inevitability, after this, of the world-war, or of realising that the question of the continued existence of the Monarchy was thereby posed under the most unfavourable conditions conceivable. I can see Baernreither now, as I met him, unexpectedly, one evening in the early days of the war, on the point of leaving Vienna for his Bohemian home. The deepest distress, nay despair, spoke in the words in which, obviously fighting for control over the profound emotion which shook him, he expressed his horror at the catastrophe.

Baernreither was well-nigh seventy when the collapse of European civilisation took place. Living, for the most part, on his Bohemian estate, he kept in close touch with his old friends and club mates. He disapproved most strongly of the repressive home policy of Count Stürgkh—the suspension of the Constitution, the supersession of Parliament and of the Diets, the rigorous suppression of personal liberty, and the persecution, in Bohemia, of leading Czechs. He was painfully moved by the increasing misery and destitution brought upon the people by the merciless pressure of the apparently endless war, as he saw all this, notably on the occasion of his visits to Vienna. The old social reformer was still active in him: he was energetic in pushing the extension and use of the War Guardianship arrangements—his own creation—for the aid of the countless war widows and war orphans. On the death of Francis Joseph, when the last Habsburg Monarch, Emperor Karl, formed his first Government, Baernreither was invited to be a member of it. His department was the new Social Welfare Board, which was to co-ordinate pre-war social legislation and existing institutions with what had been done during the war, and to amalgamate them into a coherent system. Into this task he threw himself with his wonted enthusiasm; he is, in fact, the creator of the vast social welfare organisation largely taken over, after the collapse of the Empire, by the various Republics as a basis for their new social legislation. To Baernreither's mind, as he once expressed it, the armistice and the downfall of the Habsburg monarchy represented a final condemnation of the whole series of living statesmen and party leaders in old Austria. For the few who, like himself, had been in opposition, decade after decade, to the ruling spokesmen of the Crown, there was no consolation in the thought that, vainly, but to the full measure of their ability, they had striven for a policy of justice to all nations and for a peaceful transformation of the monarchy on such lines.

Baernreither's matchless constitution survived the war years without any marked loss of power; he could still pursue his old avocations, living in Vienna during the winter and early spring, following the social and political stages of the new Austrian Republic with close interest, carrying on his old studies, meeting on the old hospitable terms and talking with such of his old friends as survived—a dwindling number these. Old friendship took him back to Germany, Belgium, and Holland and, above all, to the south, to Italy—Italy where he had so often spent happy months among the art treasures of the past, above all in company with his friend Baron Dumreicher, the pioneer of technical education in old Austria. The post-war period was for Baernreither a time of inner serenity, in which, with the steady calm of the wise man, he looked back over the past, assembling and weighing the experiences, disappointments and achievements which a long and full life had brought him, thanks in part to his own rich natural endowment, in part to the smiles—and frowns—of fortune. During the time which, in the years between 1921 and 1925, he passed in Vienna, he was busy going through his papers and the observations, views, and experiences recorded in the many volumes of his Diary, with the intention of arranging them so as to form a picture, for later generations, of the past through which he had lived.

The gradual failure of his health caused him to spend his last two winters—1924 and 1925—in Italy, whither he was drawn both by memories of the happy days spent there in youth, and of the friends with whom he had shared those days, and by the lively interest he felt in the new Italy and the singular phenomena of Fascism under Mussolini. For his friends, the fruit of these months was the little masterpiece, the "Roman Diary," which he closed when, in the spring of 1925, he slowly made his way from the Eternal

City back to Vienna and his old Bohemian home. Though eighty, his figure retained its old erect carriage, but when they saw him, his friends realised that his allotted span was drawing to its close.

Baernreither's life was always solitary though never lonely; his mind was self-determined in a high degree, and complete freedom was a necessity to him. For that reason he never married. Possibly he found in his long work for the protection of children and the care of the young some sort of compensation for the deprivation of wife and children of his own. After 1924, he knew his own failing health, but spoke of this to none of his friends, and no one ever heard him complain. A sudden recurrence of an internal trouble, noted some years earlier but kept at bay, compelled him to leave his estate at Lünz, where he was busy completing the arrangement of his Diaries, for Teplitz, where it was hoped that the baths might relieve him. It did not prove so: on the contrary, his condition was plainly hopeless. He did not inform any of his friends or relations. Accompanied and tended only by an old and faithful servant, he fell asleep on September 19, 1925. He is interred at Prague, the home of his father.

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PART ONE

SOUTHERN SLAV POLICY

I. TRAVELS IN THE SOUTH OF THE MONARCHY

WITH ADMIRAL STERNECK IN DALMATIA, IN MARCH 1892

PAGES FROM A DIARY

On board H.M.S. "Pelican," March 18, 1892, 10 *a.m.*

LAST Tuesday I dined with Alexander Schönburg. Among the guests was Admiral Sterneck, on the point of departure, next day, for Pola, for a voyage of inspection in Dalmatia, on board the new "Pelican." He invited me to go with him. I gladly accepted.

We left the Vienna South station on Wednesday evening, March 16. When we awoke, early yesterday morning, we were in Carinthia—snowy, but sunny. The snow melted and the sun shone on bare ground as we went on. By the time we reached Istria the weather was glorious, although hardly a sign of green was yet visible. We were nearly at Pola, at the station of Dignano, before we came upon a couple of almond trees just bursting into bloom.

About 1.30 the "Pelican" left Pola. Launched in 1891, in the Schichau yards at Elbing, the boat was intended to serve as a depot vessel for destroyers. Its commander, Captain Becker, had taken it over from Elbing (East Prussia) and brought it to Pola, via Gibraltar, through snowstorms and very dirty weather. Sterneck was now minded to test the "Pelican," especially for speed. A 2400 tonner of 3200 H.P., it is supposed to do its 18 sea miles an hour. In addition to myself, Sterneck's guests include Count Vincent Fürstenberg and his personal aide-de-camp, Captain Lehnert, whom I have met before. Two years ago he convoyed some of us M.P.'s, on board the Lloyd steamer "Hungaria," to Trieste, for the launching of a man-of-war. On that occasion he proved a most charming commander and host; now, too, his company is most agreeable, for he has a fund of information at our disposal, both about the ever-changing panorama before us and all sorts of naval and political questions.

Yesterday afternoon the engines were cross, and though the weather was good, we made poor speed. In the evening we had hardly sat down to table when there came a most unusual roaring noise from them, and the Captain rushed off to see what was wrong. No one knew what was up: Sterneck gave orders to stop the engines and set sails and have a thorough examination made. It then proved that a nut on the stuffing-box of one of the cylinders was broken: actually, it was reported that a new one would be made in the course of six hours, and the vessel under weigh again. On that we turned in, but sleep was another story. There was no end of noise, a fearful racket going on—hammering, grinding of yards, loud giving of orders, running to and fro. Luckily the weather held, for even with its sails set the heavy ironclad was impossible to manœuvre and the three red lights had to be hoisted on the foremast as a sign that we could not make room for any other vessel.

In the morning I was up betimes, and learned that we had been hailed about 5 a.m. by a small Florio steamer with offers of assistance. The offer was accepted; the steamer took us in tow, and, like some stout little beast of burden in the shafts of a heavy wagon, dragged us back to Pola. A biting north wind got up early this morning, and the Captain told me it was a nuisance, since he was not sure that the little tug would be able to turn Quarnero in so strong a wind. In that event he should make for Lussinpiccolo.

12 *o'clock noon.*

At sea I have often found Neptune begin by showing his teeth, and then all at once turn mild. There is a great improvement in the weather. Our course is set for Pola and we are due there some time this evening.

On board the Admiralty yacht "Greif," Castelnuovo Docks, March 21, 1892.

Two days ago we were transferred to the "Greif"—an admirable exchange. It is only a small, old-fashioned paddle-boat of some 1500 tons, but a very comfortable ship to live in, with a most agreeable motion.

We reached Pola about 6 p.m. on Friday, and left it again about midnight on the "Greif," which had been got ready within a bare six hours. Early yesterday morning we ran into Bocche. Off Castelnuovo an Austrian squadron is lying, under Rear-Admiral Rohrscheidt. The ships were all beflagged to greet us, and we were hailed with the National Anthem. Since they are wooden vessels of the old type, the crews stood out on the yards—a sight one rarely sees nowadays. Sterneck sticks to these old wooden ships for manœuvres—a point on which his officers do not agree with him. We anchored off Castelnuovo. Yesterday evening I went on shore with Lehnert. Between the bare steep cliffs and the shore there are a great number of deep cuttings and hollow slopes where the ground is exceedingly rich and fruitful. But everywhere signs of neglected cultivation meet one. Olives, vines, maize and wheat do well, but care and attention are lacking. Both planting and tillage are irregular and primitive, and much of the land lies fallow. The explanation is both simple and pathetic. All the inhabitants of the Bocche were seamen; in the old sailing days sailors and captains made such good money that they could neglect the soil and yet have enough to live upon. To-day the days of the sailing ships are gone: many of the Bocchesi have emigrated to the United States, and those who remain are gradually being forced, by sheer necessity, to take to agriculture. Obviously, however, there is no tradition of good husbandry, and nothing has been done to teach or stimulate the people. The state of the cattle is noticeably poor. The cows looked no larger than our calves, the pigs are small, the sheep of an inferior breed. Yet there is scope here for men who are prepared to work and win from nature what it would really be ready enough to yield; and a far-seeing Government would find a big field here for agricultural development. Politically and economically great mistakes are obviously being made here. Italian cannot be upheld as the governmental and official language when the entire population is and feels itself Slav; if we were wise, we should set our minds to training up a race of Slav officials with an Austrian standpoint who might influence the people. Italian is dying out; though it will live on on the coast, politically it is dead. On this all the naval officers I have talked with who know the country best are in agreement. Yesterday evening we had a gala dinner on board, to which the commanders of the vessels and the local commandant of Castelnuovo and others were invited, and had some most stimulating talk.

This afternoon, while Sterneck was inspecting the corvette "Friedrich," I took a walk inland. It was quite mild, but there was little sign of spring green to be seen. In a brook I saw some small turtles which I was sorry not to be able to bring back with me for soup, but Lehnert tells me that they are not of the edible variety. Towards evening we anchored by Teodo whither the squadron had preceded us. There is a naval coaling station there, and large works are being planned, on which Sterneck has his eye.

On board the "Greif," Thursday evening, March 22.

This morning I walked by myself from Teodo to Cattaro in three hours. The road goes over the water-shed which divides the Bay of Teodo from the Bay of Cattaro. It was a superb walk, going right up over the summits of the hills, and then, at a considerable altitude, joining the serpentine road from Cattaro to Cettinje. The bridle-path runs between great laurel bushes, and one gets a series of varying views over sea and mountains. The air was clear, and the sun bathed everything in wondrous colours. From the serpentine road I had a truly marvellous view. I sat down on a wall, overcome by the loveliness of the prospect—below me the sea, a mirror of motionless blue; to my left the green of the foreshore with its clustering houses; to the right the rugged peaks rising sheer up into the sky. Cosily nestling in the bay, Cattaro with its harbour.

In Cattaro I got an excellent meal at the "City of Graz," and called on the prefect of the district, Baron Maroićić. He told me a good deal about the folk hereabouts. Much could be made of them if their idiosyncrasies were taken into account and their needs considered. I wandered through the town with Maroićić, and bought some antique weapons; then, with the other guests who had been invited to dine on board the "Greif," got into the commander-general's steam launch. We went right along the Gulf of Cattaro, through the "Catena," the narrowest point of the Bocche—so narrow that it was once possible to chain it across—up to Teodo harbour. On our way we passed a little island, with a church on whose walls were hundreds of votive tablets put up by seafaring Bocchesi. This evening there was a big dinner on board, at which Rear-Admiral Florio, who has lived here since he retired from active service, was present. The conversation was most animated, and the naval officers told me a great deal about the country and its people.

On board the "Greif," Thursday, March 24, 1892.

We have two days of manœuvres behind us. Yesterday there was a naval engagement between two gunboats. The "Albatross" was sent out first, to hide somewhere. Sterneck took me with him on board the "Nautilus," whose task it was to discover and attack its sister ship. It soon succeeded in the first part of its task, and a hand-to-hand struggle developed, with salvoes of shot and all sorts of movements—a magnificent sight for me. At last "Nautilus" was declared victorious—a point on which I was no judge. To-day, gun practice. We were transferred to the frigate "Radetzky," and sailed out. A target was set up on a crag overhanging the ocean, at which "Radetzky" fired with all its guns as it sailed by. Next came manœuvres under sail, which did not seem to me quite to fit into our ironclad age. But I could not ask my friends, the naval officers, about this, since I knew that they, too, thought exercises of this sort out of date.

On board the " Greif," Friday evening, March 25, 1892.

To-day I saw a fleeting yet superb picture. Yesterday evening we were shipped back on to the " Greif " and made for Gravosa. Quite early this morning I was on my feet, having a look at Ragusa. Although it is now pretty late, I must put down a few lines by way of record of the wonderful impression made upon me by this spot. Take it all together—wild coast line, towering mountain peaks, rich growth of ivy covering the buildings, grey-green olives and aloes, and, in the midst, the ancient town, walls and towers drenched in the Southern sunshine—there is nothing in the Riviera to compare with Ragusa. Here, within a relatively small compass, is gathered together what there is admired for its picturesqueness in many scattered spots. Walking along the main street of Ragusa, the Stradone, one is surprised by the fashionable aspect of the town. There, its aristocratic history is visible. The Rector's Palace, the Zecca (Mint), the Cathedral, the Cloisters, with corridors revealing architectural beauties as well as most interesting sculptural details and, as a vivid foreground, the South Slav population. On one day's visit one can only get a general impression. But hardly anywhere else can one find such a combination of natural beauty, historic interest, pictorial quality and glorious colour. Unfortunately, we left Ragusa that same evening, in glorious weather, under a clear star-spangled sky, with Spalato as our next destination.

On board the " Greif," Sunday, March 27, 1892.

We were lucky, yesterday, in having as our guide in Spalato Professor Bulić, the director of the Museum here, whose knowledge of the Palace of Diocletian and of Salona is unrivalled. Here again we could only hope to gain a general survey, but his information and his skill in conveying it to us amply compensated for the shortness of the time. The palace of Diocletian, and Salona, once the capital of Dalmatia, are a fragment of the Roman world. The palace is the most perfectly preserved castle of a Roman Emperor existing. Within its huge area, with its cincture wall, residential buildings, temples, open spaces and passages, there has grown up a new city, occupying all the apartments and creating a new, impoverished sort of life there; with the result that the palace is now a town, and a town which has helped to preserve it. The ancient remains are late Roman, and far surpassed by the remains of classical Rome itself. Apart altogether, however, from its pictorial values, the palace of Diocletian has architectural significance as a finely preserved example of Roman forms which largely served as model to the builders of later centuries. With so excellent a guide, we had no difficulty in making out its general plan. The separate parts of the palace, and in particular the Cathedral (originally the Temple of Jupiter), the Baptistery (originally, probably, the Mausoleum of Diocletian), fell into their places in the vast ground-plan of the palace, which Bulić enabled us to see rising as a mighty whole before our eyes.

The so-called Museum in Salona is in a poor condition. It has had to be housed in three separate places. Statues, busts and sarcophagi are all heaped together in such a jumble that it is difficult to see any of them. The other objects of architectural interest are only temporarily preserved. Unhappily, there seems no hope of the State deciding to restore this museum. Both the town and the country are too poor for that. Elsewhere such remains would receive great care and attention, but we have no money for them, no time, no feeling. This afternoon we visited Salona, an hour's drive from Spalato: it is an extensive plain, on which the Roman remains, so far as they have been excavated, lie scattered. All Bulić's imagination was required to enable us even to make out the topography.

Yesterday night we left the harbour of Spalato, in bad weather; there was a heavy S.E. wind. This afternoon we were in Sebenico. In this thoroughly Venetian town the most interesting object is the Cathedral, which we inspected from all sides. The steep, narrow streets (*calle* in Venice) are most rich in architectural detail: one often sees a Lion of St. Mark (if often minus a head) and carved portals and armorial bearings which recall Italian art and Italian rule. In Ragusa, Slav speech predominates: in Spalato, Italian is preserved still, above all in Sebenico, where it remains the business language. Here too, however, the majority of the population is Croat, although the whole town has an Italian tone.

"Greif," Monday, March 28.

We entered the harbour of Lussinpiccolo in a dead black night. There we found the corvette "Friedrich" and the torpedo-boat "Lussin." The latter greeted us with electric lights. Notwithstanding the lateness of the hour, the commanders of both vessels came on board the "Greif" to pay their respects. This morning Baron Chlumecky came to breakfast, and we then went on shore. I met Pergelt, my colleague in the Reichsrat, who is here doing a cure for his catarrh. In the company of the "Greif's" captain, Adamović, I then took a delightful walk along the shore of a tranquil ocean bay to Lussingranda, talking hard all the way about conditions in Dalmatia. We inspected the Archduke Stephan's villa, and a church in which there is a beautiful 16th-century sculptured Madonna. Ineradicable traces of Italian culture everywhere. In the harbour square at Lussinpiccolo, a military concert took place towards evening. All the world assembled there to enjoy the fine weather.

Trieste, Wednesday, March 30, 1892.

We left Lussin yesterday morning early, under a strong wind. Gradually, however, the sea calmed down, and by 3 in the afternoon, when we anchored in Abbazia, it was as smooth as oil. There I took my leave of Sterneck, full of gratitude to him. Throughout, he was always in the best of temper, conversational, companionable, and concerned to make the trip as pleasant as possible for his party. In the evening, if we had no outside visitors on board, we played Tarock, and, willy-nilly, I had to take a hand. I am a bad and inattentive card player. To that extent I paid my share of the entertainment, for my mistakes were passed off with uproarious spirits. When the seas ran high, it was often far from easy to keep steady on one's chair with cards in one's hand.

This trip gave me a general view of the Dalmatian coast such as could hardly have been bettered. Venetian rule here was very clever. They saw to it that their officials could understand and speak the native language of Dalmatia, namely, Slavonic; there was a Slavonic Institute in Venice, a sort of Theresianum, where these officials were trained. Sea-faring nations are bound to take wider views. To-day this Slav element, partly Serb but predominantly Croat, is uppermost—with the exception of the town of Zara—and steadily gains ground over the Italian. Our policy has contributed to this change, but we govern Dalmatia without any real affection. I do not believe that anyone could visit Dalmatia and not ask himself, What might not be made of this region?

FIRST JOURNEY TO BOSNIA—OCTOBER, 1892

During the meetings of the Delegations in Budapest in October 1892, I told Kállay that I should like to use an interruption that took place in our discussions to make an expedition to Bosnia and Herzegovina. One or two of my colleagues proved inclined to join me—Dr. Kathrein, Moro and Camillo Starhemberg. Kállay, helpful as always, made the necessary arrangements for us. At Bosnisch-Brod, Mikuli, prefect of the district, received us, and about midnight we boarded the narrow-gauge line railway car for Sarajevo. By daybreak we were at Dervent. The first view of the country is not too attractive. The Bosna valley, along which the railway runs, is neither very fruitful nor well tilled; towns and villages are scattered hither and thither at long distances from one another. The hills are covered with low-growing trees. Dusk was coming on as we reached Sarajevo. Next morning surprise awaited us.

The aspect of Sarajevo is perfectly charming: the general view of the town as beautiful as anything of the kind in Europe. Set in the centre of a great bowl, it is surrounded by range upon range of mountains, the lower slopes being wooded, the higher ones heath-clad. A small stream divides the town into two portions. Everywhere one sees the new Sarajevo, with its European buildings and modern streets, pushing through the bright confusion of the old Oriental city. Whole quarters, on the higher slopes, are hardly touched by modernism: there, the Muslim houses gleam through the branches of clumps of glorious trees. Mosques with their minarets rising up on all sides give the characteristic decorative note of the whole city. Naturally we were shown all the "sights"—the view from the Citadel, which is of really enchanting loveliness; the Great Mosque; the Bazaar; the new Government buildings; the tobacco factory and the Peasant Art Depots. The latter are Kállay's particular pride. He is seeking to revive and develop the old native arts of carpet weaving and metal working, and make an economic proposition of them. We also visited Illidže, the bathing resort in the neighbourhood of Sarajevo, and likewise the source of the Bosna, which is surrounded by magnificent trees. We also paid a visit to one of the rich *Begs* at his country seat. The whole thing was quite Oriental. He received us with the grave solemnity peculiar to the well-bred Muslim. We had to smoke his cigarettes, drink his coffee and taste his sweetmeats. Since none of us spoke or understood Serbo-Croat, the conversation had to be conducted through an interpreter, and was rather stiff. General Appel, Commander-General of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was also most hospitable and gave an elaborate dinner-party for us, to which the notables of all three creeds were invited.

I soon cut loose from official direction and got into touch with the higher civil servants. Kállay has been most fortunate in his choice of men for these higher appointments. I made the acquaintance of a series of first-rate men. Baron Kutschera is the civil colleague (adlatus) of the Commander-General. Trained in diplomacy, thoroughly well-informed about the country, he is a skilled instrument of the dominating will of Kállay. The chief administrative officer, William von Sauerwald, of German descent though actually born in Slav southern Hungary, came from the General Staff. Edward Eichler, at the head of the Department of Justice, born in Eger, is an outstanding person, both as a man and as a lawyer. With him are von Scheuer, the head of the Superior Court of Appeal, Schmidmayer (Director of Finance) and Mr. Stix, Chief of the Department of Public Works. Men like these, representatives, all of them, of the good old Austrian official tradition, German by education but complete masters of the vernacular, have rendered the country inestimable service. From talking with them I got some idea of the administrative and judicial system Kállay has established here. Before the occupation, the condition of Bosnia was that of the average Turkish province. If possible, indeed, it was worse, since the Bosnian *Begs* had always been an intractable element and a standing source of disorder, irresponsible action and disregard of the *Rajah's* authority. To-day there is complete security of life and property, administration and justice are quite up to the average European standard, and the officials do their work disinterestedly. Kállay holds the whole thing in the hollow of his hand. On a short visit to Sarajevo, of course, I could not go deeply into things : only later did I realise how well planned and organised the administration actually was.

We left Sarajevo to make for Mostar, the capital of Herzegovina. The narrow-gauge railway is a continuation of the main Brod—Sarajevo line, and runs over the Ivan, a pretty high wooded mountain saddle, into the adjacent territory. It is an interesting run, climbing, first, up through the wooded mountain slopes, and then, after crossing the water-shed, dropping down into the valley of the Narenta. The character of the landscape changes rapidly. One comes out of the wooded valleys of Bosnia into a stony country, growing more and more treeless. In place of the high, grey, straight roofs—higher, as a rule, than the white walls beneath them—which give a distinctive character to the Bosnian hamlet, the flat, stone-roofed huts of Herzegovina begin to appear.

Mostar lies in the cup of a shallow valley, on the two banks of the Narenta, which are joined by a famous curved bridge, the sign and pride of the town. Kállay has had a series of very good Government hotels built in the occupied provinces, and there was one at Mostar, where we were very comfortable. He attaches great importance to attracting foreign visitors, since he seeks, by that means, to rouse a European interest in the civilising work which the Monarchy is doing here. "If Paris talks of Bosnia, Vienna will do so too," is his opinion. The Oriental type is even more noticeable here than in Sarajevo. In the environs there are wine, maize, and tobacco—the latter renowned throughout the world. We were amply supplied with samples in the tobacco factory at Sarajevo. We took an expedition to the source of the Buna, which starts as a tiny stream, out of a steep ravine. At the entry to the ravine is the shrine of a Turkish Holy Man, guarded by Turkish monks. A hunting party was arranged for the sportsmen in our company. The great vultures, native to this part, are said to gather by this spring. An ass was slaughtered and laid out, and we sat for some hours on the terraces of the Turkish shrine; but the vultures did not come, and the Government's ass had laid down its life for naught. Then partridge shooting was arranged, and we spent some hours scrambling over the most awful rocks and boulders. The bag was poorish, but tasted excellent. These journeys made clear to me that railway development would be a big step on the way to economic advance. On one side of the stretch of narrow-gauge line, right up to the Serbian and Montenegrin frontier, there is no connexion at all: nor is there any on the other side, that towards Dalmatia and the sea.

After spending several days in Herzegovina, we made our way back by rail to Jablanica, and thence, by coach, via Prozor, to Jajce. This gave us a chance of getting a nearer view of the smaller towns and villages, and especially of the agriculture and the way the peasants worked and lived. A well-informed Government official explained things to us and acted as interpreter. The Bosnian peasant is a *Kmet*—that is to say, he has the usufruct of his ground, and, in general, hands over one-third (tretina) of the yield *in natura* to the superior owner. The Kmets are Rajahs: the superior owners, as a rule, Muslims. I frequently got out of the carriage to inspect the way the people lived at close range. It does not require much insight into social conditions on the land to perceive that this system of gross deduction is a major obstacle to full production and agricultural development in the occupied regions. We also came upon a genuine Southern Slav scene. In a village, towards evening, a group of men and women were gathered round an aged minstrel, who, so we were told, was singing old Serbian heroic songs, to the accompaniment of his *guzla*. No one in the whole crowd could read or write, but, thanks to the national songs, their imaginations are peopled by heroic figures from the fights for freedom against the Turks.

Jajce is picturesquely situated above a waterfall. Again we fared most comfortably in a Government hotel. We spent a wonderful autumn day on Lake Pliva, where there are excellent trout. Our next goal was Travnik, which we reached after a day's journey over a lofty pass. We lodged in the old Turkish *konak*. Wooden stair-case, panelled walls, the rooms, all very large, with rich carpets on the floors and as hangings. Here, the Turkish style of architecture predominates: the projecting roofs and windows, and the arrangement of the windows themselves and their ornamentation, give the leading notes in a style whose characteristic forms have great charm.

In Lašva we again touched the railway line to Brod. On our homeward way we halted at Zenica. There Kállay has erected a penal institution, conducted on what is called the progressive system—quite a modern method. There is nothing quite like it in Austria. The prisoners are divided into three categories—in the first, which is rigorous, there is solitary confinement; in the second, prisoners enjoy considerable freedom of movement; in the third, they may be employed on work outside the institution. Movement from class to class is determined by good behaviour. The Governor, who seemed to be a man of experience, told me the system worked well. The main reason, according to him, was that the inmates, when treated calmly and intelligently, were tractable and capable of improvement. In the institution I saw an example of religious equality, to which Kállay attaches great importance. One big room is used for services by all three confessions: there is a Catholic and an Orthodox altar, and a prayer niche for the Muslims. I was not informed whether the arrangement was dictated purely by economy, or whether this inclusion under a single roof is designed to promote greater mutual toleration.

On my return to Budapest I took the opportunity of speaking on Bosnia in the Delegation. This I did on October 19, in a longish speech. I described the existing system of landownership as intolerable—as must be patent even to a superficial observer. Next in importance to agricultural relief—on lines properly adjusted to the special circumstances of the country—I put the question of the schools. "Bosnia is no Egypt," I said. "It has no inexhaustible resources. It is a land of moderate productivity, whose future depends on the hard work and the intelligence of its people. From this point of view the capacity to learn and the desire to learn are vital: they are, broadly speaking, present. A thoughtful schoolmaster told me that the children in the schools are like ducks, so eagerly do they drink up the knowledge and education offered to them." In addition, the people have great manual skill. In Turkish days there were only the Serb, Turk and Muslim confessional schools, but since the occupation there have been State schools, too. Even so, in 1892 there are only 328 schools, with 17,540 pupils registered, in the whole country. The greater part of the population grows up without any schooling. The gradual introduction of compulsory school attendance, and, especially, the provision of industrial and agricultural secondary schools, seemed to me the primary need. I did full justice, in my speech, to what had been achieved by the administration; to the initiative that had been shown, and the thorough and organised way in which work was being done. I paid tribute to the driving force behind all this and to the way in which this sense of purpose inspired the civil service. I indicated the urgent need of new railways, and suggested where they should run—in Western Bosnia:

to connect up with Jajce and Banjaluka; and to Spalato—that project so often discussed.

Kállay's reply to the various speakers who touched on Bosnia in the course of the debates showed plainly that his reforming period was drawing to a close. On the land question, he claimed that the Begs and Agas felt that they had a stake in the country—and no policy of landownership could therefore be undertaken without their consent; as for the Kmets, any sudden emancipation, he maintained, would ruin them economically, and make them dependent on the patriarchal bounty of the Begs. What he meant by this, he did not expound. He hoped everything from "cultural progress," but did not attempt to discuss any possible form of land relief—in other words, he was immovable on the point. When it came to education, one heard the voice of the Magyar, who has no feeling for schools for people who speak other languages than his own. He declared that it was simply a question of money. It was hard to find suitable teachers; the Sarajevo Training College only turned out 12 to 14 teachers a year. At such a rate, it is naturally idle to talk of any improvement in the schools. He was obstinately set in his conviction that there may be Serbian and Croat stocks, but not a Serbo-Croat nation; and, in Bosnia, only Bosnians. This is his old theory of Bosnian nationality. Hence, despite the excellent spirit still animating the administration, I began to feel that the Kállay *régime* had reached a standstill on certain points.

In Spalato, in 1898, as Minister

In the year 1898 I travelled through our Adriatic provinces, when I was Minister of Trade, because it seemed to me that, from the economic point of view, the improvement of the harbour at Trieste, and of our coastal regions generally, was a task, far too long neglected, which must not now be postponed. Here, as part of my Bosnian travels, I merely mention the establishment of the connexion between Dalmatia and the hinterland, by the construction of the Spalato—Bugojno railway. I had an opportunity of seeing the correspondence between Kállay and the Hungarian Premier in 1896 about the building of this line. The Hungarian Premier opposed it, in one of those long-winded documents which display every art of the advocate in heaping up mountainous difficulties. Banffy sees no interest but that of Hungary; he declares that it is contrary to Hungarian interests to have a connexion built between Dalmatia and Bosnia, with Spalato as terminus; he can only be party to its construction on condition that Hungary is compensated by the building of a direct normal-gauge connexion between Spalato and Hungary, such connexion to be subject to the Hungarian State Railways, so far as rates, etc. This shameless suggestion—absolutely characteristic of Banffy's whole attitude to Austria—was the opening move in a game, since steadily pursued by Hungary, of refusing to agree to any railway construction in the occupied areas except on condition that a piece of line to suit Hungary was laid down at the same time. Kállay replied in an admirable note, in which he tore Banffy's arguments to shreds, proved that the line was necessary on general economic grounds, and told the Hungarian Prime Minister that he could not entertain, but must absolutely reject, a method of compensation which led to an impossible situation.

The whole problem of communications in Bosnia and Dalmatia was blocked by this Hungarian attitude, as was any improvement of Dalmatian coastal stations, and, above all, of Spalato, whose situation ought to have given it a great trading future. I was at pains to familiarise myself, at this period, with the possible methods of improvement in Spalato, and made a study of the harbour question and of the general economic conditions and prospects there. Obviously, nothing can be made of a harbour town which has no hinterland behind it. Discontent with this state of things, and with the Government, was universal; and the young and highly competent chief executive official found this quite natural. The President of the Chamber of Commerce told me, at this time, that there was actually more intercourse between Bosnia and Spalato in Turkish days than since the occupation, and road traffic no longer paid. No place I visited on the Dalmatian coast showed more patently what an empty phrase was the declaration, made at the time of the occupation, that the extension of the coast line of the Monarchy made the possession of the hinterland necessary.

A few weeks after my visit to Spalato I ceased to be a Minister, and had no longer any say in these matters.

The future showed how right Kállay was. All his successors allowed themselves to be overridden by Hungary, with the result that, the basis of discussion being thoroughly false, agreement could never be reached, and right down to the end of the Monarchy urgently needed railways in Bosnia and Herzegovina were not built.

Bosnian Journey, 1908

The reason for this journey was the reports of agitation in the occupied areas arising out of the increasingly grave situation in the Balkans. All the indications were that the methods of government so far pursued in Bosnia were out of date. After an interval of more than fifteen years since my last visit, I returned to these regions. From Madonna di Campiglio, where I spent a few refreshing days, I went via Riva on Lake Garda, which always has an irresistible charm for me, to Venice. Thence, on a warm August night, by sea to Trieste, and next morning, on board the "Gautsch" —one of the comfortable new Lloyd steamers—direct to Gravosa. Then straight on to Sarajevo. The Bosnian Government had sent a saloon car for me, which was doubly welcome. The heat was oppressive, but, in that airy carriage, tolerable. It was attached at the end of the train, and gave me an uninterrupted view over the country. The line curves sharply up along the bare, steep hill-sides; the higher it rises, the more glorious the views one gets over the Ombla valley, and, ever and anon, as it curves and bends, superb glimpses of the shining sea. From the station of Hum onwards, the route runs along the Popovopolje, one of those long, trough-like valleys between rocky bluffs that are converted into lakes in winter as the water rises from the naked rock soil, the "carso," and, when it vanishes again in the spring, become rich, alluvial plains. Now, in high summer, the harvest had been gathered, and the soil was baked and dry. Herzegovina is a stony world. The village houses, built of stone, with pent-house roofs, can hardly be distinguished from the stony background against which they are set. Once, there were woods here, and young oaks are sprouting green in the plantations laid out, here and there, by the Forestry Department and fenced off for protection against the goats. About the houses, with their encompassing stone walls, poorish cultivation. The view of the Narenta valley, when the line drops down into it, is surprising. From Čapljina, a branch of the narrow-gauge line runs to the Dalmatian harbour of Metković; the main line goes up to Mostar, along the Narenta. Few places of any size upon the way. Soon after we had left the junction, the little town of Počitelj, built up against a hill-side, appeared on the left bank of the Narenta, very picturesquely situated on the river, and crowned by a great, ruined castle, with portions of the keep wall still visible. The houses rise up in tiers, some fine-looking buildings; in the centre, a great mosque, with lofty minaret; the whole broken by *boskage* and some large single trees. The line winds along the bed of the Narenta, under rocky bluffs, over bridges and through tunnels, into the plain of the Mostar—a great, fruitful oasis after the stony world we have been going through so far. In Mostar, where we made a halt, the August heat was at its zenith, and I had eyes only for the delicious figs and grapes offered to the thirsty traveller. The stretch from Mostar on was already familiar to me. Towards evening we crossed the wooded Ivan mountain ranges, and it became pleasantly cool. Where the line passed by the garden of some Muslim country-seat, we caught sight of women sitting in the open—they covered their heads and ran. Here the Turkish women are much shyer than in Constantinople.

Gradually we saw fires being lit up on the heights, outside the various farm-houses, shining, like giant glow-worms, through the trees. It was late when I reached Sarajevo and the Hôtel de l'Europe, which really has quite an European air. In the morning I looked out with pleasure over the upper part of the town, which I was to find greatly altered in every respect, and, externally, greatly for the better. In the centre, the quays of the Miljačka river have been extended; on the right bank there is a row of fine, new buildings. Indeed, the right bank, up to the station, is practically a new city. Not entirely so, for the design is broken by many narrow, old streets, single Mohammedan houses, Mosques and Muslim cemeteries. But the total effect is European, with picturesque details from a world long since gone by. Unhappily the architectural style is bad; reminiscences of so-called Oriental forms are interspersed among the most banal façades. There has been no adaptation of the pleasing aspects of the Turkish dwelling-house. On the left bank, however, Sarajevo retains its picturesque charm. True, the first thing that strikes one is the vast new barracks, built in place of the old Turkish one. But the Begova Deschamia—*i.e.* the Mosque of the Begs—with its lofty minaret, the ancient Konak, a great number of ancient buildings and mosques, and, above all, the Mohammedan part of the city, unchanged, on the higher slopes; and, all around, the everlasting glory of the mountains—here is still the old loveliness, indestructible.

Politically, I found a completely changed situation. When I was here, for the first time, in 1892, the atmosphere was one of energetic progress, well-considered and full of eager hopefulness in the future; to-day, inactivity, doubt, apprehensiveness are the notes. Gone is the organised and conscious activity I once admired so much. Not so much the defects of Kállay's *régime*, and the weaknesses of his latter years, as the sins of omission of his successors are now plainly bearing fruit.

Kállay's attempt to separate the Bosnians from their neighbour Serbs and Croats failed completely. He hoped to stimulate the lively sense of independence into a Bosnian national consciousness: to that end, tried to impress a Bosnian stamp on to certain externals—local flags, arms, uniforms, etc.; specially promoted the manufacture of Bosnian products; and sought to elevate the Bosnian dialect into a definite Bosnian language. In vain. The hoped-for assimilation of the three nationalities and confessions did not take place. The Mohammedans, roused from their lethargy by the Young Turk Revolution, have turned their eyes to Constantinople, and are waiting to see what is to come thence—divided though they are into two camps, since the old Turkish party is strongly represented in Bosnia. The Serbs are in a state of excitement and suspicion about what is going to happen next. The Catholics are, in feeling, primarily Croat. People's minds move along these three channels, although all speak the same tongue.

The men I meet are all new, and all filled by the same dominating sense of uncertainty. For me, this has the advantage that all doors are open to me, since everyone is glad of a chance of unburdening his soul. For a member of the Austrian Upper House to visit Bosnia and take a serious interest in its affairs is something of a rarity.

I met a great variety of persons in the next few days. As it happened, Burián was in Bosnia at the time, staying at Bad Ilidže. I saw him several times, and paid him a longish visit. Lieutenant Field-Marshal von Winzor is Commander-in-Chief—not very easy to get at, and not very important. Baron Benko, his civil attaché, is an ex-naval officer, who won the gold medal for valour at the battle of Lissa, when a cadet on the old man-of-war "Kaiser." When I told him how unfavourable my first impressions were, he at once admitted that the constitutional uncertainty of Bosnia's position was giving rise to aspirations that could only be quieted by the establishment of some definitive status, which would then be accepted. There was no love for Austria-Hungary in the Balkans; it was to blame for everything, and said to have spies everywhere. In Serbia, in particular, systematic agitation against Austria was going on. Of the local newspapers, the *Srpska řiječ* had the largest circulation, and it was thoroughly pro-Serbian in tone, inspired from Belgrade, and found fault with everything the Government did. The same was true of the *Narod* in Mostar, and a literary organ like *Bosanka Vila*, which had a large circulation and was thoroughly pro-Serb. There was practically no government press. *Démentis* inserted in papers with tiny circulations had no effect. Benko, who is a thorough realist, is not of the opinion that all Serbs are Irridentist. The country folk are untouched, so far, but dependent economically on the Serbian trader in the towns, who takes the peasant's produce, lends him money, and so gets him financially involved, and influences him politically. This chain could only be broken by raising the economic status of the peasant, and, specifically, by establishing local savings-banks and endowment funds (which, as it is, in 1906 granted loans to the extent of 3 million crowns). The Serbians were possessed by a strong but not necessarily Irredentist Nationalism, which expressed itself in a great readiness to make sacrifices for national, and, above all, confessional purposes—*e.g.*, schools.

The views of Constantine Hoermann, the head of the Interior in the government, are identical. Until the constitutional position is regularised, there can be no thought of a constitution, such as is now being demanded on all sides; for, otherwise, it would merely be a platform for every kind of Irredentism and opposition to the government. Order can only be created by the establishment of some definitive status here, such as would put an end to centrifugal tendencies, be accepted as legally established by the Turks, and so would cut the ground from under the feet of Serbian agitation. As it is, the Serbs call the Emperor merely Administrator.

With the chief judicial officer of the Government, Shek, I had a really thorough discussion of the most various conditions in the country. Him I found a man of the widest education and experience. After being a judge and then president of the Sarajevo Court, he taught law in the Scheriat School, is at home both in Austrian and Turkish law, has studied German and French juristic literature, and, in addition, is well versed in philosophy and has a philosophy of life of his own. A Croat by birth, his command of language, both literary and legal, is perfect. He has a great plan of judicial reform, and is not in the least afraid of a Diet—which, if properly handled, could only do good—provided always that it is preceded by a declaration that our possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina is irrevocable.

Contact with this gentleman speedily convinced me that there has been no falling-off in the calibre of the higher officials : where there is falling-off it is in the spirit and energy of the government. There is no longer the old confident belief in the future. Councillor Mikuli, who received me in 1892, is now head of the Department of Agriculture, and a great support to the Government. The people must have their say, he declares, but before that can happen, the constitutional question must be settled. Let there be no romanticism. In this country, everything must be taken *cum grano salis*. More freedom of movement might be allowed, but the straight path must be kept to—and there must be no going back.

This political picture gained colour as I gradually got into touch with representatives of the three religious bodies. Their attitude to me varied, but very few among them showed any reserve. Among the Muslims, Essad Effendi Kulović, the first mayor of Sarajevo, plays a very important rôle. His visiting card records the fact that he wears the Order of Francis Joseph. He is also on the Railway Board. A dignified and amiable figure. But our conversation did not get very far. The young barrister, Dr. Halidbeg Hrasnica, is an interesting man. His family is one of those who went over to Islam in the 15th century, when Bosnia was invaded by the Turks, and so saved their estates. He told me that he had family papers in his possession dating from the period when his people were still Christian. To my query whether the family would ever revert to their old faith, he returned a decided negative. He impressed me as being highly intelligent, and seems to be prepared to accept the inevitable march of events.

There was a lively freedom, though also some contradictory elements, in the conversation of the editor of the Young Turk paper, *Muslimanska Svijest.* Sahinović Hamid Ekrem seeks to organise a Young Turk movement through his organ. He will not hear of annexation, since the Muslims refuse to contemplate it, the Padishah being, for them, the sole Emperor. The opposition Muslims wish for a constitution, but without annexation. But, as our conversation proceeded, he had to admit, in the same breath, that a constitution was impossible until the question of landownership was regulated. There will be gravitation by some to Constantinople, by others to Belgrade and others again to Croatia. The Catholics, too, are discontented.

The *Bosnian Post*, which represents their views, reprinted this winter, a series of articles, called "Vienna's Zig-Zag Course," full of complaints about the neglect of the Croats in Bosnia, which roundly stated that it will depend on the energy and insight of the government whether the present troubles issue in the erection of a great and powerful Habsburg realm or in a forced retreat from this area. The local Catholic archbishop, Monsignor Stadler, a man of marked personality, with whom I have had one or two extensive talks, says the Catholics here are being driven to the wall. The government has satisfied nobody. He is for joining Croatia. Dr. Nicola Mandić, the second mayor, political leader of the Catholics here, is of opinion that, as it is, the Emperor possesses full sovereignty in Bosnia, and has only got to use it positively. The question of union is purely formal.

Naturally, I was most interested in the Serbs. Their leaders, Jeftanović and Šola (Mostar) were disinclined to talk. I got more out of Dr. Dimitrijević, editor of the *Dan*, an Agrarian paper, who revealed the Serbian aim: a constitution without annexation. This point of view is comprehensible enough. While I was in Sarajevo, the *Srpska řiječ* published a memorandum by the Serbian National organisation and the Muslim Executive Committee, which set it out bluntly. By way of greeting to

Burián, the paper printed an article ending with these words: "If we are not given a Parliament, we shall get one in our own way. We shrink from nothing, and are prepared for any sacrifice."

The views thus outlined form the background of all my talks and observations. The latter includes economic conditions. Volkert, director of the Agricultural Bank, spoke in the same sense. He was very friendly, introduced me to the Sarajevo club, where I made the acquaintance of a large number of men engaged in trade and industry. Everywhere, I was told, all loyal officials and citizens in Bosnia are longing for definitive union. In my numerous conversations about annexation, judgment was passed upon it from the most diverse points of view. So long as Turkey had no constitution, it would have been easier to get it accepted by the Sultan, an absolute ruler, than it could be now, when he had been eliminated by a constitution. The very people who are most eager to see both regions part of the Monarchy deprecated the word "annexation." There could be no talk of that, whether by Austria or by Hungary. Sovereignty belonged to the Emperor personally, and was sovereignty over an independent State, to be organised as a third member of the Habsburg possessions, paying its quota for common concerns, supporting itself, and concluding an economic agreement with both States. Again and again this emphasis on independence came up.

I saw a great deal of the journalists of various parties. They amplified what I had already heard. On the main issue, there was no room for doubt. But my enquiries into social and economic conditions led me deeper into the fundamental problems of the country which had impressed me in 1892.

First of all, the agrarian question. This has not been seriously coped with. Out of 101,625 Kmets in Bosnia and Herzegovina, only 22,116, or one-fifth, have, so far, been emancipated by free purchase. There is no getting away from the verdict passed by these figures on a government which has taken thirty years to get only this distance in the emancipation of the peasantry, although it is bordered by Serbia, Hungary and Croatia, where there has been a free peasantry everywhere for a long time now. Plainly, no one has ever stopped to consider the impression bound to be made by this on the mind of a population which knows that, across the Drina and the Save rivers, there is no sub-pasha to appropriate a third of the harvest every year for Beg or Aga. Here are facts which set a social molecular movement going which spreads gradually but increasingly, and, suddenly, at a time of political crisis, produces results which astound statesmen.

Education I found equally backward. In 5388 localities, only 366 elementary schools, or 120 or so more than fifteen years ago. In 1905–6, only 14.33 per cent. of children of school age actually attended school. Here is a glaring contradiction! Think of this nation of analphabets, and remember that they are creatures of most lively political imagination! In the towns, where more people can read, the desire to hear about politics may possibly find satisfaction. In the country there are the minstrels with their *guzlas*, putting pictures of the glories of the Serbian past into folks' heads. In addition, so I have repeatedly been assured, any individual, here and there in a village, who can read will read out the newspaper to a circle of listeners, and so, from this by no means limpid source, satisfy their political cravings. Actually there is a desire for education among these people which runs far ahead of any facilities provided to meet it. A more lamentable condition, from an educational point of view, cannot be imagined. A generation has been permitted to grow up without the countervailing influence of any positive and practical schooling, any instruction in their new fatherland, any attempt to implant a feeling for it in the responsive mind—although all this would have been much easier to do in the early days than now, when a strong, conscious counter-current is flowing.

Nor has there been any progress in the establishment of self-governing institutions. In 1907 the cities of Sarajevo and Mostar were given charters, and in addition there were, in the whole country, 95 communes, organised municipally, partly provisionally, partly definitely, most of them being towns, one or two only country districts.

When I was invited by Burian to dine with him in Sarajevo in the last days of my visit, I was eager to hear his impressions of the situation. My curiosity was not satisfied, however. He declared that there were no grounds for the prevalent unrest and expounded to me his theory of an administrative " pyramid "—theme of much talk and some ridicule in Sarajevo at the time—to be erected on a broad basis, first of parish and district representation, then regional, and, finally, crowning the whole, a representative Diet. He seemed to have no idea of Sarajevo's opinion of his pyramid.

Leaving Sarajevo that evening on my way home, I met, in the station, the guardian of the Franciscan monastery at Visoko, Alois Misić, who got into my compartment. We had much talk, I putting questions, he answering them; indeed, he travelled far beyond his station, and we only parted at Zenica, after we had dined there during the night, still busy talking the while.

In the occupied provinces the Franciscans are a power of a quite unique sort.

They come from the people and live for the people. In the worst days of Turkish rule they stayed on, and that gives them a great hold. They are simple folk, few as highly educated as is the average cleric to-day, but welcome visitors in every hut, even if its occupants be Orthodox or Muslim. They are strict Catholics, but do not proselytize, only seek always to help in any way they can. They are a real force in the nation, and the main bulwark of Catholicism in this land. They feel for it and for its independence. The guardian did not merely confirm what I already knew, but told me much that was new to me of the work of his Order, which has endowed a Gymnasium at Visoko. He avoided any reference to the somewhat strained relations between the Franciscans and the Archbishop, and I did not desire to touch on this topic. This nocturnal conversation made a deep impression on me, for here I was in contact with genuine enthusiasm for the Order's mission.

When I got back to Vienna I was so full of all that I had seen and heard that I set down at once, and, while my impressions were fresh in my mind, wrote a series of articles which appeared simultaneously in the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* and in the *Prager Tagblatt*, and, later, were reprinted in the shape of a pamphlet called "Bosnian Impressions."

Looking back over my experiences as a whole, I asked myself what were the obstacles that were preventing these regions from growing with the rest of the Monarchy, keeping them still a foreign body, treated as such; wherein their economic and social backwardness really consisted; and why Greater Serbian propaganda progressively gained hold. In my pamphlet I answered these questions out of my knowledge of the facts.

The incorporation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has become unavoidable, but it is senseless unless accompanied by a change in the system of governing both countries. The regularisation of their international status is the general condition on which all else depends, but the real essential is a new internal policy, which must be of a permanent character, and such as will promote a real assimilation of the two provinces to the Monarchy. Annexation without reform is a waste of time. The two aims are inseparable. This sentence sums up the observations contained in my pamphlet, and remained the leading note in all my efforts in relation to the two countries.

There has been far too much delay in taking a step which, now made unavoidable by an external compulsion—the Turkish Constitution—was long ago dictated by internal conditions in the countries themselves. As I put it: "The regularisation of the international status of Bosnia and Herzegovina, their definitive union with the Habsburg realm, and the transformation of the Berlin mandate into final possession has become the necessary condition of their own future peaceful development."

I stated that it was false to talk of annexation. The Emperor has long had all the rights of sovereignty in his hands. Nor is there any subject for annexation: these regions cannot be annexed as a whole either by Austria or by Hungary or by the Monarchy; the real issue concerns merely the constitutional act by which, without any immediate change in the circumstances, the Emperor's actual sovereignty may be converted into a formally recognised one, and, by an extension of the Pragmatic Sanction, these two regions become indissolubly incorporated with the two other States composing the Monarchy, as a third portion of the Habsburg realm.

As I wrote these words I had no suspicion of the fact that Aehrenthal was already planning annexation. I was not in touch with him on this matter. He used the same words in his proclamation, though I should have preferred to avoid the word " annexation," since it carried an aggressive expansionist connotation that there was no need to underline—the less that it does not correspond with the facts.

I dealt in detail with the second part of our task, as yet unaccomplished, and cited statistics to fill in the picture of the backwardness of agriculture and of education, the neglect to develop any form of self-government, and the social and economic evils resulting therefrom. I stated that a comprehensive scheme of reform in these departments is the key to the gradual elevation of these regions out of forms of tenure and of economy that are still largely medieval. I pointed out that political interest and national consciousness are much more active among the people than is imagined in Vienna and demand most careful handling, in view of Greater Serbian agitation, the activities of the semi-official Bosnian committee in Belgrade and the *Slovenski jug*, as well as all the anti-Austrian forces operating from outside the country. One example to show the tactlessness with which all this is actually being handled. In Bosnia there is no right of assembly or meeting, political associations are not permitted. They exist, however, in large numbers under various disguises. The three parties are organised, have representatives everywhere, and hold meetings of these representatives behind closed doors, with no sort of government cognisance. Instead of being officially represented at such meetings, as it is in Austria, the government is reduced to finding out what goes on there from quite untrustworthy sources. This must lower its prestige in the eyes of the population.

Basing my conclusion on all I had heard in Sarajevo, I state in my pamphlet that the Serbian population as a whole is not to be assumed to share the view of the Greater Serbian groups, but that the right means ought to be employed to counter the influence of the latter: energy and vigilance, always accompanied by a due regard to national idiosyncrasies; a careful handling of the religious question; improvement of material conditions, above all among the country folk, with whom propaganda has not yet taken root. We must act in such a way as to win confidence in our rule, and must mould general conditions so that comparison between Serbia and Bosnia is favourable to us. I could cite men of judgment who urged the establishment of a State Council as a transitional stage to parliamentary government in Bosnia, such Council to have certain legislative powers, and, in the first instance, to be entrusted with the task of working out the new constitutional laws. The establishment of a constitution without any co-operation on the part of the people themselves is to be avoided. The political atmosphere of the 20th century extends to the Balkans.

My brochure, which appeared shortly before the Annexation Proclamation, attracted considerable attention, but, like any and every expression of a relatively liberal and far-sighted point of view, it was hardly so much as noticed in Government circles. All that Aehrenthal said to me about it was that I was a "thought-reader." What I read, however, was not his thoughts—hardly known to me, when I wrote—but the living stuff of opinions and conditions in Bosnia. I saw both sides of the problem, while he was occupied only with its diplomatic externals.

II. AEHRENTHAL AND ANNEXATION

Aehrenthal's Earlier Views

Gathering together the contents of my Diaries, I shall speak of this most important phase of our Eastern policy only in so far as I had first-hand insight into the issues through discussions in the Delegations, my own study of Bosnian affairs, and my personal intercourse with Aehrenthal. This material I have amplified by looking into the official papers from time to time.

Much happens that finds no place in speeches, diplomatic notes and State papers, and much can only be explained through knowledge of the characters of the actors. Therefore, a psychological analysis of the character and even of the hidden feelings of the statesman, as expressed in the action he takes at certain stages in his political career, often affords the key to a right judgment. What determines is not external circumstances only, but his individual temper, education, and personal experiences. These are the forces through which he works on given circumstances. They are also the measure of his capacity to receive impressions and of the degree to which his point of view is free or rigid. In judging Aehrenthal, this is specially true. What follows is a contribution to such an approach.

My relations with the Aehrenthal family go back to the '70's, when I was a colleague of the Foreign Minister's father as representative of the constitutionalist landowners in the Prague Diet. Old Aehrenthal had a great reputation as a politician, although by this time he was quite blind and could no longer take a very active part in affairs. But he was a loyal party man, and immovably German in his standpoint. His wife, Countess Thun-Hohenstein by birth, had been a noted beauty in her day, and possessed the charm that distinguished all the members of that branch of the Thun family, which, again, was thoroughly German in point of view. Between mother and son, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, there was a very close tie. True to his family traditions, Aehrenthal's influence with the Emperor was always cast on the German side, though he said pretty harsh things about Germans who tried to combine the rights of a governmental party with the freedom of an Opposition. I carried on a regular correspondence with Aehrenthal while he was in Petersburg, and was in constant touch with him when he was Minister. In general, we got on very well, although at times our views were widely divergent.

Aehrenthal served his apprenticeship under Kálnoky when the latter was Ambassador in Petersburg. He was a diligent student of Russian language and literature, sought and made contacts with the intelligentsia, and so acquired a knowledge of the various trends of opinion. When Kálnoky became Foreign Minister he took Aehrenthal back to Vienna with him, and deep impressions were made upon his mind at this period, since the Austrian Minister was in close touch with Bismarck. In the first half of the '90's, Aehrenthal accompanied him to Friedrichsruhe.

The Imperial Chancellor's views of our foreign policy are well known. The reader of his "Recollections" can perceive that he regarded it as natural for the inhabitants of the Danubian basin to feel needs and entertain plans extending beyond the limits of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and regarded the German Imperial Constitution as pointing out the road along which Austria-Hungary might achieve a reconciliation of the political and national interests existing between the Eastern borders of the Rumanian race and the Bay of Cattaro. It would, so Bismarck remarks elsewhere, be of advantage to Germany to have the Russians establish themselves, either physically or diplomatically, at Constantinople, with the responsibility of defending it; were he an Austrian Minister, he should not try to keep them out of Constantinople, since it was only through an understanding with Russia that Austria could hope to get a share of the Turkish inheritance. Such was his theory of the division of interests between Austria and Russia in the Balkans. He may have spoken, in his extraordinarily impressive way, to the Austrian Minister on these lines, and Aehrenthal was, directly or indirectly, under this influence.

A couple of years later, when Aehrenthal was Ambassador in Petersburg, I had an opportunity of confirming the fact that such were his political views. In the summer of 1899 he spent his holiday at Gastein, in order to be with his mother, who was taking the waters there, enjoy the mountain air, and do some mountaineering. I had left the Thun Ministry six months earlier, and went to Gastein in order to talk over home affairs with Aehrenthal. He was busy on a Memorandum he was going to send in to the Emperor in favour of a pro-German turn in domestic policy. During these days he laid his views on the Balkans very freely before me, in a series of lengthy talks we had. I remember going up the Tauern heights with him one very fine summer day, discussing the Balkan problem with animation the whole way. The core of his view was that there ought to be a division of spheres of interest in the Balkans, as between the Monarchy and Russia. He told me then that the Western Balkans—*i.e.* from Serbia as far as Salonika—should fall within the Austrian sphere, and the East, including Bulgaria, in the Russian. When I asked him, "What about Constantinople and the Dardanelles?" he replied, to my amazement, I confess, that he was not afraid of the results of handing them over to the Russians. For both spheres, what he had in mind, of course, was some form of protectorate—*i.e.* the establishment of over-lordship by means of alliances, trade and military conventions, etc.; but when I sought to explore this further, he seemed vague, either because he did not wish to express his views, or because he had himself not thought out all the international and commercial complications.

Aehrenthal, at this time, was regarded as a definite supporter of a close understanding between the Monarchy and Russia, and, as such, signed the Mürzsteg Agreement.

For this reason, he was viewed in Berlin with a certain suspicion. In part, this was due to a ridiculous misconception: he and his Councillor, Prince Karl Kinsky, both absolutely German in outlook, being described as Bohemians and taken to be capable of Slav proclivities on that ground! While Aehrenthal was Foreign Minister, I often took an opportunity of clearing up this error when I was in Berlin, but I saw that doubts as to his sound German standpoint were not yet extinct.

His first statement as Minister to the Delegations, in 1906, was altogether on the lines of open friendship with Russia. "For more than ten years," he said, "this has existed between Austria-Hungary and Russia." He was convinced that the interests of both ran parallel, on all major issues, and, naturally, in his present position, it would be his aim to foster the existing bond of amity. "At the audience in Petersburg, on the occasion of my taking my leave, I was able to confirm the fact that the government there fully shares the views I have just expressed. The friendly discussions we have had with the Russian Foreign Minister, Isvolsky, enable us to look forward with confidence to continued co-operation between the two Powers: a co-operation directed by the desire to preserve peace and improve the conditions of the populations of Turkey in Europe."

In the further course of discussion, he waived any idea of a policy of acquisition and declared we seek only to maintain the rights and spheres of influence given us under the Berlin Treaty. He asseverated warm sympathy for Serbia. The Monarchy's policy towards that country had always been one of good-will, notably at the time of the Berlin Congress. Such difficulties as exist at the moment, he was careful to state, are due to geographical and political conditions in Serbia.

At the Council of Ministers, on October 27, 1907, he spoke even more explicitly. There, too, he spoke more freely than in public. In a powerful address he surveyed the relations of the Monarchy to the various great Powers in turn, and then the mutual relations between those States.

The relations of the Monarchy to all the dominant factors were good. As regards Italy and Serbia, he had inherited from his predecessor in office a situation that left something to be desired. But his conversation with the King of Italy and with Tittoni had cleared that up, while leaving both States complete freedom of action in the eventuality of the non-maintenance of the integrity of Turkey, or the failure of efforts at reform in the Balkans. Italy's interest in the Balkans—notably in Albania and Montenegro—was keen. There we had been guilty of sins of omission: we must bestir ourselves, and secure our threatened terrain by commercial and trade measures—a *pénétration pacifique*. With Serbia, he hoped to see a Commercial Treaty concluded. Our policy of making Serbia economically and politically dependent and treating it as a *quantité négligeable* has foundered. Only the third party would profit by a conflict between Serbia and the Monarchy. Politically, he must urgently beg for such a conduct of Croatian, Dalmatian, and Bosnian affairs as would place the centre of gravity, for the Serbo-Croat peoples, within the Monarchy.

With clear prescience, he then sketched the broad outlines of the European situation. Externally, the relations of the Great Powers are good, and there is the will to settle differences amicably. Differences, nevertheless, persist, and there is, notably, a sensible antagonism between England and Germany. There is inflammable material in Morocco. Conditions in the Near East are highly problematic. Austria and Russia have recommended the execution of judicial reforms in Turkey, but England seeks to go further, and is the most active force in the situation. Here there are grounds for apprehension of war. Russia has made a rapid recovery from the last war, and, despite a critical internal situation, has regained its freedom of action. It has entered into agreements with England and with Japan, and is at work on internal consolidation, and intervention in the Near East is within the realm of possibility. It is not to Austria-Hungary's interest to have Balkan waters troubled. He is convinced that the good relations between the Monarchy and Russia will bear fruit. But there is much agitation throughout the world. "The stage is set, the actors are ready, only the costumes are lacking for the play to begin. *The second decade of the 20th century may witness very grave events.* In view of the combustible material about, they may come sooner. The Monarchy will act so as to avoid conflicts." But the Foreign Minister can give no guarantee that mediation will succeed.

In this survey, Aehrenthal, in a few strokes, characterised the latent tension in Europe, emphasised the decisive importance of our good relations with Russia, and laid stress on this as the motive that must govern our Serbian policy. But events were to turn out differently.

The Sanjak Railway

The plan of building a railway line from the terminus of the projected East Bosnian railway through the Sanjak, to connect with Mitrovica and Salonika, had a previous history. As far back as December 1902, Goluchowski had been ready to approach the Turkish Government with this idea and seek their consent to the construction of a secondary line through the Sanjak to Mitrovica. He asked the German Government to back this request at Constantinople. Germany, however, considered a juncture at which everything turned on tranquillising the Balkans inopportune for launching a plan which was bound to rouse a cloud of opposing interests. When Goluchowski persisted in his idea, he was advised by Berlin to secure Russian agreement in advance, in order thereby to paralyse the opposition likely to come from Serbia and Montenegro. The Emperor and Goluchowski brought the subject up when Count Lamsdorff, the Russian Foreign Minister, was in Vienna at the end of December 1902, but received no definite support; whereupon Goluchowski let the matter drop.

Aehrenthal revived the project on January 27, 1908, and in his *exposé* before the Committee of the Delegations declared that the Monarchy was a Balkan Power, too, and, although it aimed at no territorial expansion, must pursue a commercial and transport policy corresponding to the vast developments going on in the Balkans. "We must play our part," he said, "in the mighty interchange of commercial products between East and West via Constantinople and the Straits."

Very few members of the Delegations had any clear grasp of the situation. But they were stirred by Aehrenthal's grandiose alfresco painting of expanding trade policy.

Aehrenthal's handling of this matter was thoroughly typical. The great passion of his life was his desire to revive the prestige of the Monarchy. Here he saw the opportunity he sought of taking a positive step in Balkan affairs which would open up new prospects for our commerce, and do that independently of the Triple Alliance, which was not of his promotion, and simply on the basis of our unquestioned rights under the Berlin Treaty.

All of which sounded very nice, but was not as simple as it sounded. At the moment, we were in the act of putting through a series of judicial reforms in Macedonia, in conjunction with Russia, with whom we had come to an agreement at Mürzsteg in 1903 over the Balkan *status quo*. There was, therefore, justice in the argument put in the Delegation to the effect that Aehrenthal would jeopardise this policy, and our agreement with Russia, if, under his scheme, we were to get a railway concession out of Turkey while we were busy pushing through reforms which were most unacceptable to Turkey. To which Aehrenthal replied that the building of the railway did not affect the political *status quo*, but merely provided for the natural development of transport automatically resulting from the extension of the East Bosnian Railway. Here was a matter which solely concerned Turkey and ourselves. But the doubts expressed in the Delegation soon proved to be well founded.

Aehrenthal got his railway concession from Constantinople without consulting Russia. He had to inform the Common Ministerial Council on April 30, 1908, that the judicial reforms in Macedonia had collapsed, since Isvolsky had stated that a new situation had been created by our action in the Balkans, and had seized the opportunity of getting out of the agreement reached at Mürzsteg under this head. Aehrenthal did not make a tragedy out of this declaration by the Russian Foreign Minister; on the contrary, he saw an advantage in the fact that, so far as judicial reforms in Macedonia went, we were released from a responsibility only shared by Russia, which, otherwise, continued to act within the limits of the current programme. The upshot, however, was the over-clouding of our relations with Russia, and the creation, between Aehrenthal and Isvolsky, of a tension that was to play a great part in the future.

The railway project was soon buried likewise. Plans of the line were drawn out, but the preliminary work—technical, rate fixing, and financial—was not done, and the government took no serious steps to organise any such preparation or get on with the execution of the plans. When, shortly after, Aehrenthal put through annexation, and cast the Sanjak, with the other provisions of the Berlin Treaty, overboard, the whole project was silently abandoned. It remained a gesture, with no practical results; all that survived of it was excitement in Serbia and irritation in Russia; and, ultimately, the counter-project of the Danube-Adriatic Railway, with all the trouble that it was to cause us.

In Aehrenthal's allocution to the Ministerial Council, referred to above, his references to Serbia sounded a new note. Apropos of the Southern Slav movement in Bosnia, Croatia, and also in Hungary, he remarked that the national dynasty in Belgrade felt impelled to carry on an active foreign policy, and, to that end, to rely on certain unsavoury elements. He appealed to the administration in Bosnia to look for support primarily to the Croatian element. The Serbians could not be silenced, but they should not be relied upon. "Where treasonable agitation is found, it should be dealt with with the utmost rigour; Belgrade ought to be watched, but the feeling of our strength should make the greatest impression." A very different tone, this, from that employed by Aehrenthal a few months earlier, when he had sought to move the Serbo-Croat centre of gravity towards the Monarchy, and uttered conciliatory words to Serbia.

At this time there began that shift in his views which carried him step by step into hostility to Russia and Serbia, and, ultimately, to the misinterpretation of Croatian conditions revealed, later, in the so-called Friedjung Trial.

An old friend and supporter of mine, Professor Jagić, the well-known student of Slavonic language and literature, who had once been a professor in Petersburg, and since in close touch with Aehrenthal, often talked to me, later, about this change in the views of the Ambassador and later Minister. Unlike most Austrian statesmen, he had, earlier, thoroughly grasped the supreme significance of the South Slav question, and said to Jagić, apropos of Croatia, that he realised the urgency of raising the status of Agram, and also dropped some remarks about the Croatian electoral system not giving a true register of the popular will. Jagić felt that Aehrenthal, later, became quite different, and quite dropped any views of this kind. He felt that a complete change was registered when Aehrenthal went so far as to maintain, in conversation with him, that the whole of Croatia was in Serbian pay, and, to his mind, was to be regarded as a rebellious territory. This revealed the Hungarian influence, or, rather, the Magyar pressure, under which Aehrenthal progressively fell.

None would refuse a statesman the right of altering his policy when necessary. But one looking back has the right of enquiring how far such change has been just in its aims and successful in its execution. Here the events of the next few years afford ample material for judgment.

Annexation—the Preparatory Stage

The Berlin Congress wavered between occupation and annexation of the two provinces. Baron Schwegel, Count Andrássy's right-hand man at this period, took an active part in the work of the Congress. I often discussed the point with him, and I am in possession of an unpublished autobiography in which he speaks from direct observation of what went on. "There was a critical moment in Berlin," says Schwegel, "shortly before the close of the Congress, when the Turkish plenipotentiaries appeared before Andrássy in the Pariser Platz Palace in Berlin, where we had our temporary lodgment above Count Károlyi's residence, and stated categorically that they would not accept the agreements arrived at as to the fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina unless the continued suzerainty of the Sultan over these provinces was expressly recognised. We (*i.e.* the Foreign Office staff) begged Andrássy not to be bluffed by Karatheodori Pasha into giving way on this, for we were convinced that Turkey would, in the end, accept whatever the Congress agreed upon. Andrássy, however, perhaps knowing more and being better informed than we were, was disinclined to submit results highly favourable to us to a fresh Congress discussion and the possibility of compromise, and gave way. Perhaps the concessions made by Russia rose before his mind, and he believed that occupation, under actual conditions, was synonymous with annexation; anyhow, he held to his opinion, although Haymerle and even Károlyi shared the view taken by us, his general staff. Perhaps he was right, but his prestige in Vienna suffered more than it ought in justice to have done from his yielding on this matter."

Schwegel gave me many details by word of mouth. Bismarck, who, in general, handled the Turks cavalierly, was not anxious to exercise extreme pressure upon them. Nor England either. Just before the signature of the Berlin Treaty, Andrássy concluded a secret convention with Turkey, under which Austria-Hungary recognised the Sultan's sovereignty and the provisional character of the occupation. The Emperor Francis Joseph was displeased, since he, at that time, desired annexation. Subsequently, as is well known, the question of transforming the occupation into annexation was often raised between the Monarchy and Russia, and certain understandings were reached. More than once we neglected favourable constellations in the International firmament. The uncertainty and clumsiness of our policy postponed action until we were compelled to take it at an unpropitious moment. True, one contributory cause of this hesitating attitude of ours was the fact that difficult internal questions became acute when these regions were incorporated in the Habsburg domain. Here, too, the growing influence of Hungary made a solution the more difficult. As far back as 1896, at the sittings of the Ministerial Council of August 26 and 30, a resolution laying down principles for application to internal politics in the event of annexation taking place was passed in reference to a whole series of points, and with the concurrence of both Premiers, Banffy and Badeni. It is of interest to-day only in so far as it shows how much stronger the power of the State as a whole was, as against Hungary, than was the case twelve years later. There was then agreement on a proposition of Kállay's that the two provinces should be treated as common concerns, and administered accordingly, the Bosnian-Herzegovinian troops being incorporated in the common army, and the Budget for the two countries discussed and passed by the Delegations. Badeni indeed would have liked to go further, and stressed the necessity of having the incorporated provinces represented in the Delegations. The whole thing was far more thoroughly thought out than the flimsy construction actually established at the time annexation took place, under constant interference from Hungary.

A few years later, on December 21, 1907, the common Ministers, with Aehrenthal in the chair, discussed the situation in the occupied provinces, the then Premiers, Beck and Wekerle, both being present. Here, the initiative came from Burián, who delivered a long lecture on the necessity of introducing a Diet into the two provinces, whereupon Aehrenthal immediately stated that there could be no question of that until annexation had taken place. He then took the view that this could be done at the moment when other provisions of the Berlin Treaty came up for review.

Events, however, outran these dilatory proceedings.

Under the influence of growing agitation in Bosnia, Burián set forth the case for annexation in a memorandum which he laid before the Emperor on April 4, 1908, pressing for the substitution for occupation of a permanent constitutional incorporation in the Monarchy. Aehrenthal continued to hang back, emphasising the international character of the case, and still unable to see a line of diplomatic action. To action he was forced, however, by the outbreak on July 25, 1908, of the Young Turk Revolution. By August 6 he had a discussion with Burián, on the Semmering, where they came to an agreement that the time for annexation had now come. Aehrenthal at once settled down to study the question thoroughly, and went into all the previous papers. Among them he found a document sent by Count Andrássy on August 6, 1879, to the Duke of Würtemberg, Commander-General in Sarajevo at the time, in which he argued convincingly the case for the occupation of the Sanjak. The marginal comments made by Aehrenthal on this paper show, however, that his opinion of the occupation of the Sanjak was not the same as that of his predecessor. On grounds diametrically opposed to those set out by Andrássy, he came to the conclusion that annexation should be coupled with the evacuation of the Sanjak.

His stay on the Semmering bore another, even more important, fruit. During this period he drew up a comprehensive memorandum—dated August 9, 1908—covering the aims he envisaged in the event of a complete break-up of Turkey in Europe. He wished to base his Balkan policy on the antagonism between Bulgaria and Serbia, using to that end the Bulgarian conviction that their way to Macedonia lay necessarily over the body of Serbia, and took it for granted that there would be a bitter struggle between Bulgaria and Serbia for the possession of Üsküb. "If in this struggle," says Aehrenthal in his Memorandum, "we promote the Bulgarian cause, and favour the creation of a Greater Bulgaria at Serbia's expense, the way will be open for us, granted a favourable constellation in Europe, to lay our hands on what remains of Serbia." Albania, risen to independence under our ægis; Montenegro, on friendly terms with us; Greater Bulgaria under obligations of gratitude to us; such was his picture of the future! Such a combination, rather than the annexation or occupation of the Sanjak, would secure our frontiers. The aims of our Balkan policy are to be reached, not through Novi Bazar, but through Belgrade.

Between Bulgarians and Serbians there was great jealousy, of which we were justified in given circumstances in taking advantage: building our whole Balkan policy upon it, however, was another matter. Granted that the humiliation of the Serbs by the Bulgarians was an accomplished fact, our South Slav problem, which was, at bottom, a Serbo-Croat problem, would be far from being solved; would, indeed, have been aggravated. Moreover, there was an under-current of common Slav feeling in both the South Slav Balkan States which, at any given moment, might turn against the Monarchy. But the notion of using the Bulgarians to hold the Serbs in check gained more and more hold of Aehrenthal's mind, and in all the conversations I had with him from time to time about our relations to Serbia he always answered me in terms of Bulgaria.

Memoranda are written and then forgotten, but this particular one remained typical of the change that had taken place in Aehrenthal's political views and of the outlook that he retained from now on. The opinions therein expressed are diametrically opposed to those he had enunciated in the Ministerial Council a few months earlier. Then, his aim had been to win over the Serbo-Croat population and put our relations with the Kingdom of Serbia on a good footing; now, he committed himself to an entirely false estimate of national forces, as though it were possible for Austria-Hungary, by sheer exercise of its supremacy, with no national impulse to back it, to divide and subdue a people like the Serbs, which had grown up in liberty.

For this reason, his Memorandum has a symptomatic significance: the view Aehrenthal there expressed, on the situation as he then saw it, was to remain the outlook of the Ballplatz, with its deep-rooted habit of playing off one force against another, right down to the outbreak of the war. This, if one may so express it, was the ruling spirit there, which masked itself, insincerely, under a stream of declarations of equal goodwill to all the Balkan States, phrases about the *status quo*, *pénétration pacifique*, and slogans like "The Balkans for the Balkan peoples," and so forth.

This Semmering period, moreover, saw the rise of another idea in Aehrenthal's head. He resolved to put annexation through on the basis of an agreement with Russia, but without having come to any clear understanding on the matter beforehand with the other signatories of the Berlin Treaty. And this resolution of his was the one, among the many at which he arrived in these days, which was to have the most far-reaching consequences.

He proceeded at once to the execution of his plan. As usual, all the Emperor's Austrian and common Ministers assembled in Vienna on August 18 for his birthday. On the next day a meeting took place at which Hungary and the chief of the General Staff of the army were represented, of which an interesting report survives. As a result of the Young Turk movement, so Aehrenthal stated, entirely new conditions had come into existence in the Balkans. The Powers had agreed on watchful sympathy to the new constitutional forces in Turkey, and a waiting policy. But, so far as Bosnia was concerned, the establishment of constitutional arrangements there was a matter of pressing urgency. This was impossible without the previous annexation of the two provinces; annexation had therefore become inevitable. At the same time, the Emperor would withdraw his forces from the Sanjak and the Monarchy would waive the rights granted it under the Berlin Treaty so far as that region was concerned. For the execution of this policy the Minister contemplated an understanding with Russia, to secure its complaisance, but did not propose to consult the other signatories. Wekerle, the Hungarian Prime Minister, spoke definitely for annexation, while immediately stating Hungary's conditions. There must be no Trialistic union of the Southern Slavs, and Hungary upheld its admitted possessive title to the two provinces. Beck, the Austrian Premier, was more cautious. Lacking the agreement of the signatories, annexation would be tantamount to tearing up the Berlin Treaty, and unless diplomatic preparations were duly made, one must be prepared for conflicts with Turkey and the Balkan States. He would regard it as dangerous to create a *fait accompli.* He could only contemplate annexation on the basis of an understanding with Turkey, Russia, Italy, and England. To Hungary's possessive claims he opposed a decided negative. The two provinces must continue to be administered as a *corpus separatum.* He reserved the right of discussing annexation with the Austrian Ministers.

In the following weeks Aehrenthal went on with his preparations. A waiting policy was counselled, not only by the Austrian Prime Minister, but also by the Austrian Ambassador in Constantinople, Count Pallavicini, who advised delay until there was a stable government in Constantinople, with which the question might be discussed; then he believed the consent of the Porte might be secured, in exchange for the renunciation of the Sanjak. But Aehrenthal succeeded in converting the Ambassador to his view, and the Austrian Premier, too, gave up his opposition on receiving Aehrenthal's assurance that he had secured the agreement of Russia and of Germany.

The policy of annexation was finally decided on at the Ministerial Council held on September 10, 1908. The Foreign Minister reported his previous discussions with Isvolsky. To him he had, on August 27, sent a Memorandum, in which it was stated that whereas, so long as circumstances permitted, the two Empires would maintain the *status quo* in the Balkans, nevertheless, if conditions were to arise which absolutely compelled Austria-Hungary to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Russian Government would take a friendly attitude to such a step. On its part, the Vienna Cabinet would undertake to withdraw the Austrian troops from the Sanjak and finally renounce any claims to the incorporation of this territory. In relation to the question of Constantinople and the Straits, the Vienna

Cabinet declared itself ready, in the event of that issue coming up, to enter into a confidential and friendly exchange of ideas. This Memorandum had been well received by Isvolsky, who was to meet him *chez* Count Berchtold—the Austrian Ambassador in Petersburg—at Buchlau, in Moravia, and he, Aehrenthal, hoped that Russia would make no difficulties. The support of Germany was secured; at a conversation at Berchtesgaden, von Schoen, the Secretary of State, had displayed some surprise at finding that Austria-Hungary was so moderate and modest in its claims on Turkish territory. He should inform the Italian Minister shortly before annexation took place, that he might not be involved in difficulties with his Parliament. Beck, the Austrian Premier, was still concerned to know whether it was not possible to approach the Sultan and inform him as to annexation, making at the same time the declaration about the evacuation of the Sanjak. Aehrenthal replied that Pallavicini, our Ambassador at Constantinople, had at first been against taking Turkey by surprise, but was now of the opinion that surprise was the way to set to work there.

On September 15 and 16, accordingly, the famous interview of the two Ministers took place at Buchlau. Had the result been a clear understanding between the two, the course of annexation might have been smoother and cleaner. I have no authentic contribution to make to the vexed question of what really happened at Buchlau and what actually was agreed upon there. But this much is certain: at Buchlau the talk was not straightforward and honest on either side. If the art of diplomacy really consists, in such matters, in keeping one another in the dark on certain views, and keeping certain back doors open for oneself, this art was exemplified on both sides. The significant fact that the two diplomats did not agree on any written formula on a matter of such importance is compatible only with the existence of *arrière pensées* on the part of each.

The Emperor's Manifesto and the Delegations in the Autumn of 1908

On October 5, the Emperor signed the Proclamation to the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina which was posted and published in the annexed areas on October 7. The Emperor extended his sovereign rights and the succession of the hereditary house over the two provinces and at the same time granted them the promise of constitutional institutions. The next day the Delegations met in Budapest, naturally in a mood of considerable excitement. It seemed to me that in reading the Speech from the Throne which contained the great announcement the Emperor was notably moved.

The proceedings of the Delegations proved most interesting. After a long period of stagnation in our foreign policy, during which this body had only a stale "concoction" of the political situation placed before it, it was suddenly confronted with an action which, although neither its previous history nor all its implications were fully realised, was a decided sign of life in the Monarchy. The necessity of annexation became manifest and we were all in good spirits—a fact that was useful to Aehrenthal, when he had to make out his case before the Austrian Committee of the Delegations. Making the meaning and intentions of the Berlin Treaty his point of departure, he spoke of the need of constitutional institutions in the occupied areas, and their impossibility until every doubt as to our full sovereignty was removed. In view of the new situation in Turkey, the Monarchy renounced our garrison and other rights in the Sanjak, and, in view of the circumstantial compulsion thus presented to us, "we compensate ourselves for this renunciation by a formal annexation of the two provinces. Thus obeying a categorical imperative, we in no way depart from the basis of the Berlin Treaty, inasmuch as we are acting in the sense of our mandate, and have shown a wise moderation in so far as it is only after thirty years that we have proceeded to its natural development, under the pressure of compelling circumstances."

Aehrenthal's words were very well received by the Committee. From the first there had been included in it, in addition to the representatives of the Delegation from the Upper House, the leading personalities, national and political, from the Lower House, who were more or less in touch with foreign policy. They all had the feeling that the Monarchy had at last wakened up to action. Opinion in favour of annexation was overwhelmingly strong, though there were some signs of doubt as to possible violation of the Berlin Treaty. Conservative members of the Delegation felt weighty objections, however, to the cession of the Sanjak, and these were expressed, in particular, by Prince Karl Schwarzenberg. When I put a question to the Minister about his transactions with the signatories to the Berlin Treaty, from which he was departing, I received no answer. When, a few weeks later, the matter was debated in the full Delegation, and could be gone into more thoroughly there, there had been time for our views to be cleared and also affected by the Press campaign against annexation, staged and carried on, with much hostility and exaggeration, in England, Russia, Serbia, and even in Italy and France. The coldness of a section of German opinion also made an impression. Naturally, the chorus of delegates from the Upper House was solid behind the Minister. Among M.P.'s, the South Slavs were absolutely enthusiastic for annexation, for they saw more clearly than anybody else what was going to come of it. Even Kramař spoke and voted for annexation, while stating that there had been an alteration in the basis of the Berlin Treaty. In Turkey, as was said, a salutary change had taken place, and, as a result, the Government was forced to do what it had done. But their action had no justification in law, and a moral justification could only be created by establishing an entirely new administrative system in the two provinces, under which their inhabitants would not be merely half-citizens; rule must not be confined to officials, but the active co-operation of the people must be secured. He did not get beyond such generalities in his speech, but he was on the real point.

The attitude of the Germans was obviously governed by their determination not to repeat the mistake of 1878, when by opposing occupation they had drawn upon their heads the ill-will of the Emperor, which weighed upon them for long after. Karl Hermann Wolf, their delegate, a German Bohemian Radical, based his affirmative vote on the German alliance, but went on to reveal, as so often, his very notable political *flair*. Our internal strength and cohesion were not of such a nature as to permit us lightly to overturn a Treaty which had hitherto proved a sound guarantee of peace. The breach of the Berlin Treaty would lead to conflicts with other States, and in all probability give rise to fatal complications. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the contemporaneous declaration of the independence of Bulgaria, were the first stages in a partition of Turkey, and the South Slav problem was not going to be settled. Aehrenthal's speech was not inspiring. He was anyhow no orator. But his profound seriousness made an impression, and his quiet and realistic manner strengthened it. There was not a man who did not believe in his sincere desire to raise the power and prestige of the Monarchy. He found a brilliant defender in Dr. Redlich, a member of the House of Representatives, who displayed consummate art in using the political atmosphere, the feelings of the meeting, its elevated mood, and the sense of confidence that animated it, backed by his rich stores of historical knowledge, to put into convincing terms what the members themselves thought and hoped.

I did not intervene in the debate till later, when the administration of Bosnia came up; then I made a long speech on the obligations undertaken by the Monarchy as a result of annexation. I laid stress, then, on my deep conviction of the need of comprehensive reform, and of a new perspective in our South Slav policy in general. The Government must now set to work in a large spirit, and seriously tackle its unsolved problems. I pleaded for a definite programme, one calculated to fire the imaginations of the people with the sense that a new era was really dawning and to prove that the fact that they had become

Austrians meant, for the inhabitants of Bosnia, new and more intensive provision for their welfare than they had as yet experienced. I dealt at length with the agrarian question, the education problem, and the position of the Kmets in its significance for the future of the land, and begged the Government to face the facts. If they were to come before the future Diet without ideas, without money, without hope, without definite plans, the result could only be unsettlement and grave disappointment. The Government would find itself in an impossible situation, for what was here at stake was something of a lofty and most vital order—no less than the creation of an inward bond between us and the two provinces, of such a relation between Government and national consciousness as would cause the trust and confidence of the people to attach themselves to the Monarchy. In reply to an observation by Wolf that, in Bosnia, things would end as they had ended in 1859 in Lombardy: we should spend blood and treasure only to lose everything and be driven out in the end, I said:

"At the Congress of Vienna, in 1815, Austria's position in Italy was conceived in terms of supremacy, but to-day, looking back over the history of the 19th century, no one can say that the reason why we lost Lombardy to Piedmont is that we were defeated at the battles of Magenta and Solferino. We lost Lombardy because the living centre of the Italian idea came to be outside of Austria. We shall now lose Bosnia and Herzegovina, and compromise the whole South Slav question, unless we succeed in placing the centre of the South Slav world inside Austria."

The fact that it was precisely this part of my speech that roused loud applause showed that the Delegation had grasped the situation. It was repeated when, in closing, I said that we were living at a moment of the greatest importance for the Dual Monarchy, when it had got to prove that it possessed enough creative force to diffuse a genuine order and culture in the provinces; that on our ability to rise fully to the height of the great obligations we had undertaken in carrying through annexation depended the welfare of the peoples, peace in that part of the Balkans, and the whole status in Europe.

The period was a singular one. It proved how the will to perform some notable action, together with a definite stand before the world at large, could fill men with new confidence in the future of the Empire. Few were in a position to see either how annexation had come to pass or what consequences it was to bring in its train; resolute action, in and for itself, so long lacking in Austria, affected men's minds the more potently that Austrians always rush to extremes, whether of hope or fear. Aehrenthal ought to have been able to take practical advantage of this psychological lift, and to show that he had the will to give an upward turn to our policy. But he took no steps to that end. Animated by the best intentions, a tireless worker, he yet lacked that inner fiery glow which communicates warmth to others and sets them in motion. We frequently met in these days, in the National Casino in Budapest, on free and easy terms, and I had constant opportunity of speaking of the things that then wholly filled my mind. They left him absolutely cold. Let anyone come to him full of enthusiasm, and an ironic smile would curve his mouth: he had no use for independent views. His constant companion was his chief official, Count Paul Esterházy, one of the most thoroughly educated human beings I have ever known, but a Hungarian aristocrat through and through: in other words, a man who saw in the South Slavs an inferior race, knew nothing of the people who lived there, and was not even in a position to judge of our Austrian conditions. The whole Budapest *milieu* was unfavourable to any free or unprejudiced vision of our political task in the South-east. Aehrenthal was married to a Magyar countess, and under the influence of the great Hungarian families who dominated the capital, brilliant and self-absorbed people.

So there was hesitation in launching our policy on new lines. The reverse, indeed, actually occurred. During this meeting of the Delegations in Budapest, the fall of the Beck Cabinet was engineered behind the scenes. Judge the Beck administration as one may, Aehrenthal's intervention in the formation of the new Ministry, instead of producing an improvement in conditions in Austria, plunged us further into the morass. Various individuals combined to bring Beck down. He had called the disfavour of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand on his head, and the Bohemian aristocrats were his embittered opponents. There was an obvious alliance between Aehrenthal and these gentlemen. Certain influences in the Austrian Parliament also contributed to the result; but for Aehrenthal the decisive factor was Beck's having taken and maintained to the last a view different from that of the Foreign Minister on the technique of annexation. Aehrenthal wanted an Austrian Premier who would be his absolute tool. The various conversations Aehrenthal carried on during the sessions of the Delegation, particularly with Count Stuergkh, did not escape me. The latter could not refrain from telling me that he had been offered the post of Minister for Education, but was not prepared to enter the Cabinet as a party minister, preferring to retain his freedom and be a Minister of the Emperor's. A few days after the close of the Delegation meeting, the change of Cabinet took place. Bienerth was nominated as Premier, and formed a provisional administration, of which Bilinski did not become a member until later. This set the seal on the abandonment of any higher conception of Austrian policy, any organised action by the Government in home affairs, any push in the direction of taking the steps annexation had made necessary. Bienerth was perhaps the weakest Prime Minister Austria had ever had, and he was Premier at the period when we required the strongest.

The Storm Breaks

The declaration of annexation created astonishment in Europe. Very soon criticism sounded on all sides. Almost the whole foreign Press denounced Aehrenthal in chorus. Annexation was communicated to the signatory Powers in holograph letters from the Emperor to the heads of the various States, followed immediately by a Circular Note to the Cabinets.

The Emperor announced annexation as a *fait accompli.* His communication took the form of personal letters, but, though not countersigned, they were almost all composed by Aehrenthal himself. To that extent they are essentially State papers; and, all dated September 26, were to be transmitted by the respective Ambassadors on October 6, the day before the annexation was declared. Our Ambassador in Constantinople informed the Porte of annexation and of our evacuation of the Sanjak. The contents of the Emperor's holograph letters were in essentials uniform. The Emperor stressed the need of instituting constitutional machinery in both provinces, as could not be done without the extension of sovereignty over them, waived any idea of territorial aggrandisement in the Balkans, stated his adherence to conservative principles, and drew attention to the evacuation of the Sanjak, and his renunciation of certain rights secured to him by the Berlin Congress.

The tenor of the answers varied widely. Emperor William wrote on October 14 in full agreement, with warm friendliness. President Fallières on October 22—very polite assurance of the readiness of the French Government to co-operate in a general understanding. The King of Italy took time to reply. Aehrenthal had spoken to Tittoni about annexation, on the last occasion of their personal meeting, in terms that caused him to express himself as complaisant. But, as the matter became known in Italy, there was such a storm, both in Parliament and in the Press, that the Italian Minister was hard put to it to justify his benevolent attitude.

Not till December 12, therefore, did the King reply to the holograph letter, and even then he did not express his personal agreement, but merely informed our Emperor that the measures that had been taken had been submitted to thorough examination by the Italian Government, that the result of this examination had then been laid before Parliament, and that Parliament had approved the action of the Government. The King hoped that the solution of the question now open might be of such a nature as to promote both general peace and the Alliance. Warning, here, of the reservations which Italy was determined to enforce.

In Berlin the matter did not go through without a period of difficulty. It arose out of a *contretemps* which occurred in connexion with the transmittance of the letter to the President of the Republic in Paris. The Ambassador, Count Khevenhüller, in response to a request by President Fallières, who was in the act of leaving Paris for some hunting, handed him the Emperor's letter ahead of the appointed day (October 6), with the result that the matter became the subject of talk, and the German Emperor heard of it before it was officially communicated to him. Szögyény told me later, on one occasion, that when he went, on the appointed day, to Rominten, to inform Emperor William, the latter at once said to him, "But I know it already. Anyhow your colleague in Paris told Fallières about it yesterday." On which "mishap" Count Erwein Nostitz wrote to me on November 3, 1908, just before a journey to Donaueschingen, that he had heard from Prince Fürstenberg that the Emperor, at first, was offended that he had not so much as received a private communication in advance, but that he (Fürstenberg) had finally succeeded in convincing the Emperor that Aehrenthal's procedure had been correct. Nostitz justly observed that, in view of the by no means cordial relations between Fürstenberg and Aehrenthal, this was a sign of the former's very high sense of honour. I had a letter, a few days later, from Nostitz, then in Donaueschingen. He had had a long conversation with Emperor William about Austrian affairs. His mood had swung round entirely in Aehrenthal's favour. "Annexation was necessary, and could only be worked as Aehrenthal had contrived; the relations of Germany to Austria meant that the two empires formed a power that could say 'Hands off' to anybody." That was how the Emperor now spoke. He displayed great delight over the wrath of his uncle across the channel; and Aehrenthal knew how to take advantage of this turn in his mood on the occasion of a

Court dinner. These are small but significant incidents surrounding greater events.

The reports from England and Russia were in a very different vein. The holograph letters here are of the highest political interest.

For their understanding, it is necessary to recall that Gortschakoff, in his Circular Note of October 31/19, 1870, during the Franco-Prussian War, announced that Russia intended to denounce the Black Sea Convention, which formed part of the Treaty of Paris, and free itself from the arrangements therein concluded so far as the Signatory Powers were concerned. This action caused general surprise and loud protests. Prussia alone was privy to the step, and had promised Russia a benevolent attitude in return for security on its rear during the Franco-Prussian War. Lord Granville's Note of protest was underlined by one from Count Beust, who had a great deal to say about such high-handed disregard of treaty obligations. Bismarck, however, skilfully covered Russia, and at the Conference in London on January 17, 1871, all that happened was the issue of a protocol declaring that such a breach of a treaty was invalid. This procedure was now recalled by England and Russia.

The letter of our Emperor to the King of England called forth on October 11 a short but sharp reply from King Edward, expressing his regret at the decision taken by the Emperor and stating that, particularly in view of existing conditions in the Balkans, he laid great weight on the principles enunciated in the London protocol, according to which alteration in the Berlin Treaty could only take place with the consent of all the Powers. The correspondence was not continued. The British Press played variations on the views expressed by the King, in a wide range of keys, including the most marked hostility.

The exchange of letters between our Emperor and the Tsar, which lasted right through January 1909, was much more serious. In all, the monarchs exchanged six letters on annexation, which must be read if the contest between the two Foreign Ministers is to be justly appraised. They both fought under cover of their crowns. Despite the superficial cordiality of their language, they are political polemics, and the personal tension between the two Ministers echoes sharply through their lines.

To my mind, the Ministers ought not to have exploited to this degree the confidence reposed in them by their sovereigns, as demonstrated by the despatch of the letters. They ought not to have jeopardised the solidarity of monarchical interests by playing off one crowned head against another in this fashion in political contest. This English and Russian correspondence explains the acid language used by the two Cabinets.

The terms of the Circular Note addressed by Aehrenthal to the various Governments were unfortunate.

Instead of putting annexation frankly in the forefront, and going on, after justifying it, to explain the evacuation of the Sanjak, the Note presented the argument upside down. Thus, after the evacuation had been gone into at length and in detail, there was an account of the constitutional institutions that were to be introduced, and only then followed a curt sentence in which, as though it were a secondary matter, the necessity was enunciated: "De s'affranchir des réserves contenues dans la convention de Constantinople et de reprendre (!) quant à la Bosnie et l'Herzegovine son entière liberté d'action." In so far as the Note referred to the vital act only in terms of a quite general claim, without any detailed establishment of it, it was highly characteristic of Aehrenthal's habitual conversational method of referring to the most important matter only in some subsidiary sentence, dropped, as it were, by the way. So, he avoided any laborious argument.

The rights which the Emperor had exercised throughout the last thirty years in the two provinces had gradually, and without encountering resistance from any quarter, already absorbed all the rights of sovereignty. For instance, troops were raised in the Emperor's name, and took the oath to his person; law ran in his name; all the departments of administration were carried on exclusively by his officials. Constitutional relations between the three creeds were regulated by him. Under the criminal code introduced in both provinces, offences against the Emperor were treasonable, while those against the Sultan were treated merely as offences against a friendly potentate. The whole of this constitutional structure had been built up step by step by the Austro-Hungarian Government, without any questions asked of anybody, under the tacit consent of the Signatory Powers, and even with a measure of recognition of the civilising work that was being done in Bosnia, with the result that all that was left was a right devoid of content, a *nuda proprietas* on the part of the Sultan. In so far as Aehrenthal had already dispensed with securing the consent of the Signatory Powers to the extension of our Emperor's sovereignty over the two provinces, he ought at least to have tried to prove that this extension had already taken place *via facti*. Aehrenthal, however, sought to make a surprise move—a fact that increased the irritation caused by this coup which found expression in the official replies and foamed over in the Press. Indignation, both genuine and artificial, burst out in flame; it was a veritable torch he had kindled.

The wildest gestures came from the two Serbian States. Montenegro, basing its action on wilful violation of the Berlin Treaty, announced its release from the obligations laid upon it by that instrument. Serbia protested against annexation, called up its reserves, credits for military preparations were voted by the Skupshtina, bands were organised to rouse insurrection in Bosnia from the Balkan side, to say nothing of the storms that raged in the Press. In Turkey a boycott of trade with the Dual Monarchy was proclaimed, and all the Signatory Powers asked *unisono* for a Conference. Italy in addition gave notice that it would demand a modification of Article XXIX of the Berlin Treaty. The only exception in all this was Germany, who stood behind the Monarchy from the first. A stiff task was set Aehrenthal's diplomatic skill.

Even in Bohemia the die he had cast created loud reverberations. In Prague one of those outbursts of Chauvinist Nationalism took place which the Czechs were accustomed to indulge in whenever any step taken by the Austrian Government failed to please them, and the word was passed round. This time the capital was, for weeks, the scene of outrageous attacks on German students, acts of terrorism against German-speaking persons, excesses and scandals of all sorts, pro-Serbian demonstrations and displays, with the result that the Government, after looking on passively for a long while, was at last compelled, on the day of the Emperor's Jubilee, December 2, 1908, to suspend civil rights in Prague, with the result that the whole thing faded away. Swift was the price exacted for the fact that, at this most difficult time, a weakling like Bienerth, totally inadequate to the task of coping with internal conditions in Austria, should have been placed at the head of affairs. And these internal disorders weakened the prestige of our policy abroad.

A Diplomatic Campaign

Thanks to the calm with which he met these attacks, and thanks to his skill in negotiation, Aehrenthal succeeded in riding the storm until the end of March, getting rid of the idea of a Conference, and obtaining the recognition of annexation by the Signatory Powers and the defeat of Serbia. He conducted this diplomatic campaign with consummate skill, handling each issue as it arose with patience, playing a waiting game until tranquillity was gradually restored, and then using it at the right moment. At home, he had to cope with the party which was always snuffing for war; holding it at bay by saying that he could be relied on to maintain the rights of the Dual Monarchy, and would defend them, if necessary, by arms; but he did not allow these gentlemen to shift him from his purpose. Serbia threatened and appealed before it gave way; and Aehrenthal had to take up a very stiff attitude before it made up its mind to give way, under pressure from the Signatory Powers.

Two circumstances afforded Aehrenthal vital support. Through all the stages of this matter he had the loyal assistance of Germany behind him, covering his rear, and coming out actively in support of his policy at the decisive junctures. Further, there was in Europe a sensible undercurrent of support for his peace policy, in marked contrast to what was to happen at a later period, when a contrary current made itself felt. At the time of annexation, no one in Europe wanted war. Aehrenthal's policy was borne up by a ground-swell of peace. Recognition of this fact must not lessen the recognition due to his skill, but it does explain his resounding success.

It is worth glancing at the separate phases of this diplomatic campaign. The excitement in Serbia, fostered by protests by the Government, military measures, the action of the Skupshtina and of the Press, continued to rise, and took possession of the entire nation. It spread to the streets of Belgrade and found a target in Austrian and Hungarian businesses and even citizens: our Embassy had to have military protection. Aehrenthal's temperature did not rise. On our side, necessary military movements were made without unnecessary advertisement, and grave remonstrances were addressed to Belgrade. At the very beginning of November, Russia, England, and Italy made representations to the Serbian Government, as did Germany, on similar lines, against taking unconsidered decisions, and throughout the crisis the Powers repeated this effort on their own initiative. Serbia, in consequence, refrained from any aggressive demonstration, but became all the more magniloquent in its demands. The Skupshtina called for the autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina under Turkish suzerainty, compensation for Serbia, the union of Serbia and Montenegro and for freedom for Serbian transit in all directions. The Serbian Government prepared a Note, designed to set out the Bosnian question and its influence on the vital interests of the two Serbian States, but never got so far as presenting it. These outbursts were not taken over seriously by the Signatory Powers, and when, at the end of February 1909, an agreement was reached between the Dual Monarchy and Turkey, the Serbian Cabinet gave way. Under the influence of the German, and, later, of the Russian, Ambassador, it decided to renounce all compensation, avoid any provocation to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and stop military preparations; and the Prime Minister, Novaković, expressed the hope that normal relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary would be restored in the near future. Aehrenthal made a conciliatory answer to this intimation, and announced his readiness to enter direct negotiation with Serbia on economic issues. These amiable pronouncements helped to smooth the way, but it was long before the difficulty was removed. Negotiations dragged on throughout the whole of March. Serbia had a relapse; military measures were strengthened on both sides, and a very critical moment arose. It was not until Russia had unconditionally agreed to the abrogation of Article XXXV of the Berlin Treaty that Serbia accommodated itself to a formula devised with the co-operation of Cartwright, British Ambassador in Vienna. In this, Serbia stated its readiness to accept the decisions of the Powers, as taken in relation to Article XXXV (or already operated in the sense of its total abrogation) and undertook to abandon all provocation and opposition in the future, to alter its policy, and maintain good neighbourly relations with the Habsburg Monarchy. This form of tacit agreement to annexation on the part of Serbia was expressly designed to facilitate the domestic position of the Serbian Government, which had to deal with a population whipped up into the greatest state of excitement. The agreed formula was transmitted by the Serbian Minister in Vienna on March 31. Serbia reduced its army to the footing of New Year 1909, and dispersed the irregular bands.

The Turkish boycott of Austrian and Hungarian goods caused much concern and lively excitement in trade circles. It had been proclaimed in an article in the *Tanin* on October 10 in Constantinople, and came swiftly into operation. Admittedly, the Young Turk Government was behind it, but the movement soon grew beyond their control, a boycott syndicate was formed, and handling of Austrian goods was refused by the dockers in the ports. Aehrenthal now got into verbal touch with Turkey. At first he had intended to take no action until the boycott was raised, but he gave up this attitude when he perceived that he had to deal, not merely with the Turkish Government, but also with a popular movement. On February 26, 1909, an agreement with Turkey was concluded, including the payment of 2½ million pounds Turkish, the raising of the Turkish Customs rates, and the grant of other commercial benefits. The payment was not to take place until the boycott had been raised, which took place soon after this peaceful settlement. Our Eastern trading community suffered considerable losses through the boycott, and here, again, we gave up commercial advantages in order to gain political concessions. As things were, however, Aehrenthal was compelled to come to terms as quickly as possible with Turkey, in order to have his hands free to deal with the Conference question.

This Conference question was, in fact, the pivot of all Aehrenthal's negotiations. Although he was set on avoiding a Conference, which was being demanded on all sides, he was acute enough not to refuse it in advance, but rather to lay stress on the need of its having a well-formulated programme. He was quite determined to have no negotiation either about annexation or about compensation to Serbia. As early as October 16, Germany was acquainted with a programme for the Conference, originating in London, which put on the agenda, not only annexation and compensation for Serbia, but also a whole series of other Balkan questions. On October 30, Isvolsky handed our Ambassador in Petersburg a draft on similar lines. This gave the Conference a basis most unfavourable to the Dual Monarchy. Immediately after this, however, Germany transmitted to the Russian Government a declaration to the effect that it could only entertain the idea of a Conference on condition that Austria-Hungary took part in it, that the question of annexation was reserved, and that there should be no discussion of any compensation to Serbia and Montenegro which Austria did not recognise. The result was that discussion was shifted on to the question of the Conference agenda, and Aehrenthal stood firm in his insistence that the main points to be discussed must be absolutely clear before the Conference came together. As time passed, antagonisms softened. The general peace sentiment made itself felt, and when Aehrenthal was able to announce that he had come to an understanding with Turkey, Novaković in Belgrade had expressed readiness for peace, and Isvolsky had told the German Ambassador in Petersburg that he would agree without reserve to the abrogation of Article XXXV of the Berlin Treaty in the event of Aehrenthal's addressing himself to Russia, in view of the understanding reached with Turkey, the psychological moment had arrived. The decisive step came from Germany. In agreement with Aehrenthal, Bülow approached the Signatory Powers and called upon them, after they had been informed of the conclusion of peace with Turkey, to declare that Article XXXV had lapsed. The Powers agreed, and there was no more talk of a Conference. A happier way of handling the matter had been found, which took account of the standpoints of both sides. Sure of the agreement of the Powers, Aehrenthal, citing his agreement with Turkey, made a formal approach to them (*une demande en règle*) for the declaration of the abrogation of Article XXXV. The Powers' acceptances followed one another speedily. Meantime, Aehrenthal had met Italy's demand for the modification of Article XXIX of the Berlin Treaty by Austria-Hungary's cession of certain rights in Montenegro. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy renounced these rights—again a limitation of its political and economic sphere, but one of minor significance, since we had, as it was, been unable to turn them to any advantage.

The matter thus concluded, Aehrenthal's aim was gained, and the diplomatic campaign won. He harvested all the gains that can fall to a successful statesman—the thanks of his Emperor, who made him a Count, recognition from all patriotic citizens, many pæans, and also some critical blame. Voices were raised even at the time, and were to be raised much more freely later, asking whether annexation, by then a necessary step, could not have been differently initiated and differently carried through. As regards the agreement with Turkey, it was natural to question whether the sacrifices actually made—evacuation of the Sanjak, subsidy, the loss of trading privileges—could not have purchased Turkey's consent before annexation, when the entire policy of annexation might have worn a very different visage. This, for example, was the view taken by the German Ambassador in Rome, Count Monts, in the light of his contacts with Turkish statesmen. Be that as it may, one point is worth mentioning. Annexation might perhaps have been effected differently, but, once accomplished, it could not have been more skilfully defended. True, the sacrifices it cost were not trifling, and the victorious campaign cost us a sensible contraction of our commercial and trading sphere in the Balkans proper, as well as leaving behind it a residuum of distrust of the Dual Monarchy, which we were to feel later on. It remains undeniable that Aehrenthal displayed throughout these transactions a combination of firmness of will and clarity of purpose with real acumen in handling complex issues. He acted in agreement with Germany, which rendered him the greatest service, in such fashion as to leave Germany the initiative at the most critical moments and bring home to our granaries the gains which it harvested for us. So he succeeded in dealing with a most delicate situation by plucking off leaf after leaf, as if from an artichoke.

He accomplished his dominant purpose of raising the international status of the Monarchy, proving its vitality, and strengthening our national consciousness. His was a policy of prestige, but its core was sound. In the beginning the shadow-side of his work made no impression. Joy in the maintenance of peace and satisfaction in the firmness of our stand overwhelmed other feelings.

One must have lived through those days to comprehend the sense of exhilaration and hopeful expectancy which his skilful solution of the diplomatic conflict evoked. The situation, for him, was a call to renewed exertion. He appeared destined to lead us out of the lethargy that had come upon our policy as the result of repeated defeats, not only towards an improvement of our European standing, but also towards new and creative action in our difficult home conditions. More than ever was he the man on whom expectation hung. It was now for the statesman to harvest the fruits of the situation the diplomat had created.

III. FROM THE WINTER OF 1908 TO NEW YEAR 1909

PAGES FROM MY DIARY

Vienna, November 9, 1908.

YESTERDAY I had a visit from the Serbian Agrarian, Dr. Dimitrievič, editor of the *Dan*, from Sarajevo. He talked to me for hours about agrarian conditions in Bosnia, about the franchise issue, approaching settlement, and about Serb opinion there. In the towns, there is a good deal of Irridentism, but the country districts are sound. For that reason he regards a wide franchise as in Austria's interest. The present Kmet system is against intensive cultivation of the soil. The Kmet has, as a rule, to give the Aga half his fodder (clover). The result is that no clover is grown, and no fodder collected, and stable feeding is impossible. Cattle-breeding suffers and cannot be improved. A system of gross deduction, of course, conduces to slackness. No one will work for somebody else's benefit. The fact that any increase in yield goes to the Aga blocks all progress. So, for example, there is no large-scale vegetable-growing; the Kmet merely plants enough for his own consumption. All this is familiar enough, but when is it to be remedied? His main demands fall under the head of agricultural development. He says, Austria-Hungary ought to lay out 15 to 20 million crowns, so as to make the year 1908 a turning point in the imagination and recollection of the people. Primarily on canalisation and irrigation of the *Polje* in Herzegovina and in Bosnia. There are schemes, but no money. Equally necessary is the provision of cisterns in the parishes which have no water supply. They ought to be constructed and marked "1908." Aqueducts, of which there are a grave deficiency, ought also to be constructed, and finally a dam built on the Save. All these would be useful signs of annexation. On such lines, much ground could be won. In a word, he asked for a programme of action in Bosnia such as had been promised in Dalmatia, calculated to demonstrate to the inhabitants that things are now different, and something is being done for them.

Meran, December 12, 1908.

I saw to-day a certain Mr. Emil Scarpa, general agent of the Austrian Lloyd Steamship Company's house in Bombay, where he has been engaged since 1890. He described how the Germans are making progress in every direction, setting up export houses in all parts of India and Eastern Asia, while the Austrians do nothing of the kind. In Austria everything is bureaucratic, hierarchical, aristocratic; there is no independent merchant class; the business man has no social position, but ranks after every little lieutenant or civil servant. Scarpa admires the English and their government of India. Under Lord Curzon, there has been a notable increase in centralisation. When signs of reaction against this manifested themselves, a Royal Commission was appointed to go to India and take comprehensive evidence on the spot on the question whether, and, if so on what lines, it would be possible to introduce administrative decentralisation into India. Witnesses from a very wide range of occupations were called, in order that the findings arrived at might serve as the basis for ultimate legislation. And all this took place in public. Such a method not only secures a mass of facts being brought to light, but inspires the population with confidence in the activity of government. Compare this with the timid, furtive, and unwilling manner in which we are now going about the business of finding out the views of the people of Bosnia on the constitution to be introduced there!

Scarpa takes a very grave view of the Turkish boycott. He thinks that many connexions will be weakened or destroyed, and that the Italians in particular will try to cut into business there. Lloyd's losses have been heavy, and their dividends will be poor.

Meran, December 14, 1908.

There is an article in *The Times* on the Near East, reminding Austria that decisions on foreign policy are nowadays a matter which concerns the people and not only Cabinets, and that the boycott movement is a popular one. We are being told that on all hands, these days. Our diplomats are too little in touch with the sections of the population among whom the ultimate deciding forces, even in foreign policy, are to be found. Otherwise, it would be incomprehensible that there should have been, at first, such a failure to appreciate the meaning of the boycott in high places. We have clung to the Turkish officials and failed to see that it is with the people we have got to deal; in cases where the officials have seemed to be the actors, they have really acted under pressure from below rather than vice versa.

Meran, December 20, 1908.

Read many English and French newspapers. The latter are calm, because they desire peace, and friendly to Austria, as a result of the report that Aehrenthal has at last given way and is negotiating with Turkey, without waiting for the boycott! Charmingly they put these things!

Vienna, December 28, 1908.

This afternoon I had a long conversation with Aehrenthal and Schönaich. This Turkish business is going badly. Aehrenthal is now inclined to buy Turkey's consent. Turkey stands in urgent need of some 2 to 3 million pounds. He asked me what I thought of this, and what would be thought in Austria. I replied, we should feel like guests who, having been put in excellent spirits by being invited to a good dinner, found that, as they passed out through the ante-chamber, they were presented with a bill. Our joy over annexation would be quite spoiled if a bill came in for it afterwards. Speaking more seriously, I argued strongly against charging this sum, even nominally, against Bosnia, since to do that would seriously compromise our position there. Aehrenthal talks of payment in return for Turkish

State property we have taken over (woods and forests, etc.). When I asked in what way we should be better off, even if we did pay, he replied that at any rate our standing would be greatly better, since the Turkish Parliament would then say " Yes " to the agreement—and payment would not be made until the boycott had been raised. He had to admit that the hope he had expressed to me some weeks earlier that Turkey would be satisfied with the evacuation of the Sanjak and the waiving of the Capitulations had not been justified. When I objected that a separate agreement with Turkey would not prevent Serbia and Montenegro from breaking out, he retorted that if they did so we could beat them. The real difficulties of the situation are now becoming apparent. We then discussed Hungarian military demands. Schönaich thought some sort of compromise necessary. He would concede Hungarian ensigns and the use of Magyar as regimental language in return for the new Service law and a larger recruitment. He thinks the Hungarian regiments more reliable now than the Bohemian. When the battalions were entraining at Jungbunzlau for Bosnia, there were ugly scenes. Voices from the crowd shouted: " Shoot down your officers ! "

Vienna, February 21, 1908.

Redlich and Friedjung are often with Aehrenthal. He is planning a *démarche* and an ultimatum to Serbia for the end of March—demobilisation, disbanding of the comitadjis, etc. Result, submission ? good : if not, better—we march in, another dynasty is set up. Friedjung came to see me the other day (straight from Aehrenthal) and asked me my views on a Customs Union. It appeared from his talk that he regards a Customs Union as a sort of strait-jacket in which Serbia could be confined. I set out the points, one by one : a common tariff, and a common tariff area, with free trade within it ; a common system of collection of duties, with a quota to each State, etc., etc. Above all, I tried to get him to understand that a Customs Union was compatible with a voluntary political understanding. This statement of mine he received with impatience, opined that these were "technical details," and left me, obviously not at all satisfied. I had some talk shortly afterwards with Rössler, head of the trade section of the Foreign Office, with whom I had a good deal to do during the time when he was in the Trade Ministry as a councillor. He admitted that the idea of a war and a subsequent tariff union was being discussed in the Foreign Office. On the Customs Union point, he said the thing was blank nonsense, and declared that he had spoken definitely against it to Aehrenthal. He thought that Germany and England would not tolerate the abrogation of their treaties with Serbia, which run on to 1917: that Serbia's budget is so restricted that it simply would have to live on what it got under the tariff; in other words, would become financially vassal to us: finally that Hungary made the thing quite impracticable. He, however, goes too far. There is no political impossibility in the gradual establishment of a Customs Union with Serbia, if we set about it in a spirit of consideration for Serbian economy and as part of a policy of *rapprochement* between us; but it will not serve as an instrument for taming Serbia.

Rössler seemed to me to be disillusioned by his work in the Foreign Office. He says diplomatic orthodoxy is incredible and invincible. An impenetrable caste-spirit.

Vienna, February 23, 1909.

Max Fürstenberg tells me that the Bülow–Hardinge meeting, at the time of the royal visit to Berlin, has had no positive result. As regards Serbia, opinion in Berlin is that although perfectly aware that she would be defeated, she would none the less risk war in the expectation of thereby rousing the entire Slav world. Serbia is in an impossible situation; to the leaders of the movement it is nothing that a couple of thousand people might fall, and even the dynasty might fall; they would go with their eyes open into a losing battle, in the belief that Russia would be compelled to call a halt. Russia cannot strike, but opinion there is dead against us. The same in Italy—so once war breaks out, no one knows where it might lead to. Germany is solidly with us. Fürstenberg thinks, although he does not know, that the German Emperor holds the unuttered opinion that were he once to march as victor through the Brandenburg Gate, his prestige would be vastly enhanced. All of which is bad for us and for peace. The slogan " Through War to International Rehabilitation " is old and deceptive. Military " overrunning " of Serbia would be of no use to us, but might lead to anything—even to a war on three fronts.

Vienna, February 27, 1909.

Talk with Karl Fürstenberg, fresh from Petersburg. There are two distinct currents of opinion in Russia, of which one is anti-German—*i.e.* against German expansion in the Balkans and in the Near and the Far East. Austria is there regarded merely as an outpost of Germany, to be shoved forward and used as a tool. This anti-Austrian current combines with the other—Slav Orthodoxy against Catholicism. People fear and fight against the idea of a rally of all Catholic Slavs under Austrian leadership. Russia is and must remain the great shield of the Slavs, and, above all, of the Orthodox. Russia is not in a position to wage war. Hence it is " Now or never " for Austria to put things in order there. Two methods are possible—*saigner à blanc*, a new dynasty? Serbia weakened for decades—will Russia allow that?—or a policy of waiting quietly for the storm in Serbia to break, building golden bridges for the Serbs, giving them some sort of economic security, and steering for peace and good understanding with them.

I made the point that although annexation has certainly injured Russian prestige in the Balkans, actually it connotes the reverse of expansion for us. From a trade point of view, we are, in fact, weaker there than we were before annexation, having lost by our evacuation of the Sanjak together with the railroad, by our trading concessions to Turkey, and by the abandonment of our position in Montenegro. Fürstenberg says Nicholas II is a feeble fellow. For a Three Emperors' Alliance, but with no strength of will. Fürstenberg declares Isvolsky has only one thought—that of paying Aehrenthal back. He is entirely filled by desire for vengeance. It is a duel between them. The idea of a Bulgaro-Turkish financial scheme emanated from England, via Constantinople. Isvolsky threw himself blindly into it: the thing was launched almost before he had grasped what it meant, in an entirely undigested form, with no previous planning. Subsequently it came out that it was necessary to have the whole thing thought out before any action could be taken. A Commission is now at work on this task. Such is the light-minded way in which high politics are carried on.

Vienna, March 16, 1909.

I was received in audience to-day. After a few generalities, I said to the Emperor: "We live in troublous times. It is to be hoped, indeed, that when the Monarchy has to meet a grave external task, the petty squabbles at home will fall silent; but we all pray that Your Majesty's love of peace may triumph." "Yes, I wish that, too, but it seems hardly possible, now. Russia is spoiling everything." "But Europe's greatest need is peace, and the French are working in that sense." "Yes, so far, but now they are tottering" (he made an expressive motion of his hand). "They have a great deal of money sunk in European investments." "That is true, but, all the same, they are under the influence of England; they are shifting their ground." The rest of our talk was on domestic matters, the state of the Reichsrat, and the causes of its impotence.

IV. TRAVELS IN BOSNIA IN 1909

Up to April everyone held his breath in political circles owing to the annexation crisis. The news I got from Sarajevo suggested that the situation there was very far from having cleared up. So I made up my mind, at the end of May, to travel thither once more. Once again I took the route via Gravosa. The glories of spring were all about it as I went, and even in Herzegovina the green was pushing up between the stones. Sarajevo was wonderful.

I was most eager to see the effect of annexation on men's minds here, and what the Government had done to give practical effect to the new status of the two provinces. I was right in the centre of political life throughout my time in Sarajevo. My arrival was heralded by the Opposition paper, the Sarajevo *Tagblatt*, which spoke of the downfall of Burián's system and mentioned myself or Count Johann Zichy as his heir-presumptive. This gave people an interest in me, and I found them very ready to talk. The former Governor-General had been replaced by Lieutenant Field-Marshal Varešanin, a South Slav, whose wife was a highly cultivated and delightful woman, and, like himself, full of warm and genuine feeling for the people. Otherwise, the head officials were the same as in the previous year. Benko, the head of the Civil administration, and the chief of the section for judicial business, Shek, I approached at once, and spent much time with them both. I also made the acquaintance of some of their juniors, among them Councillor Trešces, a Croat, who stays in my memory the more vividly in that he was one of those who believed in Bosnia's future as a flourishing and contented portion of the Dual Monarchy. He was an expert on the land problem, and I learned much from him about the enfranchisement question.

I went about the country as much as I could, as well as travelling down the East Bosnian Railway, which was to have been the point of departure for the Sanjak Railway. It winds through narrow valleys and clefts between perpendicular cliffs, in sharp curves, shortened by innumerable tunnels, most of them very short, right through the mountains. To Vardište, the terminus at that end, there are 98 tunnels in a distance of 111 kilometres. You pass a ruined castle here and there, you follow the course of the foaming stream, until the country opens out for the mouth of the Drina, then swings over a bridge at a most interesting point at which the line forks into two tunnels, lying side by side—the right-hand line going down the Lim valley to Uvač, the Sanjak terminus, and the left-hand one to Vardište, the Serbian terminus. Our route took us along the latter, and so on as far as Višegrad. Everywhere the same romantic scenery, with a beauty enhanced, here, by the lambent green water of the Drina. All along the line the buildings are notably clean and attractively constructed; and everything is perfectly kept. The director of the railways, Schnack, went with me and pointed out all the objects of interest. The party also included Dr. Redlich, member of the Reichsrat, and Dr. Patzauer, of the Treasury, which made it all the more pleasant. Višegrad, the furthest point of our excursion, is situated on both banks of the Drina, with a considerable garrison, various military offices, a beautiful church, set high on the hillside, modern houses, and, altogether, a highly civilised aspect. The river is spanned by a splendid bridge, with eleven arches made out of blocks of yellow chalk-stone. It was erected by a Pasha of Bosnian origin, Sokolović by name, who entrusted the work to an Italian, who produced this remarkable and tasteful design. So far as pictorial beauty goes, this eastern stretch of the line is notable, but I can hardly see it becoming very important from the transport point of view. Like all the Bosnian lines, it is narrow-gauge, and owing to the enormous constructional difficulties of the terrain everything is as far as possible reduced in size. The coaches, tunnels, dams, curves, and bridges are constructed in such a fashion that it would be either quite impossible, or possible only at a quite disproportionate cost, to convert them to broad gauge. On the way, I heard a great deal about conditions in the country, and enlarged my views.

The main impression I got in Sarajevo was that there was much less sign, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the great excitement that had surged through the neighbouring land throughout the winter than one would have expected. The country—in which there are, of course, pretty big military forces—has remained tranquil; more, national spirit there has not caught fire, although there is the most lively expectation of what is coming next. The whole population is in a state of tension. Everyone is waiting to see some change in the relation of the Bosnian State to the Empire as a whole, in its administration, and in economic conditions. Opinion is at a turning point. The action of the Monarchy has made a decisive impression here; even the Serbs have been affected by the collapse of Serbian heroics: and men's eyes, instead of turning outwards, are now directed to the future of the country under the Habsburg sceptre. And there is an intense quality in this expectant gaze. The whole problem of the constitutional structure and economic development of these two regions stands before me in clear outline and in more definite detail than a year ago. My pamphlet has been much more widely read here than in Vienna. Everybody knows about it, and most people expressly state their agreement with it. I could see that I have succeeded in estimating correctly the point which moves thinking minds here the most. The main theme of talk was the promised Constitution. On the gravity of the error that would be committed were the co-operation of local persons of standing not secured, there was only one voice. A sort of enquiry is being carried on by the Minister, but this is merely a sham—*ut aliquid fecisse videatur*—and miles away from really getting at the opinions of independent persons. So, on the very threshold of constitutionalism, a lack of real straightforwardness.

Here, in the midst of the actual facts, one can see far more clearly than in Vienna the direction in which the true line of development lies. So I can readily understand why here everyone is against any rushing of the constitutional issue, as it was put to me a year ago. A State Council, as a transitional form, is advocated, in order to prevent any stereotyped, incomplete settlement of public questions. Hitherto, the occupied regions have been administered as a sort of outwork of the Monarchy, and the laws of 1880 subjected them *de jure* to the influence of the two Governments. Actually, however, Kállay had a more or less free hand. He did not ask for any money, and the two Parliaments and the Delegations took little or no interest. His success covered him. Now, however, things are entirely different. The existing relation between the provinces and the Monarchy no longer suffices. In Bosnia there is a very strong movement for autonomy, and an equally strong demand not, any longer, to be treated as second-class citizens, but to be admitted to participation in the business of the Delegations, and to have a voice in issues that affect the life and property of the people of Bosnia. In order not to complicate the process of annexation, it was carried through without any alteration being made in the constitutional status of the annexed territories: the *status quo* was retained. But this is a state of things that cannot last. The financial question is the more urgent, too, that the necessary reforms will cost money; here, again, action is requisite.

I covered all such matters in *tête-à-tête* talks with the leading officials, as well as in conversations at dinners and evening parties, at which I had an opportunity of meeting men of the most diverse sorts. We have the right men, in Bosnia, for a great reform programme, but the Burián system lies on top of everything like some crushing Alp.

Burián's knowledge of conditions in the country is great and very detailed. He can lecture on them for hours, like any professor. Talking to him, one always has the sensation of being back in the atmosphere of some academic class-room. It is interesting enough to listen to him, so long as one forgets that one is dealing with the living stuff of politics and does not expect action to issue from his talk. Here, in a country whose people are compact of imagination and fancy, government cannot be carried on without some spark of enthusiasm, some sympathy and warmth of human feeling, least of all at a moment when the atmosphere is one of tense anticipation of what is to come next. Burián is not the man to comprehend the soul of a people, or take the lead in creative educational work—and that is what is wanted here. A man of his type can make no impression on the thinking or feeling of the people, he is too remote. Not only has he no nerves: there is no red blood in his veins. Impossible to conceive a greater contrast than that between him and Kállay. Kállay, whatever else one may think of him, was a vital personality, a born leader. His authority derived from his personality, which impressed the Begs as well as the Serbs and the Croats.

Something of this vitalising force ought to have been set in operation for modern purposes, after annexation. But Burián is stiff and unapproachable: everybody who goes to see him comes away with a sense of chill. He had never made a public speech in Bosnia: there has never been any contact between him and the people there, for good or evil. Wherever he appears he is like a man of stone: whether as a member of the Delegations or when, later, Foreign Minister, he reduced our German allies to despair. Impossible for any impulse to creative activity in the country to emanate from him. My general impression was that of a tense waiting throughout the land to see what annexation is going to mean for it. And certainly no more time ought to be lost.

Some time later, in the spring of 1910, Baernreither again felt impelled to express his views on the military and administrative reorganisation of the annexed territories in a special Memorandum. Although this was not included in the "Fragments of a Political Diary" as planned by him for publication, it seems worth while to append here that document in which he sums up the thoughts raised in him by the annexation policy as a whole.[1]

MEMORANDUM ON MILITARY AND CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

The Emperor exercises the rights of sovereignty in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the Berlin Treaty: since occupation, under a mandate from the Great Powers, and, since annexation, as of right. The supreme administration of the areas is committed to the common Ministry, and, thence, specifically, to the Minister for Imperial Finance. So far as concerns Civil administration, the Austrian law of February 22, 1880 and the corresponding Hungarian law gave a certain influence over it to the Governments of Austria and of Hungary (and in given cases also to their Parliaments). This law, of course, did not touch the military service regulations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, since the position at the time was simply a military occupation of both provinces by detachments of the Imperial Royal Army, no specifically Bosnian-Herzegovinian formations existing. A year later, on October 24, 1881, a provisional service law for Bosnia and Herzegovina was promulgated by Imperial rescript, which prescribed terms of service for the nationals of the two regions.

Under the new constitution, the Bosnian-Herzegovinian troops are declared to be an organic part of the military forces of the Monarchy; and both service conditions and the voting of military laws are removed from the competence of the Diet. The supreme war-lord now as before issues all service prescriptions out of the plenitude of his own powers, measures taken under this head have to be voted for by the Diet in Sarajevo. That the Emperor is supreme commander over the Bosnian-Herzegovinian, as over the rest of the forces: that war and peace are in his hands so far as Bosnia and Herzegovinia are concerned: that the Emperor, and the Emperor alone, controls everything that concerns the command, leading and internal organisation, the commanding and service language of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian troops—all this is self-evident. It must be expressly noted that, so far as Bosnia and Herzegovina are concerned, these rights are nowhere codified, since there are no prescriptions under this head in the Bosnian Constitution, and those in the Austrian or Hungarian Constitutions are not relevant to the newly-acquired territories. So, in so far as they apply to these two provinces, the above-mentioned rights derive exclusively from the meaning and nature of the Emperor's unlimited sovereignty. They are unwritten laws, but no less absolute for that reason than if they had been promulgated in the form of a basic law.

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[1] On the origin of this Memorandum, Baernreither notes in his Diary:

Vienna, March 3, 1910.

When recently in Bohemia for conferences at Count Buquoy's on Bohemian matters, Count Ottokar Czernin showed me a telegram from the Archduke Francis Ferdinand in which he asked if I would not draw up a memorandum on Bosnian conditions. I complied, and sent it to Czernin at Vinař, and he passed it on to the Archduke Francis Ferdinand.

This fact is significant in relation to the application of these rights inherent in the Crown.

Provisoes and provisions derived from the text of the Constitution, and especially of the Hungarian Constitution, giving any right of interference in military matters, have no reference to the Bosnian-Herzegovinian portion of the Imperial Royal forces. It is, of course, of practical importance to have this incontrovertible position maintained by the common Government as against any attempts to undermine it, such as may be made by the Diet at Sarajevo. The provision in the Constitution that the Diet has no voice in the voting of recruits will be challenged sooner or later, but the existing reservations, excluding military matters from the Diet's purview, will be accepted more readily by public opinion in both provinces if it can be stated that these rights appertain to the Emperor exclusively than if it were the case that the Austrian and Hungarian Governments had the right to be consulted on issues affecting life and property in these regions. For Bosnia and Herzegovina the issue of the Constitution marks a turning point of decisive importance, not only for the provinces but for the monarchy as a whole. The time is not yet ripe for "Trialism," but the administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina must create conditions and elicit sentiments such as may constitute a new and powerful fulcrum for the idea of the common Monarchy. Therefore, with full intention, and the use of every means available, these regions must be educated to feel that they are "Crown Dominions," with a definite and organically Austrian outlook.

In approaching this task, we must not be blind either to the favouring circumstances that exist, or to the difficulties. The strong sense of independence which has existed there from time immemorial is a helpful factor: the people want neither to be Austrians nor to be Hungarians, but to be Bosnians, and with the *naïveté* and the force of children of nature, expect to be given all they desire from the Emperor's own hand. The leaders of the Catholic Croats are in close touch with Agram, but, as is well known, their views are divided, and only the future can clear up and fix the relations of these newly-organised provinces to Croatia. All that can be done at the moment is preparatory work, based on the hopes and feelings of the people; wise administration, directed to realising as much as possible of these long cherished hopes, and, above all, an active extension of educational facilities, hitherto lacking, will help to make good citizens of Austria-Hungary out of them.

This aim requires to be pursued without flinching by a series of well-planned reform measures. The political parties whom the Constitution calls upon to play their parts are as flighty and unreliable as so many school-children. It would be the greatest mistake to try to take advantage of their simplicity. In a country which is still half Oriental, State authority must play a larger part than anywhere else. The only policy which can succeed is one that genuinely promotes the welfare of the country; states frankly what it aims at; has the courage to state both what can and what cannot be done; and sticks to it. Any form of hesitation, of "diplomacy," will be merely demoralising in its effect, and will strengthen every destructive element.

Only by these means, again, can we render the Serbian movement and its connexions with the Serb kingdom harmless. That such connexions exist is undeniable, but they are often so exaggerated that one frequently hears them described as ineradicable. If we can make the material existence of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina better than that enjoyed by their brothers in Serbia; if we can effectively promote and maintain order, justice, and popular education, while sparing religious feelings, not injuring national idiosyncrasies, and, scrupulously avoiding petty police *régime* and any sort of brandishing of the torch, intervene firmly when there is anything dangerous on foot—then we shall win even the Serbian section of the population over to our side. It is only a question of time, and of cause and effect. One could see a good deal, in this connexion, at the time of the crisis last New Year. Then, the people showed no inclination for experiments, since conditions in Serbia were not attractive and the fact that Austria was in earnest was thoroughly realised.

The question now arises, How can such a policy be pursued within the limits of the new Constitution?

This new Constitution has strengthened the influence possessed both by the Austrian and by the Hungarian Government among the people of Bosnia and of Herzegovina. Every official proposal put before the Diet at Sarajevo and every amendment thereto, requires, as has already been mentioned, to have the approval of both these Governments. In Sarajevo, this is bound to be felt as an injurious limitation of their own interests; it must also cabin and confine such an administration as has been sketched above, complicate the position of the Provincial Government at Sarajevo, and tend to cause undue delays in the settlement of any and every issue. The Austrian and the Hungarian Governments are bound to look at every Bosnian issue from their own specific point of view, and to try to play off the other, with the result that while initiative and energy are the qualities most urgently necessary in the

Bosnian administration, it will, as a matter of fact, be perpetually compelled to compromise instead of acting swiftly with a certain freshness of attack.

These drawbacks, instead of being lessened, will be aggravated when the Constitution actually comes into force. At the moment, however, this state of affairs has got to be faced, and the question is how, nevertheless, it is to be possible to set up an administration that will be strong and will operate in the interest of the Austrian Monarchy as a whole. The expectations of the people are unlimited. There will be voices asking, at once, why Bosnia and Herzegovina are not represented on the Delegations; why the settlement of their domestic affairs should be dependent on the consent of the Governments of Austria and Hungary: why they should not have the right of voting their own contingents of recruits, and so on. But these unattainable aspirations will be dropped if, in their place, the people are not merely promised but really granted other practicable things. Agrarian reform is urgently needed, but requires great care in its execution; the improvement of the schools is demanded on every hand, but is only feasible if a class of teachers with an Austrian point of view can be brought into existence; then there is the development of a railway system independent of Hungarian influences; irrigation and agricultural improvement, which might bring thousands of acres under profitable cultivation—here are a few of the questions that press for solution, and can be solved along lines that correspond to the legitimate desires of the inhabitants.

The existing machine of ultimate administrative control over the country is such as to increase every difficulty. Any scheme drawn up in the Imperial Ministry of Finance on the basis of reports from the Bosnian Government requires to be certified by the Austrian and by the Hungarian Governments and modified in accordance with their wishes. In Vienna there is an abundance of good will, but no knowledge of conditions in the recently acquired provinces: in Budapest, conditions are better understood, but no will exists except the will to the exclusive pursuit of Hungarian interests. Some device must be found to enable a concentration of administration, so far as Bosnia and Herzegovina are concerned. Something would have been gained if their affairs were transferred from the Common Imperial Ministry, which, as things are to-day, is generally controlled by a Hungarian, to some new fourth Common Ministry, charged with the administration of these regions, which might have a non-Hungarian as its chief.

With a view to lessening friction between the two Governments in relation to the certification of Bosnian affairs, creating a mode of direct contact, and accelerating the conduct of business, it would be well if there could be established a Bosnian Conference in Vienna, consisting, on the model of the Customs and Trade Conference, of representatives of the Common Ministry, of the Bosnian Government, and of the Austrian and Hungarian Governments—the latter to be clothed by the Governments they represent with plenary powers. This would enable questions to be discussed by word of mouth and so avoid the dreary interchange of written communications; it would also give scope for the influence of the War Ministry.

What, however, appears indispensable is that the Governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina should have a freer hand and more power than has hitherto been granted to any holder of such a post, since nothing will be accomplished, here, unless the administration on the spot can act swiftly, with energy, purpose, and intimate knowledge of the country and its people, their language, their habits, and their feelings. For a considerable time to come, this Governor must be a military man, who, anyhow, can be franker in his reports, more decisive in his actions, and more independent in his bearing than a bureaucrat.

Another reason why some such combination of the various determinant factors into a uniform administration is here necessary in the interest of the realm is that our whole political position in the Balkans is going to be powerfully influenced by the shape conditions take in the annexed lands. Bosnia and Herzegovina must serve as a fulcrum for extending and consolidating our position on the lower

Danube. Only a strong and independent stand, purposeful administration, and loyal feelings on the part of the population can give us such a fulcrum.

The visit that I paid to Herzegovina in the autumn of this same year (1909) had no political reference. I was again greatly interested by a visit I paid to the Museum at Sarajevo. It was one of Kállay's outstanding services that he organised scientific investigation of the country on a grand scale, summoned scholars thither for the purpose, caused monographs to be prepared and published on the results of excavation of archæological and prehistoric objects and forbade their exportation, under penalties that were rigorously enforced. In Sarajevo I had some pleasant and most informative intercourse with Dr. Patsch, the learned archæologist, who, being a German Bohemian, was a countryman of my own; to him I owe my introduction to the rare treasures of the Museum—less well housed then than later, since the splendid Museum buildings were then only under construction. He told me about a Roman castellum which he had discovered and excavated at Mogorilo, near Čapljina, in Herzegovina, and offered to show it to me. I am familiar with the Saalburg near Homburg, restored by Emperor William in the exact likeness of a Roman castellum, and Kapersburg near Nauheim, smaller, unrestored, but nevertheless very interesting, and also a Roman castellum. I was therefore delighted to fall in with Dr. Patsch's suggestion. We met at Gravosa on October 15, and took train to Čapljina, a journey I had already often made. Dr. Patsch, of course, knew it intimately, and in his company I saw it under a new light. He drew my attention to prehistoric barrows where I before had seen only heaps of stones in the midst of that ocean of stones; and gave me his views on the deforestation of the Herzegovina. He by no means cleared the Romans and the Venetians of their share of responsibility for stripping the mountain sides of their trees, but held that the Slavs had the most to answer for; they are no friends to trees and their goats devour all unprotected vegetation. Patsch showed me a hill near Čapljina, quite bare to-day, which was wooded within the memory of men now alive.

In Čapljina we partook of a simple meal, and visited the tobacco depot, where we had the opportunity of seeing some specimens of splendidly athletic and picturesquely clad and armed Herzegovinian manhood. There are many Catholics and friends to Austria in the area, but the people here cannot be governed by the Vienna foot-rule. In the afternoon we went to Mogorilo, to the castellum. It is right on the line between Čapljina and Metkovič. When the railway was being made, the diggers came upon traces of a Roman settlement. Dr. Patsch was commissioned to survey the site; saw that there were extensive signs of Roman work, and persuaded Kállay, who saw the point at once, to have the course of the line deflected so as to clear the Roman remains. The excavation then conducted by Dr. Patsch revealed the remains of a Roman castellum which constitute one of the things most worth seeing in Herzegovina, though unhappily but little known. The plan conforms to the Roman lay-outs I have seen in the Taunus region. Erected under the Empire, along the frontiers, on the Narenta as on the Limes, alike in construction and alike defended by its legions, these buildings again demonstrate the universality and the large scope of the Roman State.

Returning to Ragusa, I enjoyed some glorious October days there. I visited an old friend, Otomar Svoboda, former Councillor in the Bosnian Government, who lives in Gravosa since he retired. I wandered all over the town in his company, revelling in the architectural beauties of the past and the lively bustle of the present, with its alternation of old Roman and Slav. We visited the old Mayor of Ragusa, Pero Čingrija, a very fine old fellow, whose house is set in the centre of a beautiful garden. We talked in Italian, since he knows no German. From Ragusa, I went on to Cattaro, where I had not been for long. The local administrator there, Budisovljević, is an extremely capable official, a Serb by race, but a true Austrian in feeling, who has won great distinction as a public servant. He has made many an enemy. I took a great deal of trouble to persuade the folk in Vienna that they would make a very great mistake if they listened to calumnies about him. Budisovljević was, later, transferred to Vienna, and I succeeded in protecting him; but his powers were never used to the full.

On my homeward journey, Baron Conrad von Hötzendorf was on board, returning from Herzegovina with his officers: high-strung, assertive, laying down the law, and, as usual, very unsympathetic to me. From Gravosa, we also had the Archduchess Josefa on board the S.S. "Gautsch," but she kept herself quite aloof. One evening, the Captain had searchlights playing in her honour over the coast and the islands—a very pretty effect. There were several Dalmatian M.P.'s on board and I had much talk with them.

V. AEHRENTHAL AND MILOVANOVIĆ

On November 19, 1909, the big Serbian merchant, Pero Despić, invited me to meet Milovanović, at that time Foreign Minister in Serbia. The merchant, who took a most lively interest in politics himself, is married to a Viennese, and has a charming home in the "Cottage quarter," and we were quite undisturbed there. At supper, we had some most stimulating talk with the master and mistress of the house. Milovanović, who has held diplomatic posts in Rome and in Berlin, proved to be a man of high education. He has not got the expansive and lively temper of so many of his countrymen, but a serious measured demeanour. One has the impression that he has thoroughly studied the topics on which he speaks, knows exactly what he is after, and never says more or less than he intends. Temperamentally reserved, his words are definite: there is nothing ambiguous about him. At table, the talk was of Italy, Donatello, Van Dyck, and the antique; also about archæological discoveries in Serbia, which are just now beginning to be made; it was all easy and unconstrained; he spoke with a certain calm assurance, which was almost modest, and one felt oneself in contact with a man of real cultivation and a real understanding and love of art.

After dinner we sat down for a talk, and our hosts left us alone together.

Milovanović had come to Vienna in the hope that Aehrenthal would have something definite to say to him this time, although he had not had, on the occasion of his last being in Vienna. It was taken for granted, with no word said, that I would inform our Minister of the substance of our conversation, and Milovanović said many things to me which he desired to have thus indirectly brought to his notice. He spoke in measured terms, rather as though he were delivering a lecture, plunging right *in medias res* with the remark that a survey of the last few decades of Austrian policy showed a very vacillating course in its relations to Serbia. There was no clear line in it: Serbia had never known what it would be at: and it was this that had made Austria so unpopular there. Milan had been pro-Austrian; but his first steps were unfortunate, and he had been unlucky, for instance, in his treaty with the Union Générale; he got himself involved with it, whereupon it collapsed. The present King is very retiring; he does all he can, but the fact that he has lived so long abroad is against him. Previous events have undermined the royal authority; this makes the position of the Crown very difficult and compels the Minister to act as a sort of umbrella over it. Austria had never known how to win sympathy for itself in Serbia. When a door is ready to open, one only requires to knock to get it to unlatch; it is by no means necessary to try to push at it with one's foot. Bulgaria has an attraction for Serbia, because Russia is known to stand behind Bulgaria, and also because of the Pan Slav idea. In the last few years there has been a notable increase in this inclination towards Bulgaria, simply because the fact that Serbia is repulsed by Austria drives it to the other side.

Three points require to be cleared up if a revulsion in popular feeling in Serbia and a close association with the Dual Monarchy are to be secured.

First, there must be a change in trade conditions. We get, said Milovanović, everything that makes life agreeable, every form of luxury and even of comfort, from Vienna. If you want a good concert or theatre, you have to go to Vienna to get it: the arts and all the higher forms of enjoyment bear the Austrian hall-mark. Austria, moreover, is the natural market for our products and merchants. For this reason, there is far more understanding of and interest in foreign policy among our people than is generally assumed. The peasant who wants to sell his cattle and his corn calculates on the basis of prices in the Monarchy:

there is no country in which the agricultural producer understands freights, customs, export possibilities so thoroughly as with us. Foreign policy has a direct effect on his pocket, and therefore also on his opinions and temper. Serbia is now about to revise its minimal tariff on certain points, in order at least to give Austria most-favoured-nation treatment. When I asked him expressly about the prospects of a Customs Union, he replied that it was desirable, but there must first be a Commercial Treaty and a gradual assimilation of the two producing areas. The longer it was before this was started, the harder would it be. England and Germany were taking Austria's place. The English could be pushed out again, but not the Germans, because of their remarkable power of adapting themselves to the needs, desires, and predilections of the population. The German trader is a master. German goods come down the Danube or by railroad through the Monarchy, which thus conveys its most dangerous rival's goods to Serbia. Austria cannot compete here. The dangers of cattle pest in Serbia are greatly exaggerated. The actual case is the reverse of what is believed. Cattle in Serbia live under natural conditions; the pasturage is good, there is no stall feeding, no use of factory refuse. Swine fever often comes over from Hungary and is then put down in Serbia. There are no endemic cattle diseases there. Further, the Belgrade export slaughter-houses are a model.

The second point on which Serbia lays great emphasis is the question of communications. Austria has not got the power to cut Serbia off from the rest of the world. It cannot close the Danube or the route to Salonika; but these are roundabout routes, while the most direct communications lie through the Monarchy. Here is a door that has got to be opened if there is any genuine desire to meet Serbia. To-day, munitions, for example, have got to be sent via Salonika, since Austria will not give them passage. In time of war that would be comprehensible, but not in peace time; the refusal, then, does not enable Austria to prevent the import of munitions into Serbia, for that cannot be prevented; it merely compels them to go over Salonika and the refusal to permit transit is regarded merely as a piece of pretence.

Third, and most important, according to Milovanović, is Serbia's national future. Of the Young Turks he has no opinion, and thinks that a very short time will see the old chaos again in Macedonia. It is vital to Serbia's national interests to have a clear answer to the question: What is Austria's attitude? "For us it is essential to know what sphere is assigned to us in the eventual regulation of Macedonian conditions: how far our claims are going to be recognised. Complete clarity on this point is the indispensable condition of any good understanding between ourselves and Austria." He referred to the Kossovopolje and Old Serbia, and kept coming back to the point that Serbia required some guarantee as to the lines of demarcation to be followed in the event of a partition of Macedonia. This was the pivot of the whole conversation. Milovanović wanted to have a definite assurance as to Serbia's share in the Turkish inheritance in Macedonia. Naturally, too, we had some talk about Bosnia.

Milovanović realises that the administration deals seriously with political demonstrations and must set a dam against certain aspirations. At the same time, there must be changes in Bosnian administration. The whole political outlook there would be cleared if changed relations were established between the Monarchy and Serbia. Conditions in Bosnia, moreover, would be modified by a revolution in public opinion in Serbia, since popular opinion is the decisive factor with the Serbs. The reason of Milan's failure is that he never succeeded in understanding it. Kállay committed a capital error in neglecting education in Bosnia. From this, Milovanović passed on to a long discourse on Catholic and Orthodox systems of Church government. Catholic propaganda can never get anywhere: it merely deepens the existing gulf. Croats and Serbs speak the same language, but for centuries the former have been under Byzantine, the latter under Roman influences. Hence their different development, with the result that, despite their common tongue, they represent two nations. The higher classes are working, however, for some sort of ethical and æsthetic union of Serbian and Croat elements. This aspiration for the realisation of a common cultural inheritance has got to be recognised; just as, in the case of the German-Austrian, there is no denying his kinship with the German realm. For this reason, he sharply condemned the Agram Trial. The development of Bosnia depends on the emancipation of the peasants: Kállay was entirely wrong in trying to find support among the Mohammedans. They may represent a relatively peace-loving element; a fine, gentlemanly people, and, as such, sympathetic to the Magyars, but they are useless in any modern State, apart from the fact that, anyhow, there is no satisfying them.

Running like a scarlet thread through our long, discursive conversation was the idea he put before me that, if Austria could contemplate a complete revolution in its Serbian policy, an economic and political *rapprochement* was possible.

In Bosnia, too, the Monarchy had got to strike out on a new line, ruling firmly, but in such a way as to promote the real economic interests of the people, recognising national consciousness, and giving this recognition scope in the spirit of its administration.

The general impression I gathered was that Milovanović desired to put out a feeler to discover whether and how far Austria could contemplate a fundamental change in its Serbian policy. This was obviously the object of his journey to Vienna, and our conversation was designed to serve this same end. I got the impression that he was genuine in what he said, although I do not conceal from myself that I am in no position to measure how far he was speaking without *arrière pensée*.

I naturally at once went to see Aehrenthal, in order to communicate to him in detail all that had passed.

I warmly expressed the convictions I had so often put out in full and in vain in the Delegation. The centre of gravity of the Serbo-Croat world must be placed within the Monarchy, and, within it, must be guaranteed freedom of self-development; the policy of annexation must be followed up by a policy of attraction; our whole South Slav policy, both external and internal, must be fundamentally changed. Once again, however, I experienced disappointment. Aehrenthal seemed to be more or less familiar with the run of Milovanović's ideas, but described them as the music of the future. He had said to Milovanović, when he raised the question of Serbia's national interests in Macedonia, "Let us speak of the present: when it improves, we can begin looking into the future." He therefore declined to enter on Milovanović's main desire, and that in a form that once more left the Serbian Minister quite in the dark as to Austrian intentions.

Aehrenthal did not go into the idea with me as a whole: he picked out a point here and there, and ended by singing the praises of Tisza and Bienerth. Our conversation lasted an hour and a half, and, in spite of all my efforts, we got further and further away from the subject on which I had sought him out. Therefore I need only devote a couple of lines to this talk. He complained that Darányi, the Hungarian Minister of Agriculture, was making a mess of everything, and preventing the conclusion of any commercial treaties. He declared that the Agram Trial was a piece of nonsense. Rauch was a ticklish customer. Of Trialism nothing, of course, could come, but Bosnia might be a useful counter in the game of Dualism. He was mainly preoccupied with Hungarian affairs. He is greatly taken up with Tisza, whom he described as the man of the future for the whole Monarchy. The Kossuth-Jústh policy must be smashed and, once it was smashed, there should be a chance of setting up a '67 Cabinet, on new foundations. He set out to me in detail that the Emperor would make no concessions to Hungary in military matters, although he, Aehrenthal, desired negotiations, in the economic sphere, between the two States of the Monarchy. He spoke about enquiries on the question of gold payments, and of an intermediate Customs line—none of which, however, was to be binding, since there was always the hope that the '67 Cabinet would arrange it all differently, in the end. What he said about Hungarian affairs seemed to imply that we were to pursue a dilatory, evasive, insincere sort of policy, a policy of gradual wearing down, with some notion that, in the end, we might make a clean sweep of it all; and in this Tisza was to agree.

The details in which he lost himself are of no intrinsic interest except in so far as they serve to show he was allowing himself to become absorbed in and crushed by the dreary weight of all these "shoddinesses" and the possible and impossible criss-cross of domestic policy; to such an extent, indeed, that it was not possible even to have an academic discussion with him on any larger conception of foreign policy.

From the Hungarian crisis he passed to the Austrian, and here too he mentioned some petty matters, which, however, plainly interested him less, since they did not seem to him so dangerous as the Hungarian.

I left Aehrenthal, much dissatisfied. He had simply let drop everything I had discussed so thoroughly with Milovanović. I went to him, eager to see that Milovanović got the right answer, and he gave me nothing but pæans on Tisza, the incarnation of Hungarian intolerance and short-sightedness!

Soon, however, I perceived that the object of Aehrenthal's long-winded excursus on Hungarian and Austrian policy was to evade the subject I had put before him. In the course of our talk he only touched on general Far Eastern policy in a casual remark on the growing antagonism between England and Germany in Constantinople, which he did not pursue further. This was simply an instance of his usual habit and trick of referring to the main point only by the way. Thus there was no reference in our conversation to the fact that Germany's Eastern policy, with its far-flung aims, now dominated the situation, and Austria was confronted, in the Balkans, with the old dilemma—either to support Turkey or carry on a Southern Slav policy. The very day after my talk with Aehrenthal I received confirmation of this, and the explanation of his evasive bearing. I learned from a person in close touch with the German Emperor that the latter is now very actively concerned to bring about a close union between Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Turkey. The leader of the Turk deputation in Vienna is said to have offered Aehrenthal a military convention with Austria-Hungary. He put him off; he must reflect upon the matter. In Germany everyone believes, so it is said, in an approaching conflict with Russia, and Turkey's military power is still regarded as worth something. Above all, the German Emperor is preoccupied with the great question of the future—whether Mesopotamia is to be a second Egypt—*i.e.*, English; or Germany's Bagdad policy is to prevail. This gave me the key to Aehrenthal's attitude to Milovanović. He saw quite well that the Balkan situation demanded a new South Slav policy and a new attitude to Serbia on our part, but at the same time he was tied by the tail to Germany's Eastern policy. And, for him, this last was plainly at once more actual and more urgent; any change in our South Slav policy would bring him into collision with the selfish and short-sighted agrarian policy of Hungary, nor could he count on any support from the German parties in Austria, who simply did not understand Balkan politics. Therefore he did not throw himself whole-heartedly into either of the two courses. In Balkan politics, so he observed to me shortly after, two turns are necessary—one with Germany for Turkey, another for the Slav peoples. Our South Slav policy was to be wrecked on this double game.

The desire of reaching an agreement with the Monarchy was not extinguished in Serbia. The question whether the future of the nation was to be achieved with or against Austria still swayed to and fro. With due reserve I refer here to a visit I find noted in my Diary as paid me on May 19, 1910, in Graz by Dr. Emil Gavrila, a lawyer, from Budapest. I had been for some time in touch with this gentleman, who possessed an intimate knowledge of the autonomous administration of Serbian schools and churches, and placed a wealth of material on these questions at my disposal. I have often talked over these matters with him. Since he was regarded as being in close touch with the Serbian Government, he was looked at askance in Austria, subjected to police supervision, and finally denounced. On this occasion he came to me, so he told me, on behalf of Jeftanovič, the Serbian leader in Sarajevo, whom I had known personally for several years. As usual, he had a great deal to tell me of conditions in Bosnia, and finally came out with the statement that there were Serbians in the Kingdom and in Bosnia who cherished the notion of uniting all the Serbs under the Habsburg sovereignty. The desire for union was extremely strong among the Serbs. To live side by side with the Croats, whose mentality was altogether different, was impossible for them. They would like to shake them off and hand them over to the Hungarians. On the other hand, the union of the Kingdom of Serbia with Bosnia and of Herzegovina and Dalmatia, too, was ethnologically, economically, and geographically necessary. At the head of this union they would like to put a son of the Austrian House by secundogeniture—they even had got so far as to contemplate the son of the Heir to the throne, Francis Ferdinand, for this position. This new State should inherit the Serbian territories in Old Serbia and Macedonia, when Turkey's hour finally came. This, again, was cardinal. The eyes of all Serbs were on this inheritance, and what they sought was some sort of guarantee and form for the fulfilment of this hope of theirs. Gavrila's fantastic picture expresses that fact. It was what really occupied Milovanović, when he knocked at Aehrenthal's door in November 1909. If the Monarchy had been able to give the Serbian people something to look forward to, along these lines, the course of events in the Balkans would in all probability have been wholly different from what it actually proved.

VI. THE FRIEDJUNG TRIAL

The Friedjung Trial proves how easy it is for a statesman, at a time of crisis, to take a false step which unleashes consequences extending far beyond the possibly insignificant event which gives them rise.

The conflict with Serbia which developed out of the annexation of Bosnia reached its zenith in March 1909. We were on the razor's edge between war and peace: our papers did their utmost to stir up fever against Serbia. Military influences pressed for war. Aehrenthal kept his head, however, and stood firm for peace. He caused a statement to be made in the House by the Prime Minister, Bienerth, on March 23, 1909, in which he definitely upheld the Austrian point of view, while asserting that he was pursuing no aggressive designs against Serbia and was not carrying out a policy of prestige. He urged patience, while pressing for the immediate solution of an intolerable condition of things. I was of the same opinion, and agreed with Aehrenthal that I would intervene in this sense in the debate in the Upper House. Since this debate never took place, I wrote a leading article in the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* of March 25, 1909, in which I described the condition of Serbia as pathological in its senseless passion and the tortuosity of its policy, said that the ridiculously challenging tone taken up by the Press there was intolerable, and demanded an immediate ending to such a state of things. At the same time I suggested that, in view of the vast discrepancy between the power and position of the two States, we could afford to keep our patience to the last possible moment, in view of the tasks before us in the Balkans, which required both power and generosity for their solution.

The *Neue Freie Presse* of the same date contained a long and carefully argued article by Friedjung, taking the exactly opposite point of view and containing an impassioned attack upon Serbia and the Serbo-Croat coalition in Croatia. It proved, later, that the historian had raised his voice on the responsibility of and in understanding with the Foreign Minister. In moving and supremely assured tones, basing himself on authentic documents in his own possession, and filled with perfervid zeal, he brought an indictment against the Government, the King and the people of Serbia, and against the Coalition, which he actually accused of treasonable machinations against the Habsburg Monarchy. What to this day remains a mystery is how an article composed in the tones of a war fanfare came to be published on March 25, since, by then, Serbia was already on the high road to submission, busy producing the explanations for which we asked, and dismissing its reservists—in other words, events were entered on a peaceful course. Whether the Foreign Office Press bureau made a mistake, or really wanted, even at this hour, to let off a shot against Serbia, the bullet was out of the barrel—and a veritable boomerang it was to prove.

Since Friedjung had accused the parliamentary party in Croatia *en bloc*, without naming individual names, of treasonable associations, the 52 members of the Serbo-Croat Coalition immediately filed an action against him for criminal libel. A second and parallel charge was laid against the editor of the *Reichspost* for a similar offence; and there was also a third charge laid by a Croat member, Dr. Supilo, which, however, played but a subsidiary part, and need not be referred to in any detail here. It was not till nine months later, in December 1909, that the suit, after every conceivable sort of delay, actually came before the Vienna jury. Meantime, during the summer, a monstrous case had filled the stage at Agram, and created the most unfortunate possible background for the Vienna trial. The way was prepared for the Agram case by numerous arrests there in October 1908, and the verdict of the Court of first instance was not delivered till October 1909. The Hungarian Government charged the leaders of the Serbo-

Croat Coalition, on the flimsiest suspicions, of organising a separatist movement of a highly treasonable character. The charge rested on the evidence of a Crown witness who was, in fact, a most notorious informer, a man in the habit of going about the Serbian regions denouncing people. The conduct of the trial was highly partisan, and the result was described by the entire Slav Press as a judicial scandal. The matter was raised in the Austrian Parliament in an interpellation by Masaryk. His condemnation of the whole proceeding was not only loudly echoed by the Slavs; there were many on the German side who viewed the Agram transaction as a shocking business, an outrage. The Hungarian Government wanted to make the Coalition politically impossible, and the criminal prosecution bore this political tendenciousness on its face. The endless protraction of the case, the tumultuous interruptions that marked its course, the partisanship shown by the tribunal, and the uncontrolled bearing of the accused, did in fact make the case an international scandal. A document was published at the time in Paris under the title, "Le procès d'Agram et l'opinion Européenne," in which a large number of distinguished men—among them Björnson, Vandervelde, Branting, Jorga in Bucarest, Gabriel Monod, Georg Tazy in Geneva, Professor Denis, the aged Frederick Harrison, H. M. Hyndman, the British Socialist, Yves Guyot, Barzilai, Lombroso, and others—criticised the case more or less sharply; and, unfortunately, most of these gentlemen being ignorant of our constitution, criticised Austria rather than Hungary, which was solely responsible. The upshot was that Radicals all over Europe were mobilised against our policy. That the trial was political was undeniable: and the way in which it was conducted was unheard-of according to European standards.

Aehrenthal found the affair becoming embarrassing, as it dragged on, month after month. After the crisis had passed its height, he strove to establish some sort of tolerable relations with Serbia, which he desired on economic grounds, apart from others. The ill-feeling against Austria unleashed by the trial threatened to spoil his plans. In vain did he appeal to Wekerle to clear the case out of the way: he got nothing out of the Hungarian Prime Minister, who had plunged into the affair and was blind to the consequences of this travesty of justice. The case ended in the condemnation of the accused to long terms of imprisonment, which had, later, to be remitted, but at the time created a state of feeling most detrimental to the whole Monarchy. The irritation throughout the entire Slav world during the course of the Friedjung trial, an irritation inflamed to bitter animosity, cannot be understood except when seen against the background of the Agram trial.

I followed the course of the Friedjung case before the court most carefully. The crowded audience revealed the political character of the trial. Correspondents of foreign papers showed a keen interest in it, among them being Mr. Wickham Steed, of *The Times*, whose hostility to the Habsburg Monarchy was well-known. Professor Masaryk, who also appeared as a witness in the case, was present throughout its course. Before it had gone very far, the trial took a turn that seemed to me to leave one course only open—namely, its conclusion by a compromise. My efforts to bring this about, however, were misunderstood, and even taken very much amiss in the quarter to which I thereby rendered the greatest service. The trial created the highest possible excitement, through a concentration of every kind of circumstance; I shall merely record its broad outline here.

The Austro-Hungarian Embassy in Belgrade had for years been in touch with confidential agents who submitted documents to it of which it took a very serious view. A great mass of material was collected, containing, as is always the case with contributions from paid spies whose livelihood depends on their collections, a mixture of true, false, and falsified stuff. When war threatened with Serbia, Aehrenthal caused his Press office to put a part of this material at the disposal of the historian Friedjung, in order that he might thereby justify the Monarchy's war-making before the world, and, as he put it, supply an apparatus of motives for that war-making. The historian worked up this material, and Aehrenthal declared that he was satisfied with the article produced as a result.

The whole thing turned, in the main, on reports and receipts of the Belgrade Union *Slovenski jug*, which were supposed to show that this Union was the headquarters of our opponents, the core of the conspiracy against Austria: that, by it, money bribes had been paid to members of the Coalition; and to prove the connexion between it and Belgrade.

Friedjung further relied on a report by Spalajkovič, the leading officer in the Serbian Foreign Office, to Pasič, the Prime Minister, to demonstrate the existence of a highly treasonable understanding between individual members of the Coalition and the Serbian Government. In similar fashion, the Vienna daily newspaper *Reichspost* was supplied with material which it employed for its defence. Among this was a striking set of instructions from the Serbian Foreign Minister, Milovanović, to the Serbian Ambassador in Vienna, containing detailed plans for the pursuit of Greater Serbian aims inside the Monarchy.

On the very threshold of the affair, one met incomprehensibilities. It was incomprehensible that Aehrenthal, who must have been aware of the character and origin of the material supplied by the Belgrade embassy, should have used such material, of the type employed everywhere in the darker reaches of diplomacy, for a public action; still more incomprehensible that he did not obtain proof of the genuineness of the written exhibits. It is difficult to find any explanation of this carelessness. Equally incomprehensible, too, is the attitude of Friedjung. From the beginning, and throughout the case, he seems to have allowed himself to be hypnotised into a conviction of the genuineness of the documents, which he submitted to no sort of proof, and although he attempted throughout to fortify his position by coming forward as a historian, he completely forgot the most elementary duties of historical investigation.

Very soon after the Friedjung revelations appeared, a cry was raised from the Southern Slav side that the documents on which he relied were forged, and, when they were submitted to closer inspection in the Foreign Office, the experts there did actually declare that some of the signatures on the facsimile papers were blank forgeries. Actually, the Embassy had only been able to lay hands on copies of the documents that were put in, and in some cases mere photographic copies: the originals were not in their possession, they had only been given a glance at them by their agents. Friedjung and his counsel, with nothing in their hands but these copies, were greatly embarrassed when their authenticity was challenged, and justifiably troubled about their proofs. So, in the weeks before the trial opened, there was a lively exchange of letters between Friedjung and the officials in the Austrian Foreign Office who had the affair in hand (Macchio and Oppenheimer) as well as between the latter and our Minister in Belgrade, Count Forgách, who cast about to find proofs of reliable character for Friedjung.

On November 20, 1909, Friedjung addressed a letter to Aehrenthal, in which he put before him, in moving tones, that, " As a man of honour, he could not bring forward such serious charges, without being in possession of documents to substantiate them with." " Since," so he continues, textually, " in the article submitted to Your Excellency, I expressly stated that I was relying on such documents, I must, as a historian, produce these papers in my own justification. This is the vital point." Friedjung became more and more pressing, Aehrenthal more and more aloof, his diplomats more and more anxious. Forgách in Belgrade, who held obstinately to the genuineness of the *Slovenski jug* protocols—another of the imcomprehensibilities of the trial—now began to perceive the magnitude of the danger in which he, the Foreign Office, and Aehrenthal were involved. In numerous letters and reports he now declared that the trial was the most impolitic step that could be taken: it would let loose a storm, directed by Russia, against the Monarchy: it would be better for Friedjung to discover some honourable mode of retreat. Such documents are of the greatest service, but one cannot produce them in court. He moans—"We must have nothing to do with the trial officially." If Friedjung is to base his defence merely on the confidential papers, the trial will be nothing short of a political monstrosity. The world will shake its head if it sees us, a year after annexation, and half a year after making peace with Serbia, again attacking it and its statesmen. Unconsciously, these words describe the reflex action of the trial on the mind of the Slavs, but it was too late to stop it. In these circumstances, far from auspicious, it opened on December 9, 1909.

Of the accusers, 23 were present, among them being Field-Marshal Lieutenant Tomicič in uniform, Count Pejacsevich, the former Ban of Croatia, the ex-Vice Ban Nikolić, and Dr. Medaković, President of the Croatian Diet. All representative citizens of Croatia. Nor was the much-talked-of Dr. Supilo absent. Friedjung made a three hours' speech, which was not a defence but a fresh attack on the Serbian Government and the Coalition, in the course of which he boasted that he based his charges on documents obtained from "high places," by means of which he could prove all he said. The whole thing was delivered with challenging self-confidence and an offensive scorn for the accusers. A similar line was taken by the editor of the *Reichspost*. There was a long and most bitter exchange of speeches, but when it came to the examination of proofs, such details fell into the background as it appeared, step by step, with incontrovertible force, that the documents were actually forgeries. The first big sensation occurred when Professor Marković, a Belgrade teacher of criminal jurisprudence, came forward voluntarily as a witness to declare that the Protocols of the *Slovenski jug*, in which he was cited as speaking as President and which he was said to have signed, were forged, proving it by the fact that, at the time, he was not in Belgrade at all but in Berlin at a scientific gathering. The most dramatic moment in the trial came when Spalajković, chief officer in the Serbian Foreign Office, voluntarily entered the box, on the instructions of the Minister, Milovanović, to state that the latter's alleged instructions were forged, as was the alleged letter from Pasić. He pointed out gross errors and misinterpretations contained in these exhibits. Experts in Serbian proved that they contained Germanisms and Croatisms which made it impossible that they had been composed by a Serb. Davidović, an ex-Minister who also gave voluntary testimony, was another witness against the genuineness of the documents.

When Marković's presence in Berlin was officially confirmed from there, and Spalajković's evidence was also substantiated, it was no longer possible for anyone to doubt that the documents on which Friedjung and the *Reichspost* had based their charges were forgeries.

Meantime, Aehrenthal, perceiving the awkward fix he had got himself into by using papers obtained from spies, washed his hands of Friedjung, gave him no further assistance, and endeavoured to detach himself from the trial. For the historian, the position had become untenable. Such was the impression made by the proceedings that a compromise was reached. Affidavits were exchanged: Friedjung declaring that, in view of Professor Marković's alibi, the documents affecting him must be rejected, and that he was prepared to drop the other documents likewise. The accusers, on their part, recognised Friedjung's good faith, which no one had doubted, and withdrew their charges; whereupon the case was dismissed. The case against the *Reichspost* ended in similar fashion.

It is not the case, as has been erroneously reported by Mr. Seton Watson and others, that I was in any way commissioned by Aehrenthal to bring a compromise about. On the contrary. Aehrenthal said to me, a short time before, that he wished to know nothing of the matter; the trial was no concern of his. What happened was that Judge Wach, the President of the court, whose conduct of the case inclined at first to the side of the accused, finding himself more and more embarrassed, appealed to me. At his instance, I took a hand. He made a similar request to Professor Masaryk, and we worked on parallel lines to get the case settled out of court.

A sense of deep humiliation was produced in me by the fact that it was possible for the ex-Serbian Minister, Davidović, the Serbian Secretary, Spalajković, and Professor Marković from Belgrade to risk appearing voluntarily in Vienna as witnesses, and here to come forward with complete assurance to prove the falsity of the documents and so expose both the historian and the Foreign Office behind him; so painful indeed was this impression that I said to myself an end must be made of this hideous game. True, this was merely an emotion. More than that was at stake. It was easy to perceive that the members of the jury were becoming more and more disquieted and uneasy; this appeared from the questions they addressed to the parties in the case. They had begun to realise the dilemma in which they were becoming involved as the case developed. To acquit Friedjung—as a large section of our Press was noisily clamouring for them to do, and as the Foreign Office expected them to do—would, after the complete breakdown of his attempt to substantiate his evidence, be a patently false verdict, from which they very properly shrank, since they saw how it must injure our repute in the eyes of the world. On the other hand, if they condemned the historian, they were at the same time condemning those who stood behind him. The compromise, therefore, was a relief to their consciences, as was shown in the parting words of a member of the jury, who, at the close of the proceedings, expressed the satisfaction of his colleagues that the case had thus been settled in a manner that, they hoped, might redound to the welfare and betterment of our country. The Croatian members, too, had good reasons for being satisfied with this solution. Friedjung's acquittal could not but have injured his accusers in the eyes of many, while his condemnation must have deepened and poisoned existing political antagonisms. As for Friedjung himself, his incomprehensible lack of critical faculty made his position more and more painful as the trial went on. He had been shamefully used by Aehrenthal. But he was by no means clear of blame himself, He laid himself open to such abuse by his fantastic loyalty, his credulousness, and his overweening conceit. In the box, nothing could induce him to admit where the documents had come from, although the whole world knew their origin. After the trial, Friedjung broke off all relations with Aehrenthal, and remained inaccessible when, some time later, the Minister made an effort to approach him through a former lady of the Court, Madame de Ferénczy. The only person who was really displeased with the ending of the case was Aehrenthal himself. He took my having intervened extremely ill, and actually imagined—ostrich!—that acquittal would have been better for him.

The whole business of these forgeries was, in fact, a vast plant, by which the Embassy in Belgrade had been deceived, and the only question was: Why did nobody see through it? Some of the documents were forgeries on the face of them. One glaring example. At the time of the Serbian crisis, the Austrian Government used the so-called instructions of Milovanović to the Serbian envoy in Vienna, which have been referred to more than once, as a means of rousing feeling against Serbia. Bienerth called a number of German members together, and, in strict confidence, communicated the text of these instructions to them as proof of the existence of a widespread conspiracy against the Monarchy and of the dangerous situation in which it found itself. They were assumed to be a sort of preparation for war. My old friend, Dr. Pergelt, who took part in this would-be hair-raising meeting, came to me directly afterwards, and read me the text which he, being a first rate shorthand writer, had taken down as it was read to them, asking me dubiously whether I believed the document to be genuine. At my suggestion, we then went to Baron Schwegel, since I was sure the old diplomat would have no doubts upon the matter. After hearing the document read out, he at once stated his definite opinion that we had a forgery before us. He pointed out that no Foreign Minister would dream of setting out all the details of far-flung political plans in this way in an instruction, in writing, to an envoy. The whole style of the document was against its diplomatic origin; phrases like "fraternal Russia," "the fraternal Kingdom of Bohemia" and "golden Prague," which occurred in the alleged instruction, were never employed in diplomatic intercourse.

In justice to the Foreign Office staff, however, it must be stated that there were persons among it who doubted the genuineness of the document. Since Aehrenthal, however, insisted on it, no one dared to contradict him; when one civil servant did make the attempt, the Minister exploded. As a rule, Aehrenthal was highly conscientious: this time, however, his prejudices ran away with his judgment. When the case was at an end, and there was no longer any possibility of doubt that the documents were forgeries, he addressed a communication on January 26, 1910, to the Austrian Minister in Belgrade, in which he demanded to know whether, despite the suspicions thrown upon them in the case, the documents could still be regarded as genuine, or, at least, as possessing a sufficient basis of genuineness; to which, on February 1, 1910, Forgách replied at length to the effect that before and since, on internal and external grounds, he had no doubt that the documents were genuine.

This case had two aspects. Political mistakes, committed throughout years on both sides of the Save, had progressively undermined relations between the Monarchy and Serbia. The longer our negative South Slav policy lasted, the more extensive and the more dangerous became the propaganda carried on, on every kind of line, by Belgrade. The net of this propaganda had long been woven in all parts of the Dual Monarchy. Even so, there was no attempt on our side either to countervail the real forces that animated this anti-Austrian movement; we still underestimated their strength. In the trial, the actual situation was presented upside down. Thanks to the clumsiness of our diplomacy, the very Serbian influences whom the Minister set Friedjung to accuse appeared as our accusers. The appearance of the Belgrade actors at the trial was a grisly comedy. Far from succeeding in revealing anything, we were compelled to beat a retreat lest worse might befall us. Fighting cannot, in fact, be done with the sort of methods employed by Aehrenthal. Time was to show with appalling clarity that, in our time, when the opposing forces are not Cabinets but peoples, a campaign of lies injects a deadly poison into international moral and human relations. Aehrenthal should not have trod this path if he desired ever to reach a tolerable footing with Serbia.

If possible, the other aspect of the trial was even more evil. To attack the entire Serbo-Croat Coalition—*i.e.* the overwhelming majority of the national representation of Croatia, including the most representative men in the country—demonstrated a complete failure to understand political conditions there. No race had been so gravely sinned against by Austrian policy as the Croatian. Small wonder if their politics fell into devious paths. Yet the solid basis of the nation was still true to the Habsburg Monarchy. Whether or no its leaders had, recently, taken to right ways or wrong politically, to level an anonymous accusation against them *en masse* was to indict the nation and blacken its face before the world—an action of blank idiocy. The one great gain secured by the compromise which ended the trial was that it avoided supreme disaster—the acquittal of the historian, which would have sanctioned his charges.

A trifling episode proved to me the degree of attention with which the people of Croatia had followed the trial, and how universal was the feeling among them that the good name of their country was at stake. Staying for a brief period during the winter of 1910 in Lovrana (Istria), I visited an antique dealer at Volosca who was a Croat. When I gave my name and address, the old man stared at me and asked whether I was the gentleman "who had helped the Croats in the Friedjung trial"—whereupon he thanked me and shook me by the hand.

The waves raised by the trial unhappily did not abate long after its conclusion. Professor Masaryk followed up the case: filled by that passion for truth which he had shown in other important instances, he travelled up and down the South Slav regions collecting material to enable him to clear the whole matter up. As a matter of fact, there was nothing more to discover. The evidence at the trial had shown that the Embassy and Aehrenthal had been deceived by forgers; and the further conclusion to which Masaryk actually came was incorrect. He attacked Forgách for having taken part in the forging himself, whereas the entire correspondence between the Embassy and the Foreign Office proves that, on the contrary, he had been throughout an obstinate and inconceivably blind believer in the genuineness of the documents, and took Aehrenthal in because of this blind conviction of his. Aehrenthal did not come off well in the duel between him and Masaryk in the Delegation's autumn session. He was naturally unable to make any reply to a series of questions by Masaryk, because he could not admit that he had been privy to the affair and had known of and approved Friedjung's article. He had to evade the interrogatories addressed to him, and did so very clumsily, making quite unjustified personal attacks on Masaryk, and speaking with obvious irritation.

Thus, the after-effects of the Friedjung trial deepened and embittered existing antagonisms, and barred the way to a straightforward South Slav policy.

VII. BELGRADE IN 1911

PAGES FROM MY DIARY

Vienna, June 5, 1911.

SHORTLY before starting for Belgrade I had a talk to-day with Gavrilović, the newly-appointed Serbian Minister for Cetinje. He appears to be a very serious-minded man, who speaks after due consideration and with reserve. He criticised severely the line taken by Austrian diplomacy in Serbia, and its lack of interest in the country and the people, and in intellectual life. Under Metternich, and even later, this had not been the case. Then, men had been sent to Belgrade who understood the language and the country. For example, men like Mihanović, the consul Atanasković, and especially Radosavljević, who had had a great influence in Serbia and was known as the Vice-Prince under Alexander Karageorgěvić. Finally, Kállay. Since then, none possessing these qualifications. Forgách had made many mistakes, through ignorance of the country, its inhabitants, and its conditions. This conversation strengthened my conviction that our diplomatic service in the Balkans requires thorough reorganisation. Intelligent handling of national self-consciousness ought to play a part in our diplomacy here.

Belgrade, June 8, 1911.

In marvellous moonlight, I crossed the Save yesterday evening by the great railway bridge, with the broad river glistening below. On arriving in Belgrade, I was merely asked my name and passed without trouble. The works of man are here as bad as that of nature is grand. I cannot recall such vile paving anywhere else. Bumping frightfully, I made my way uphill to the Grand Hotel, where I was received by German-speaking waiters and guides—Austrians. They were all very polite, although they did not know who I was, since I gave myself no titles in the visitors' book. Electric light throughout the town, and an obvious effort at Europeanism everywhere.

Early this morning I made my way to the Embassy. There are no guards. The building, erected by an Englishman and acquired from him for the Austrian Embassy, is neither roomy nor representative, but has its elegance. There is a small garden, with one great shady tree, and a Catholic chapel, the only one in Belgrade. The Chancellery is quite modestly furnished. Next, I went to our Consulate. On the way, my driver dealt a fellow with oxen, who did not make room for him at once, a hefty blow with his whip between the shoulders, cursing him loudly the while. The Balkan touch. The consul was for the moment absent. The vice-consul, who has not been here long, gives me information on many points, and I reciprocate. Antagonism to Austria is said to have been roused by annexation, and to have grown markedly since.

Belgrade, June 9, 1911.

My whole morning was occupied with visits to the Embassy, the Consulate, and the Foreign Minister, Milovanović, whom I was not so fortunate as to find. My friend Ginzkey in Maffersdorf introduced me to his representative in Belgrade, Mr. Kusmanović, who spoke freely to me of business conditions in Belgrade, which he knows thoroughly. He showed me over the National Bank, which has a very fine marble hall. In his view, the position of the Serbian exchange is not at all bad. Gold is little in circulation, however. In the same street as the Bank are many big merchant houses, among them some old, rich firms. Out of it, you turn into the Michaelstreet, where the best retail shops are. We inspected one or two of them pretty thoroughly. During the tariff war, Austrian goods vanished, but now they are gradually coming back. Austrian goods are the easiest for Serbia to import. The merchant here finds everything he wants in Vienna, in a way he cannot do if he has to rely on Berlin alone. The old connexions, which have both taste and habit behind them, are being renewed. Losses from the tariff war fell principally on Austrian silks, woollen yarns and tissues, made-up goods and printed fustians, whose supply has been taken over by Germany. Kusmanović estimates that, since the conclusion of the new commercial treaty, about half our lost export has been recovered, and that more can be got back, but that some loss will remain. The wholesalers in Belgrade import largely from England, France and Italy and sell to merchants in the provinces. The goods are cheap: the Serbian peasant wears cheap woollens from Leeds. Where the Michaelstreet turns in the Terazia and in the Terazia itself the shops are mostly small, and to-day Austrian goods are everywhere displayed in them. But the commercial treaty of January 1911 was concluded too late; orders had already been placed for the forthcoming season. Had it been put through a couple of months earlier we might have got the New Year orders. According to Kusmanović, it is a good thing that the Radicals are now in power, since there is at least some degree of stability. King Peter was put upon the throne on the strict understanding that he would sign whatever was put before him. The Radicals might wish to change their course, but they are bound by their own past. There was no prospect now of getting anything from Russia. It would, however, do everything in its power to uphold its prestige. Opposite the Konák, an Embassy is now being built at a cost of a million and a half. The Serbian peasant is pretty well off, but greatly annoyed with Austria because he has lost the market for his cattle. There is still a good deal of land not yet under cultivation.

In the evening, we took a walk in the Park (Volksgarten), where there are busts of Serbian statesmen and poets. Thence up to the fortress, a magnificent ruin with an extensive view, in various stages of decay. The walls, which we Austrians erected, are still standing in part, but the whole thing is in a neglected state. There is a four-fold fortification, of different dates. Inside it are moats, gardens, barracks (still in use): the whole a great block of masonry lifted high over the Hungarian plains, right above the confluence of the Save and the Danube—a situation resembling that of the Dufferin Terrace in Quebec above the junction of the St. Lawrence and the St. Charles rivers. The view over the windings of the Danube, which makes a sharp curve at this point, is superb. The centre of the great sweeping outlook is constituted by Semlin, which is not exactly opposite Belgrade but some 5 or 6 kilometres higher up the Danube. Before one stretch great unbroken fields, with no villages; in the distance the hills of Neusatz and Karlovic—historic ground in the story of Austrian military greatness and tenacity. I saw a magnificent sunset—the sun reflected, blood-red, in the waters of the rivers, and again in mile upon mile of inundated plains. As it gradually sank behind Semlin, the play of colour was glorious. There is a magic in this long vista, and the mind is somehow elevated by the commanding position of the place. Everything looked fresh and sparkling in the young green of June; the islands in the rivers were like shimmering meads.

In the centre of the fortress is the building inhabited by Milan as commander of the army. He has made some very attractive plantations all round. There are some antique cannon lying about, some being fine bronze pieces of German origin. One specially fine piece bears the inscription: " My name is fool's-head; I punish him who threatens me; Barthe Fiedler made me "—a sort of echo of the days when one heard good German everywhere in Austria. There are paths by which one can go right round the fortress, getting a delightfully varied view as one walks. On the far side, the horizon is bounded by the Serbian mountains, among them Avala Mountain. I observed some very fine conifers on this walk: fine specimens of the *Pinus strobus*, and a sort of short-needled fir, with rather a bushy growth.

Belgrade, June 10, 1911.

This afternoon I made a visit to Professor Dragoljub Pavlović of the University, to whom I had an introduction.

He offered to make me acquainted with the leading men in politics and the University. I had a long talk with him. He is a historian with a scientific outlook on things that does one good. He told me about the zeal of the Serbian young people for knowledge and education. If a Serbian goes to study abroad, as often happens, he goes to Vienna for medicine, to Germany for philosophy, for law to Leipzig or Munich, or, more rarely, Paris, for history to Germany or Paris, and for theology to Russia.

In the afternoon I did a tour of the town, with an excellent guide, and discovered another little mosque and the remains of the Turkish colony. Below the fortress is a lovely old Baroque gate, known as " Prince Eugen's Gate," on which the monogram of Emperor Charles VI can still be discerned. A Turkish bath is also still in existence and is used as a steam bath for the soldiers. I was also shown the barracks from which the conspirators dragged the cannon, their wheels wrapped up in straw, on the night of the murder of Alexander and Draga. The Skupshtina building is of wood. " There is often a good deal of liveliness in there, but not as much as in other Parliaments," said the man who took me round.

In the evening, I had a long talk with our Consul, Dr. Wildner, who comes from Reichenberg. He knows the country and the people well, and is thoroughly at home in economic matters. Both he and Baron Haymerle, the Secretary to the Embassy, said outright that it was a good thing for the Foreign Minister that the Friedjung trial had been broken off. Not before it was time.

Both these gentlemen were quite of my opinion about the way the Southern Slav States are being treated. They are being treated *de haut en bas*. They are full of mistrust. But if a real interest were to be shown in their aspirations, their language, institutions, and customs—a method that has long fallen out of usage—they would become quite different.

Belgrade, June 11, 1911.

Spent almost the whole day with Professor Pavlović. At first in the National Museum. The archæological and prehistoric collections cannot be compared with those in our museum at Sarajevo. But research in this direction is now beginning in Serbia. Roman remains have been excavated at Viminiatum (Kostolać), and at Naisos (Niś), the birthplace of Constantine the Great, where a magnificent bronze bust of the Emperor was discovered. It is splendidly preserved, a highly individualised head with expressive features, with traces of gilt here and there. I was struck by a large onyx cameo of a Thracian king on horseback and by some beautiful silver keys. The prehistoric collection is only in its infancy. There is a fine gold ornament from Vrbica and various specimens of pottery. The pictures in the National Museum gallery are mostly copies. A large portrait of Queen Natalie stands out. The chamber of Vuk Karadžić is set out with extreme piety—there are his furniture, pictures, samovar, all sent to the museum by his daughter. The ethnographical museum contains exhibits from every Serbian land. They are interesting, both in the details that are common and those that are distinct. The embroideries are beautiful. Even very poor women set much value upon that.

On the heights between Belgrade and Topčider lie the so-called vineyards, which are only partly planted with vines. There the Belgrade people go for summer holidays: there are villas with gardens, now blooming with roses. In the afternoon I paid some visits with Professor Pavlović in this delightful region. First to Professor Perić. He belongs to the Progressive party, and was very forthcoming and communicative. He gave a highly coloured picture of the position of Serbia—surrounded, unable to move either economically or politically, getting no effective aid from Russia, badly treated by Bulgaria, and, because seen to be isolated, rejected and threatened by Austria. All the same, he would be in favour of a pro-Austrian policy under certain conditions. We had a long conversation, in which I endeavoured to get him to state as definitely as possible his view of such a *rapprochement* with the Monarchy. Austria, he replied, must renounce any attack on Serbian independence; and Serbia must have certain guarantees for the future. The position of the Turkish element in Europe, and particularly in Macedonia, was no longer tenable. Sooner or later the present state of things was bound to come to an end. In the partition of Macedonia, Serbia seeks to have its share. Austria should not rob it of the hope of getting this, for national ideas cannot be suppressed. Any approach on the part of Serbia to Austria could only be accomplished step by step, and the various stages had got to be gone through—commercial treaty, Customs alliance, military convention, finally, union with the other Southern Slavs in the Monarchy—the object being a relation to the Monarchy analogous to that of Hungary, under which it might form together with the Monarchy a great common realm, closely allied with Germany. For Germany he has the greatest respect: against it he would do nothing. Perić takes account of the German drive to the East, and has no desire to oppose it, preferring union with the Triple Alliance, although, at the same time, he desires access to the Adriatic for Serbia, and thinks that not superfluous, even on the assumption that there is a Customs Union with the Dual Monarchy. Stress was laid by him on the need for demonstration that different ideas are held in the Monarchy about its relations to Serbia, and that different men should decide on them from those in power to-day. A wholly new treatment of Serbia requires to be substituted. It is not for the small to approach, but for the great to take the initiative. The line of thought is the very same as that which Milovanović expressed eighteen months ago. Perić was so impressive in his development of this picture of a new Austro-Serbian policy that I believe he still thinks it possible. He rather departed, however, from his programme of association and friendship when he admitted that Serbia had been sharply disappointed, and as it were awakened from a dream, by Annexation. When I retorted that it could have been foreseen, he replied that there was still a hope that a great transforming war might yet lead to the evacuation of the provinces. Russia had been a great disappointment. Plain to see how Russia is fostering the notion in Serbia that Austria will, after all, have to give up the provinces again. I told him that events in Turkey had compelled us to annex, and he saw this from our standpoint. But he kept coming back to his point that Austria must assume a different attitude towards Serbia, and that an improvement in our relations, while it must take place gradually, was still possible.

Our next visit was to Ljuba Jovanović, a Bocchese. We talked Italian and German. In the main, he said the same as Perić. Milan was very intelligent, but superficial, and never loved the Serbian people. Proof, a letter from Biarritz to his wife in which he advised her to impress upon their son not to trust any Serb! Milan was an adherent of Austria, but Austria has not yet won Serbia as a result. The Austrians ought to take more trouble to get to know conditions in the country, as to which they were not informed.

Belgrade, June 12, 1911.

Belgrade makes an unfinished impression on one, but Western Europeanism is everywhere in the ascendant. The streets are mostly planted with trees, look attractive, and are shady and agreeable. The tastefulness of the drapers' shops reminds one of Vienna. I saw soldiers—some smart, others shabby. The officers are mostly well turned-out. The Royal Konak is a tasteless erection. The portion in which the murder of the King and his wife took place is shut up. The garden is protected from the street by a fence. Opposite, placed so as to be able to watch the Konak, is the Russian Embassy, for which a great new palace is building.

A visit to the park at Topčider was a pleasure. Old Milos' Konak, in which he died, is there. It is a magnificent model of Turkish architecture, which here is only found, now, in isolated examples. The projecting roofs, the fine disposition of the windows, the open galleries and thrown-out bays, the pleasing decorative work, and the colonnades give a great charm to the whole. Yet, despite the beauty of its details, this style has hardly been copied by modern architects, either here or in Bosnia, presumably on Nationalist grounds. The park at Topčider is very rich in splendid old trees. Behind the Konak is a century-old plane, whose branches, supported all round the tree by an encircling fence, make a great halo of shade about it. There are admirable specimens of white beech in the gardens. The moisture of the valley encourages a lush growth of vegetation, and the abundant foliage of the trees, with their heavily-laden branches, is extremely picturesque. Behind the garden is the great deer park.

Belgrade, June 14, 1911.

I have brought with me, to read on my journey, Ranke's too-little known book on "The Serbian Revolution," which I once read with great interest and am now turning over again. The ideal premises of the book have certainly now vanished. I also have with me Siegfried Kapper's translation of Serbian songs. On the spot, these chants acquire fresh life. I was very glad when my tireless guide made me acquainted with Professor Ljubomir Stojanović, ex-Minister, Councillor, and member of Parliament, who told me much of the co-operation between Ranke and Vuk Karadžić. He is editing his letters, and is thoroughly familiar with his works. This Vuk Karadžić was the son of a South Hungarian peasant, went to school in Karlovac, became a writer for the insurrectionists, first in Serbia then in Semlin, and a Customs official in Negotin—thus being occupied alternately first on one side of the frontier then on the other. In 1813, he came to Vienna, and there made the acquaintance of Kopitar, from whom he soon became inseparable, a fact that had a decisive influence on his life. After travels which took him as far as Russia, he was for a time secretary to Prince Miloś, and a life-long adherent of the Obrenovićs.

Vuk Karadžić is the creator of the Serbian literary language and orthography. He pursued his literary aims with enormous diligence and huge tenacity of purpose. He composed a lexicon and collected Serbian popular and heroic songs, a first edition of which he printed in Vienna in 1813. The second edition, however, was held up and forbidden in Vienna, and finally printed in Leipzig. He was in contact with Goethe, whom he interested in Serbian folk songs, and also with Jacob Grimm.

It was about this time that Ranke's book on the Serbian Revolution was written; they worked at it together and shared the profits; and it is a most interesting piece of co-operation between two very different minds. This explains the warm tones in which Ranke describes the force and the enthusiasm behind the rising of the Serbian people. The book shows how the beginnings of civilisation in Serbia were carried thither by Serbs from the Habsburg Monarchy—a fact of which his collaborator was the living proof.

Vuk Karadžić lived down to his death in Vienna, in very humble circumstances, supported by small pensions from Serbia and Russia, and perpetually engaged upon his task. His remains were brought from the cemetery of St. Marx to Belgrade and interred before the cathedral there.

My next visit was to Professor Cvijić, whose geographical and ethnographical studies have won him a reputation extending far beyond the borders of Serbia. He is now one of the forces in Serbian life. Professor Suess in Vienna told me that he had once applied for a professorship there. His application was unsuccessful, however. He is not against a closer union with the Monarchy, but developed the same views that I meet everywhere here. He is engaged with Novaković and our aulic Councillor Jagić on the Slav encyclopædia, being editor for geography and natural science. This encyclopædia is planned as a counterblast to *divide et impera*, and as a means of forging an intellectual bond between Serbia and Croatia. He is not disposed to any approach between Serbia and Bulgaria. Were it possible, he would prefer union with the Dual Monarchy to a forced understanding with Bulgaria, whose ambitions in Macedonia are very strong at the moment, and extend even as far as Constantinople.

The patriarch of the learned and political world here is Stojan Novaković, who has been Prime Minister, and enjoys high consideration as President of the Academy of Science. I paid a visit to him at his villa in the vineyards, where he has a superb view over Belgrade, the course of the Save, and the heights of Topčider. Like everybody else here, he talks of the equal rights possessed by small nationalities, and the fact that they must not be driven or sacrificed by the great. The task of the Germans in Austria is, according to him, to facilitate co-operation of all the nationalities, instead of, as at present, only looking after Hungary. Like Cvijić, he emphasises the cultural unity of the Serbo-Croatian peoples, and is convinced that both will achieve the realisation of this unity. None here has spoken with so much assurance and conviction on this point as he does. His conclusion is that, in so far as it resists this cultural tendency, the Dual Monarchy will be committing the same error as it did in the past in Germany and in Italy. Hungarian policy is a flat contradiction of inevitable historical development.

In the evening I heard fundamentally the same views, expressed with much more liveliness of tone, by the President of the Belgrade merchants, Mr. Marko Vuletić, who came to see me. The substance of what he said was what I had already heard in so many quarters, but his expression was more popular. He regards Austria as a clerical State of a type that is no longer possible in the 20th century, when freedom of thought has got to be accorded to everybody.

This was what Novaković had already said, in more academic terms, when he remarked that the Serbians would not tolerate the sort of mental domination implied by the Catholic religion. Generally speaking, it was interesting to find the merchant agreeing with the great scholar, even on points of detail.

Belgrade, June 15, 1911.

Yesterday I had a nice motor run with Haymerle and Consul Wildner to Avala. It is a height with a ruin on it whence one gets a comprehensive view over the country round. At night Baron Seidler, Secretary to the Legation, gave a dinner. We had a lively conversation about the country and its people. I had recently read Brailsford's book on Macedonia and was much pleased to find myself sitting next to the German Ambassador, who is considered to have a great knowledge of Macedonia. He is a Swabian, but Prussianised. I tried to get him to tell me something about the Balkans. But he put me off with the remark that the best thing that could happen would be for the whole cauldron to be filled with petroleum and then set on fire.

Belgrade, June 17, 1911.

My stay is drawing to an end. To-day I paid my last calls. I was unlucky enough to miss several people, who were absent from Belgrade.

Bogdan Popović is a professor at the University. He lectures on comparative literature and æsthetics, and has a wide knowledge of Italian literature and art. He has travelled far and seen much, and is an admirer of Jacob Burckhardt, of whom we talked at length. We also exchanged ideas on the Dresden Gallery: then we got on to the general outlook in Serbia. The hemmed-in condition from which it suffers, economically, applies, he says, also to its literature and general mentality. Not much more than half a century ago the Turks were still here. Serbia is a small State, and, unlike other small European States, has not got centuries of development behind it. Now, everything has got to happen all at once. For that a State of 2½ million inhabitants is too contracted. That is why street paving, lighting, water supply, and building are all behind, and have to be promoted gradually. There is immense literary activity going on. Serbia has men of learning, but its market is too small for their work, their books, and their papers. Hence, the Serbs must endeavour to get into touch with the rest of the Serbo-Croat world. Hence, too, the significance of the Slav Encyclopædia, on which Novaković and Cvijić are at work. He complained bitterly of Austria's lack of readiness to understand all this. In the 20th century, no people could be deprived of light, life, and air. In fifty years, there will be so many Serbo-Croats that they will have to be reckoned with, for good or evil. Austria ought to make use of the force of this people. In Popović, again, I found a leaning towards Austria, but he holds that Serbia requires to be understood by Austria and to have its future guaranteed it.

I paid another visit to Milovanović. He is greatly depressed, for his son, to whom he is devoted, is dying. He notes an improvement in conditions, but feeling that I ought to take account of his obvious frame of mind, I cut my conversation with him short.

Something of a contrast to what I had heard so far was presented by the expressions of Kosta Stojanović, Minister of Trade throughout the crisis period, to whom I paid my final call. In him I felt the echoes of that time still sounding, but the man struck me as straightforward. He is for an alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria, and would only treat with Austria-Hungary on this basis. The advantage that he sees in this is that Serbia would speak with greater weight in the negotiations. His capital demand is for access to the sea. He hopes to reach agreement on that with the Albanians. Provisionally, however, he would accept a connexion with the Adriatic through Bosnia. I felt quite a different wind blowing through his words.

I have been at pains to outline here briefly all my conversations in Belgrade. They give a picture of opinion: one for me constantly filled in as I talked with my amiable guide, Pavlović. He told me that the Russian Ambassador holds open house for everyone in Belgrade. The French Ambassador is a learned historian, who has travelled all over the country and knows it better than most. He is in close touch with the intellectual world of Belgrade and much looked up to on that account. The English do less in this regard, the Germans still less, and the Austrians nothing. Serbia is a thoroughly democratic country and very social. The merchant is as acceptable at Court as any dignitary. The King and the Crown Prince meet everybody. There is no question of rank in marriage, and no noble class.

On our last walks, Pavlović asked me how I summed up the views prevalent here, to which I replied that everything said to me seemed to centre on the fact that the Serbs demanded of Austria security for the satisfaction and support of their national desires in the future partition of Macedonia. Pavlović stopped and said with a certain solemnity, "Yes—that is the root of the matter. You have got it, there."

Vienna, June 20, 1911.

I look back over my journey with mixed feelings. The development of Serbian into a written language, the first literary products, the introduction of European habits and of European economic needs—all this has been brought across the Save by Serbs from the Austrian Monarchy. Here, if ever, is a case where nature and the course of events indicate a union of States. Our unhappy relations with Serbia have grown up in despite of nature, of geography, of a common tongue, and of natural ties which unite the peoples on one side of the Save with those on the other. The great question is whether it is still possible for us to redeem the sins of omission and of commission on both sides which have bred so much bitterness and so many mutual misunderstandings.

PART TWO

BEFORE THE WORLD WAR

DIARIES, TALKS, TRAVELS AND LETTERS FROM LATE AUTUMN 1912 TO JUNE 1914

LATE AUTUMN IN 1912 IN SARAJEVO VIENNA AND BUDAPEST

PAGES FROM MY DIARY

Vienna, November 2, 1912.

Returning from a brief visit to Sarajevo, I wrote the following letter to Prince Max Fürstenberg:—

" As I promised, I will give a picture of the impressions made on my mind during a four days' visit to Sarajevo.

" I went thoroughly into things with Potiorek, almost all the higher officials in the Government, the leaders of the parties in the Diet, various bankers and old acquaintances.

" How does the war affect the views and outlook of the world there? One notices small external sign of it in the town, save that the tobacconists and booksellers, where the telegrams are displayed, are besieged from early morning till late at night. Internally, however, everyone is keyed up, and there is an enormous interest in the war. The Muslims are depressed, silent, and keep themselves retired to themselves. The Catholics (Croats) are divided. The poorer classes are neutral, but sympathise with the Christians. Under Archbishop Stadler's influence, the newspaper takes the Turk side, out of antagonism to Orthodoxy and in the interest of the pact which the Catholics have entered into with the Muslims in the Diet. The Serbs are naturally in high spirits. News of victory is celebrated in all the restaurants. Partisanship runs high. Over a thousand volunteers are serving in the Serbian army, and, so I am told, men who were under no sort of obligation. Cases are reported of men giving up good positions to go into Serbia to join up. Collections for the Serbian Red Cross are being made. 80,000 crowns have already been collected in Sarajevo, and two other towns have each produced 40,000. Linen and clothing are being sent. A course in nursing the wounded was arranged at the hospital in Sarajevo, attended by Serbian ladies, who are now going to the theatre of war. Old legends, current in popular story and song since the days of Zar Dušan and the battle of Kossovopolje, are now reviving in the most remarkable way and fill the imagination of the people. On one of my walks someone pointed out to me a tiny girl singing, on the streets, one of these old songs about the liberation of Serbia. Feeling reached its height with the news of the capture of the old Serbian royal capital, Usküb, and the entry into it of the heir to the Serbian throne. The old heroic days are coming to life again and breeding unmeasured hopes of the future. In Herzegovina opinion seems divided. An old Catholic peasant said to one of my friends, "We only heed what our old father (*stary otac*, the Emperor) says." But the Orthodox are for Montenegro. On September 22nd of this year, the annual conference of the great Serbian society, *Prosvjeta*, took place in Sarajevo and Serbs from all parts of Austria-Hungary, the Kingdom, Montenegro, and Macedonia assembled there. Ever since, it is common knowledge in Sarajevo, though little has leaked through into the newspapers, that a Balkan alliance exists and covers not merely the conduct of hostilities but the partition of Macedonia, a future tariff union, a common post and telegraph administration, and other matters. In the coffee houses, people talk, cards in hands, about the future of every place that is taken; for instance, on the division of the Sanjak: the right bank of the Lim river is to go to Serbia, the left to Montenegro. I have been informed, on very good authority, that there is much more in all this than is generally believed. In the conquered territories, the Serbians are behaving and establishing themselves in truly Prussian fashion. Three days after the battle at Kumanovo, and but a few days after Üsküb was captured, letters came to Sarajevo with Serbian stamps and the postmarks of these two places. A professor of literature at the University of Belgrade, whom I met there early in 1911, was nominated administrator of Mitrovica. So, occupation, and the introduction of Serbian administration, are being put through. Unless a miracle occurs and the Turks are victorious after all, no human being will be able to take from the Balkan peoples what they have won—and miracles do not happen.

"Equally interesting, again, is the view taken here of the future. The view of the Commander-in-Chief here, General Potiorek, who has talked openly to me, is the opinion of everybody in Sarajevo. Once the fate of Turkey is definitely sealed, it is idle for Europe to oppose the partition of Turkey. The sooner and the more benevolently we recognise accomplished facts, the better. Equally candid is the view taken that there can be no talk of striving for any territorial acquisitions; what is necessary is that we should put ourselves on the best possible footing, both politically and economically, with the States that are going to be aggrandised, and above all with Serbia. Here, what Potiorek thinks is that, assuming that the Slav States increase their power at Turkey's expense and form a ring round us, the position thus created could only be rendered tolerable for us by our concluding a trade and tariff alliance with Serbia and Montenegro, to be followed, later, by a military convention. If this proves unattainable, then he regards the outlook as very black, since he considers that, in such circumstances, the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent territory would prove untenable, for it would be impossible for it to resist the attraction of these two States. On the other hand, the idea of partitioning Bosnia and Herzegovina, in such an eventuality, between Austria and Hungary, is unanimously rejected by everyone who knows these regions and the passionate resistance any such proposal would rouse there. My authority indeed goes so far as to say that he would go to war to establish such a tariff union. But, of course, no one can be compelled to enter into trade relations: and if anything like an exclusive Balkan tariff union were to come into being, our situation down there would certainly be highly critical. Lombardy again!

"Among the Catholics, the idea of Trialism is pretty widely spread, and is being advocated notably by the Archbishop. But no Bosnian's heart is in it, since they are all great autonomists. Muslims and Serbs, who compose together well-nigh three-quarters of the population, are hostile to Trialism. The tone of the leaders of the latter is very black—yellow at the moment; and I imagine that the older men among them, who are interested in the present Diet and in politics, are quite genuine in this. About the younger generation, I can hardly speak: opinions, here, are very much divided about where they stand. Many hold that any hopes of really winning the Serbs to Austria are vain; others, however, are convinced that were Austria to get on to a really good footing with the Greater Serbia of the future, were intercourse and trade with it really free, and no attempt made to deny the cultural union of the Serbs with their brothers across the Drina, then the attitude of the Bosnian Serbs to Austria could be relied upon. What is quite certain is nothing whatever can be achieved by force or repression, for the Serbs are 43 per cent. of the population, and the richest, most energetic and efficient human beings that we have got in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their prosperity is visibly on the increase; they dominate trade and intercourse: are very ready to make sacrifices for national objects, for schools and education generally, and stand united in their aims. Unhappily, the reverse of this has to be said of the Catholics. They expect the Government to do everything for them, and are in many points disunited and mutually jealous. The Muslims, in true Turkish fashion, are backward and extremely apathetic in relation to European institutions. Nevertheless, Arnautović, the real leader of the Bosnian Muslims, earnestly assured me that they are aware that, if they are not to disappear and become impoverished, they must accommodate themselves to European ways, in particular as regards their schools. Many who know the country best are of the opinion that the expulsion of the Turks from Macedonia may well have the effect of making our Muslims, provided they are fairly treated, more settled, and arrest their tendency to emigrate, since Anatolia will be too far away for them to go. There was, so it seems to me, more than a mere phrase in what was said to me by Shek—almost the only really efficient man among the higher officials here—that our slogan here ought to be 'Firm and Fair.' General Galgotzy, well known as a commander in the field, was, soon after the occupation, military prefect of the Bilek district in Herzegovina, and was venerated as a god in his area. Even to-day he is remembered; people ask after him, and the old folks would gladly see him again. His one-time mistress, now an old woman, old Stanushka, enjoys universal honour and has a social position. Galgotzy was ruthlessly stern; hanged quite a number of men; but, in general, treated the people with good will, made his soldiers build roads and bridges, and showed the people how to lay out their gardens. He used to go about the mountains, alone, without sabre or pistols, with money in his pockets, saying: 'If they have the courage to waylay and kill an Austrian General, let them know that he has money.' A legendary figure, this. I do not cite this example by way of suggesting that we could govern here on these lines to-day; of course we could not: at the same time, the one feasible programme for us is the combination of clear purpose and effective and practical good will. That, however, is not how we are acting to-day. The new higher officials, appointed by Bilinski, are weak, some of them notoriously incapable, even scandalously so. The high administrative head, to whom I have already referred, Herr von Shek, who knows the country better than anyone, has, it is true, been retained by the new *régime*, but put in cold storage. The worst feature of all is the destructive effect of the parliamentary system. That its introduction, at all events in the present constitutional form, was premature is a point on which all men of insight are now at one. There ought to have been a transition period, with some sort of State Council—the view I took and substantiated in the Delegation as far back as 1908. Potiorek is entirely of my opinion on this. Whether the present constitution can go on functioning is dubious; as it is, it is revealing none of the good and all the bad sides of constitutionalism. As with us, every sort of promise is made to the various parties to get them to vote; ditto, the individual members—for this traditional Turkish method of winning their suffrages comes much more naturally to them than it does with us. Another serious evil in Sarajevo is the way the members intervene in administration. As time goes on, the effect of this must be even more destructive than it is with us, since an administration which is not yet consolidated is not made stronger by the intrusion of an autochthonous official element. Officials who, formerly, were entirely dependent on the Provincial Government and could therefore display a certain degree of firmness and continuity in their work, are now under the thumb of the Diet, the Sabor, and of its members and their Press. They are afraid to offend anyone, lest they are attacked in the Sabor and mentioned in the newspapers. It is our Austrian case, in a far more primitive, ruder and more dangerous form.

" I stopped in Budapest on my homeward journey, and visited Szterényi, ex-Secretary of State and an intimate of Wekerle, Széll, and Andrássy, in the hope of getting some light on opinion in Hungary. He says, with justice, that the present *régime* in Hungary and Croatia is untenable and, with things as they now are, highly dangerous; and that order must be created at home in order to be able to pursue a firm line in foreign policy. He tells me that it is *communis opinio* throughout Hungary that Austria will have to recognise the accomplished fact in the Balkans: that there can be no talk of territorial acquisitions: and that the best that can be aimed at is some sort of guarantee of trade and intercourse. The Hungarian cloven hoof soon looked out, however. When I gave it as my view that we ought to aim at once at a tariff union with these States and make that the actual goal of our present policy, he swerved off; that would hardly be possible in Hungary; a system of differential rates was what should be aimed at. Naturally, he threw the blame on the Austrian agrarians, although he had to admit that Hungarian economic policy is really run for the benefit of some three hundred landowning families.

"From these casual observations, the one fact that, unfortunately, emerges is that we are absolutely not equipped for the sort of large scale action, on broad economic lines, which is the very bread of life for us. We have let Herr von Hohenblum and the Agrarians get on top of us. Hungary is dominated by a class of self-interested egotists who can break any policy that aims at the common weal; and our Foreign Office has made mistakes in the last few years for which a ghastly punishment is now being exacted. In 1909, Milovanović, the pro-Austrian Serbian Premier, came to Vienna to try to get a concession for the import of Serbian meat out of Aehrenthal—in vain. I had much talk with him at the time, and reported every word to Aehrenthal, whom I pressed to give Serbia some gleam of positive hope. What Milovanović wanted was a specific guarantee on the part of Austria against the event of Macedonian conditions ripening—a definite word, a sign of good-will; and all that Aehrenthal replied was: 'My policy deals with the present, the future will look after itself.' A year later, when I came back from Belgrade and tried to impress him with the urgency of strengthening the hands of pro-Austrians in Serbia by some act of conciliation, by making an end of the insensate line we took about meat imports, his reply was—'Bulgaria is more important than Serbia.' Indeed, he was actually annoyed with me for having gone to Belgrade at all. He spoke of the Serbs absolutely in the tone that used to be employed in Vienna before 1866 about the Prussians, who 'needed a thorough thrashing.' The awful error of his policy was that he did not thereupon destroy the Serbs or actually thrash them, which might have produced some result; nor did he adopt the one alternative line to that and come to an understanding with them, which was, after all, what they were anxious for while Milovanović was Premier.

"At that time, the Serbians were ours for the asking, and by allowing the importation of a larger number of oxen and pigs we might have laid foundations for a friendship for which we now have to appeal."

I will record one more symptom—only a symptom, but a characteristic one—of the fact that, down there as elsewhere, great attention is being directed to our relations to Germany. The very fact that they are discussed proves that we have weakened in this regard, and that here too the price, and a heavy price at that, is being exacted for the mistakes that have been made. Some years ago I supported a young and highly intelligent Serb here in Vienna, and, on the completion of his studies, recommended him to the Provincial Government in Sarajevo; being a Bosnian by birth, they found him a post. He turned out very well, and is now chief clerk to one of the Heads of Department, has a remarkably good grasp of politics, like most Southern Slavs, reads all the papers and has a sound judgment. We talked of the relations of the Great Powers to the Balkan States. We talked of Russia, England, and France, and I, intentionally, did not mention Germany. He, however, observed with a smile and a sidewards glance at me, "What about Germany? there seems no more talk of the shining army and Nibelung loyalty; the Germans are dumb as fishes." So, a little Bosnian clerk is quite alive to the situation we discussed the other day (coolness between Germany and ourselves).

Vienna, November 3, 1912.

To-day, I had a long conversation with Professor Neurath, who has been in Sofia and Belgrade for the Carnegie Endowment, to study the effects of the war on the finances and general economy of these States. His judgment is on the whole favourable, especially so far as concerns the financial position of Serbia. Dr. von Sauer, too, visited me, after having been sent by the Chamber of Commerce here to Sofia, Belgrade, Constantinople, and Bosnia to make similar enquiries. Like Neurath, he was very well received everywhere. The impressions of both were the same as those I gathered in Belgrade a year and a half ago. Austria's insolent attitude to the Southern Slav States has caused a sense of injury. It interested me to hear Sauter say that he had learned from a group of merchants in Sofia that they are by no means extra keen on a Balkan tariff union, but inclined, like proper Bulgarians, to consider the matter thoroughly and coolly.

In Bulgaria, Sauter travelled over the Cypress (Kupreš) pass. The Hungarians have made a veritable legend of the difficulties of this pass and disseminated the belief that it would be impossible to build a railway over it to Spalato. But Sauter convinced himself that this is one more of the Bosnian geographical problems located in Budapest.

Budapest, November 7, 1912.

Before starting on my journey hither for the meeting of the Delegations, I expressly informed Count Berchtold that I proposed to speak there definitely in favour of giving Serbia access to the Adriatic to construct an international harbour. This appeared to annoy him, mightily. When I got here I found that Stuergkh and Bilinski are also much excited about what I am going to say. Yesterday, in committee, I made my speech, which was applauded from all sides, and even Berchtold has calmed down. But when Mendel Singer, the journalist who reports speeches to Vienna, wanted to use the official wires to transmit it, Stuergkh refused permission, obviously hoping that, as a result, it would either not be reproduced in Vienna at all, or in a garbled form. Since I anticipated some jest of this amiable kind, I had written down an exact version beforehand and given it to the Press. It was reproduced in all the Vienna papers.

Budapest, November 8, 1912.

Yesterday evening, I had a long talk in the Nemzeti Casino with Széll, Czernin, and Clam. Czernin comes from Konopischt, has had long conferences with Berchtold, and is patently the emissary of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The substance of the conversation was between Széll and myself, the others only throwing in a remark now and then.

Széll is by far the most approachable of the Hungarians still.

Apropos of future commercial relations, he stated that the resistance of the Hungarian agrarians is likely to weaken: the importation of live cattle would be very difficult to get through, but its acceptance by the Hungarian agrarians is not excluded. A trade and tariff alliance with Serbia cannot be put through at a stroke—it is a matter that will take years of economic development. What ought to be done to-day, as a preliminary step, is to conclude a regular commercial treaty. This view of Széll's agrees with my own, and yesterday Schwegel put the same very well and clearly before the Committee. Here, then, there ought to be a line of advance. Adriatic railway and harbour: I expounded the view that both are unavoidable, as things are. We must make up our minds to that. I defended my notion of a neutralised harbour, at the terminus of an Adriatic railway. I urged that we promise Serbia our support and at the same time intervene actively. I threw out the idea of forming an Austro-Serbian commercial company for the development both of the railways and of the harbour, whether it be Medua or Durazzo, so that we might begin this common action through economic co-operation. After the war, the new Balkan States would be getting money from all quarters; if, with no *arrière pensée*, no desires of dominance, and no purpose of exploitation in our minds, but only a realistic and intelligent egoism, we were to begin this *pénétration financière*, the whole thing would certainly commend itself to the Serbs. Széll expressed vigorous agreement. To the question: Would Serbia and the harbour be an outpost of Russia? he replied: "Less and less, in proportion as Serbia grows stronger." Clam interjected: "In proportion as Serbia grows stronger, its attraction towards us will strengthen." To which I: "That depends on the sort of treatment we extend to our Southern Slavs. Look at Bulgaria; the stronger it has grown, the more independent of Russia it has become."

The Croatian question. I said to Széll: "All these plans are vain, unless a different note is sounded in Croatia."

He admitted this. I then asked him whether it was not a great mistake to break the Coalition, since it was a possible party from the point of view of Hungary? He admitted that the Cuvaj *régime* had got to be brought to an end, as soon as or before discussions with Serbia began. On the positive part of our conversation he was—as so often happens with Hungarians—vague. He agreed that Croatia was at a disadvantage economically, but held that he, in his day, had granted benefits to Croatia. On the point of subsidies for the encouragement of industries, he admitted that this might have been used to deprive Croatia of its sense of injury. In general his tendency was: *rapprochement* is necessary and readiness for *rapprochement*. But he was quite vague in his agreement.

Tactics. He was energetic and even personally emphatic in his endorsement of my view that action must be immediate. Positive proposals must at once be made to the Serbians, especially in relation to their justifiable claims. There is no time to lose, Austria-Hungary and Serbia must have tuned their instruments to the same pitch before the European concert on the Balkan question begins. He held that the former frontier Custom privileges ought to be revived.

Budapest, November 12, 1912.

I have seen a good deal in these last few days of Riedl, head of the commercial treaties department, who had been to Semlin to talk with Wildner, our Consul in Belgrade. He gave me the Memorandum to read he had drawn up for Berchtold and the Heir to the Throne, covering the economic situation throughout the Balkans. On his journey, he met Ugron, our Ambassador to Belgrade. At the critical period, in the summer, the Embassy at Belgrade was practically deserted, since Ugron was away on leave, and his *chargé d'affaires*, a certain von Pflügl, was often in Budapest, or somewhere else, three or four days out of the week. Small wonder that we know nothing. Riedl's Memorandum is an imaginative fantasy, built up on a mass of facts and observations. Dangerously attractive to readers who are not in a position to make the necessary corrections. Noticeable is his love for Albania, which he seeks to incorporate in the Austrian sphere. Also for Rumania, with which he would like a Customs Union.

Budapest, November 13, 1912.

I saw Baron Láng to-day, the ex-Minister of Trade. Genuine Hungarian line of thought. Like Széll, he assured me that the agrarians would not be any obstacle to commercial treaties with the Balkan States; he laid all the blame at the door of the Austrian agrarians and above all of Mr. Hohenblums. And, of course, it was not long before the parenthesis appeared—Hungary was not to be incommoded or have sacrifices asked of her; she must be induced to move by skilful handling. Anyhow, Tisza was against the whole thing, but until the opposition was worn down it was impossible to do without him. Gratitude does not exist in politics; he must be used and then cast over. Lang, certainly, is not alone in regarding Tisza as a political *condottiere*: every one of his opponents burns with desire to be able to say to him: "The Moor has worked off his debt, and can go."

Láng has a great contempt for the Serbs. With them, one has got to dig one's heels in, never give way. The wretched condition of the Turkish army is the sole cause of Serbian victories. Of Croatia it is useless to talk with him. There is order in Croatia. Count Khuen Héderváry is the only man who knows how to set about things. Whoever rules in Ofen, rules in Agram. Let the Croats once realise that there is a *régime* in Ofen that cannot be upset, and they will submit, and everything run smoothly. For Láng, Khuen is Sir Oracle on all Croatian matters: anyhow, he really admits that he knows nothing of conditions there himself.

Unfortunately, I must admit that the editor-in-chief of the *Pester Lloyd*, whom I met yesterday, spoke in the very same strain. Even now, after all that has happened in the Balkans, no conception of the significance of the South Slav question!

Budapest, November 18, 1912.

On the evening of the 15th, Schwegel and I had a good talk with Clam and Czernin, in the National Casino, in which we laid our cards on the table on the Albanian and harbour questions. Schwegel was in his element. He is not apt to assert himself, but get him in a small group, and he is both communicative and instructive. At the time of the Berlin Congress, he was Andrássy's right hand, and puts the case for our *pénétration pacifique* in the Balkans with zeal and knowledge. His great idea is the establishment of a connexion with Salonika and the acquisition of a free trade area for the Monarchy. He knows the situation there in detail, and I admit that I was converted to his view. The thing started with a request from Berchtold, the other day, to have our views communicated to him. Schwegel is doing that, at length. He is going to set it all out in a Memorandum. I spoke of Albania and reiterated a caution against identifying ourselves with Albanian interests. This is the dominant tendency to-day, however, and is obviously being propagated specifically from the Catholic side. Opinion in the Delegation is anti-Serbian.

Budapest, November 19, 1912.

The South Slavs are greatly excited by the dissolution of the city councils in Spalato and Sebenico: and events in Sarajevo also register a notable rise in temperature. Szterényi told me that it is believed that a partial mobilisation will take place within the next few days: all the journalists are running around saying that a state of siege is going to be proclaimed in Bosnia. It is undeniable that the situation is becoming more and more critical. Big military gentlemen, *e.g.* General Krobatin, have begun crying out that we must deal seriously with Serbia. Must send monitors to Belgrade, bombard the town, etc., etc.

Budapest, November 21, 1912.

In the National Casino yesterday evening with Count Tivadar Zichy. He too is for sending monitors down the

Danube, and so on. When I reminded him of the consequences, he calmed down. He is for co-operation with Italy in Albania—a view derived from a conversation he had just had with Ambassador Tschirschky, who sees great advantages in such a procedure: but quietened down on this head, too, when I suggested to him—that would give us a complete " Schleswig-Holstein " position.

Budapest, November 22, 1912.

Yesterday evening, the President of the Hungarian Delegation, Count August Zichy, the " amiable Hungarian," gave us a dinner in the Park Club, to which he invited all the Austrian and Hungarian delegates, ministers and Government representatives. Everything very well done, and the food first-rate, far better than at Court yesterday. Animated talk after dinner. There is no doubt that a tendency exists for Germans and Magyars to draw together, to make common front against the South Slavs. Every Hungarian speech reveals their intransigent attitude to everything South Slav; for instance, my neighbour at table, ex-Secretary of State Molnár, takes the view that there is nothing for it but German rule in Austria and Magyar rule in Hungary. I felt bound to say to him that it was to our interest to reach a compromise with the Czechs, and the Magyars would have to do the same with their nationalities. He would hear nothing of that: the Serbs were the black spot among the Hungarian nationalities, and there was nothing to be made of them. He could not see one good point in the Serbs. Were I to assemble all the statements I have heard made by Hungarians during my three weeks in Budapest, I should be driven to the conclusion that, with very few exceptions, they are all in the intransigent camp. Above all, they refuse to hear of a harbour, in any form whatsoever: however it were done, nothing could come of it but conflict. The universal assumption is that our relations to Serbia are and must remain hostile. To my warning of the danger of war, Czernin replied with arguments obviously derived from the atmosphere of Franz Ferdinand. He said, "Well, the soldiers will march in any case: Germany is with us: if we are victorious in the field, opinion will be on our side. Better do it now, when the constellations are favourable, than later, under compulsion, at a far less favourable moment." He admitted that this is playing va-Banque, but insisted that such is the case in every war.

Vienna, November 22, 1912.

Travelled hither with Clam. He admits that there is a movement in certain circles for a German–Magyar *entente* within the Monarchy, in order to put a damper on the South Slavs. He disapproves, but regards it as a result of the present state of things. Either Serbia must fall to us, or our Serbo-Croats to the Serbs. One or the other is inevitable—there is no third possibility. He views any association of Serbia with us on economic lines as improbable, and so looks eventually to war, if the Serbs do not fulfil our demands. What are our demands? He does not know. He hopes that they may be specified. He believes that Russia will not wage war: is therefore for going as far as mobilisation and then leaving the matter to be straightened out in a Congress. But who controls events if mobilisation has once taken place? To that, he has no answer. These gentlemen take victory as axiomatic, and Trialism likewise. This appears to be the word that has been given out by the Heir.

Vienna, November 24, 1912.

Yesterday I had a call from two gentlemen from Belgrade. Kosta Risnić, president of the Chamber of Commerce, and Mil. M. Pavlović, a big business man, who did the talking. He brought me a letter from Stojanović, the Serbian Minister of Trade. Adriatic railway—nothing but Adriatic railway. There is nothing else thought of in Serbia. Russian sympathies grow in proportion as Austria appears anti-Serbian. The case would alter were a friendly relationship with Austria to be developed. On future commercial relations, the opinions of the two gentlemen were—conclusion of a mutual convention: abolition of the rationing of meat imports: commercial treaty, without any frontier discrimination, since Serbia is for most-favoured-nation treatment and fears third party claims at the frontier which it does not desire. Germany and Italy! The gentlemen said that German travellers were better than Austrian. German goods are good and cheap. Two factors, however, are on Austria's side—the difference of freights and the circumstance that Vienna is a place where a whole range of goods can be bought, since all branches of trade are represented there, whereas in Germany it is necessary to travel about to get them. Moreover Vienna is much nearer than Berlin, and much pleasanter. Of all of which Austria should take advantage.

Vienna, November 30, 1912.

I have had many conversations with the two Belgraders, and they were present at a lecture by Professor Neurath, who spoke very sympathetically of Serbia. The next day, I invited them to dine at Sachers to meet Professor Philippovič and some other gentlemen, where we had much talk. The Vienna Chamber of Commerce has made the usual Austrian mistake—President Schöller has not so much as received the two, far less talked with them, and this although they are here on an official mission—*i.e.* from the Belgrade Chamber. Why? The Belgrade gentlemen desired to discuss the Adriatic harbour question: the Executive of the Chamber did not desire to discuss it, since it is a "political" matter—hence no talk with the President. Naturally, the gentlemen will go home feeling that they have been insolently treated here in Vienna. Everybody, here, plays the diplomat. You find beaureaucratic arrogance even in people who, like Schöller, ought, in our democratic days, when one should be on easy terms with everybody, simply to feel themselves citizens. Nothing is lost by talking with foreigners and even with opponents.

The other day I had a visit from a Bulgarian who came with a recommendation from Ginzkey, Pipeff by name, a deputy to the Sobranje and president of the Sofia Chamber of Commerce. The Bulgars are very different people rom the Serbs—much more calm, considering, realistic nd positive. In conversation with him, I gathered that is opinion was as follows. The Bulgars would fain have eace. They have lost too many young men, the flower f the nation, don't want any more sacrificed. They have ecades of work ahead of them in incorporating their ewly-acquired territories. He said, with a grin: "It is eyond our brightest dreams; we should have been satisfied vith an autonomous Macedonia." War between Austria nd Serbia would be most undesirable from their point of iew. At the same time, were it to arise, they would ndubitably go with the Serbs. They hope that the Rumanians would not fight against the Bulgars, but if hey did they would fall upon them with might and main. The Bulgars are prepared to consider a tariff union with Serbia. These things require to be looked at from all oints of view. In sum: the Bulgars are set on work; hey are not going to throw themselves either into the rms of the Triplice or of the Entente. They want to be n good terms with both Russia and Austria, but at the ame time to maintain the Balkan League as far as possible.

Vienna, December 1, 1912.

Yesterday, Professor Redlich gave a small lunch party. Besides myself, there were Baroness Franckenstein, Count Hoyos from the Foreign Office, Chlumecky junior, and Paul Schulz. Baroness Franckenstein at once began singng the war song, the necessity of cold steel, etc. I let he company talk for a bit, and then pressed for an answer o the question: "What good could we hope to get out f a war?" To which came the stereotyped reply—ictorious war would give us the annexation of Serbia, Trialism, and improved relations with Hungary. Similar xchange of question and answer at night, in the club, rom Karl Schwarzenberg, Czernin, Latour, and Nostiz. And yet nobody seems to bother to enquire how we are to set about assimilating with old Austria, a State that is emocratic through and through, possesses neither arisocracy nor large landowners, and, born of revolution, has known decades of freedom and, to-day, is carrying on a victorious war of expansion! Merely to mutter Trialism gets us nowhere at all. Even a super Bismarck could not extemporise over-night a result that might have been achieved through long years of well-directed policy.

Vienna, December 1, 1912.

Emil Fürstenberg, fresh from Athens, reports that even the Greeks are full of an intense self-consciousness. That Salonika and Valona must be Greek is taken for granted. The greatest difficulties will be presented by the delimitation of the Albanian frontier. The Greeks are claiming a line running above Valona from the sea to the interior—with Valona Greek.

To-day I had a visit from the correspondent of the *Hamburger Nachrichten*: he asked me: "Has not Austria-Hungary been too ready to give up in advance—*e.g.* handing over the Sanjak hastily to Serbia and so depriving itself of important potential compensations?" In Germany it was held that the Monarchy had been too yielding from the outset. Stibral maintains, justly, that the route to commercial treaties with Serbia is via Berlin, and that the first essential is to be fortified with knowledge of Germany's attitude to a commercial *rapprochement* between the Monarchy and Serbia, and, eventually, Rumania. In which he is in complete agreement with the attitude of the president of the Belgrade Chamber of Commerce. An awful mistake was made by Schöller and the gentlemen in our Chambers of Commerce in omitting to meet the latter. All along the line, nothing but servility, dread of responsibility, and thoughtlessness. No State can survive it, in the long run.

Vienna, December 2, 1912.

In Budapest I observed that certain persons are at work endeavouring to bring about a sort of fraternity between Germans and Magyars, with an anti-South Slav aim. For that reason, I took an opportunity some time ago, of raising in the columns of the Prague *Bohemia* the question whether it would not be well for leading men in all parts of German Austria to face the probable consequences, for German Austrians, of the changed state of affairs in the Balkan Peninsula. Shortly after, a dinner took place in Budapest, attended by German and Hungarian politicians, at which provocative and highly unconsidered speeches were delivered. Naturally, too, a Vienna newspaper was forthcoming to write up this fraternal gathering in the silliest possible fashion. Dobernig, realising that a false note had been struck by him at the dinner, is now turning round and taking up the lead I gave in the *Bohemia.* I replied in the *Deutsche Rundschau.* Never having myself lain under the familiar suspicion of hostility to Hungary, I rejoice to see the Germans freeing themselves from anything of the kind. From of old, I have stood for a *rapprochement* between Germans and Hungarians. But always subject to one proviso. "It would," to quote my own words, "show a petty conception of the goal to be aimed at were this *rapprochement* to be envisaged merely as a move in a transitory political game, directed by a particular partisan Hungarian policy, and directed against any racial section within the Monarchy: or if the object of such united action by Germans and Hungarians were the deprivation of other nationalities of their right to exist. Permanent, nay historic value attaches to the *rapprochement* now being planned, if, and only if, it is carried through in the mutual interests of the various States concerned, and directed by a recognition of necessary future developments."

Vienna, December 16, 1912.

To-day I had a longish conversation with Berchtold, whom I sought out on an urgent appeal that I should do so, on the part of my good friend Professor Cvijić, the Egeria of the Belgrade Government on matters of Balkan geography. On the two crucial issues—Albania and the Adriatic harbour—Berchtold anticipates a pacific understanding. He thinks that we Austrians may have a settlement of our own, within the neutral harbour on the Adriatic. On Salonika, he was evasive. He told me that Daneff had put Bulgaria's claims with great force. "Ce que nous voulons, nous l'obtiendrons"—so he said, at the Ballplatz. His highly self-reliant manner seems to have made a big impression here. On the much discussed questions of the guarantees to be given by Serbia for its maintenance of a correct and neighbourly attitude, after things have once been settled, Berchtold was again non-committal: he merely said that such guarantees must consist in certain transactions to be concluded, through which Serbia must demonstrate the correctness of her attitude. I expressed the view that Daneff's twice repeated visit to Budapest and Vienna had been serviceable to Austrian prestige, and asked whether it were not advisable to invite Pašić also. The opportunity now offered to convey this intimation to him through Professor Cvijić, who was to visit me on the following day. Berchtold, however, replied that the Austrian Ambassador in London had by now received the necessary instructions, and, the matter being on the agenda of the Ambassadors' Conference, such a step would not now be opportune. At the same time, he exhausted himself in assurances that it was far from the mind of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to make any attempt to exert compulsion on Serbia. "We are not asking it to bow in the dust before us: not at all: but we must work for a correct and normal neighbourliness. I am working for peace." At the end, after speaking fully and hopefully about the meeting of Ambassadors, I put the question to him: What was his attitude to the singular logic of the War party (among others, the *Reichspost*, Krobatin, Conrad, and others)—war as the instrument for transforming Austria-Hungary into a centralised Federal State? conquest of internal difficulties through the repercussions of a victorious campaign—and all the rest of the patter? Berchtold laughs at such views, and holds that the real disgruntling would begin were anything of the kind to take place; at the same time he does not deny that such ideas obtain. In the last few weeks, they have come before him in the most varying forms—Trialism, the partition of Serbia between Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Austria, its assimilation to Austria by means of a tariff union and military convention, and so on. He does not take any of that seriously, or so he said.

Vienna, December 17, 1912.

Professor Cvijić came to see me to-day. Greatly troubled about future relations between Serbia and the Monarchy. Concerned, as of old, to prove the necessity of a corridor to the Adriatic; holds leniency and a friendly approach the only right methods towards Serbia. I utilised the opportunity to put things rather more clearly before him. "Why," I asked him, "did Novaković, the other day, in Paris, talk so foolishly about the realm of Dušan on the Adriatic? Is there any sense in reminiscences like that?" On which Cvijić did not defend Novaković. "Why," I went on, "when Serbia introduced its Customs duties on the Sanjak frontier, did it not so much as inform our Minister in Belgrade, so that he was compelled to send all round the town to find out what the duties actually were? Why does the Serbian Government's organ, the *Samouprava*, always talk about the *Neue Freie Presse* and the *Reichspost* as semi-official organs of Austria?" We discussed these and many other questions, until I, finally, expressly emphasising the fact that it was my own idea only, raised the query whether Serbia could not do as Bulgaria had done in the case of Daneff, and send someone to Vienna, as a mark of its readiness to come to a good understanding with us. He was greatly struck by this, although he seemed to be at a loss to think of anyone in Serbia capable of being entrusted with such a mission. Pašić was not master either of French or German, and he could not think of any other man who possessed his universally admitted authority. Merely in passing, he referred to Paču, the present Serbian Minister of Finance. We parted on excellent terms.

Vienna, December 21, 1912.

Yesterday I had a call from Professor Masaryk. He has recently been three times in Belgrade, and came to inform me as to the results of his journeyings there. As I regarded any steps taken by him as of importance, I begged him to give me his notes in full detail, which he was good enough to do.

On the first occasion, he went to Belgrade at the instance of Benedikt, the editor of the *Neue Freie Presse*. He spoke with Paču, the Finance Minister, and by the time he reached Budapest, where the Delegations were sitting, was quite full of the Serbian corridor idea. On the second occasion, he was in Belgrade in the beginning of December, and had numerous talks with Pašić. At first, there was only general discussion between the two of them on the necessity of an improvement in the relations between the Monarchy and Serbia: Pašić spoke as if he desired to curb the Serbian Press, but nothing was specifically formulated. When, on December 10, Masaryk was preparing for departure, Pašić sent for him again, and put before him quite a comprehensive plan, which he commissioned him to communicate confidentially to Berchtold, saying: "Please, go to Count Berchtold and say to him what I am now saying to you." According to Masaryk's notes, what Pašić said was as follows:—

1. Serbia will and must remain quite independent economically and politically, but we can enter into the best and most friendly relations with Austria;

2. While desirous of partitioning Albania, we accommodate ourselves to Austria's desire for an autonomous Albania, as a proof of our readiness to meet the wishes of Austria;

3. We demand of Austria a harbour and a strip of territory as corridor for the said harbour;

4. We are ready to give all possible guarantees and undertake never to fortify the said harbour, place it at the disposal of any other Power or cede it to any other Power;

5. We desire to make all possible economic concessions and in all things to give Austria first consideration; in 1917 to conclude a commercial treaty; to give Austria first

consideration in all loans, to grant it tariff preferences and give it preferential treatment in deliveries. If an agreement on these lines is not reached, we will certainly maintain a correct attitude, wage no war for the sake of a harbour, but instead construct an outlet in Salonika, associate ourselves commercially with the Balkan League, and purchase no goods from Austria.

He further expressed consideration for Austria's prestige and said he was ready to come himself to Vienna, there to state his desires in person and negotiate about them. Such was the proposition that Masaryk brought to Berchtold on December 12th. It is quite comprehensible that the latter should have shown some reserve, and not entered, at the first blush, into these economic questions. To the main question—that of Pašić's coming to Vienna—he replied in the negative, giving Masaryk the same reasons that he put before me some days later. Masaryk, however, was disappointed by his answer and at a loss as to what to do. He came to see me, but did not find me, since I was absent from Vienna: discussed the matter with some South Slav friends, and with Wickham Steed, the correspondent of *The Times*: and then set out once more for Belgrade. He informed Pašić of the negative result of his journey, which seemed to disappoint him likewise. This final conversation with the Serbian Prime Minister took place on December 17th, and, in the interval, an intimation had appeared in various newspapers, without attracting much attention, to the effect that Berchtold had intentionally declined this visit of Pašić.

Such was the story Masaryk told me yesterday, that is to say, on December 20th.

Vienna, December 22, 1912.

Yesterday a debate took place in the Upper House on the "General Service for War" Bill, when I had intended to speak on foreign affairs. After a thorough discussion with Schwegel and other friends, I gave up this intention, but told them about Masaryk's communications. Schwegel, Czernin and I decided to inform Berchtold forthwith that we were all of the opinion that he had made a mistake in declining a visit from Pašić. What finally decided us on taking this step was the news published in the Press that the meeting of Ambassadors had come to unanimous conclusions, in the Austro-Hungarian sense, both on the Albanian and harbour questions (Serbia to have a commercial outlet to the sea, but no corridor) and had signed a protocol to this effect.

Yesterday, about 4 in the afternoon, we three had an extensive talk with Berchtold. I introduced the discussion by expressing the view that, now that the Ambassadors' meeting had settled the harbour issue in our sense, and made it therefore impossible for Pašić to open by talking about his corridor, nothing stood in the way of his being received, while, on the other hand, such a journey on his part, at this precise juncture, would constitute a most striking success for Austria. Coming as it would on top of Daneff's pilgrimage, Pašić's pilgrimage to Vienna was the circumstance most calculated to raise our prestige, relieve us of embarrassment, and create a revulsion of self-confidence in public opinion. Berchtold did admit that Daneff's visit had been a success, adding: " In Berlin they tell me that we are being cozened by Bulgarian flattery." " If, then, you let yourself also be cozened by Serbian flattery, that will make our position so much the better," I replied, but without convincing him on the point. To all the arguments that I and Schwegel could produce under this head, he invariably replied: " This is not the right moment; the affair is pending in London: Jovanović, the Serbian Ambassador, who is coming to me, has instructions and proposals "—in a word, he was not to be won over to our idea, even when Schwegel, renewing the attack, set out in lively terms the improvement in our position *vis-à-vis* the other Powers that would be accomplished once we reached a definite understanding with Serbia. We understood well enough that Berchtold could not very well have let Pašić come on the basis of Masaryk's proposals, since to have done so would have given the impression that his propositions about the corridor were by us regarded as discussable. To-day, however, with the harbour question settled in London, to talk with Pašić would prejudice nothing and could only serve to help to clear up the situation. Nevertheless, nothing could move Berchtold from his own view. The remainder of our very lengthy conference with him was devoted to economic topics; Schwegel raised the question of Salonika for the *n*th time. A moment might come when Salonika, having been made a neutral, free port, might not be, as now, merely an object of keen desire to Bulgars and Greeks, but a subject of interest to all the Balkan States and to Austria itself. Clear too was Germany's interest in such a solution. Then, the administration of the harbour and of the town would be either international, or the concern of the five Balkan States, of a Conference *à cinq* (Austria, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Albania). Schwegel, as I had done in Budapest, stood for a Disraelian policy, the purchase of a harbour area, etc. Berchtold listened to us calmly; but we got no further. We left Berchtold with the feeling that, in the Pašić affair, there must be some obstacle in the way of which we were not aware, which explained his incomprehensible refusal. Czernin was of opinion that the resistance might well come from the Emperor; he himself took it as self-evident that such a visit could only be of advantage to us. On the Michaeler-platz, we parted, and I went into the Café Pucher for a cup of tea. There I met Paul Schulz, who at once came over to me and began talking. Under his roof—he has a super-excellent cook—there gather all sorts of people, especially those who happen at the moment to be in the public eye. At present, Conrad von Hötzendorf is frequently there. Talk, there, is quite unreserved. Schulz told me that at a recent evening there Conrad had eagerly and energetically enunciated the view that there could be no avoiding a conflict with Serbia, that the wound must be kept open, that, so soon as one difficulty was surmounted, another should be created, so that there might always be an excuse for attack. Serbia, as now aggrandised, would serve as a sort of magnetic mountain of irresistible attraction for all Southern Slav elements. This must be resisted. The point to be noted is that Conrad's speeches are made elsewhere as well, and in places quite porous enough to ensure their getting through to Belgrade. In such circumstances, how are reasonable relations between the two States to be hoped for?

Here is another fact. The other day, Krobatin, the newly-appointed War Minister, paid a visit to Prince Fürstenberg on taking up his appointment. On this occasion, he remarked: " It is to be hoped that we shall not, this time, neglect the opportunity of getting order established down there as we did in 1909." Finally, the words addressed by Berchtold to one of my colleagues in the Upper House: " I do not intend to incur the reproach of doing as Aehrenthal did in 1908, and preventing a final reckoning with Serbia."

A conversation with Kánya, the director of the Press Bureau, gave me an insight into the manner in which he influences the Press. I complained to him that while Berchtold always talks peace, either he gives the Press Bureau bellicose tips in the exactly opposite sense, or the latter, on its own responsibility, pursues a policy of war that is precisely contrary to Berchtold's words, and so causes confusion in the public mind. He defended himself by saying he had got to " counteract " the perpetual peace " sob stuff " of the *Neue Freie Presse*, and said that he put on the brakes and set his Press information at " no change " in the weather, since, in fact, things were not as that newspaper made them out to be. But this was done in understanding with Berchtold.

Berchtold's pacific assertions on the one hand, and, on the other, his refusal to receive Pašić: the protraction of the Prochaska affair, and the anti-Serbian Press campaign, in which the Press Bureau is involved: the very varying utterances which I have here set down exactly as they were uttered—all this, taken together, cannot but awaken a suspicion that our will to peace is not sincere, and that, in point of fact—as Conrad actively desires—we are concerned in keeping open the possibility of conflict with Serbia. Berchtold is influenced by the most diverse tendencies, and lets them carry him along. Whither, none knows.

JANUARY AND FEBRUARY 1913 IN VIENNA

PAGES FROM MY DIARY

Vienna, January 1, 1913.

YESTERDAY I had some talk with Prince Karl Fürstenberg, who is just on the point of returning to his post at Bucarest. He takes an optimistic view of Rumanian reliability. He hopes that even the Liberals would stand by the Triplice, could Tisza be induced to treat the Rumanians in Hungary differently from the way he has done hitherto—in other words, give them officials of their own nationality, and a better franchise. Fürstenberg is endeavouring to bring about contact between the Rumanian parliamentary leaders and Tisza, and is even going into such petty things as to insist on the latter that he, Count Tisza, should return the greetings made to him by the Rumanian members. Commercial political questions are in great confusion. An assurance on the part of our Minister in Bucarest that, from now on, Vienna would not take the initiative in these commercial matters, coincided precisely in time with the arrival in Bucarest—without Fürstenberg's knowing anything of the matter—of Riedl, the head of the Commercial Treaties Department, for the purpose of negotiating a tariff union. Of which, in Fürstenberg's opinion, there can be no talk, although possibly something might be done on the lines of differential duties. To that he replied, in answer to my objection, that Germany would probably take no exception, though it certainly would to any sort of tariff union.

Vienna, January 4, 1913.

Count Heinrich Lützow told me a most incredible tale. . . . When he was Ambassador in Rome, at a time, some two years ago, when there was acute tension between the Monarchy and Italy, he had a conversation with Conrad von Hötzendorf, in which the latter once more trotted out his theory of a preventive war with Italy. On Lützow's asking him, however, what we could demand of Italy even in the event of a victorious war, Conrad replied that our Italian frontier was a very bad one, and when Lützow, pursuing the subject, enquired what would constitute a good frontier, his answer was: "We must get the Quadrilateral back again." Not that I have any grounds for doubting the accuracy of the reporting of this singular duologue. Conrad's reply is an imbecility such as could fall only from a man who has not the faintest inkling of the realities of European politics.

Vienna, January 6, 1913.

I had a visit to-day from Professor Otto Neurath, on his way home from his study of Galicia, for which I had supplied him with introductions. He intends to give a lecture on his experiences there. He is also going to send me a confidential memorandum on the preparations being made for a rising there to be directed against Russia, should it come to war between us and this neighbour (what they call an "Imperial-royal rising" in Galicia), and about the distribution of Mannlicher rifles. He is of the opinion that this distribution is being done from the General Staff, and actually over the heads of the corps commanders.

Vienna, January 10, 1913.

At Friedjung's, to-day, I met M. Ferry, a member of the French Chamber, and nephew of the late Minister. A very pleasant, well-informed young fellow, who has already made the tour of Laibach, Agram, Belgrade, and Budapest, and gathered some pretty clear impressions. In Belgrade, the French Ambassador said to him: "l'Autriche fait une politique trop dure." To which I had to agree. What was interesting was that Ferry said, apropos of Austria's attitude in the recent Morocco crisis—Austria then had been fairly *gentil* towards France and France was accordingly grateful: a proof of the extent to which our ambiguous attitude to Germany at that time had penetrated into the French consciousness. Yesterday evening I was with Riedl, who gave me an incredible account of the lack of co-operation in the present critical juncture. Riedl was in Budapest four weeks ago, but has not succeeded to this day in getting Stuergkh to receive him for the purpose of reporting to him! There are, now and then, talks between him and Count Wickenburg, the permanent head of commercial affairs in the Foreign Office, but there is never any positive result. Nobody has got the threads of this very difficult and complex situation of ours in his hands.

Vienna, January 20, 1913.

Schwegel saw the publisher of the *Information* the other day, who told him that there was propaganda going on to get a Prince of Parma given the throne of Albania. A few days earlier, Schwegel also saw the Catholic Albanian Archbishop of Ipek, who had information on similar lines. The Archbishop gave disquieting reports of the well-known Consul Prochaska of Prizren; he is respected by no one, and to blame for friction with Serbia; Schwegel discussed the matter with Berchtold, and advised him to keep a better eye on his consular officers. He went on, however, to ask him whether this Prochaska affair, which has created such a dust, was not being intentionally dragged on, and its clearing up being delayed, in order that it might serve, eventually, as the excuse for a conflict with Serbia; to which Berchtold made no reply. At the same time, Schwegel now states that Berchtold is at last beginning to make some sort of picture for himself of local conditions and circumstances in the Balkans. Unfortunately, he also had to recognise that all the advice either he or I have given to Berchtold in Budapest has left absolutely no impression upon him. Again and again have we put before him, and I have repeatedly stated in public, that the Monarchy ought not to take upon itself the responsibility of delimiting the Albanian frontier, but rather direct its efforts towards getting an International Commission to undertake that task. As it is we are obviously likely to be pulling other people's chestnuts out of the fire, in a European question. Berchtold cannot but admit that on this frontier question we stand alone—*i.e.* he will find himself making proposals which nobody will accept. When the conflict with Serbia threatened to become acute, Russia let it be known in Berlin that it would take part so soon as we attacked Serbia: nevertheless Schwegel has the impression that the Minister is still hoping to arrive at an understanding with Russia which will permit us to achieve the "reckoning" we desire with Serbia without Russian interference. Schwegel thinks that is possible, in certain circumstances; not so I. On the economic questions, which Schwegel tried to raise, Berchtold was not to be drawn. Once again, Schwegel put it to him that the Monarchy ought to press for having Salonika made a free area; a proposition which Bulgaria would accept in order to keep the Greeks from acquiring it. As for the Greeks, they could be compensated with the islands. On the question of communications in the Balkans, Berchtold clings to his idea of a Conference *à quatre*. Schwegel, however, tried to convince him that that was not enough. He held that we ought to endeavour to get special facilities on the lines of communication with Salonika that are most vital for us. Berchtold sighed with boredom and said nothing.

Prague, January 24, 1913.

Yesterday we had a meeting of the Bohemian Diet Club, which was attended by Max Fürstenberg from Berlin. In the evening, there was a dinner given by Nostitz. Berlin does not seem too much pleased over our handling of foreign policy. As Prince of Albania, Berchtold had proposed, in succession, a Mohammedan, a Protestant, and, finally, a Catholic. Emperor William remarked: "Now he is only waiting to propose a Jew." There was also some talk about Szapáry's mission. A short time ago Szapáry, who had till then been Permanent Secretary in the Foreign Office, was sent to Berlin and asked our Ambassador to take him to see Bethmann. The Ambassador accordingly took him to the Imperial Chancellor, and they had a conversation *à trois*. Szapáry talked on everything under the sun, but old Szögyény got nothing out of all that, and finally asked him what he wanted. To which he replied, he was commissioned to sound the Chancellor as to whether Germany, in all eventualities, would stand on Austria's side. Bethmann, however, asked the Ambassador, next day, what Szapáry had really wanted of him. He seems to have moved like a cat on hot bricks.

Both our Ambassador in Berlin and our representative in Bucarest complain of not getting any clear instructions. The result of Berchtold's habit of talking everything over with all the secretaries in his Ministry, and being, as he is, under the most diverse influences, is that no firm line is taken. His lack of independence certainly struck us, on the occasion of the last meeting of the Delegations in Budapest, and Schwegel, that experienced old diplomat, was incensed to have Count Alexander Hoyos, Berchtold's chef de Cabinet, walking in, unannounced, on confidential discussions, and taking upon himself to speak, unasked, at them. During the last few days I have been reading the first volume of Friedjung's book, on the "Fight for Hegemony in Germany," of which the new edition has been sent me by his publisher. The state of things in our Foreign Office in Mensdorff's day, before the 1866 war, must have been very like the wretched pass to which they have been brought now: the Minister of Foreign Affairs the "sport" of every cross-current and eddy of opinion. Then, however, there was more conscientiousness and devotion to duty in the service than there is to-day. The to-and-fro-ing between Schönbrunn and Belvedere makes everything worse. This is the explanation of the ill-tempers, contradictions, omissions and insincerities of our policy. Francis Ferdinand is reported as having said, the other day, that he had got Berchtold in his pocket. I am not sure, however, whether he really knows *what* he has got in his pocket.

It would certainly be important were it to prove that the Heir Apparent has lost interest in the Bohemian

Compromise. It is said that he is no longer concerned about it: nay, that he is not even for it, because he is apprehensive lest the Germans and the Czechs should prove able to come to an agreement on a basis of mutual liberty. If this is true, Pater Abel was right when he dreaded an understanding between Germans and Czechs on the ground that, once united, they would exert the same pressure on the Emperor that the Hungarians now do. More than that, it would prove the unsteady basis of the Archduke's policy. Whether and how long it is going to go on being possible to seek for a Compromise in Bohemia through the instrumentality of the great landed proprietors is highly dubious. What is certain is that we have no sort of interest in seeing the Conservatives break with the Czechs, since they still serve as a bridge over to the Czech leaders. We avoid anything that could antagonise them. When the War General Service Bill was up in the Upper House, Heinrich Clam wanted to attack the Czechs on the ground of certain incidents during mobilisation. Lest that should happen, we refrained altogether from intervening in the debate, and all that happened was that Count Beck made a statement. Clam was much put out by this, and let me see that he was. Whereupon I told him that it was important, in view of conditions in Bohemia, for him not to get out at elbows with the Czechs. As it is, the Czech agrarians are turning away from the Conservative landowners. Anyone who thinks things out is bound to realise that, in the long run, there is nothing for it but some sort of democratic compromise at the expense of the great landowners. If, however, it is the case that the Heir to the Throne is turning against a Compromise, he is acting directly contrary to the interest of the dynasty. In Austria, the further extension of *divide et impera* means its very slow but quite inevitable dissolution.

Vienna, January 27, 1913.

Yesterday I was told by Marchet that, some ten days ago, he met Schoenaich, the ex-War Minister, at Frau Schratt's, and was informed by him that, during the time he held office, Conrad von Hötzendorf had three times put plans for a war with Italy before him.

Vienna, January 29, 1913.

Professor Redlich finds particular pleasure in the society of certain aristocratic circles, where he is especially welcomed by the ladies, since he is a most fascinating talker. Yesterday, he talked with a "Princess" about Francis Ferdinand. She held that he was certain to be the victim of an assassin, on account of his grim personality. Nice conversation in our dynastic society!

I am oppressed by a thought—Germany is not sentimental. Kiderlen said to Fürstenberg, a little while back, "There are no friendships in politics. . . . I have no use for that sort of thing; but we two (Germany and Austria-Hungary) need one another, and this mutual interest is decisive. So, Germany will 'keep step' if we come to blows with Serbia and Russia. Suppose, however, this action of ours is a piece of stupidity, what then? Germany, without any necessity so to do, is involved in a life-and-death struggle with France, Russia, and England. Is Germany then bound to win, as in 1815 and 1870? The universal judgment is that the French army to-day is quite different from what it was then, and then Germany had to fight only on one front and had Russia covering its rear. Do we constitute a sufficient substitute, in the far less favourable position of to-day?" Portentous questions, these, which might well cause Germany to lay a friendly hand on our shoulders and say: "Look out!" Goluchowski was right enough when he said to me yesterday that our proceedings in Galicia—*i.e.* the "Imperial Royal rising"—together with our handling of the Ruthenian question, were entirely incomprehensible on the assumption that it is desired to be on good terms with Russia. I advised him to have a talk with Professor Neurath, who has just returned from Galicia and could tell him much. To-day, I had a letter from the correspondent of the *Hamburger Nachrichten*, Dr. Hartmeyer, who is anxious to have a talk with me on the very obscure political outlook. I held it to be my duty to talk to him as man to man. In the last analysis, does it not concern us deeply if Germany become involved in entering a world war under an unfavourable constellation, and consequently does not emerge victorious, as in 1870? What would be the outlook for us Germans in Austria, were Germany compelled to step down from its present pedestal? It is generally agreed that it has an inept Ambassador in Vienna; my acquaintance with him is only superficial, but there are complaints of him from many quarters. Count Monts always calls him the "Saxon electoral councillor." Aehrenthal wanted him removed at any price, but the result of his efforts was the reverse. In Berlin there is an idea of sending the Ambassador here to Rome in Jagow's place, but Emperor William appears to have made up his mind that, so long as the old Emperor lives, he will not change his Ambassador in Vienna. Baron Tucher, the Bavarian Minister here, confirmed this statement of the case. It shows a very petty conception of a very important matter. In Berlin, in the course of many conversations with persons in high positions and great responsibilities, I have always found them ill-informed about Austrian conditions. It is years now since we have had, in Vienna, a German Ambassador who either himself, or through adequate assistants, thoroughly understood the difficult and complex conditions of our Monarchy, and could send truthful and undoctored reports of them to Berlin. The Military Attachés may keep us mutually fairly well *au courant* about army matters; but the German Government is most imperfectly informed as to the play of domestic forces, the conditions affecting the nationalities, and the general mentality of our vast agglomeration of races. Reuss, Eulenburg, and Wedel were all great gentlemen, perfect as representatives and on all matters of form, but Fürstenberg is wrong if he thinks that sort of thing the first consideration. Not that a mere official like Tschirschky will serve. It seems to me, from what one can observe to-day, that French and, above all, British, diplomacy is far superior to German, and infinitely so to ours.

Vienna, January 31, 1913.

At a dinner given yesterday by Director Spitzmüller, I sat next to General Krobatin, the War Minister, whom I have known for many years; he spoke in quite unbuttoned fashion with me. On internal and external grounds alike, war is a necessity. My speeches in the Delegations had suggested to the Minister that I had some interest in Southern Slav questions; he is convinced that we have got to annex Serbia, and the sooner the better. He does not seem to be convinced that war with Serbia must necessarily bring war with Russia in its train, but finally admitted that this was highly probable. He developed a plan of campaign on broad lines. As to Germany, he seemed uncertain. He states that, when our Heir Apparent was in Berlin, Emperor William had preached peace: but that in Donaueschingen he had done the opposite. He also knew about Szapáry's mission to Berlin, and held the view that it had failed. In intervention by France and Britain he does not believe. Some time ago, he asked Berchtold about Germany, and got the reply: "I do not know whether the threads that have been spun between Berlin and Petersburg have yet achieved any definite strength." Krobatin admits that the Bismarckian policy of throwing out lines to Petersburg has proved thoroughly justified, from the German point of view: further that Germany has no interest as yet in a war and would, at the moment, avoid one and strive to restrain Austria-Hungary from warlike steps. When I enquired: "What are we to do with Serbia, suppose it conquered?" the usual answer followed— In that case, a third State corpus must be formed down there and the entire structure of the Monarchy transformed. To do that along normal lines is impossible, but the annexation of Serbia would burst the untenable form of Dualism. When I enquired: "And what would Hungary say?" the answer came: Féjerváry had had his proclamation all ready. Then, the courage to carry through was lacking. Now, universal suffrage will be proclaimed, and the Parliament elected on that basis will sanction everything. Further, war would regenerate the army. Conditions in the army are impossible. He takes a very serious view of events in Bohemia—no doubt intentionally. He says that so soon as the troops are taken out of their native *milieu*, there is an entire change in their spirit. Before the enemy, they will do their duty. He was more sceptical about the South Slavs. Upshot: the cold-steel theory on every hand. And Krobatin says all this with an air of such complete assurance that one recognises how often he has said it all before. Then he talked with me about the 1859 war. The real motives for the armistice of Villafranca have not yet been disclosed (rather make peace than beg for Prussian aid!), but he is of opinion that it was the softness of the Emperor which then prevented the carrying on of the war. Had it been possible to keep him off the field of battle, we might have been able to carry on the war to a successful issue. Benedek was victorious: one Army corps was intact: the Isonzo valley troops were marching up. The War Minister denied that the "Imperial-Royal rising" in Galicia was being promoted by the military: the Mannlicher rifles had been delivered to the Defence unions, there as in the other provinces. Not to anybody else. When I referred to Professor Neurath and his observation that the General Staff was behind the whole business, Krobatin cried: "No, no; Conrad has been obliged to give me written assurance that nothing of the sort is to happen." *Sic!* The Minister does not deny that the Social Democrats are behind the movement. He had never heard the expression "Imperial-Royal rising"—and laughed mightily thereat.

Colonel Boog, the War Minister's Chief Secretary, is, of course, his obedient echo. When I put it to him that there was a point to be kept in mind in all this calculation, namely, that the Emperor had sworn an oath of fealty to the Hungarian Constitution, all he said was: "Sentimentality!"

After dinner I got hold of Zaleski, the Finance Minister, and asked him whether he were prepared to face the verdict of history and answer for the financial position of the State and the financial consequences of a war? "Oh, yes," he said; "that would be all right." The Minister of Railways, Forster, was likewise bellicose, but shrank from the consequences. He thought it idle to talk of our winning over the South Slavs, as against the counter-attraction of Serbia. He referred to Spalato, where the Town Council had had to be dissolved because it had voted a gift to Jukić, who had made a murderous attack on the Banus, Cuvaj. By way of answer, I retailed to him a series of incidents illustrating the want of understanding of the people of which the Hungarian Government had been guilty in Croatia. Our governors have no idea of what is going on inside the soul of the South Slav nation, and imagine that these things can be cured by destroying the Serb State and forcing a people accustomed to complete independence into an Imperial "delegation"!

To-day I told Max Fürstenberg about this conversation of mine with Krobatin. He had been asked by von Jagow to sound Berchtold, since it is being said in Berlin, with the confirmation of a high officer who has been sent to Vienna within the last few days, that the military party in Vienna is eager for war and making all preparations to be able to start it as soon as the weather becomes better. In Berlin they are anxious, since though faithful to the Alliance, they are not prepared to enter a world-war on account of any Serbian plan of Austria's. Fürstenberg, accordingly, is commissioned to find out from Berchtold what attitude he takes in the matter. My narrative seemed to him to confirm the apprehensions of Berlin. On January 26th, Emperor William expressly told Fürstenberg that he would be loyal to the Alliance, naturally: but that he could not interpret the Alliance to imply that he should let his soldiers be shot to pieces for the sake of promoting Austria's Serbian plans.

Vienna, February 3, 1913.

To-day I had a long conversation with Dr. Ivo Pilar, an advocate in Tuzla (Bosnia): he is son-in-law to Shek, the Permanent Secretary, a Catholic Croat, a vegetarian, with a highly abstract and brooding mind, but a man of high seriousness, deeply influenced by German scholarship. The result of his studies has been to enable him to estimate the influence of Orthodoxy on the one hand and Catholicism on the other on the minds of the Southern Slav people. Both confessions preach retreat from the material world. Catholicism has built on that its system for dominating the masses; Clericalism, which is everywhere in opposition to the individuality of the State as such; while Orthodoxy, although it too holds that this world is a passing illusion, does not find it necessary to attempt to influence the broad masses of its adherents to carry this view into practical life. As a result, while the Catholic world shows a marked lack of initiative, there is a robust will to live throughout that of Orthodoxy. For which reason, our Catholicism will never prevail against Serbian Orthodoxy. When it comes to practical life and its expansive activities, Byzantium is more potent than Loyola. The Achilles heel of Orthodoxy, however, is its hostility to culture, which is itself a result of its intrinsic immorality, since it recognises no higher moral aims. If conditions remain as they are, the Orthodox population will beat the Catholic. On the basis of such views he set before me the necessity for freeing the Slavs from Orthodoxy. At the same time, Catholicism, in its Germanic-Latin expression, has nothing for the Slav world. Therefore, he seeks for some third possibility, and, in most singular fashion, thinks he has found it in the Bogumilism that prevailed in Bosnia in pre-Turkish times. It was easy, of course, for me to prove to him that a gnostic Manichaean creed, denying every form of State authority, could only increase the great fault of the Slavs—their incapacity for organised State development.

His judgments are most incomplete and in part actually false; but they are by no means devoid of interest. Dr. Pilar is proud of the fact that, although a Catholic himself, he has played his part in resisting the influence of Archbishop Stadler. Thanks to that, a coalition between Catholics and Mohammedans has come within sight, although the latter had, previously, been exasperated against the Catholics by the proselytisation carried on by Stadler. In regard to actual present-day problems, Dr. Pilar is one of those who look upon any reconciliation between the Monarchy and the Serb element as impracticable. The Serbian spirit of Orthodoxy is aimed directly against Austria: and, in the long run, he thinks it impossible for Austria's South Slav world and Serbia to continue to exist side by side. When I put it to him that the logical deduction from his opinions, supposing that the Monarchy was not going to throw up the sponge, was the incorporation within it of the Serbian State, with the result, according to himself, that, within Austria, Orthodoxy would then be powerless against the Catholic Slavs, he at once admitted that this would be the case. Whereupon he reverted to his idea of a third religion, uniting the other two; but had to agree that our materialistic times were hardly capable of founding such a grandiose new religion as he had in view. All the same, he harked back to his point that Orthodoxy with its plutocratic offshoots was a disaster for the South Slavs: his ideal, so he declared, was a class organisation on the lines of the Germanic tribes. Nebulous as was much of his talk, and an odd mixture of true and false, it does nevertheless cast a searchlight on the profound contradiction amidst the South Slav world. Much of what he had to say about the fundamental opposition between Orthodoxy and Catholicism is perfectly accurate. In relation to the immediate aims of practical existence, and as a technique of twists and sharp practices in trade and business, Orthodoxy is a more unscrupulous foil than Catholicism.

Vienna, February 4, 1913.

Shek, who recently dined with me in company with Šola, the President of the Bosnian Diet, and Professor Redlich, is retiring—*i.e.* he is being retired. Differences with Potiorek. The latter is now introducing a military *régime* in Bosnia, against which Shek has been fighting a vain fight in these latter months. Under the name of "Reform of the Administration," conditions like those that once existed in Lombardy are being created here. On the Serbian programme issue, conflict flamed up between Shek and Potiorek. Potiorek wanted to have this party programme prosecuted as a treasonable act, although it was signed by the three Orthodox Bishops and Šola, the President of the Diet, and contained nothing treasonable, though it was a pretty definite political manifesto on the part of the Serbian party in Bosnia. Shek prevented the accusation from being laid, but now the Government's line is to hunt for high treason everywhere. Raw boys are being arrested, and the military interfere in every department. Potiorek goes down daily to the "Vlada" (Government building) and, without any experience or any knowledge of the laws, deals with all sorts of civil affairs. For this reason, the removal of Shek, who, with Benko, fought against a system of this kind, represents a very evil turn in internal policy in Bosnia. It is not as if this method of governing carried with it an absolute guarantee of order and security! A mania for prosecution is combined with an incredible carelessness. Thus, Sarajevo shuts both eyes when the great Serbian National Union, *Prosvjeta*, proceeds, under the presidency of Novaković (former Serbian Premier and present President of the Belgrade Scientific Academy) to hold a great conference, attended by the entire Serbian world, of such a character as is bound to have wide repercussions throughout the entire Serb world!

Shek describes as "madness" the notion of drawing Serbia into the ambit of the Austrian Monarchy; to attempt to bring a people, free and independent for a hundred years, and, at this moment, flushed with victory in a war of liberation, under the control of the Austro-Hungarian Government, is to invite civil war. He thinks that the entire population would take to the mountains and proclaim a Haiduck war!

Vienna, February 5, 1913.

Edward Liechtenstein told me yesterday that he had been in company with Conrad von Hötzendorf, who spoke in just the same sense as Krobatin.

I went to-day to see Berchtold, in order to draw his attention to the fact that comment is being excited by the way in which his Press Bureau runs counter to his professed devotion to peace. For instance, Steinberg, the editor of the official *Prager Abendblatt* recently received from the Press Bureau a paragraph so anti-Russian that he went to the governor, in order to avoid taking the matter up. Similarly, Mandl's pamphlet, with its violently anti-Serbian tone, appeared with the sanction of the Press Bureau. Thence, too, comes the wind that blows through the Sarajevo *Tagblatt*, which, under instructions from Kánia, is full of tendencious stuff against the Serbs in Bosnia. Berchtold answered all this in his nonchalant way, in meaningless phrases. I then put it to him that it is not a matter to be dismissed lightly that high Generals should be going about talking of war, the partition of Serbia, and the overthrow of the Hungarian Constitution. Berchtold implied that these gentlemen were merely breathing out fire because they had no voice in foreign policy.

Marchet telephoned me to-day that he had told Frau Schratt about the warlike plans of the military party and she had said to him that she would speak to the Emperor about it at 5 o'clock to-day.

Vienna, February 7, 1913.

I have just been reading in the February 1913 issue of the *Documents of Progress* an interesting thesis by a certain Dr. Hallstein on the Greater Austrian idea. He repeats and combines everything that is being said by our war party. The militarist argument admits frankly that an acceptance by Serbia of Austrian demands is by no means desired: on the contrary, rejection is awaited as a welcome excuse for beginning war, subjugating, not Albania merely, but Serbia itself and the territories which it seeks to acquire as part of the heritage of Turkey, and doing all this as the realisation of a colonial idea. Those who think on these lines argue that Russia would be prevented by apprehension of German attack from opposing an Austrian war of conquest against Serbia. They visualise, further, an alteration in the constitution of Hungary and the substitution for Dualism of an association of three, four, or five constituent States under the Habsburg sceptre. An eye is cast even on the Ukraine. The author, who takes the point of view that in any event a development of our South Slav regions and the establishment of some definite constitutional order in Bosnia and Croatia are necessary, meets these Utopian fantasies with the reminder that Italy would certainly not tolerate an Austrian campaign of conquest in the Balkans of this nature; while the dreams of incorporating the western Balkans, to say nothing of Poles and the Ukraine, could, obviously, be realised only as the result of an overwhelming victory of our arms in a European war against all the States bordering Austria on south, east, and north. His final sentences are as follows: " Since there is small probability of any such victory, the more likely possibility is that the loosing of such a war would lead to the defeat of Austria, and the partition of its territories among the adjacent national States. Nor must we omit to state that, from the European point of view, it is impossible to stress clearly and early enough the appalling risk of war involved in such an idea."

Vienna, February 11, 1913.

Met to-day Dr. Beck of Meran. An able jurist, who knows the Tyrol thoroughly, and talks with all the peasants in Meran. An absolutely sound fellow, keen in his judgments: *integer*, independent, a bit of a character. In Welsch Tyrol the peasants are still pro-Austrian, but the whole of the intelligentsia, and the clergy, with their head, the Archbishop of Trent, are absolutely Irridentist. The peasant knows that he gets the best prices for his wine in Austria, and does not think beyond that. In North Tyrol and in German South Tyrol the case is rather different. There, the educated classes hang on to Austria, but the peasant sells his wine and fruit to Germany. " A hundred marks are more than a hundred crowns," so Beck has heard, often enough. The outlook is mixed. Against Italy, all the German elements would combine with enthusiasm.

Vienna, February 15, 1913.

Wekerle gave a lecture yesterday evening. General impression, he wants to put himself forward as the future

Prime Minister of Hungary. He spoke tactfully, and there was considerable applause, for in his speech he distributed his blows with much skill. A lunch given by Baron Beck gave us the opportunity of a thorough discussion of plans with Wekerle and Szterényi. Wekerle laid out a complete programme of government which he got Baron Beck to listen to, perhaps in the hope of having him as his partner in Austria. Points in that programme: No coalition, but a new party, for which he counts on large part of the opposition. He would renew the compromise with Austria before it runs out, and for a longer period than ten years. He accepts the import of live cattle for fattening, but would have the slaughter take place on Hungarian soil. Would revive frontier trade, with certain concessions to Serbia. No recognition, here, of the need of establishing trade relations with the Balkans on new principles. He would make certain concessions to the nationalities in Hungary, especially the Rumanians, even making them prefects in the counties (!) (Aside by Szterényi: "But not in Rumanian districts!"). But there can be no talk of introducing the Nationality law. When I asked about the state of opinion among the Hungarian Serbs, Wekerle replied: "Events have caused a certain movement, meetings for the Serbian Red Cross roused sympathy, but no more: there is no danger." He seems to have no suspicion of the great Jugo-Slav movement that has swept through the whole of the young people. Both of them kept repeating: the Hungarian State recognises Rumanian-, Serbian-, and German-speaking Hungarians, but, at home, neither Rumanians, Serbs, nor Germans. So, if, as a result of the new franchise reform, 20 to 30 Rumanians should be returned to the Hungarian Parliament, they have got to join one or other of the existing political parties. If they were to form a Rumanian Club, it would have no parliamentary recognition. Its members would count as outsiders and be put on no Committees. As to any provisos touching Southern Slav policy, the administration of Bosnia, the modification of the 1880 law, or the impossibility of carrying on, as is now being done, different policies in Agram, Sarajevo, and Spalato—no reply, no give and take. In other words, despite all the threatening evidences of the vast movements released by the Balkan wars, the same old intransigence. No help here to a solution of the immense problems before us.

Vienna, February 18, 1913.

Another long talk with Professor Neurath on the Orthodox question. He thinks the development of a Western European Orthodoxy possible. A task for Austria. Catholic propaganda gets us nowhere. A Europeanisation of Orthodoxy only conceivable on democratic lines. Plainly, he talks under the stimulus of a lecture delivered in Berlin by Professor Harnack—" On the Differences between the Spirit of the Oriental and the Occidental Church."

Vienna, February 21, 1913.

Yesterday evening, I gave a long lecture to the Industrial Club on our trade in the Balkans, under the title, " The Outlook in Trade Policy." I dealt comprehensively with the possibility of full commercial treaties and most-favoured-nation treatment, with preferential duties and the tariff union problem, stating that from this point of view Dualism was in need of reform; and I dealt with the whole topic from the standpoint of our large policy, which is, in fact, petty. I also replied to the lecture recently delivered here by Wekerle. I believe that the agreement with which I was greeted was genuine.

Vienna, February 22, 1913.

Krobatin has confided to Paul Schulz that the Emperor recently admonished him not to talk about war in the way in which he did at the Spitzmüller dinner party. The Emperor said: " Neither I nor you know whether it will come to war. I have no objection to your going about in society, but you ought not to talk of such matters with civilians." It appears that our table conversation had the following history. I related my conversation with Krobatin to Max Fürstenberg: he reported it to the German Emperor: he told it to our Ambassador in Berlin: who told Berchtold: who told our Emperor: who sent for Krobatin. Lesson for me—as a civilian, I am not entitled—even were I a Minister—to talk about the war plans of the gentlemen of the army!

ROMAN DAYS AND THEIR ECHOES

PAGES FROM MY DIARY

Rome, February 27, 1913.

I GOT here in the afternoon, the day before yesterday, by the 25-hour train-de-luxe from Vienna. Marchet met me, and I have a nice room in the Hotel Eden. Yesterday I went with Marchet to see our Ambassador, Mérey. He declares that Irridentism is on the wane. No serious person thinks of Trieste, for the Italians know that it is further protected by Germany. The Trentino, on the other hand, is the universal dream. Not at once. *Qui vivra, verra.* Mérey does not believe that the Italian University in Austria plays any considerable rôle here. If there were not so much talk about it in Austria, no one would pay much attention to it here. All of which is very optimistic. Interesting, if hardly exhilarating, what he has to say of the incessant minor friction between Austria-Hungary and Italy. He deals with these numerous cases personally—and rightly so. Our General Staff takes a delight in collecting every incident, every year, but even it has got to admit that their total has shown a notable fall. The sort of case that comes up is that of an Italian gendarme somewhere or other up in the mountains having stepped a couple of yards across the frontier line, with a dossier of reports, sworn statements, etc., on the case. On both sides, there is a tendency to exaggerate, in which we seem to surpass the others. When Steinwender, a member of the House of Deputies, was in Rome some little time back, with a view to arranging a visit of Austrian members, he met Nathan, the Mayor here, and the Foreign Minister, San Giuliano, but ignored the Embassy—a piece of gross tactlessness. It was met with equal stupidity. Mérey was instructed from Vienna that should the said visit take place, he was to watch out that the mutual outbursts were not too violent. He was, in fact, to prevent the people here from falling into one another's arms. Mérey says that, had the visit taken place, as it did not, he would have had a veritable egg dance to perform. Old Austria, aristocratic, bureaucratic, simply does not understand the modern world, and therefore is not understood by it. An Ambassador is instructed to restrain the well-meant meeting of the free members of Parliaments of two allied States, lest we appear too forthcoming!

Mérey's views on Albania are the same as mine. The Italians are apprehensive about our plans there, and fancy that we shall exert great political and financial influence. Mérey, however, is rather of my opinion, that the opposite is likely to be the case. He also sees this Albanian affair as the probable source of complications with Italy. At the same time, Albania offers an opportunity of contacts with Italy. Mérey tells me that agriculture in Italy has made great progress latterly, greater really than industry, especially in the Romagna and Venetia.

To-day I visited San Giuliano, to whom Mérey had given me an introduction. He speaks admirable French and likes to hear himself talk. Conversation with him is light and easy. He answers readily, leaves many points open and untouched upon, goes in to this, evades that, but all easily, with no trace of bureaucratic furtiveness, smooth, natural, unforced. Our first topic was the relations between ourselves and Italy. Austria-Hungary and Italy are States with wholly different mentalities. We do not understand each other. Here in Italy there is complete liberty in the expression of political opinion. No one understands how anyone could be prosecuted for the utterance of a political view. There is no making of martyrs. In Austria, *per contra*, there are police prosecutions, on the old-fashioned lines, for every sort of thing. Every time one of them takes place, there is a stir and excitement in Italy. In Austria, on the other hand, the liberty that here prevails is regarded as tendencious disorderliness, and causes a sense of injury. Seriously, in his opinion, no thinking man here is really Irridentist. Not that he used that word. We must go on working for good relations.

Albania. There, civilisation can only be introduced step by step, and slowly. He does not believe in the outbreak of war, since he fails to see any outstanding difference to justify it. Everything he said on this head revealed the great interest taken by Italy in Albania. Italy recognises the *status quo*, and our present position on the Adriatic. He realises that we cannot allow Italy to establish itself in Valona, but, *per contra*, Austria can only get there at the cost of a war. Since San Giuliano is further of the opinion that Albania will be, for a long time to come, incapable of functioning as a State—notably in foreign affairs—I found myself strengthened, through what he said, in the view that Schwegel and I have always taken that these matters have got to be managed in Albania by an International Commission. On which Mérey agrees. Condominium would, in the end, lead to conflict with Italy. Clerical and militarist circles with us regard that with equanimity, although or because it must lead to collision.

Rome, February 28, 1913.

Marchet and I have had an interesting afternoon. We called on our Ambassador to the Vatican, Prince Schönburg, with whom I have long been acquainted. He showed us all over the Palazzo Venezia, which has been restored in the last few years, under his supervision, and on the whole with skill and taste. Where he has been completely successful is in the reconstruction of the Palazzetto, which had to be moved and set back on account of the view of the Victor Emmanuel monument. The reconstruction is a brilliant success. The court is now, though hardly known, one of the things that must be seen. The arcades, formerly to a large extent over-built, are now superbly effective and constitute a specimen of early Renaissance work with which there is hardly anything in Rome to compare: the cloisters in the new Palazzetto, if hardly as magnificent as the court of the Cancelleria, have a refined and tranquil beauty of their own, and once the garden layout is completed the whole will have a unique picturesqueness. We were enchanted with the main court of the Palazzo Venezia, despite the fact that it was a dull day and raining. We then went on to the International Institute of Agriculture in the Villa Borghese, where Professor Ricci and Professor Lorenzoni did the honours. With both of them we discussed the system of mezzadria or semi-tenancy which is customary in many parts of Italy, and interesting to me on account of the analogous conditions with us, like the colonial system in Dalmatia and Southern Tyrol and the Kmet system in Bosnia. Lorenzoni is greatly enamoured of the mezzadria as exemplified in Tuscany. There, the institution is apparently not unfavourable to agricultural development. Under mezzadria, an aliquot part of the harvest—usually one-half—is handed over to the proprietor of the soil. But the personal relation is wholly different from that between Beg and Kmets in Bosnia. The Tuscan landowners reside to a large extent on their estates, and the whole relation is patriarchal. Ricci is absolutely opposed to mezzadria, since he regards every system of divided yield as an obstacle to progress. In cases where patriarchal conditions still obtain, it may be tolerable, but elsewhere it is out of date, and one of the reasons why the condition of agriculture is unsatisfactory in Italy; moreover, in general there is an effort not to make the tenants owners of the soil but to convert them into day labourers living in tied houses. In the Institute Library I came upon a book giving a comprehensive account of the various forms of holding in Italy, " I contratti agrarii in Italia ": since it dates from 1891, it must be largely out of date.

Rome, March 2, 1913.

Yesterday we went to see Sodoma's picture in the Farnese Palace, " The Marriage of Roxana." It confirms the observation that 16th century masters who are not actually in the first rank will yet touch greatness in individual works, as if seized, in them, by the full glory of their age. Such a work is " The Marriage of Roxana." Its composition is easy enough to describe. Roxana is sitting on a bridal couch of attractive Renaissance blue, a putto waving her light veil, while Alexander, seen in full profile, approaches and holds out a crown to his bride. Roxana is gazing straight in front of her, lost in thought, not regarding Alexander. The whole figure is compact of charm; so much so that, at first, one quite overlooks the drawing of the left arm and hand. Alexander's countenance is full of Hellenic calm, his figure of lofty dignity, and the two, bride and bridegroom, are combined in a wonderful unity which seems to express not so much a union of affection as a great act of State—in which the painter no doubt is true to historic tradition. To this central conception the surrounding figures are adjusted in the most various postures. To the right are two youths, one, bearing a torch, of striking Raphael-like loveliness. The calm of these two figures helps to give the whole a certain air of grave solemnity. Had the picture dated from the 17th century, we should have seen these two youths in the most lively motion! To the spectator's right, the Moor. He strikes the one sensual note in the harmony of the whole, since his reaction to the situation is expressed in a friendly grin. The female figure at the extreme left, in the act of departure, is casting a glance of serious wonder and sympathy on the bride, while another female figure stands by, clad in draperies of classic beauty. The whole has caught and held a moment of solemn loveliness, in which there is no passionate movement, nothing erotic. Equally harmonious is the surrounding of the group. To the right, one has a glimpse down a colonnade, beyond it, a wide landscape with people on foot and horse visible in the distance, which sets the marriage group in the centre of a fair perspective of busy life and the open air. The most splendid *décor* for the central figures is supplied by the garland of putti, in whom the *naïveté* and expressiveness with which Correggio endows his children's heads are combined with the beauty of Raphael's. They recall both these great painters. Above the canopy over the couch there are six putti, occupied in holding up a ponderous green curtain. The spectator is left in doubt whether they have raised it to permit Alexander to behold the bride, or are about to drop it to permit him to rest in Roxana's arms. Especially charming is the expression on the countenance of the putto who is hard at work taking off one of Roxana's sandals, eagerness and effort being blended on his little face. The utmost discretion in the distribution of all the other putti, each one of whom is fairer than the last. They are indeed a heavenly escort for a moment of supreme earthly solemnity. With Marchet and his ladies I stayed for above an hour revelling in contemplation of the picture.

Rome, March 3, 1913.

I met yesterday Miklós, former Hungarian Secretary of State, who is a delegate to the International Institute of Agriculture here. He is greatly taken by the King and Queen of Italy. The King has absolutely no prejudices, takes people as he finds them, and uses them as best he can. We Austrians are not used to that. Our Emperor has never known how to use the men he had. With us, the policy of the squeezed lemon takes the place of skilful selection in the employment of the admirable men whom we possess. Those persons who are distinguished are taken up and squeezed dry so long as they can do anything at all. Bit by bit, " how " has become a secondary consideration: long aims, calculation of the future, no longer exist. A wall of prejudices divides the Emperor from all free political personalities. He is surrounded by a ring of advisers, domestic, military, and medical, which cuts him off as completely from any political as it does from any atmospheric fresh air. The great tides of life of our time hardly reach his ear as the most distant echo. From any real participation in that life he is barred: he no longer understands the time, and it is passing over and beyond him. One feels an immense contrast here in Rome. Italy is a growing, democratic national State, which cannot understand the petty criticism of our policy and never finds any real sign of power in us. What San Giuliano recently said to me was repeated by Miklós in almost identical terms—Italy does not understand us and we do not understand Italy, marching towards a great future and prepared to rise as it can and with any aid it can find.

Rome, March 4, 1913.

Lunched with Mérey yesterday. My neighbour at table was San Giuliano, who said one or two good things. We spoke of the approaching elections, under the new franchise law. He thinks there will be no great change. There will perhaps be 21 Clericals in the new Chamber, but they will not be true Clericals, only Clericaloids. Confessional questions count for nothing in Italy; there was once a Jewish War Minister (Ottolenghi). When he was in office, someone spoke to the King of Confessional differences, and remarked that in Italy they had a Jew as War Minister, whereupon the King asked, with animation, when was that? in other words, he did not know that his then Minister was a Jew. Or so San Giuliano said. Here, one is in a different atmosphere, both social and political. But we do not even trouble to understand modern Italy.

In the evening we went to "Traviata." Traviata was sung by a Miss Storchio, who acted wonderfully. To-day we had a motor ride to Frascati, the Lake of Nemi, and Albano. Great luck with weather. Wonderful spring-like air. The ladies, especially the beautiful Desirée, were enchanted. In Frascati we ate young chickens and delicious spring lettuce, drank plenty of Frascati wine, took a walk by the shores of Lake Nemi, and in the evening drove back to Rome through the Campagna, lit by a glorious sunset sky.

Rome, March 5, 1913.

Miklós took me to-day to see Luzzatti. Certainly, an interesting man. Externally, a Jewish patriarch, conceited, talkative, witty and continuously instructive. I had a very stimulating hour with him. He is one of the main architects of Italy's present finances. He is very proud of having been secretary to Sellas and followed in his footsteps. All of what he says is thoroughly sensible, and, what is more important, he has also acted sensibly. He spent a good deal of time inveighing against what are called "Investment Budgets," such as we have experienced in Austria. In Italy they call it, kindly, "la transformation des capitaux." His view is, as expressed in his public action (he has been four times at the Treasury) that investment loans ought to be funded and that the State, in issuing loans, ought to be extremely careful not unnecessarily to withdraw capital from productive industry or weaken its credit facilities. Old-fashioned bourgeois principles these may be, but under them Italy's finances flourish. On this very point, however, Luzzatti has opponents who maintain that Italy under-invests; a charge that does not shake the old gentleman. He is, however, a keen defender of the necessity of making timely provision, through taxes, for the future requirements of the State. He is greatly occupied with the financial consequences of the Lybian war. In sum, it will have cost them a round milliard. He envisages future expenses in Lybia which will have to be covered. Everything is voted that comes forward under the Lybian flag. He had a good comparison: there have been times in Italy when if a thief was caught in the open and his friends, to help him to get away, shouted "Evviva Garibaldi!" the crowd would join enthusiastically in the cry with the result that the thief got clean off. So is it now with Lybia. One has only to shout "Evviva Lybia!" and everything goes through. Luzzatti is full of antitheses. Giolitti hates the bankers, but upholds them: he, Luzzatti, honours the bankers, but does not uphold them.

Luzzatti is an opponent of the new Italian system of insurances. I asked him all sorts of questions about it. There has been a great increase in savings bank deposits, based on thrift and individual enterprise: it is a mistake for the State to install itself forcibly in the place of private enterprise. In principle, he approves of the idea of the State's undertaking life insurance, but he desires to have the State do that in competition with private enterprise —*i.e.* do insurance business better and cheaper for the insured and so beat the private firms openly, in free competition.

In the afternoon, with Mérey again. Further talk about Albania, in which we again found ourselves in agreement in holding that there must be an international organisation there. He has vainly endeavoured to dissuade his chief from his contrary opinion. With us, Catholic and militarist circles are on top in the Albanian question. Condominium with Italy, however, would merely repeat the Schleswig-Holstein experience. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy cannot pursue two contrary aims at once: on the one hand, seek to protect Albania, strengthen and fatten it at the expense of Serbia and Greece, and, on the other, to promote good relations with these two Balkan States. The only way for us out of this dilemma is international regulation of the Albanian question—but it looks much more likely that we shall fall between the two stools. The standing argument against international regulation is, of course, the view that any such organisation will go against us. Is that necessarily the case?

It is not without interest that Mérey, referring to a personage often enough mentioned in these pages, spoke strongly against the intervention, in diplomacy, of outsiders who seek thereby to acquire position for themselves.

In so far as this is really the case, he is certainly right, but it is inept, to say the least, on the part of our Foreign Office, Ambassadors, and envoys to let slip the great advantage of gathering information and so extending its sphere of influence by using men of political standing and knowledge, even if they are not in the diplomatic service. Outside of the ranks of professional diplomacy, there is such a thing as disinterested concern in the welfare of the State. In other countries, the greatest and most serviceable use is made of such independent factors. With us, there is not the smallest attempt to find out such people, hear what they have to say, and use them according to their quality. How often have I returned home from journeys in whose course I have seen and heard much, and found nothing at the Ballplatz but that air of cold, superior indifference, often enough no more than a mask for ignorance, which makes any real communication impossible. It is of a piece with Aehrenthal's remark, "What was Baernreither after in Belgrade?"

Rome, March 6, 1913.

A memorable party at Marchese Cappelli's, an ex-Foreign Minister, with whom Miklós made me acquainted, and at whose house I met many interesting persons. In addition to all these visits and talks, I have done a good deal of sight-seeing with Marchet and his ladies. For example, the Colonna Gallery, with the Gaspard Poussin pictures: parts of the Vatican collection: and the Baths of Caracalla. The pearl of our Roman perambulations, however, was the little cemetery of the German Cloister on the Borgo. *Pace Tedesca* it is appropriately called. A multitude of German names on the tombstones, which here are in the midst of exuberant vegetation. Here, in this quiet remote corner of the earth, a tiny German congregation has reunited in death. Evergreen plants and close-set palms shade the sacred spot. Nothing of the outer world to be seen save the vast cupola of St. Peters. The whole forms a moving and unforgettable picture.

Vienna, March 10, 1913.

I look back over my brief journey, with its wealth of impressions. I was first in Rome in the year 1864, for a couple of winter months, in the company of my then tutor, devoted to art and archæology. Rome then was still under Papal rule and there was a French garrison. Then I went with that noble lover of arts, Countess Resa Kinsky, and her son: then again once with Dumreicher—on both these occasions being occupied mainly with the art treasures and the beauties of the scenery. But never was the contrast between my first experience of Rome and its later development so striking as on this last visit of mine. In 1864, dirt, disorder, beggars and bribery were the order of the day in Rome. The curse of travel there was the crowd of beggars in every street, in every open space, everywhere one set foot. Tips had to be given in every shop, to every driver, to every servant. Hardly a trace of any of that to-day. A notable order and cleanliness obtain. By the side of the Rome of antiquity and the Rome of the Renaissance, there is now arising a third Rome, modern Rome, with superb buildings, and a splendid lay-out, which dominates the scene. The grave Roman character, formerly over-laid and hidden by filth and rags, now gives the leading note to the entire city. And it is not in externals only that national consciousness, a national sense of responsibility, education, comfort, and State order have produced a complete transformation in Rome; they have, in a way one could never have foretold, raised the whole being of the city. In Rome to-day one breathes the invigorating air of the new Italy.

As usual, I took care to equip myself with suitable literature for the journey. I took Alfred Reumont's "Contemporaries and Biographies" with me. "Austria," so he wrote in the year 1862, "misunderstands the genius of the Italian nation, as transformed during twenty years of French rule, which count for more than a normal half-century. It had no idea of how to attract Italy to itself, even in the imperfect fashion in which that was done by Napoleon. It conceived its rôle of Conservative restoration in a petty and ungenerous spirit, and instead of playing its influence over the other Italian States to establish itself as a substitute for the undeniable advantages of French organisation, succeeded in making itself responsible, as a whole, in the eyes of the Italians, for all the mistakes, all the perversities, all the miseries of all these separate Governments, even in cases where it was as a matter of fact entirely without guilt. Instead of absorbing into itself the vital forces of the nation, on a basis of mutual interpenetration and equal recognition—the only way of achieving anything permanent—it appeared in the character of an alien dominion, and, as such, showed no capacity of winning over either the aristocracy or the upper middle classes: it weighed upon the nation like some dead piece of rigid mechanism, while its persistent injury to the national consciousness caused even institutions in themselves excellent to be either rejected altogether or operated only in a truncated form." Such are the words of Alfred von Reumont, a Catholic and a

Conservative, who had an almost unequalled knowledge of the persons and circumstances of Italy at the period, and, as a German, viewed them with unprejudiced eyes. What he wrote more than sixty years ago, is true of the entire period of our rule in Italy, and unfortunately lives on in our Italian policy to-day. At a Roman antiquarian's, I came upon Balbo's well-known pamphlet, "Della Speranza d'Italia," of 1844. Though long out of date, I read it with great interest. What the nation needs, wrote the author, is nothing less than its independence from any alien rule. A Piedmontese and a staunch Conservative, Premier in Turin for a brief period in 1848, and certainly one of the first minds of the Risorgimento, Balbo desires to see Italy freed, not by a national uprising, still less by secret conspiracy, but by a new disposition of States. The partition of Turkey, which he sees as inevitable, would give the opportunity for Italy's liberation from Austrian dominion, through Austria's finding compensation in the northern provinces of Turkey in the Balkans. So, the Eastern Question would be solved contemporaneously with the Italian, and solved by the united action of Britain, France, and the Austrian Monarchy, and old enemies would become new allies of Italy. So may the fancy of gifted men play with the possibilities of a political future. But the political future is determined rather by men's errors and mistakes than by their noble and benevolent ideas.

BERLIN IN MARCH 1913

Vienna, March 14, 1913.

At the Ballplatz they are full of an idea of offering Salonika to the Bulgars in order to induce them to cede Silistria to the Rumanians. In his habitual fashion, Emperor William has recently expressed himself very openly on this in the last few days, deploring this latter project. It is a good deal to ask him to co-operate in taking Salonika from the Greeks at a moment when his brother-in-law, the Greek Crown Prince, has just saved the dynasty by his attitude. He could not, so he tells Max Fürstenberg, be a party to depriving the Greek dynasty of a success which is apt to strengthen it. Francis Ferdinand maintains that the Salonika–Silistria combination is not his idea, but Berchtold's, but he is greatly preoccupied with the way in which Rumania is to be treated. Russia is only waiting its chance to draw Rumania into its ambit, and if Austria-Hungary does not now come to Rumania's assistance in the matter of Silistria, on which they have set their hearts there, the situation will be dangerous. The present King of Rumania is loyal to our Emperor, but he is an old and ailing man, and his successor not to be counted on.

So far as I can, I keep track of the views of the German Emperor and his Government on the South Slav question. That is the most burning question for us, and the most perilous for the peace of Europe. Emperor William said to Max Fürstenberg that, at an earlier epoch, it would have been a good thing to have co-operated with Bulgaria, but that to-day the King of Bulgaria is absolutely unreliable. Austria has been deceived by him often before, and will be deceived again. Bulgaria should not be permitted to grow too strong: Austria ought to arrive at some sort of understanding with Rumania and Serbia, from the trade point of view as well as from the political. Further, he is reliably informed that were Austria to march upon Serbia, Russia would act at once, lest it should lose prestige. To which Fürstenberg agreed, and soon after came upon a despatch of Jagow's with a marginal note of the Emperor's in which he recorded Fürstenberg's concurrence. Jagow, at the time, does not seem to have been quite of the same opinion, influenced, no doubt, by a report from the German Ambassador in Vienna stating that, in Austria, the opinion prevails that Serbia will not hear of any *rapprochement* with the Monarchy—a statement that is hardly accurate in this connexion. I fancy there are many men in governing circles in Berlin who do not desire to see closer relations between the Monarchy and Serbia, since that would necessarily mean commercial intercourse based on mutual preferences, if not a common frontier tariff policy. And this would not suit the Germans, who have ruthlessly exploited the period of our fatuous commercial conflict with Serbia to deprive us to a very large extent of the market there.

Francis Ferdinand is for an alliance of the three Emperors. Italy he views as our foe, and has stated so bluntly to more than one visitor. When one of these quoted me on the sound condition of Italian finances, he was greatly astonished, the more that his interlocutor went on to cite me as authority for the fact that the Pope speaks of *re nostro*, and for the further fact that Papal and royal banks have speculated jointly in Lybia—*i.e.* that there is no longer a primary hostility between Vatican and Quirinal.—Unfortunately, I have repeatedly heard that Francis Ferdinand has spoken in a sense quite hostile to the Bohemian (Czecho-German) compromise—This compromise business is senseless: Thun's efforts are senile: the compromise would be worthless, since it is easier to play one side off against the other without it. So the great promoter of the compromise, who not more than a year ago was going up and down the palaces of Prague gathering adherents, one by one, has become an opponent.

Berlin, March 18, 1913.

Long conversation with Jagow to-day. He spoke very openly. A " Borussian " from Bonn, he is a corps brother of Fürstenberg's, hence his amiability. Takes a grave view of the general political situation. Very realistic in his talk, no superfluous verbiage. And a remarkable logical sequence. One feels a high degree of intellectual self discipline. I remarked that I had just come from Rome, where he had been very happy as Ambassador, and this called forth friendly recollections. I told him that the Italians had been by no means forthcoming on the subject of Albania. He said that the conduct of the Italians in this matter had been perfectly loyal, and explained their reticence as being not merely tactical and part of their desire to stand well with Montenegro and Serbia, but as due to the necessity, for them, of keeping Russia in mind, since Russia had inclined to Italy's side in the matter of their Lybian war. *Passing to Balkan affairs, he said, and emphasised it repeatedly, that Germany would not leave Austria-Hungary in the lurch, but that the position was a difficult one for Germany.* A conflict would mean for Germany a war on two, perhaps even three, fronts. If Austria-Hungary were to attack Serbia, Russia would declare war on the Habsburg Monarchy and Germany on Russia; but in that case France would intervene. Relations between Germany and Britain are on the road to improvement, but time is required for the consolidation of that improvement. Were the issue to be presented to Britain to-day, it, too, would intervene. On my observing that lasting good relations between Germany and Britain would alter the whole world situation, he concurred, nor did he seem to regard the possibility of that as excluded, though he remarked that it would take time for the British to rid themselves of views they had once taken up and grasp a fresh situation. A war would set light to all the combustible material available. Russia would throw its main weight against Germany, which would have to cope with the French likewise on the West. Austria would not play the principal part in this northern theatre; it would have the Serbs to deal with in the south. But war must have a purpose, and this purpose was not clear. Does Austria desire to annex Serbia? If so, it would burden itself with a mass of Slavs, and Orthodox Slavs at that, which it could not digest. The result would be to make the Dual Monarchy so preponderantly Slav that its utility as an ally would be impaired. Austria ought to come to an understanding with Serbia, because it has 5 million Serbo-Croats within its own State corpus. The only way of paralysing Irridentism, whether Serbian or Italian, was to establish good relations with Serbia and Rumania. One could not launch a world war for the sake of Diakova. When I said that, in the matter of Albania, Germany ought to mediate between Austria and Russia, he replied that Germany had already more than once attempted to do so, and Russia had been ready to leave Scutari to the Albanians if it received Diakova in exchange. But the Ballplatz would not hear of this, and that was why the question was still buzzing. And it would become far more acute, once Scutari was occupied. For who was then going to take over the task of dealing with Montenegro and Serbia? Whereupon Jagow remarked that Russia, through Germany's good offices, would have been ready to demobilise as early as the beginning of January, but at that time Austria-Hungary was unwilling to accept these propositions. The Monarchy could have saved itself hundreds of millions, had it then been ready to accept mediation.

We went thoroughly into the question of Salonika. I took the view that the Great Powers ought to make Salonika a free port with a neutral zone—but on this I could not carry him with me. Szögyény explained this to me later as due to the unwillingness of the German Emperor to hear of it, since he could not contemplate depriving the Greeks of Salonika. For the same reason, the notion of handing Salonika over to the Bulgars, in exchange for Silistria, threw Jagow into terrible excitement. He regards Austria's policy in relation to Bulgaria as quite wrong. Financially, Bulgaria is in the hands of France, and buys all its munitions from Creusot; were it given Salonika, it would pursue an absolutely selfish policy there, whereas the Greeks would open it to international trade. If the Monarchy were to stick to the idea of handing Salonika over to the Bulgars, the only result would be to provoke the hostility both of Greece and of Serbia, which would much dislike to see Salonika in Bulgarian hands.

In the course of our conversation he asked me, more than once, whether there was not talk against Germany in Vienna, on the ground that it did not sufficiently consider Austrian interests? to which I replied that I considered it no more than natural instinct for self-preservation which made Germany exercise pressure on us in the peace sense. He knew all about our war party. Characteristically, he enquired who really directed foreign policy in Vienna. I was not previously aware, until he communicated the facts to me, that whereas France has a war chest of 5·6 milliards. Germany's is only 2½ milliards. We only just touched on Austria's finances in our conversation, with an expression on his part in which doubt and discretion blended: such an expression as implies unwillingness to touch on the poor circumstances of a good friend.

Berlin, March 19, 1913.

I informed Szögyény of the substance of this conversation. He confirmed the German Emperor's knowledge of Spitzmüller's table-talk, and his (Szögyény's) having at once reported the fact to Vienna. The Ambassador's speeches plainly revealed that he had recently been entirely out of sympathy with Aehrenthal, notably on account of the evacuation of the Sanjak. Szögyény was particularly searching in his questions about Tschirschky. He had been of the opinion, from the start, that he was the most unsuitable man to send to Vienna, but thinks that the Emperor still believes in him. Every effort to get rid of him has failed because of the German Emperor's opposition. Szögyény does not think much of Berchtold, and deplores the fact that the policy of the Ballplatz is controlled by a couple of youngsters. When I mentioned General Schemua's mission to Berlin (just before he was dismissed!), the ostentatious despatch of Conrad von Hötzendorf to Rumania, and Szapáry's journey to Berlin, he was obviously of my opinion that these were all ill-advised steps: and he stated, with some apparent satisfaction, that he too had failed to get anything out of Szapáry's mission. Like all our diplomats, he is greatly preoccupied with personal questions. He knew of Hohenlohe's candidature for the Berlin Embassy and informed me that it was said in Berlin that Bienerth was being contemplated as Foreign Minister. Further, he reported a talk he had had with Francis Ferdinand. The Heir Apparent had talked of having someone *in petto* for the post of Foreign Minister, had refused to mention any names, but had finally admitted, on further questioning by Szögyény, that the man was an outsider. Plainly, Count Czernin is the person he had in mind.

The Ambassador sought to gather all sorts of details from me about the entourage of the Heir. Was Tarouca or Czernin the coming man? To which I could reply quite sincerely that I did not know. So far as trading relations went, he believes an agreement with Germany could be reached on the basis of the exclusion of most favoured treatment, *i.e.* the establishment of closer relations between the Monarchy and both Serbia and Rumania.

I learned something more from a talk I had on the same day with His Excellency von Koerner. He said to me, short and sweet—there are two alternatives, either treaties with most-favoured-nation-treatment, or no treaties—*tertium non datur*.

I also called to-day on Professor Harnack. He gave me his lecture on the Oriental Church. In his opinion we have got to bind Serbia to us, not only politically and economically, but culturally. First in Bosnia, and then, with Italy, in Albania, it is Austria's mission to europeanise the Orthodox world. Academies and universities will not suffice; the work has got to be done first in the higher and ultimately in the elementary schools. At this point his views join on to those of Neurath. Kállay had attempted to attach Orthodoxy in Bosnia to the Monarchy. This could be done, however, only along the lines of a differentiation within Orthodoxy, not as any form of Catholic proselytisation. He thinks it possible that there may arise an intermediate zone, in the Western Balkans, between the Latin Occident and the Græco-Slav Orient, and that, there, a modified West European Orthodoxy may be the dominant form.

Whether or not that is possible, I am in no position to decide. It is true, of course, that some such notion must have been in Kállay's mind, when he tried to extrude the lay element in Orthodox Church government, and sought to make the Orthodox Church in Bosnia an Episcopal Church. The only result, of course, was a war of cults, which was not ended until Burián guaranteed the autonomy of the Serbian Church. Unfortunately he at that time committed the far-reaching and fatal error of handing over the schools to the Serbians.

For years I endeavoured, from a point of view quite similar to his, to get the Sarajevo Museum so developed that it might serve as a scientific and cultural centre for Bosnia and the Balkans, and, apart from all the three confessions, serve them all impartially. I got no hearing—which was not surprising, in view of the deaf ear the Ballplatz always turned to such efforts, and the invincible ignorance and indifference of the members of the Delegation.

PRAGUE AND VIENNA IN THE SPRING OF 1913

Prague, March 22, 1913.

The editor of the local official Gazette, published in Czech, Councillor Svátek, was sent, a short time ago, to Belgrade, and reported on his impressions via the Governor here to the Ballplatz, but also gave a lecture before the local national council on the same topic. The reports in the two cases no doubt showed considerable variations. Relations between the Czechs and Belgrade are very close. Serb and Bulgarian students here are in touch with the *České Slovo*—Klofač's organ. These are the sort of people who spread reports that Austria-Hungary is impotent since it has neither *moral* nor financial resources for carrying on a war.

Prague, March 28, 1913.

The Easter numbers of the newspapers are full of talk about our incapable diplomacy and its out-of-date methods. Superiority of Russia, Italy, France, and above all England. Far too much bureaucracy in Germany and particularly in Austria. How can a Foreign Minister of ours understand the South Slav question when he has no contact with the administration of these regions! Our diplomacy is not in touch, nay, is not supposed to be in touch, with internal South Slav tendencies. The Embassies in Belgrade, Sofia, and Cettinje, of course, see only one side of the question. The Minister knows nothing of what goes on in Agram, Sarajevo, and Spalato. Of Croatia he cannot trust himself to speak. Dalmatia falls under the competence of the Austrian Government. Bosnia he sees only through the spectacles of his colleague, the common Minister of Finance. Then there are the reports of the Military and of the General Staff, which only come, now and then, under the cognisance of the Foreign Minister. Taken as a whole, the information at his disposal is quite insufficient. Hence, the ignorance of our diplomacy and the surprises it experiences. I am convinced that, at the end of September and beginning of October, there was more knowledge of coming events in the Balkans in Sarajevo than there was in Vienna. Our diplomats and officers abroad are often able and patriotic, but very seldom individuals with any close contact with the life about them. Relying on one or two confidants. There was a time when the courier never left our Paris Embassy until Dr. Frischauer, the journalist confidant in question, had been consulted and brought the latest news.

Vienna, March 29, 1913.

Had a few words with Max Fürstenberg. His brother, Prince Karl Fürstenberg in Bucarest, complains of the difficulties of his post. On the very highest authority, he made all sorts of promises, which were not kept. He could no longer reconcile it with his position to go on playing such a part. He was against Conrad's being sent to Bucarest. His letter is a *cri du cœur* on the part of a diplomat who is kept ill-informed and left to fare as best he may. Emil Fürstenberg, who is in Athens, describes the state of opinion there after the King's murder and expects an Archduke to attend the funeral. He is wrong there, however. Germany, Russia, Denmark, Italy are sending Princes; we, Burián. The excuse is that he was once Ambassador in Athens. We seize every opportunity of making ourselves unpopular.

Vienna, April 1, 1913.

Yesterday I talked with Professor Friedjung about Rome. San Giuliano's emphasis on the Balkan *status quo* he refers to a clause in the Triple Alliance providing that in the event of Austria's obtaining any increase or extension of its sphere of influence in the Balkans, Italy is to be entitled to claim compensation. This naturally lames our action. Could the Italians interpret this clause to cover economic concessions and therefore oppose Austrian plans of Balkan tariff union? Yesterday evening, I had an Italian journalist, Dr. Foá, to visit me. Though a declared Nationalist, he spoke of the relations between the Monarchy and Italy very much on San Giuliano's lines. He complained of the approaching expulsion of a reporter on the Turin *Stampa*. I have represented the case to the Foreign Office for careful handling. To-day, I waited on the Archduchess Josepha, to invite her to a lecture on child welfare. A long conversation with her. *Inter alia*, on the possibility of exporting Dresden lace to the Argentine. I promised to write about it to Hoenning, our envoy there. She looked hesitant and sceptical, as though she had no confidence in this diplomatic method. I was, however, able to reassure her, by telling her that Hoenning was not the usual diplomat, but knew the world, had been in New York, Sydney, and Tokio, and would certainly handle the matter properly.

Vienna, April 3, 1913.

A long talk to-day with Berchtold. I gave him reports on my visits to Rome and Berlin. He listened to me with his usual superior nonchalance, and we had no real conversation. He did not display the smallest interest in hearing how I had found things in Rome and Berlin. I put it to him that, since there was no inclination either in Berlin or in Rome to allow us any vested rights whatever in the Balkans, we ought to be acting with the utmost energy on our own account, and might do well to develop the Trade Museum, from a commercial point of view. But he did not pursue this topic. I then spoke about Albania, and told him what had been said by San Giuliano, Luzzatti, and Cappelli. Berchtold replied that, at the time of his last conversation with San Giuliano, both parties had avoided speaking of Albania (*sic !*). Hitherto, Italy had disinterested itself in the northern frontier of Albania, and left everything to Austria: let Austria now, by way of returning the compliment, leave the southern frontier to Italy. Thereby, Italy will certainly fall out with Greece, both on the frontier question, and, still more, on that of Greek claims to a position on the Mediterranean (the islands and coast of Asia Minor). In this genuinely Austrian hope of, once more, playing off one against the other, Berchtold, however, seems to overlook the fact that, on the northern frontier question, we are just as certain to come to loggerheads with Serbia—a result which the Ballplatz does not seem to worry much about, perhaps even desires. Non-committal as Berchtold's remarks were, they showed plainly enough the opposition between German Balkan policy and our own. The Germans are working to secure Bulgaria's encirclement, we Serbia's. Berchtold regards the motive of German policy as merely dynastic: the Emperor wants the Greeks to keep Salonika. But German policy is governed by a much more fundamental interest—they want to guarantee the continued existence of Turkey, the route to Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, German expansion in the Near and Far East, all of which is jeopardised if Bulgaria gets too strong. Berchtold did not go into any of these considerations. I was equally unsuccessful in getting any answer out of him when I pressed on him that we and Germany ought, none the less, to agree upon a common line of policy in the Balkans. Although he was not to be drawn on this head, the few sentences he did utter were shot with a tone of reproach against Germany for not following us in everything, which certainly is asking a good deal. But, to-day, I got no lucid word out of Berchtold.

Vienna, April 4, 1913.

I cannot refrain from transcribing one or two sentences from a letter which O . . . . . . C . . . . . wrote me on April 1, from Viareggio. "I should be greatly interested to hear your impressions in more detail. Although I have not seen any Italian politicians, I have some impressions of my own, which go to suggest that we continue to commit the old follies, which, with iron logic, produce the old results. Here, we are not loved, and that is quite natural, since here too the pin-prick policy goes on, though we lack bravery for any big thing, whether it be a decisive step for peace or for war. Complete in nothing—that seems to be the Austrian motto. Our people here go on irritating and exasperating, without getting at anything. Just as in the Balkans. These diplomats of ours are a chorus of Eumenides, who will succeed in the end in absolutely undermining our position everywhere if they are left much longer to work, in their present spirit, for their country. You should press to have the Delegations meet in May. We have now reached an important stage in the successful Ballhausplatz play—a moment, therefore, in which the bill ought to be presented to the astonished representatives of the people. Personally, I am suffering from a division of emotion: One part of me would fain speak out my judgment on our diplomacy, while another is loath to go all out against Berchtold."

Vienna, April 5, 1913.

Talk yesterday with Engel about the financial preparations for war. He says that the talk is still all of a war of two months' duration only; that is the basis of calculation, and nobody looks beyond that. Were war to come, the exchange would certainly go—no human being in Austria doubts that. Engel struck me as being glad of a chance to unbosom himself. He feels the immense burden of his responsibility, but seems powerless against the Militarists. Since the common Ministers have no sort of regular contact with the Finance Ministers of the two States, there is no unity in finance, no plan, and no co-operation. The Dualistic form has yet to stand the test of a war. If it turns out well, then it may serve to strengthen the consciousness of unity. But what if it turns out the other way?

I went a long walk yesterday with Admiral Montecuccoli. Francis Ferdinand is dissatisfied with everything the Admiral has done in the last two years, although he has actually done a great deal for the Navy. I have twice led the discussion on Navy Estimates in the Delegations, helped him considerably then, and saw how much he has managed to do.

Vienna, April 6, 1913.

Yesterday forenoon I had a visit from our one-time consul in Prizren, Prochaska, now transferred to Rio de Janeiro. The involuntary hero of the "Prochaska affair" was born in Brünn, educated in the Consular academy, and is a complete master of the Turkish, Albanian, and Serbian languages. A small, under-sized, clean-shaven, well-fed looking little man, who is informed on every subject, answers one's questions clearly, is by no means without humour, and displays great sureness of judgment. Whether he told me all he knew, I cannot judge, since I saw him yesterday for the first time, but I do not feel that what he said to me was untruthful or his picture tendencious. He does not make at all the impression of a man who has anything to hide: on the contrary, he is much upset about the part which he has involuntarily had to play all over Europe.

He spoke quite naturally about his famous affair. When the Serbs got to Prizren, he was entirely shut off from the world for four weeks—on military grounds, so he was told—*i.e.* he could neither telegraph nor could send out letters. His *kavass*, who served him as courier to the next village, was captured by the Serbs and robbed of his letters (including a report, though not one of great importance, to Berchtold). In Prizren there is no consular guard, since the Italian consulate is not guarded and the Russian, which had formerly been on good terms with Prochaska, had gone out of action on the entry of the Serbs, replying to no letters, etc. Within Prizren, Prochaska was always allowed freedom of movement, and could go and come from the consulate, but it was watched the whole time, and entry permitted to no one, not even to persons belonging to our State. Various breaches of international law took place, but there was never a moment in which life or limb was in any danger, while the reports that he had been killed, wounded, or mutilated were inventions of our Press, for the purpose of rousing hate against Serbia. The affair created an immense amount of noise, even abroad. At the end of December, last year, Count S . . . . N . . . . wrote to me about it from London—" There is great indignation everywhere," so he said, " about the manner in which the Prochaska affair was handled, from our end: no one can understand how such a stirring up of feeling throughout the entire Monarchy should ever have been permitted. The failure to allay the rumours that were going about is described as quite improper, the more so as it appears that, on the main facts, the Serbian newspapers were actually more accurate than the Austrian and Hungarian." He went on to set out the facts, as they were by then known in London, exactly as now related to me by Prochaska himself: and concluded by remarking that this Prochaska affair had done us a vast deal of harm abroad.

The wildest stories grew up, as the result of the obstinate silence maintained by our Foreign Office about the matter. At long last, it was put about by the Foreign Office that there had been a complete muddle. Macchio was said to be to blame for that. He had attached no importance to the affair, and had delayed clearing it up from day to day. This statement, however, only made the case darker than before, for the Foreign Office must have read the diverse outbursts of Press fantasy, and had before it, day after day, the whole course of the hate campaign that was being blown up. Why was not an end made of the matter? Why was it not stated that, while enquiries had resulted in nothing specific, they at least afforded no grounds for the bloodthirsty incitements that were being put about? Even Berchtold once stated, in my presence, that the matter had been overlooked, in the pressure of other business. Is it possible to credit that, in face of a highly dangerous discussion going on for weeks in the European Press?

Prochaska told me much about the relation between the Albanian Muslim and the Serbs. It was, once, that of the ruling class to the rajah. To-day, it is an overpowering hatred. Acts of violence, murderous assaults, on the part of the Serbs. Reprisals. Anyone who has ever done anything to a Serb had now to pay for it with his life. In the places of which so much has been heard recently, the Serb element is pretty weak. Prochaska was stationed in Üsküb, Monastir, and finally, Prizren, and was long enough in all of them to know them well. The Serb element is weak, both in Üsküb and Monastir. The population in these places is a mixture of Bulgars, Greeks, Serbs, and Vlachs. The latter are a bone of contention between Rumanians and Greeks, both claiming them. The Rumanians are said to spend large sums on this. He knows both the Gegi and the Toski. The latter are the better off and more cultivated, and have always been under Greek influence. He thinks very poorly of the northern Albanians. Taxes—that is, the tenths—are not paid unless the Turk compels payment by armed force. Generally speaking, the tenths are levied *in natura* and farmed out, with a profit to the collector. They pay no indirect taxes. Tobacco is sacro-sanct.

The Adriatic railway is not yet under way. In 1909, some preparatory work was done by French engineers, but in December of that year they abandoned the work, owing to the insecurity of the region. Before the war, in 1912, work was resumed, but even then the plans were not fully worked out. Work has not yet been begun at the most difficult spot. This is a cañon in the Drina valley so narrow that there is only just space for the stream. The footpath goes right over the mountains. Another, more southerly line, once traced out by Riedl, is said to be the better.

Vienna, April 7, 1913.

I had a visit to-day from Jovanović, the Serbian Minister. He spoke in a very pacific and conciliatory strain. He considers King Nicholas of Montenegro gravely to blame, and is prepared to accept Scutari's being assigned to Albania. When I asked why, in that case, the Serbs were making common cause with Nicholas, he replied, They are compelled to do so by the terms of their alliance. Nicholas had insisted on its being fulfilled to the letter, despite the representations made by the Serbs. He declares that the latter will withdraw, once Scutari has fallen. At the same time, he had to admit that to take it with the intention of giving it up again was to play with human lives in a criminal fashion. But Serbia cannot help that. Always the old story. If Austria, at the beginning of the war, had only said what it was at: if it had only spoken openly to the Serbs: none of these complications need have arisen. But to be treated *de haut en bas* injured the feelings of the lesser. Serbia hopes to get on to a good footing with Greece. About Bulgaria, he said nothing. Serbia desires to see the Bosnian railway connected to Ušice and also to Uvač—the latter in order to open a way to Salonika for Austria. On the other hand, he is greatly discontented about the Eastern railroads. At the very beginning of the war, they removed the whole supply of trucks to Salonika, thus robbing Serbia of any means of communication. But there was nothing to be done in such a case. We then had much talk on the future of Serbia. For a generation to come it has got its hands full, organising and assimilating the new provinces. He no longer believes in a war. There may be awkward moments, but they will be rounded, since in the end Scutari will be evacuated. Throughout, his attitude was most conciliatory. For the moment, Serbia appears to be saturated. So, now, it is up to us to build a bridge.

The same evening I met at Baron Oppenheimer's Count Monts: critical of everything, from his Emperor downwards. With us he is greatly displeased for not having held up the Serbian convoys on the Danube. When I told him that Berchtold had wanted to do so, but the Emperor regarded such action as a breach of neutrality which he would not permit, he said Berchtold ought to have resigned. He is further annoyed with us for not having occupied the Sanjak at the outbreak of war, and not having sent any ships to Durazzo. The reason emerged plainly enough from the speeches of our Militarists in the Delegations: we underestimated the Serbs, and nobody believed that they would conquer or get as far as Durazzo or Medua.

Vienna, April 13, 1913.

Lunched to-day with Ottokar Czernin. We spoke about Francis Ferdinand. Czernin deplores his unpopularity and the many tales that are told of him. Francis Ferdinand is said to have watched Aehrenthal's funeral cortège through the curtains of the windows of the Court Marshal's suite in the Belvedere, with tears pouring down his cheeks. Czernin says he is not so heartless as he is made out: but he had never been able to tolerate any infringement of his rights. Take, for instance, the case of the tourists' hut at Salzburg. It was not in the least in his way from the sport point of view: but he insisted on having it removed, because it was his right so to do. In which Czernin, however, shows a shocking lack of insight. A few sentimental tears cannot wipe away the manner in which Aehrenthal—whether his policy was good or bad—was hounded down, as he was by the Heir to the Throne, whose ruthless personal attacks on him lowered the prestige both of the Minister and of himself. And for an Heir to the Throne to make himself detested throughout an entire district for the sake of a stupid hut and a couple of tourist climbing-paths—there is something megalomaniac about it.

I remember once, some years ago, making an excursion from Werfen to Blühnbach, the Archduke's hunting box. The proprietor of a large inn took me himself in his one-horse chaise. When he realised that he was safe with me, he began talking about Francis Ferdinand, of whom he spoke in the most contemptuous, nay scornful, tone, with more than a touch of bitterness, as a hard, grasping man, who was doing harm to the neighbourhood. In sharpest contrast was his praise of the Archduke Eugene, who also has a castle at Werfen. Here anyhow was the voice of the people.

Vienna, April 20, 1913.

The day before yesterday I was in Salzburg, where I gave a lecture on Bosnia. For this purpose, I had got a great wall map made of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the coast of Dalmatia, showing the course of the rivers, the towns, and railway lines. I began by speaking of the geography, history, and modern development of these regions, and then got on, at the close, to politics, touching on the good and also on the bad sides of our administration. I was quite open with my audience in this latter connexion, and gave them some idea of the necessary changes in our policy. Among my hearers were, over and above the Salzburg parliamentary members, Baron Call, the one-time Minister of Trade, my old friend Count Kuenburg, and other Salzburg notabilities. They listened with the greatest attention, but I got the impression that I was speaking to them of an unknown region.

Vienna, May 5, 1913.

Once again, a comfortless discussion with Count Stuergkh. Present, Nostiz, Clam, Czernin, Prince Schwarzenberg, and I. Stuergkh put before us a proposal for limited and belated compromise by means of which he thought that the Bohemian Diet might be restored to functioning, and the yield of taxes in general and of the beer taxes in particular increased. It was at once dismissed as impracticable and impossible of execution. We pressed Stuergkh to tell us what he really proposed to do. After much to- and fro-ing, we got out of him that he wanted to get 24 million crowns for the Bohemian Diet's Executive Committee, so as to "carry on" till the end of the year. On which we put it to him, very pressingly, that going on on present lines simply could not be continued; whereupon another plan unrolled itself in vast snake-like convolutions of ponderous weight. We must go back to the source of law. "To the October Diploma?" asked Schwarzenberg.—"No, by issue of Imperial Patent, an Imperial administration must be substituted for the Bohemian Diet Committee." Whereupon, more lengthy discussion, on the question of the attitude that might be taken by the Imperial Courts to tax collection by such an administration. The legality of the Patents would have to be secured, opined Stuergkh, but how? Heinold, the Minister of the Interior, sat there, saying nothing, only smiling to himself from time to time. Later he told me that there was a plan in existence, in the Ministry of the Interior, for replacing the Diet Committee by appointed members, but no one yet saw how to get rid of the elected assessors to the said Committee.

Yesterday evening I met Friedjung, and went out to supper with him. He is quite unhappy about things, and pants for some action. He told me that, about the turn of the century, Aehrenthal was in favour of a division of the Balkans into Austrian and Russian spheres of interest—the west going to us, the east to the Russians, even including Constantinople, if it had to be so. So, according to him, Aehrenthal had spoken at a breakfast at which, besides Friedjung himself, our Roman Ambassador, Pasetti, was also present. This agrees perfectly with the conversations Aehrenthal had with me, about this time, in Gastein. He indeed set out this idea of spheres of interest to me in detail, and did so, as I heard later, to other persons, about the same period: *e.g.* to Professor Jagić. Later, however, a complete change took place in Aehrenthal's views on this point. A change striking in itself, and momentous in its consequences. I know of no explanation of it.

Vienna, May 6, 1913.

I dined yesterday with the Baroness Leopoldine Franckenstein. She is enthusiastic for war, and much excited because the Scutari *coup de théâtre* was renounced by Nikita. He has properly bluffed us, or so it would appear. Nikita's challenge caused a day's thrill. The day before yesterday, Nikita's submission was known on the Sunday Bourse. He has certainly succeeded in discounting his submissiveness to his own advantage, thanks to his Viennese and Parisian bankers.

Vienna, May 9, 1913.

I had here to-day Dr. Sachs, Agram advocate and adherent of the Frank party. He set out the present position of the Croat question and the attitude of the Croat parties, from his own point of view. Sachs talked throughout of the future, of the "*dies certus an incertus quando*," *i.e.* of the death of the Emperor, as the inevitable turning point for the South Slav world. He agrees that a section of the young people in Croatia are being attracted by the national ideal that the Serbs have raised so high in air, but thinks this due not so much to Serbian victories as to the tactics of Cuvaj. The constitutional ideal of the Frank party is the union and independence of the Serbo-Croatian regions of the Monarchy. The party recognises, however, that when the *dies* comes, it will have to pay for union by one big concession—the establishment of a fully formed Delegation or an Imperial Parliament. In such fashion, the Monarchy could be composed of several groups, with the result that there would be substituted, for the present structure, a centralised Federal system. Notoriously, an idea to which Francis Ferdinand subscribes, and which is also accepted by our Christian Socialists. The Slovenes, who also take up this point of view, would belong to this Southern Slav portion of the Monarchy. Sachs, however, denies that he is a Trialist in the usually accepted sense. When I asked for more details about the point of view taken by the Coalition in Croatia, he said that victories in the Balkans have made the Coalition Irridentist. Nine-tenths of the Serbs in Croatia and Slavonia are Irridentist, according to him. The young folk in Croatia are also affected, and have got an organ here in Vienna, *Mala Hrvatka*. It, for instance, states that "Dr. Frank is the last man to let himself be led by the nose by Vienna."

Dr. Sachs holds that "We are the last generation by means of which the separation of the entire South Slav world from Austria can be prevented. And if it comes to separation, it is in our Lombardy on the Drau river that it will begin."

Dr. Sachs also emphasised the great difference in culture between Serbs and Croats, Orthodox and Catholics. We also had a long talk about Bishop Strossmayer, who holds what I consider to be the right views on the South Slav issue in general. He admitted Strossmayer's great services, but insisted that his influence had been bad, politically. He stressed the economic strength and superiority of the Serbs, due in his view to cunning, sharp practice and usury, of which he in particular charges the Serbs in the cities who, according to him, exploit the country folk. *Apropos* of which I put before him the Harnack-Neurath idea of a europeanisation of Orthodoxy. Not understanding what I was at, he replied that it was already in existence, in the Greek Uniate Church. It was suggestive to have him telling me, more than once, that my views were perfectly well known; he described me as a most valued adversary, since everyone was convinced of my good intentions; at the same time, I ought to be in closer touch with the parties on the Right.

According to him, if any one down there talks to me, he assumes a Baernreither point of view in advance—a dubious testimony to the straightforwardness of the South Slavs!

Vienna, May 11, 1913.

Yesterday, I had Lützow, Grabmayr, Friedjung, Redlich, and Spitzmüller to lunch. We were joined, later, by Dr. Dillon of the *Daily Telegraph*, who had been to lunch with Berchtold. Our lunch was good, our conversation bad. Redlich is a pessimist, who sees Austria on the verge of dissolution; Friedjung a boundless optimist, who finds everything understandable; Grabmayr a Ministerial apologist. Conversation never settled. When Dillon came in, everyone was shouting—so that he can hardly have formed a very favourable impression of our round table. Spitzmüller told us how Nikita is again gambling on the Bourse, through Reitzes in Vienna and Rosenberg in Paris: buying before his evacuation was declared and selling again at a profit after the declaration. Spitzmüller anyhow is convinced that, with the exception of the King of the Hellenes, all the Balkan potentates are Bourse gamblers.

Vienna, May 18, 1913.

Have seen a great deal of the members of the House in the last few days. Those of them who are at all conscientious see no hope or comfort. On the Bohemian question, the Government is stone cold. The members are so servile, and the Government has got them so completely in its power through the innumerable favours they have received from the various Ministries, that it can trample on and exploit the parties. Everybody complains of the way Dr. Gross goes on, in his leadership of the Germans, but there is no one who either can or will take his place. Any intelligent line of policy is killed, in advance, by the German Radical slogan. The Government sticks at nothing. When the War Service Contribution Bill was under discussion in Committee, and the Budget, at the same time, at a parallel stage in the Budget Committee, it was of the last importance to get the former through before the Budget, which would have occupied the House for weeks on end. Therefore, the Government, in collusion with Dr. Šustersić, the Slovene leader, assisted the obstruction which the Slovenes were putting up in the Budget Committee. Not that this is the only case in which Stuergkh has taken advantage of obstruction. Anything and everything which can get one out of a temporary difficulty is a prized adjunct in the art of government.

Vienna, May 30, 1913.

In the last few days I have been in Trieste for the purpose of seeing over some Child Welfare institutions, which the Central Office for Child Welfare and the

Protection of Youth is interested in promoting. The Governor, Prince Conrad von Hohenlohe, who told me about everything in which I was concerned, is thoroughly alive to the importance of these matters, and his wife takes a leading part in practical activity on these lines. Once again, I found that we have no lack of men and women of the loftiest and most perfectly disinterested outlook, but that every sort of initiative is blocked by political conditions. There dwells in Trieste a certain Frau Sormann, whose acquaintance I made, whose main interest in life is social service and who, anywhere else, would have become the centre of a child welfare movement. Beginning as quite a simple maid, she devoted her whole life, the whole of her earnings, and all she could collect by the most unwearied effort, to this one cause: she finally succeeded in founding the St. Joseph's Home for female orphans. The people of Trieste felt a lively sympathy for her work, and it was wholly and solely due to her efforts and her savings that this institution, which takes in over 100 orphans, was actually founded and endowed. "One fine day," so I was told, "a very important personage in the hierarchy of the Church, who died a few months ago in Vienna (Archbishop Nagl), caused the removal of Frau Sormann from the headship of St. Joseph's Orphanage: with the result that the institution declined, gradually subscriptions fell off, etc." Even so, Frau Sormann went on with her work. She turned to new ground, and so assiduously did she till it that she was able to get a Children's Orphanage of the Nazareth Homes into being, which now takes in over 100 children. Whereupon she was again attacked and compelled to hand over her newly-acquired site and institution to the old foundation, which she herself established and from which she had been driven out. I was told on all sides, and by the Hohenlohes among others, that Frau Sormann is a thoroughly religious woman, and her institutions are carried on on sound religious lines. But she is not a Clerical, and is not blindly subject to the dictates of the Bishops. In other conditions, the genuineness and sincerity of her social service would have received ample recognition. But, as it is, she is hardly likely to be able to stand up against the powers ranged against her, with the result that the seeds of social helpfulness sown by her have no chance to sprout. Even the Governor is powerless, and can only shrug his shoulders.

Vienna, June 2, 1913.

Yesterday there was a reception at the Trade Minister's. The President of the Trades Council asked me my opinion of Bienerth. It is long since I first began to observe him at work, with an attention quite clear of any partisanship, and found myself baffled for an explanation of his reserve, his extremely cautious handling of everything, his refusal to express any opinion of his own, his lack of any sort of initiative, his total want of any energy or vital concern in anything, his pronounced *point de zèle ;* indeed, I went on waiting for something to come of it all—but nothing did come. So that I finally came to the conviction that he is one of those "clever" men, whom nothing can induce to settle any question, since they feel, and feel rightly, that they will expose themselves if they do. If he has to read anything out—and he always reads and never speaks—it is always dressed out with banal commonplaces in the traditional decorated "Presidential" style. Of his behaviour and of Stuergkh's, there is only one possible explanation, which is that, for them, there is this one law and only one—to spare the Emperor, to save him from every unpleasantness, to put no difficult decisions before him. Hence they wash their hands and keep their places. But in a monarchical State, such as that in which we live, such a line is quite impossible, and can only lead to the dissolution in the long run.

HUNGARIAN DISCUSSIONS

(Commercial Policy—The Compromise—South Slav and Bosnian Questions—Military Matters)

Vienna, July 5, 1913.

The day before yesterday, the long-planned meeting between Wekerle, Szterényi, Heinrich Clam, Erwein Nostiz, Ottokar Czernin and myself took place, in the afternoon, at my house. Beforehand, I had drawn up a set of questions, and sent them round to those who were to take part in the discussion. Schwegel was to have been with us, but being prevented from coming, sent in written replies on the various points. We covered the following: Commercial policy and the Compromise between Austria and Hungary, South Slav questions and Bosnia, foreign policy and the military demands of the near future. The first part of the conversation, which covered commercial policy and the Compromise, went off peacefully; but later, when the South Slav question came up, there was some temper. The Hungarians, conciliatory on economic points, were absolutely intransigent on South Slav questions.

Broadly, the course of our talk was as follows:—

Commercial Policy and the Compromise.—I led off with the view that political conditions at the moment were not such as to pave the way to any tariff union with the Balkan States, least of all with Serbia. Even the establishment of preferential rates, with a formal most-favoured-nation treatment agreement, which could not come into practical operation anyhow till 1917, was not likely to be realised to-day, since economic-political tendencies in the affected countries were against anything of the sort, and the third parties—notably Germany and

Italy—would work against any such policy. That being so, our immediate objective should be the conclusion of commercial treaties, which might contain specialised tariffs for specific goods, and be so described in the Customs schedules that third parties could not take advantage of the rates. There must be parallel preferences given to cover freight, shipping and transport, and Hungary, in view of the fact that goods coming out of or into Austria would have to pass through, must accord us a helpful Customs policy. As an offset to these concessions, Austria-Hungary would have to take certain steps to meet the Balkan countries. First, the reintroduction of frontier privileges. Then, the rationing idea must be given up so far as concerns the importation of cattle and meat from the Balkans. This would give an entirely different aspect to the Balkan treaties. The moral effect would be notable; there would be a decided improvement in economic relations between us and our neighbour States, on which political improvement would soon follow. Here, it would be relevant to consider the importation of live stock for pedigree breeding; if this were allowed, we might, in return, export draught cattle to the Balkans. Dr. Wekerle admits that it is necessary to come to some early understanding with the Balkan States, lest someone else gets in front of us, or we are injured through the conclusion of a veritable economic Balkan League. There are certain preferences that we can at once accord: others, like frontier exchange, not before 1917. Whoever gets in first, at the present juncture, in making an arrangement with the Balkan States, will have that advantage: there is no change to be expected so far as most-favoured treatment goes. Specific tariffs will be possible in regard to certain articles, but that plan cannot be worked right through. From the agrarian standpoint, the abandonment of rationing is not excluded. The drawback to Serbian importation lies in the fact that it does not occur at convenient seasons. It ought to be distributed in time, as is the importation of pigs into Germany. Serbian cattle are not adapted for our breeding purposes, but they do well for consumption in Hungary.

Szterényi was less forthcoming in these trade matters than Wekerle. Frontier intercourse, he thinks, can be managed, but the importation of live cattle will meet with insuperable opposition from the agrarians. There could be no discussion of abolishing rationing, though the quota might be increased.

Dr. Wekerle again emphasised the need for immediate renewal of the Balkan treaties, not on economic grounds merely, but as part and parcel of our whole foreign policy. Relations between Austria and Hungary required to be regulated, at once, on a long-period basis, since the aims we were discussing could not be accomplished by a Monarchy "under notice to quit." Moreover, a long-dated Compromise was in the agrarian interest. Objections of a veterinary character are still being entered to the importation of live cattle. For the last 25 years there has been no cattle disease. Provided centres for examination are set up, there ought to be no danger in importation. Count Clam, taking the political point of view, is apprehensive lest, if we now conclude mere commercial treaties, we may compromise a later tariff union. The development of a great free Southern Slav State outside of the Monarchy must have vital reactions upon us. We ought to strive, in all circumstances, for a political tariff association. As for the concessions to be made to the Balkan countries (import of meat and cattle; meal trade, frontier trade: and tariff provisions), there would be no absolute resistance on the part of the agrarian group for which he could speak—the Czech. Our main interest is in the export of textile goods and the products of the metallurgical industries—above all, machinery.

Dr. Wekerle and I then set out fully why the immediate conclusion of commercial treaties with the Balkans, far from hindering a later tariff union, would serve to pave the way for it, since among the pre-requisites of such a tariff union is the establishment of good neighbourly trading relations; and, in general, it depends on political conditions.

Count Czernin then raised the question whether, if such an economic programme were put out it would be possible to prevent the revival of constitutional issues in Hungary; and whether any Hungarian Government was going to be in a position to carry through parliamentary action leading to economic compromises without involving the constitutional question therein. He referred to Count Andrássy's views on the military command language question, to which Wekerle replied that the language question would not be raised to-day. Nor would the separation of the Banks. The common Bank is our unique world-wide institution.

Dr. Wekerle summed up his views as follows:—A long-termed Compromise, in the main on the present basis; conclusion of Balkan treaties with the preferences referred to in our talk; the Bank to stay as it is: in military matters, the *status quo* to be maintained, as established by the Emperor in the so-called "programme of the Nine" under which further demands are excluded; the needs of the Army to be met, in view of the precarious position of the Monarchy.

It appears, from this sketch of what passed, that Wekerle was concerned to display an accommodating temper, since he plainly counted on Czernin and Clam to inform the Heir to the Throne of his views. Patently, however, he conformed to his usual practice—I am not casting any doubt on his good faith—of setting out, in general terms, a maximum number of propositions which, conditions in Hungary being what they are, he knows he cannot carry out.

Southern Slav and Balkan Questions.—I opened this topic by stating, definitely, that the results of the Balkan wars had produced a situation that was entirely new, and highly dangerous for the Monarchy. Thanks to its passivity during the war, and its absolutely unclear policy towards the Balkan States, it was now faced with a *fait accompli* whose consequences it had got to avert at any price. I expressed the view that it was essential to place the administration of Bosnia and the Herzegovina at once on a new footing, to repeal the law of 1880, and create an organ of first instance in which the two States of the Monarchy might co-operate with the Foreign Office: that it was absolutely necessary to discover a formula which would open representation in the Delegations to the two annexed territories.

The discussion which followed soon revealed the complete intransigence of the Hungarians, for which reason I shall content myself here with the briefest summary. Dr. Wekerle said: We can only consider this question from the historical angle, since the whole Monarchy is a historic structure. Croatia is a *corpus separatum* of the Hungarian Crown. We cannot permit a territory to be formed by the union of Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia. All we can do is to see to it that the South Slavs are content. The whole question has been greatly exaggerated and blown out. There is no Magyarisation going on in Croatia. He regarded the representation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Delegations as quite impracticable. The Foreign Minister has not got time to bother with Bosnia: but it might be possible to set up a Commission for the purpose of introducing certain modifications in the administration.

Czernin: We have now got to face a strong attraction to the Serbian State. We ought not to let our peoples have any reason for gravitating towards it. A certain degree of liberty is worth more to man than material advantages: what right has one to deprive a population of rights enjoyed by all other citizens? That right is representation in the Delegations. The present state of things can only be a transitional one, and cannot be permanently maintained. On which Wekerle interjected: The Bosnians have more liberty than they deserve.

Szterényi tried to make a diversion. There can be no immediate solution of these thorny questions, at the same time we must discover some method of calming them for a longish period, after which we may proceed to a definitive solution. But this transitional period cannot connote a new constitutional basis.

Count Clam also defended the view that Bosnia should be represented in the Delegations. As a result of Balkan events, an intense self-consciousness, a sort of intoxication, exists in the South Slav regions. Conditions there have got to be adjusted. Dr. Wekerle objects that the Hungarian Delegation is only a committee of the Hungarian Parliament, while the Austrian Delegation is a legislative body. In Hungary, so he says, we have 600,000 Serbs, but no Serbian question.

I referred to the fact that the Croatian Commissariat in Dalmatia and Bosnia had roused a state of feeling there which is producing dangerous reactions. Croatian matters are, in the first interest, a concern of Hungary, but they have an important relevance to our Austrian political interests and those of the Monarchy as a whole. It is well known that whereas, hitherto, discussions in Croatia had turned first on the question of finance, then on practical railway issues and the support to be given to Croatian industry and agriculture, conditions and the state of popular opinion were now such that a solution of these issues would no longer suffice. It might have done, before the Balkan wars, but now wider desires were entertained, and the Croats were becoming conscious of belonging to a greater Slav association. So far as Bosnia was concerned, there was so great a gulf between the Austrian and the Hungarian constitutional conception that any theoretical bridge over it was now impossible. Hungary takes its stand on historic right, and the Hungarian King is under the obligation laid upon him by the Inauguration Diploma and the Coronation Oath to incorporate Bosnia, on the basis of historic right. Austria, on the other hand, stands on the modern conception of constitutional contract, as the outcome of which a new right was established by the Berlin Congress, whose instrument is not Hungary alone but the Monarchy. Moreover, by section 5 of the Act of the year 1880, Hungary, despite its conception in principle, has recognised the joint partnership of Austria, and therefore a solution of the Bosnian question has got to be sought outside of constitutional strife. The present position is untenable: in eight years, not one mile of railway line has been laid in Bosnia and Herzegovina: every plan hangs in mid-air, because all have to depend on resolutions of the two Parliaments, and those resolutions do not get passed. Without its investment by imperial troops, there is no chance of holding Bosnia, and in existing circumstances we simply cannot compete with the Serbian State, visibly rising as it is. Therefore, we ought, as a minimum, to constitute Bosnian administration a common concern at least to the extent of causing the Bosnian Budget, just like the War Budget or the Budget of the Foreign Office, to be passed by the Delegations. Some constitutional modification of the relations of both these regions to the Monarchy will be inevitable, in the future; meantime, a Commission ought to be set up to deal with current business, with members of both Governments upon it. That would serve to meet at least the most pressing demands of the populations. With an efficient, popular and non-party administration, opinion would ameliorate and the way be prepared for the change that has got to come sooner or later.

Dr. Wekerle was not prepared to fall in with this point of view. Hungary took the historic, not the ethnographic, standpoint. We make claims to provinces that once belonged to Hungary; the division of the two provinces, Bosnia and Herzegovina, is a possible idea, in which case the two parts could be represented, one in one Delegation, the other in the other. It is impracticable to grant fresh rights to the Delegations. As against that, he regarded unity of administration as necessary.

Szterényi describes the present mood of the population as exclusively the product of agitation carried on from outside. He says that even in Transylvania Russian agitation is going on, in connexion with the attempts being made by Russia to draw Rumania over to the side of the Entente Powers by focussing its attention on the Rumanian parts of Siebenbürgen. There are also traces of the Pan-Slav associations' connexions in America. Wekerle observes that there has often been agitation in Illyria, but it has only been successful when it has been supported from above; where that is not the case, it has no signficance. We have got to be on our guard. Count Clam is unable to share the optimistic view that it is possible to make peace with a majority in Croatia, and thereby put an end to a really dangerous movement. There will be a great expansion on the part of the Serbs and the Bulgars, and they have in their hearts the ideal of a national State. It is unthinkable that the mere creation of common administrative principles can create such a counterpoise as to lead to a sufficient pacification to remove the need to consider the danger of counter-attraction. On the admission of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the Delegations, Dr. Wekerle declares that the people are not ripe for that. His view is that we have got to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina between the two States of the Monarchy. Our Serbian princes of the Church are, he says, absolutely loyal; they have nothing to do with Serbia. The autocephalous Serbian Church in Hungary is entirely free from any kind of Serbian influences.

Military Questions.—I opened by stating the necessity of a united programme on the questions of increased recruitment and ship-building, in order that financial requirements, instead of being met from hand to mouth, are covered in accordance with a proper plan. It was noteworthy that the Hungarian gentlemen view the international position of the Monarchy as highly precarious and as menaced. They therefore recognised the necessity of a strong army, but, in the next breath, proceeded to declare that it would not be possible to raise the increased contingent of recruits everywhere in Hungary. When the Monarchy makes demands under this head, Hungary always replies with *gravamina.* The income tax in Hungary is, they say, higher than in

Austria: the beer tax is 5 crowns higher: the present position of the apportionment of excise duties as between Hungary and Austria is untenable. Hungary cannot develop its tax system and utilise its sources of taxation to the full, because it is not done in Austria. A brandy monopoly is necessary, but Hungary must have the arrangements about private stills suspended so far as the making of fruit brandy is concerned. The sale of petroleum and a monopoly of matches would also be possible, but the present Austrian match monopoly scheme would be a terrible burden on the consumer.

Thus ends every attempt to discuss general political questions logically with Hungary; invariably, one comes up against Hungarian Constitutional law, and Hungary's complete inability or refusal to understand the position. We Austrians may be as careful and as limited as we like in our statement of the necessities of the case, the result is always the same.

Finally, we got on to foreign policy; but, since our talk had by then lasted for several hours, very superficially. Wekerle would not have it that the evacuation of the Sanjak had been an error. According to him, the Monarchy had to do it, since otherwise there would have been a war with Turkey, because Austria-Hungary, under a secret agreement with Turkey made at the time of the Berlin Congress, was limited as to the number of troops it could maintain in the Sanjak, and we therefore could not place more soldiers there without involving ourselves in a conflict with Turkey. He is for getting on to a good footing with all the Balkan States, but opines that this will be difficult in the case of Serbia, because the Serbs are so unreliable. All the same, it ought to be tried. He says that, during the late war, Russia delivered horses to the Serbs via the Danube, and we did it at the same time and in the same way to the Bulgarians, the ships actually meeting on the Danube.

We took leave of each other, on an agreement to meet again as soon as possible. But it is clear to me that, despite present conditions in the Balkans, despite the dangers that threaten, despite all the signs and portents, the Hungarians have not yet come to any sounder point of view.

Vienna, June 6, 1913.

Invited yesterday to lunch with Berchtold. The Bavarian Prime Minister, Count Hertling, with whom I had a long talk, was the centre of attraction. The gentlemen of our Foreign Office seem to feel very oppressed. Krobatin deplored that, instead of making a naval demonstration, we had not gone all out.

IN MUNICH

Munich, June 9, 1913.

I DROVE to-day, on a lovely fresh morning, through the Isar park to Bogenhausen, to see Kerschensteiner. He took advantage of the breaking up of a glorious old park that once belonged to King Otto of Greece to purchase a piece of land and build himself a house upon it. It is like some old English manor, shaded by gigantic limes and sycamores. There I had one of those talks that live in one's memory. We spoke, naturally, of his work in life, of the schools which I am to see to-morrow, but also of many other matters. I spoke to him in praise of Hertling, the Bavarian Premier, whose acquaintance I made a few days ago. Kerschensteiner amply confirmed my opinion, and when I remarked to him that Hertling had now, among other measures, carried through domiciliary relief, a Liberal plan, Kerschensteiner told me that the Ultramontane peasants had long been out of sympathy with him. He had, however, a firm supporter in the Prince Regent. Here is confirmation of an old experience. It is actually easier for Conservatives to solve certain liberal or modern questions than for Liberals. The latter have always got a left wing, which prevents them from setting practical limits to their legislative measures. With the Conservatives, it is otherwise. It is simpler for them to put through a necessarily defined application of some modern idea, for the very reason that they are, in fact, doing more than is expected of them; further, since they are not impeded by any parliamentary connexions, they are in a position to say: Thus far, and no farther. This was Disraeli's method, and it is Hertling's—it could be our Conservatives', if they were a different sort of Conservative.

I left Kerschensteiner with my head full of ideas. He is one of those human beings from whom power and insight radiate. It is a stupid arrangement of Nature that such men cannot live longer after they have reached the height of their capacities. In Munich, he had to allow himself to be elected to the Reichstag, but is not going to stand again, since he finds the double activity too exacting. During the session, he goes to Munich once every fortnight to have two or three days here, in touch with his work. He is among the veritable architects of our generation; he belongs to those rare fortunate beings to whom it is granted to see the practical realisation of their ideas. To how few among us is that lot given! We are indescribably extravagant with our human resources. The State has never been a school of political education—only a mighty dynastic instrument, which uses men and then throws them on one side. Men of thorough capacity never achieve a position like Kerschensteiner's; one does not find them, after decades of fruitful and absorbing labour, sitting contented amidst their creative activity and firm in the saddle, no matter what attacks are made on them from without.

Munich, June 10, 1913.

The main object of my visit here was to inspect one or two schools carried on on Kerschensteiner's lines, and secure visitors for the forthcoming Child Welfare Congress at Salzburg in September, as well as to inform myself on the handling of the German law on Child Labour, since the discussion of some such law with us will be one of the main items on the Congress agenda. Everywhere I met a devotion to Kerschensteiner that was genuine and sincere, though nowhere exaggerated.

To-day I went into the church in which Eugène Beauharnais is buried. At the feet of the fine figure sits Clio, in the act of inscribing his deeds on a tablet. Those deeds were all done against Austria. The Kingdom of Italy, whose viceroy he was, comprised Trieste, Trento and Bozen. The idea of their belonging to Italy goes back to that period and to its enthusiasm for a united Italy. To this idea we have been able to oppose nothing but police: no plan, no spiritual force.

JUNE AND JULY 1913

Vienna, June 17, 1913.

Yesterday I had a talk in the House with Masaryk and Redlich. The former is about to make a journey to Bulgaria, where many of the leading statesmen, including several Ministers, are his ex-scholars. He asked us whether he ought to see Berchtold before he goes: he is afraid that if he did they would merely discuss the weather. Redlich and I were of opinion that he absolutely must see Berchtold, and Redlich undertook to put before his secretary, Count Alexander Hoyos, the desirability of Berchtold's receiving Masaryk before he starts. Redlich has just telephoned me to say that Hoyos has asked Berchtold, and he has declined to receive Masaryk!

Vienna, June 23, 1913.

The German Emperor has recently celebrated his jubilee as monarch. Our Emperor, chivalrous as ever, took the opportunity of issuing a special order to the Austrian army and navy. Emperor William was greatly touched by this, and caused the Army order of our Emperor's to be read out at the trooping of the colour in Berlin, after which he called for a triple "Hurrah" for our Emperor and had the Austrian National Anthem played. The German members of the House here wanted to pass a resolution of congratulation on this jubilee. But the Slavs, with the Czechs at their head, made all sorts of objections. In the Delegations, they have, willy-nilly, to accept the Alliance policy of the Monarchy; in the House, however, they are in a strong position, and therefore take advantage of it to make a demonstration which certainly throws a flood of light upon their sentiments. Steinwender, who, as *rapporteur*, wanted to take the opportunity of saying a few words, was prevented, and the Germans' effort failed lamentably. In the Upper House, things were different. There, Fürstenberg is for the moment filling the place of President; he was with me yesterday afternoon. We composed the speech of homage which he delivered to-day, at the opening of the sitting, on the event of Emperor William's jubilee. As usual, we work very well together. I supplied the ideas, he the phraseology, in which he is a master; but the best words must be connected with some thread of idea if the total effect is to have any unity of form. The address was a success. Nothing, of course, was touched upon in it beyond the personal relations of the two rulers, and so any difficulties arising out of Fürstenberg's personal relations with the German Emperor were avoided.

Vienna, June 30, 1913.

We have recently had a debate in the Upper House on foreign policy. I am not satisfied with it. Nor with myself, although I received congratulations on all hands. In our present situation, there seems no escape from the dilemma—either one speaks the unvarnished truth, with the result of blackening Austria's face before the world; or one lets truth go by default, which is a miserable way to go on. I endeavoured to save myself from this *impasse* by leaving the past and the present severely alone, while once again developing the Balkan theme *pro futuro*. Even so, and if the right views were, at long last, to break through to-day, it is, so I said, dubious whether we possess the right means, and the fatal words "Too late" do not now bar our way. Noteworthy that even the devotees of a South Slav policy are now beginning to abandon it. Latour, a rigid Conservative and Slavophil, said to me after my speech that, since there was nothing now to be expected from the Hungarians, we must march with the Greeks and Rumanians—forgetting that the Hungarians make any such understanding with the Rumanians impossible.

The day before yesterday I went, with Marchet, to see Baron Beck. I expressed my opinion that Stürgkh is at the end of his tether, but that all we have to look forward to, in his stead, is a Bienerth or a Hussarek, since the Emperor is incapable of breaking the ring that surrounds him; Beck, on the other hand, maintained that, in moments of crisis, the Emperor still has *lucida intervalla* and can see that he has got to do something new. I dissented, because he is, after all, dependent for his information on the same small circle of persons.

Yesterday evening I passed some stimulating hours with Redlich at Döbling: Seton Watson and his wife staying there and Count Lützow also present. Seton Watson tells me that the expectations of the South Slavs are now concentrated on one point—the accession of the Heir to the Throne. Up to then, they feel themselves in a Babylonian captivity, which, however, they will endure only until *dies certus incertus quando*. His outlook is apt to be one-sided, but he has many connexions and I think his judgment is good. He has just returned from the Balkans, having been in Üsküb, Monastir, Salonika, and Bucarest, whence he has no good news to bring us.

He is bitterly opposed to the Hungarians, but seems still to believe in a solution of the South Slav question under Austrian leadership. Of course, Austria has got to alter the *procura* in the Balkans altogether. The circle of men on whom the Emperor still relies for South Slav matters is quite out of date. Nobody has any faith in the men at the head of affairs with us; they have used up all their phrases: nothing has come of any of them: their actions have too often quarrelled with their words. For instance, both Premiers declare that the Monarchy regards all the Balkan States with equal benevolence, while the whole world knows that we are actually carrying on a pro-Bulgarian policy against Serbia. Austria has agreed to let Serbia have an outlet to the Adriatic in the shape of a trading port and railway line, but is now working against that: seeks to put Serbia off with transit through Bosnia, which, as is known to the entire world, it is in no position to grant, owing to the opposition of Hungary. So, link after link is added to the chain of insincerities.

This afternoon I met the German Bohemians for a discussion as to the line they are to take to the Stürgkh *coup d'état—i.e.* the suspension of the Diet in Bohemia and the introduction of an appointed Administrative Commission. They rejoiced at the approaching relegation of autonomy, which cannot be patched up anew without their consent, and held that the Czechs are therefore "stymied." The latter, however, are well aware that the Diet Committee is not going to be replaced, as the Germans are hoping, by an Imperial Commissioner, but by an administrative commission whose composition will exactly reflect the old Diet Committee—*ergo*, it is the Germans who are "dished." Triumph, therefore, of Stürgkhian state-craft—once again, the two are happily played off, one against the other. In such conditions, the High Administrative Court will not hesitate to give the Government absolution and hoist the flag of State emergency.

Lünz, July 21, 1913.

The other day, in Carlsbad, I met the editor-in-chief of the *Wiener Tageblatt*, Wilhelm Singer, who lived for long in Paris as correspondent of the *Neue Freie Presse*, and is a well-educated and decent fellow. At length he lamented to me about the universal demoralisation of politics, nobody with any courage or any conviction, etc. I could not refrain from saying to him that his paper had a good deal to answer for, which he had to admit, but made his unruly colleagues responsible—they being under all sorts of influences. By way of excuse, he drew from his pocket a balance sheet of his paper, showing that it has over 72,000 registered readers.

FRANZENSBAD

Franzensbad, August 16, 1913.

HERE I have been for some time, taking the cure, and otherwise occupying my days in reading German, English, and French newspapers on our Revision policy. Abroad, we play a part that is neither understood nor understandable. Visits from Erwein Nostitz, Paul Schulz, and Richard Fleischer, the editor of the *Deutsche Revue*, who is in Marienbad, where I also paid him a visit, made the acquaintance of his very intelligent and charming daughter and met Herr von Mühlberg, whom I first met, years ago, as Under-Secretary of State in Berlin, and who is now German Ambassador to the Holy See. Both at table and afterwards we had stimulating talk, in which, naturally, politics played a part. Everyone, obviously desiring to be very polite towards me, was reserved in expressing judgment on our diplomatic campaigns, which, in fact, was the best proof of how incomprehensible we are found.

I also went from here to Komotau, where I gave a lecture in the Park assembly-room on the care of youth and the Congress to take place in Salzburg in September, which will be concerned with this subject. I tried to give my audience some idea of what Kerschensteiner means by "education for citizenship." We live in a transition period, in which the duties of the individual as against the community and the State are confused by the most various impulses and emotions. But the time will come when the nations will need young people who, instead of being educated to be "climbers" for careers and opportunists, are sound in body and mind, and whose character has been disciplined for life.

I further spoke in detail of the different branches of welfare work, and my hearing was both attentive and full of appreciation.

The Peace of Bucarest has been signed, but Berchtold's unhappy revision policy means that everyone is holding his breath; at home, the suspension of the Bohemian Constitution and the establishment of an Imperial Commission in the place of the Diet Executive Committee have given an acute turn to the nationalist disease in Bohemia.

Towards the end of July, I got from a very well-informed personage in Belgrade a letter which gave me a full description of the state of opinion there. "Firmly as the Serbs believe," so it runs, "that the Goddess of Victory will continue true to their flag, politically they feel far from secure. There is universal disbelief in the bombastic reports of Greek victories; in reality, they have never got so far as offering serious battle but have had a more or less easy task in pursuing the much weaker Bulgarian detachments as they retired of their own accord. Meantime, it is equally plain to the Serbians that the hegemony of Bulgaria is being replaced by the entry on to the scene of an overstrong Rumania. Rumania's having thrown its sword into the scales causes great disquiet here. There is open and extensive discontent about the fact that Rumania is not only going to take a decisive part in the peace negotiations, but is demanding to have them take place in Bucarest. On top of all this, there is complete uncertainty in the public mind about what Rumania is likely to ask on behalf of its brothers, the Kutzovlachs, who are settled in great numbers in the areas in Southern Macedonia occupied by the Serbs. Deep as is the indignation against Bulgaria, signs are not lacking of an earnest desire to leave a bridge open for them. It is emphasised that the senseless obstinacy of the Macedonian Bulgars and the arrogance of Daneff and his hangers-on are responsible for the renewal of the war: the mass of the Bulgarian people did not want war. Pašić and his followers are not abandoning the hope of winning Bulgaria over for a new Balkan League, whose object is unmistakable: and in this they are expressly encouraged by the Russian Ambassador here.

" Feeling towards the Monarchy has somewhat improved, since the passing off of the apprehension, felt a few days ago, of an attack by our troops in the Sanjak. A notable contribution to this good end was the extraordinarily rapid and ample assistance given officially by the despatch of relief parties of the Austrian and Hungarian Red Cross, the lending of trained bacteriologists, and the grant of leave of absence to numerous surgeons from the Civil Service, who asked to be allowed to serve as volunteers. The Press, with the exception of the irreconcilable Jingo Nationalist papers, which did not scruple to decry the Monarchy as the real disturber of the peace, preserved a waiting attitude; what was said was that this Serbo-Bulgarian conflict gave Austria-Hungary a last opportunity to show that it really was animated by sincerely friendly feelings towards Serbia.

" Meantime, the Serbs are straining every nerve to be ready for all eventualities, and they have recently been rapidly increasing their armaments.

" In the newly-occupied regions, the calling up is rigorous in the extreme. The Bulgarian notables were some time ago removed from Üsküb to the Sanjak, whither considerable reinforcements have been despatched in the last few days.

" Gentle pressure having been applied to the Bulgarian bishops in Macedonia, they have left their sees already. After Kumanovo, the exarchist clergy in Üsküb also have already declared their adhesion to the Serbian autocephalous Church. The Bulgarian schools remain closed; thus, the Bulgarians are losing the fruits of many decades of painful effort.

" A circumstance that has not received, outside, the notice it deserves is the increased prominence of Crown Prince Alexander. In the conflict with Bulgaria he was the spokesman of the army, and came out strongly against any suggestion of yielding. He even went so far, in a conversation reported in the papers and not so far denied, as to say that Serbia must never cede to the Bulgars the regions occupied by its troops. He was always in the van in the fighting of the last fourteen days, and always pressed for a ruthless advance.

"Meantime, there is a growing tale of well-authenticated atrocities committed by the Bulgarians. In Knjaževać they behaved like Tartars and did shameful things. Apparently they do not even spare the wounded. On this, one of the Serbian wounded who was brought into the hospital here relates the following touching little tale. He was lying wounded, and his comrades were in full retreat before an overpowering Bulgarian charge. The Bulgars pressed on, and he was in the act of raising himself painfully and signing to them for aid, when a Bulgar, rushing on towards him, struck the earth near by where he lay with his musket, saying to him in a whisper, 'Lie down, brother, and don't stir, or else you'll be killed; such are orders.'"

The above seems to me to be a very objective piece of description which gives a good picture of the actual complexity of events in the Balkans.

I cannot rid myself of a doubt whether our diplomacy in the Balkan countries, and in Vienna, is really equal to the task, has really got a true view of the situation and a sound judgment on it. I am afraid not, so far as the last point goes.

Paul Schulz has allowed me to see a letter he has had from Count M——, which refers to a conversation we three had last winter. Count M—— writes: "The King of the Bulgarians knew what he was about when he was so hard to get into the Balkan League war, a war which, be it observed, has served to open the eyes of the feather-heads with us, in England, and with you about the civilisation of Greeks, Serbs, Montenegrins, and Bulgars. That the Bulgars hate the Serbs is naturally worth its weight in gold for you, whether or no the Serbs really are such good soldiers or merely came out on top because the Bulgarian army was at its last gasp. . . . Surely it ought to be possible, as Baernreither, with his sound sense and knowledge of the country, maintained to us then, to get on to some sort of decent footing with Serbia! *A priori*, it is far more important for you than Bulgaria, because it can jump on your back. The only way of producing any improvement in relations is: first, by trading concessions (by overcoming or buying off the idiocy of the agrarians): secondly, by reorganisation in Croatia. You have got, even though the 'head teacher' (nickname for Tschirschky) says it is impossible, to make *domum Austriacum* so attractive to your South Slavs that the intelligent Serb will feel happier in the civilised atmosphere of the Imperial Royal Empire than in Serbia, which, for a long time ahead, will be ruled by a rude *Soldateska*. Only, are you capable of conceiving large ideas? That is the question. In Vienna, as here in Berlin, one lives *au jour le jour*. If it were not for the fact that the others are perpetually missing fire with their aim, the coach would be on top of one." M. seems to me to indicate the right way, in what he says. That way, in my opinion, is still open, though uphill; but to enter on it implies, not only putting the horses about, but also changing the coachman.

Franzensbad, August 18, 1913.

The newspapers of all countries are full of the Peace of Bucarest, of our revision policy, and the opposition between our policy and Germany's. The Entente seizes, delightedly, on this latter fact and endeavours as far as possible to widen the rift. The exchange of despatches between Emperor William and King Carol have made it patent. Over the head of the Ballplatz (if I may employ the metaphor) Emperor William has promoted the Peace of Bucarest, by working both on Greece and then on King Ferdinand of Bulgaria: while we first tried to get some Serbian districts and, above all, the harbour of Kavalla, assigned to the Bulgars, and then, when we had no success in this attempt, turned to the promotion of a revision of the Peace, at first with the support of Russia, now withdrawn. The text of the above-mentioned despatches represents a quite ruthless cold-shouldering of Austria-Hungary. On August 9, King Carol telegraphed (verbatim) to Emperor William—"Notable difficulties having been overcome, the conclusion of peace is guaranteed, and thanks to thee it remains definitive." He goes on to recall, with warm gratitude, the loyal friendship and sympathy shown him by the Emperor, especially at this crucial juncture. To this telegram, Emperor William replied at length in notably warm terms, praising the wise and truly statesmanlike policy of King Carol, expressing his satisfaction in having been able to contribute to the peace, and rejoicing in their common activity in the cause of peace. King Carol, in his further reply, hopes for a long period of tranquillity.

So, the two of them have made peace, quietly pushing Austria-Hungary on one side. The whole European Press is full of it. On the Ballplatz, the exchange of telegrams fell like a thunderbolt. In Ischl, a good face is put on a bad business: a telegram of August 13 conveys congratulations to King Carol. In his thanks to our Emperor, the King does not fail to emphasise his hope that the peace may be a lasting one. Not a word of revision, therefore.

Professor Joseph Redlich is a most learned man, of endless diligence and great creative energy. Temperamental and impulsive, his political views are always interesting. On one point everyone must agree—he has a passionate feeling for Austria, and therefore feels the decline of our State far more acutely than do most other Austrian politicians. I have been in active correspondence with him in these days. On August 12 he wrote me a long letter about the despatches. "I am absolutely outraged by the situation, which I know better than it can be known merely from the newspapers. In the last few days I have had an opportunity of talking with Count Hoyos, who was in Ischl on Sunday. It is interesting, and I can inform you as a fact, that the exchange of despatches, which to my mind is a historic Olmütz for Austria, was absolutely unknown at Ischl on the Sunday. The whole action was carried out from Berlin, not only without Austria, but with complete secrecy so far as Austria was concerned. The result is that, to-day, Germany is the leading Power in the Balkans, without us; six months ago the boldest imagination could not have predicted such a result. The suggestion touched upon in your letter that there is now a serious design of eventually attacking Serbia by force is not without foundation. That Rumania would have also to be dealt with, in that event, does not seem to alarm the parties concerned. It is a fact, as you put it with pregnant brevity in your letter, that the policy we are carrying on is completely incomprehensible to anyone who does not know the persons concerned. We have declared that we seek nothing in the Balkans, and now we alone come forward with peremptory demands.

"It is absolute insanity to tie up Austria's interests with Kavalla, Istip, and Kočana, but that does not occur to our excellent Berchtold or those who stand behind him and above him. Their line of thought is—if we permit the Peace of Bucarest to go through, there is nothing in the future for Austria to aim at in the Balkans. The Serbians have got to be shown that they cannot have security without us. To-day, the *Matin* reports that Russia will not have revision. What the Ballplatz thinks of doing next, I cannot conceive. I enclose with this letter an anonymous epistle, whose author is—Count Monts. Though perhaps inclined to spend too much time in retrospection, his judgment on the situation is perfectly sound, and reflects your ideas. The only course left open to us is to accept defeat, and carry through reforms in domestic policy and in Bosnia. But how is that to be done? The truth is that behind Berchtold's policy is Tisza, always. I have evidence which entitles me to believe that in Hungary they would by no means be displeased by an incursion into Serbia. By which I, of course, do not mean the people of Hungary, but the clique about Tisza. . . . What horrifies me most in the whole thing is that, really, there is not a human soul in the Monarchy who cares what happens. Is there any other country of 50 million inhabitants, in this 20th century of ours, where, at such a time, you could find all the members of Parliament tranquilly enjoying their summer repose, the parties practically wiped off the picture, and nobody making the smallest attempt to get any expression of public opinion in days which, so I fear, have done us lasting harm? For the chatter, first this way, then that, of the *Neue Freie Presse* is as far from representing public opinion as is the attitude of the *Neues Wiener Tageblatt*. The criticism of the *Zeit* is in part just, but has no effect, since public opinion does not take this paper as in any sense non-partisan. As for the provincial Press, it is, as always, dumb and deaf. I ask—Is such a state of things conceivable anywhere outside Austria?"

A temperamental outburst, but just in its main lines, and absolutely honest.

Under the pressure of external events, little attention is being given to the situation in Bohemia. The honest efforts of both national parties to reach a reconciliation have been obstinately ignored by the Government, which, as I suspect, by keeping dark these favourable tendencies on both sides, has induced the Emperor to suspend the constitutional Diet in Bohemia. On this too Redlich writes in blank despair: "On the situation in Bohemia and in the Monarchy, I agree, word for word, with your judgment: the worst of it is that the gentlemen who govern us have simply no idea of the way in which our internal and external policy has brought us down in the world's opinion. I have had an opportunity in the last few days of seeing with my own eyes how little thought goes on in the Stürgkh Government. On Friday, our Minister of the Interior dined *tête-à-tête* with me, so that I was able to inspect the 'latent ideas' of Government circles. But these 'ideas' remain latent! Venerable 'autonomy' is to be helped to its feet—that is all: it is noted, with due respect, that a high nobility and an estimable bourgeoisie, in either nation, have brought the Bohemian coach of State right into the morass: and it is felt that it is the duty of the Imperial Government to pull this chariot on to dry land again—but with all submissive regard to Thun and Lobkowitz, Svehla and Pacher, no reforms, no Constitution-building, no finance reforms: no, no, none of that. And all the time, complacency reigns, for where is the Ministerial 'set' to be found that could do better than this? Between September 15 and October 15 the Galician Diet will have assembled. That will be all right, for the Ruthenians need the Diet for their flooded peasants, and their ten seats they have conquered make them feel such a grand party that they do not even feel called upon to obstruct. In November, there will be the Reichsrat meeting, and it will eventually choose the Delegations; whether it passes the little Finance plan or not, is all the same to the Government! The great question is: How is the round 250 million loan to be got through, and how the increased recruitment? Never mind: both can be pushed off to January–March 1914, which frees the Government of all bother so far as the period up to Christmas goes. Such are the 'dominating ideas' of our rulers. But the great comfort of the Government is: Who can manage better than we do?"

Franzensbad, August 20, 1913.

Paul Schulz, just passing through, has been to see me. In some manner unknown to me he is in close touch with Bulgaria. He gave me a letter written in pencil which must have been composed after the dismissal of Daneff but before the conclusion of the Peace of Bucarest. It is highly characteristic and I therefore reproduce it verbatim:

"One of your Consuls is brave enough to convey these lines as far as my birthplace, across the Danube, which now sees both its banks occupied by Wallachians. What an irony of fate! When my last lines were written, our troops were in occupation from the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmora all the way to the Vardar: and now, within 29 days, it is all wiped off. Rumanian cavalry patrols are right up against the gates of Sofia. The whole northerly part of the Balkans is being overrun by victorious swarms, who are displaying their prowess at the expense of helpless women and girls: they blew up our railway bridges, so as to be able to starve to death the capital and the 6000 Macedonians who had taken refuge there from the Greeks and Serbs. The chivalrous Constantine's knightly bands are but 8 kilometres from our old frontier: the Serbs—undervalued by the Bulgarians, though not by me—straddle over our frontiers from Viddin to Strumiza: and in Adrianople (just acquired, *i.e.* pillaged in most cowardly fashion) and in Kirk-kilissa, Yussuf, that eternally vomiting epileptic, is speechifying about philanthropy and toleration! This brilliant result, for which the unhappy and sorely-tried Bulgarian nation has Europe to thank, has cost us, up to date, 130,000 dead, 58,000 wounded, and about a milliard of money. The final operation, the attack on Serbia, was undertaken on the express assumption that Conrad, according to his own promise, would cross the Save: instead of which, the Rumanians were invited to occupy a territory bare of all troops—a fact which threw our own men into despair, lamed our operations against Serbia and Greece, and was an invitation to Turkey to step in and re-conquer Thrace. A day will come when you will have to pay dear for this policy of lackeying to the Northern traveller, pacific out of cowardice. The following lines reproduce the words of one of the Ministers who is still loyal to you:

"'The historical moment has now come for Austria to do something for Bulgaria, to help it out of its desperate situation. By so doing, Austria will acquire the gratitude of the Bulgars for all eternity: it has got now to show them that, at a moment when all the Powers, and above all Russia, left Bulgaria in the lurch, it was Austria which extended a hand of helpfulness. It is Austria's first interest to utilise this opportunity. If no one comes to Bulgaria's aid at this juncture, it will be ruthlessly stamped upon in Bucarest. And what will be left of us, if we do not have Ištip, Kočana, Strumiza, Serres, Drama, and Kavalla restored to us? Greeks and Serbs have divided the whole of Macedonia between them and leave us nothing but Thrace, which for the moment has been completely reconquered by the Turks. In a word, we have borne the entire burden of the war, have lost 150,000 men, and spent a milliard of money for the sake of creating a Greater Serbia and a Greater Greece. Is that in Austria's interest? Austria has always desired to see the Bulgarians destroy Serbia; at the same time, it has done absolutely nothing to help us towards doing it. On the contrary, we have had Rumania let loose upon us, to the destruction of all our fair plans, for, but for the intervention of Rumania, the Serbs and Greeks would not be at the gates of Sofia and the Turks would never have moved from Tschadaldja. Kavalla is a life and death matter for us, for without it we have no real *débouché* on to the Aegean, since it is impossible to make a good harbour out of Dedeagatch. When it is recalled that the Greeks, who have done far the least, have seized the most, namely, all the Aegean islands, Epirus and the heart of Macedonia, together with Salonika, how can the cession to them of Serres, Drama and Kavalla, in addition to all this, be contemplated? Do we not deserve a part of Macedonia, after declaring war on Turkey on account of it? To what purpose have we made all our unexampled sacrifices, if, after our victories at Kirk Kilisse, Bunar-Hissar, Lüle-Burgas, and Gallipoli, we are to be poorer than we were before the war began? Is it the intention of Europe to destroy unhappy Bulgaria, together with its King? Is there no longer any justice left on the earth? . . . If Austria does not help us, the opposition will take advantage of our defeat at Bucarest to start a fight against the present competent government and against the dynasty, which can end only in the return to power of Austrophobe statesmen and the jeopardising of our political independence and the continuance of the dynasty itself.' "

Such are the words of an honest Cabinet Minister, and they show you that these unhappy people did really deserve rather better treatment than they have had at the hands of the "chilly Basilisk of Buchlau." Such is the content of this letter—a psychological document, which throws a flood of light on the actual situation.

Lünz, August 28, 1913.

I have had a visit here from Professor Neurath. We went together to the Komotau Exhibition. He talked of Serbia, whence he has come not long ago. Our military attaché in Belgrade sent a report to Vienna of the good condition of the Serbian army, to which the answer came that unfavourable information was available, and he was wrong. The director of the Semlin branch of the Austro-Hungarian Bank sent a report to his head office that the Serbian Government's stock of cash was satisfactory (150 million dinars), to which the answer came that he was wrong: the Serbians had not got so much. They always know better in Vienna.

STÜRGKH

Lünz, August 25, 1913.

A DISPASSIONATE observer of conditions at home cannot but ask himself: How is it possible for a man like Stürgkh first to have become Minister of Education and since held the position of Prime Minister for two years. He is on good terms with Kramař, Sustersić, and Karl Hermann Wolf; they deal tenderly with him: he has enthusiastic supporters among his Cabinet colleagues: he controls Parliament. He is a discovery of Aehrenthal's, who never could put up with a man of any independence of mind. Stürgkh, always ready to obey or to paraphrase whatever Aehrenthal said, obtained a complete hold over him. At a meeting of the Delegations, Aehrenthal discussed Stürgkh's being put into the Austrian Cabinet. At a Court dinner shortly after this, I sat next to Stürgkh, who told me he was being considered, but would not go in as a Party Minister, but only on an independent footing. So, he was protecting his rear—certainly a very intelligent move, from his own point of view.

Two facts sustain him in power. From above, his absolute insistence on sparing the Emperor, on putting everything before him only in the most favourable light, making light of every difficulty in order to lull the Monarch into a false sense of security, and avoiding the solution of any problem so as to spare the Emperor the pain of making decisions. It is a sort of hygienic Government system, prescribed by Doctor Kerzl, the Emperor's physician, and by the Grand Steward Prince Montenuovo, and acted upon by Stürgkh. It is at the same time most skilfully adapted to the Emperor's psychology. From the outset, our Monarch has felt himself elevated high above the business of day-to-day politics, and, like a true Habsburg, has borne the misfortunes of his peoples with equanimity. On top of which, to-day, come the weariness and resignation of his age. Francis Joseph has known so many ministers that I do not imagine that he overestimates Stürgkh's capacities, but he finds him comfortable. Stürgkh adapts himself to any man or any situation with whom or which he has got to deal; he has never had a single independent political aim, never followed a single plan of his own, never held high a single idea. He is now working for his own hand with the same skill with which he used to follow the twists and turns of his friend Koerber! From the first day of his being a Minister he has promoted his career by the use of the art of adaptation to every wish, every tendency, that comes from Schönbrunn, the Belvedere, the Ballplatz, and Budapest.

From below, his power derives from the rottenness of Parliament: from the moral and intellectual feebleness of members who waste their best energies in mutual national conflict and are filled by such intense jealousy of one another that they would rather submit to the Government than join hands in any common action in the House. From the start, nothing was more objectionable to Stürgkh than any attempt at bringing the parliamentary parties together and getting them to work on a common line. Here he has been aided by the general state of political opinion, since even men of character have long abandoned any hope of anything decisive happening so long as the present Monarch sits upon the throne. "What is poor old Stürgkh to do?" is the reply, if one points out how intolerable things are. He, with great address, exploits parliamentary conditions and this frame of mind among politicians, for his own ends. He makes no effort to play the purposeful statesman, but gives himself out to be the second-rate man he actually is. No one would deny him the credit of being a hard-working bureaucrat; his world is the world of dossiers, in which everyone knows there are no political ideas. There, however, he is tireless and always well-informed, which gives him a certain consideration, especially among men of his own class, who do not understand these things at all.

His main exploits are the Military Service Bills and the War Contribution law. In both, Tisza was his pace-maker. Opinion in Parliament having been completely transformed from what it used to be in military matters, the Service Law went through practically automatically; so, despite its rigours, did the War Contribution Bill, thanks to the fact that the various parties were all jealous lest one got ahead of the others in voting military supplies. Stürgkh sailed before the wind. There was no regular Budget discussion: he got his provisional Budget through after one or two needless scenes in the Lower House, by holding paragraph 14 and the loss of their allowances over the heads of the members of Parliament and so taking advantage of the feelings of members—partly genuine concern for the House, partly personal interest. But there is nothing done in the way of real improvement of finance. All that happens is that Zaleski, the Finance Minister, is clever in pasting over the cracks. Close inspection discloses a concealed deficit, and it grows, year by year. The good tax-yield helps to keep the ship above water; without that, all Zaleski's clever combinations would not avail to hide the proportions of the deficit.

Stürgkh's attitude to the Bohemian compromise was always cold. Even in Koerber's day he was among those who had nothing but scorn for any attempts to find a half-way house between the two nationalities in Bohemia. He was the open opponent of all my attempts; he was behind Koerber's hole-and-corner policy of using devious methods to side-track the Bohemian Compromise. To the Compromise negotiations, his attitude was purely passive; for months he did not stir one finger. In Prague, after much trouble and long discussions, which took place in the house of Kramarž, a member of the House, we got agreement on the reform of the constitution of the Bohemian Diet; when we next turned to the language question, there were negotiations over which Stürgkh presided: but he made no move to seize the opportunity, to strike while the iron was hot, to consolidate what had been achieved in Prague, and use that to effect a political transformation. Thun and

Kramarž had a great influence over him. Apparently he did not confide in them; I do not believe he was absolutely crooked; but he got on with them far better than with the Germans, whom he succeeded in reassuring with great skill, by means of heartfelt-sounding assurances and petty favours, when they eyed upon his parliamentary friendships with suspicion. With me, he never spoke of the Bohemian Compromise, since he always made a point of avoiding persons who were straightforward and had no personal axe to grind. He was always on his knees to any aristocrat, and was, in particular, fearfully impressed by the Bohemian grandees. Not that he ever talked with them on any serious or important issue. Indeed neither Stürgkh nor Hochenburger had any sort of understanding of fundamental Bohemian questions. It is really maddening to see these men handling what are life and death matters to the State, with no concern beyond not burning their own fingers.

At the Minoritenplatz, Stürgkh showed no gleam of any real interest, he neither forwarded any action nor called any into being except such as could be dealt with by a mere shuffling of departmental papers. In a period marked by immense strides in education and reform in every aspect of the school, he contributed nothing but a docile accommodation to the tendency from above which would fain have broken every kind of modern initiative. He never made the smallest attempt to inspire Parliament with enthusiasm for anything whatever. Social policy for him simply did not exist. In that direction, he learned nothing, read nothing, saw nothing. In this, however, he was at least straightforward. In all his years as a private member he showed no sense of the great forward march of social and economic ideas, and never made the smallest effort to suggest that he had either any interest or any knowledge on these topics. It was the same with commercial policy: he had no views or experiences of his own there either; when, not so very long ago, it was reported in the Press that he was to be made president of the Austrian Lloyd (he has always got people busy boosting him), it caused universal merriment. In the innumerable practical questions that came up in the course of all these years, his interest was exclusively tactical; he owed the big parliamentary part which he played, notably under Koerber, to the fact that Parliament was in such a condition that the issues there were nearly always merely tactical: real questions were never settled. My battles with him in our Club always arose out of my habit of going realistically to the heart of a question, while his view of everything was purely tactical. On tactics, he had very real skill, a fact that, despite his superficiality, won him the applause of men of the standing of Schwegel and Grabmayr. Not one single report of any significance stands to his name. In committee, he never got anything through: he was always busy with his tactical arts there. For which reason he got great support from the Press: true, the *Neue Freie Presse* has often given him a kick, but that very fact did him more good than harm in many decisive quarters. He has a following in many widely-circulated papers, notably in the *Neues Wiener Tageblatt*, whose main parliamentary reporter, Mendel Singer, he got the Emperor to nobilitate. Stürgkh, in fact, succeeded in building up a whole web of journalistic and financial influences for his own protection. As a result of all this, he has little or no trouble with Parliament. True, since there are no clearly recognised party leaders, he has to be in close touch with a crowd of members, on whom he has to work individually in order to make sure of them. His torrent of words and his voluminous, rolling sentences act as a sort of smoke-screen for him—he never needs to commit himself to any particular colour. It is a great asset for him that one effect of universal suffrage is to make members of Parliament perpetual beggars on behalf of their constituents. Every member gets stacks of letters by every post, and runs from Ministry to Ministry in search of favours, permits, tax exemption, exemptions from military service, etc., etc. There is hardly a person who is not deeply involved in some specific matter of great concern to his own electorate, as is not astonishing, in view of the uncertainty of conditions with us, the dilatoriness of our administration, and the destitution of our population. But good-bye to any hope of manly independence from people who are perpetually hat in hand at the Government Departments. Similar conditions, it is true, existed at the time of the old Parliament of restricted franchise, but they have grown infinitely more marked under universal suffrage, and have utterly ruined the character of the House. Moreover, this endless incursion, both partisan and personal, of parties and of individual members into the administration corrupts it, too. Under earlier Prime Ministers, *e.g.*, Koerber, this evil was growing and growing: it has now reached its zenith. Such is our Government, living from hand to mouth, and taking no heed either of the Bohemian, the Ukrainian, or the South Slav question, though all these questions hang like heavy clouds on our political horizon, pregnant with thunderstorms to come.

THE SALZBURG CHILD WELFARE CONGRESS

Salzburg, September 7, 1913.

From the 3rd to the 6th of September there has been an Austrian Child Welfare Congress here, for whose organisation I was responsible, and over which I presided. Just a few remarks bearing on politics. I am proud of the fact that, thanks to intelligent preparation, I was able to get a general Austrian Congress—*i.e.*, to secure the co-operation of representatives of all nationalities, all creeds and all political groupings. In the interest of general intelligibility, the Czechs agreed to have the Congress conducted in German, and the other nationalities all took the same line. After a few words of introduction from me, the Congress was formally opened by the Archbishop of Salzburg, Cardinal Katschthaler, in an admirable speech; in the debates in Congress as a whole, and in the various sections, all political parties took part, in particular the Social Democrats, whose main speaker was Glöckel. There was not one false note struck throughout. In piloting the discussions, I had notable support from Baron Call, the head of the Innsbruck Court: from Marchet, from Mataja, from Wickenburg, ex-Minister of the Interior, and from Baron Pidoll, who all did most excellent service. The experience of this meeting proves that, even with us, it is possible to interest wide circles in great fundamental social issues: that immense forces are available for co-operation in coping with these great problems of our day; that, although our wretched politics have certainly made our politicians empty-headed and corrupt, there are still sections who respond to the call to practical action, and could be rallied and united for common efforts. The professors, teachers, clergy, and delegates from the different welfare organisations and associations, the Governmental representatives, and, above all, the various women, all of whom took part with enthusiasm in the discussions, are a proof of this. Anyhow, the activity of our politicians is remote from any such aims. On one of the days, I invited one or two people to dine with me at the Hôtel de l'Europe, Kuenburg, Redlich, Marchet, and the two Salzburg members, Sylvester and Stölzel. We added the two latter that we might put it to them that things could not go on as they were doing in Austria. Sylvester, agreeing, was yet reserved. Stölzel is wholeheartedly and passionately for things as they are. He defends everything that goes on to-day, and really thinks that our present Parliament ought to be taken seriously. State politics are destroyed, with us, by provincial and local politics. Both these gentlemen are honest, intelligent men, who manage to do a great deal for Salzburg, even as things are, for which reason they support the policy of the Ministry. Exactly as do Steinwender and Dobernig in Carinthia. Marchet and Redlich certainly succeeded in cornering them, but I am sure that they left us with the unexpressed—or perhaps expressed—thought, " Yes, all that is very well, but these gentlemen have not the power to alter things. Things are as they are, and we have got to reckon with that. If these gentlemen were in power, and able therefore to carry out the ideas they put before us, we would be ready to help them. But—as it is. . . ." Such is the logic of the day. It occurs to nobody that he might make a personal effort and cooperate in political self-help.

The obstacle is the jealousy of parties and nationalities, which enables the Government to dominate, despite its weakness.

I paid a call on Cardinal Katschthaler. It does one good, in these days, to meet a man so straightforward, noble, and genuinely God-fearing, who—in sharpest contrast to our muddle-headed political careerists—goes forward, animated by the purest sense of duty, on his apostolical way, untroubled by this world with all its vanities and pettinesses. Katschthaler is eighty-three years old, has just returned from a visitation through the Zillertal, and said he was somewhat tired as a result. We talked of many things, but he did not become animated until I began to speak of Karl Chorinsky. Our common recollections of this one-time Governor of Salzburg at once created a bond between us. Certainly, there is something in veracity of character. Carlyle was right there. The old Cardinal was another shining example for me.

Munich, September 12, 1913.

From Salzburg I went to spend two days with Sascha Schlippenbach at Kreuth, where I met her sister, my old friend Constance Tattenbach, and spent a most delightful day. The Wydenbrucks were also there. Then I went to Haimhausen to Count Monts. He has seen and experienced much; his judgment is acid but accurate. He was in a very critical mood on the day of my visit—natural enough in a man who has got to look on, inactive, while harm is being done by incapable persons in the highest position in the State. On all this we, naturally, understood one another admirably.

SARAJEVO

Sarajevo, October 9, 1913.

Again and again I have been invited by Mr. Otto Steinbeis, the creator and director of the Bosnian Forestry Company, to visit his great works and his forests. At the end of September I made up my mind to do so, journeyed via Trieste to Zara, by land to Sebenico, where I inspected the harbour; thence on by the State railway to Knin, by the Steinbeis railway over the Dinar Alps to Drvar, the centre of his works; and, finally, to Ostrelj, whence I ultimately made an excursion into the primeval forests. After that, I motored through Jajce to Sarajevo. Everywhere, the company's officials showed me over the industrial establishments, the great plantations, and all the various institutions, schools, hospitals, etc., connected with them. It was a most instructive tour, which left many impressions—social, economic, and political—on my mind. This vast complex of afforestation and industry has been created by a staff of high technical and commercial training, which is now administering it with German orderliness, great business ability, and the most enthusiastic devotion to their huge task. Some day I intend to write up the numerous notes I made on my journey into an organised narrative, but to-day I shall merely briefly note the impression made on my mind by political conditions in the country.

It is exactly a year since I was last in Sarajevo. This time I did not meet the Governor, who was away hunting. A great change has taken place in the *personnel* of the civil service, but my old and tried acquaintances in Government and banking circles were as friendly as ever, and, on this occasion, very communicative; indeed, all the people who really have the welfare of the country at heart give me the impression that they gladly seize an opportunity of unbosoming themselves. Conditions have altered, greatly to the disadvantage of the Monarchy. It can be said in a short way: a senseless system of government and frightful sins of omission.

What was only a hope a year ago, at the beginning of the Balkan war, and the early Serbian successes then, is now, after their ultimate triumph, become a deep-rooted political movement. How has it been met? With a militarist-police *régime*, like that in Lombardy in similar case. How far this expresses the views of Bilinski, who has no knowledge of the country, and how far it is in the main due to the advice of Potiorek, I do not know. Here, I can but observe its results. They started here with a "war" on the Serbs, who represent forty-three per cent of the population. On May 2, an emergency proclamation was launched for the entire country, which is here unanimously stated to have been a complete error. There was not a single excuse for it. It did, however, permit the dissolution of all Serbian associations, even the welfare associations, and the branding of the Serbs as disloyal and unreliable. In the eyes of the world, they were to be stigmatised as traitors. But the intention to apply "*divide et impera*" missed fire this time. The members of the dissolved Serbian Sokols and singing clubs entered the similar Croatian unions, where they were received with enthusiasm. This one-sided action against the Serbs, instead of widening the gulf between the parties, as had been hoped on the Government side, simply made all the parties suspicious of the Government. By way of demonstrating to the world that all that had been intended was action against the Serbs, the Government renounced the state of siege a few days later. What they accomplished was that the Diet was far more difficult to handle. Bosnia cannot be governed against the Serbs. Their national sense and their pride have been enhanced by the final successes of the war; they are obstinate and ruthless, energetic and thrifty, with an acquisitiveness wholly lacking in the Muslims and Croats. In the towns and villages through which I journeyed as I made my way hither from the frontier, I saw new buildings and signs of economic progress everywhere—almost without exception in Serbian hands.

The Military Government, which is now the actual Government, is incapable of ruling and co-operating with the Diet. The Bilinski-Potiorek experiment has paralysed the entire administration. Bilinski removed the members of the old Government and put in their places men who know the country as little as he does himself. Potiorek interferes personally in the business of the "Vlada": no one denies that he is conscientious and animated by a strong sense of duty, but he has no knowledge either of the administration or of the laws. He likes to hear himself speak, and lives in a very restricted circle. He has to decide, but he is, in the last resort, under the influence of his departmental chiefs, who do not know the country either. In tragi-comic contrast to this military rule is Bilinski, the incarnation of plausibility, who is applying to conditions in the Diet here the method, used by him with such virtuosity in his many previous offices, of superficial reconciliation of opposites. That means simply the translation into Oriental of Viennese parliamentary conditions, with a result that is simply grotesque. For instance, he came to an agreement with the parties that no fresh direct taxes should be introduced for six years! I had a very full discussion on all this with a man I know, who is absolutely independent. He is a Catholic, a Croat, and knows the country through and through. Above all, I was concerned to discover whether and, if so, how deep, the Jugo-Slav idea has struck roots in Bosnia since the war. He told me that the very worst symptom here was that even the Croat young people were now passing into the Jugo-Slav camp. He illustrated this from stories drawn from the schools here. What he said was confirmed on all hands.

All of which gives only one side of the picture. In Vienna, nobody has ever asked himself the question: What ought, in a positive direction, to be done in Bosnia, since the Balkan wars have once and for all profoundly influenced the entire mentality of the Slav population there? Nothing was done. What ought to have been done was to devote our whole energy to effective reforms in all the regions which have been neglected for years, in order to demonstrate the Government's good will; a party of useful work ought to have been created to fill the imagination of the people, powerfully stimulated as it has been. But nothing was done. Nothing for the schools, nothing in the way of land enfranchisement, nothing whatever in railway building. I have driven for hours through the countryside without coming upon one school. Everywhere land development and agricultural conditions are blocked by the Turkish law of real property, which stands in Bosnia to-day as it did in Turkish days. True, between Petrovać and Jajce, we came upon a spot where work was going on on the construction of a narrow gauge line. In reply to our astonished query as to who was building a line here, an engineer replied that it was the Steinbeis Forestry Company, but that it was going on without the knowledge of the Hungarians, who would not permit it.

So another year has been lost, and that at a time when not a single hour ought to have been allowed to pass in recovering from years of dire neglect. To-day, with the neighbouring country full of the heady intoxication of self-consciousness, national expansion, and joyful hope, here we sit, with a military *régime* in power, and no understanding of the soul or the needs of the people!

Vienna, October 18, 1913.

The total impression I have brought back with me from Bosnia, and what I now learn here of all sorts of plans against Serbia, strengthen me in my convictions on the whole South Slav problem. We have got either to annihilate Serbia, or, if we cannot do that, learn to live with it. *Tertium non datur.*

A long time ago I copied out a sentence from the *Principe* of Macchiavelli, which is so apt to this situation that I transcribe it here: "Si ha a notare, che gli uomini si

debbono o vezzegiare (treat them well) o spegnere (destroy them), perchè si vendicano (revenge themselves) delle leggieri offese (pin-pricks!); delle gravi non possono; sicchè l'offesa che si fa all' uomo deve essere in modo, che la non tema la vendetta."

FROM THE END OF 1913 TO THE BEGINNING OF 1914

Vienna, October 28, 1913.

Yesterday evening I had good talk with Dumba, our Ambassador in Washington, at the Club. He was our Minister in Belgrade at the time of Alexander's murder. At that time we had 500 rifles in Semlin, and there were between 5000 and 6000 men in Belgrade. Immediate intervention was therefore not possible, but he had to admit that we could have occupied Belgrade within fourteen days. His idea was to make a centre of action and attraction of Sarajevo, by putting the Archduke Eugene there and supplying him with ample money, and at the same time spending money freely in Belgrade, with the object of drawing Serbia to us both politically and economically. He considered that still possible then. He, too, spoke of the unreliability of the Serbs, but admitted that we have always treated them *de haut en bas* and have done nothing to win them over. In his time, he had addressed a Memorandum to the Foreign Office containing his ideas—but never got any answer to it. He also had a Bucarest story to tell. It dated from the time when the Rumanians in Hungary, who had handed a Memorandum to the Emperor, were being tried for high treason. At that time, Kálnoky sent Dumba to Bucarest to look into things there. Judgment had not yet been delivered in the treason case. In the Foreign Minister's opinion the accused would have to be released, since there was nothing against them. Dumba travelled to Bucarest, where Count Goluchowski was our envoy and just on the point of going away on leave. He found the Austrian Embassy surrounded by a cordon of infantry, since it had to be protected against popular attack. Meantime, the Hungarian courts had pronounced sentence—and that sentence was many years of imprisonment for the accused. The whole of Bucarest was up in arms against us. Dumba, however, found Goluchowski comfortably playing whist and saying that he was going on leave at once, and was not going to be held up by the mob in Bucarest. Dumba thinks that, at an expense of a couple of thousand francs, a *Putsch* against the Austrian Embassy could be staged at any time in the streets of Bucarest. Count Theodore Zichy and one or two other Hungarians were present at our conversation. We pressed the Rumanian question on them. I declared that were the Deák Nationality law to be put into operation to-day, it might even now be possible to tranquillise the Hungarian Rumanians. Zichy replied that the Deák law gave far too many rights to the Rumanians and the other nationalities in Hungary, and for that reason was impossible to operate. For that reason, the Emperor had permitted the non-operation of the law. That was the case in the Tisza-Taaffe period. In Austria, Taaffe tried to meet the non-German nationalities, but, across the Leitha, the non-Magyars were handed over to the tender mercies of the Hungarians. Throughout many years the two premiers carried on opposite policies in relation to the nationalities. In Austria, equality of rights was proclaimed: in Hungary, the right given to the nationalities by Deák and Eötvös was taken from them. That meant the abandonment of any attempt at unity in respect of the Monarchy's domestic policy. In both States confusion, on all national questions, grew and grew: in both, public law paid the price, and a heavy price it was.

Vienna, November 8, 1913.

Marchet, who has been on friendly terms since youth with Frau Katharina Schratt (they both come from Baden, near Vienna), and who paid her a visit the other day, heard from her that the talk at the Emperor's had turned on the question of what was to happen in the universal confusion that now prevailed. Koerber was regarded as excluded—this and what follows is as reported by Frau Schratt—for, in his day, the Emperor had implored him, with uplifted hands, to remain in office, but there was no holding Koerber, and the Emperor has never forgiven him: indeed, in general, it is almost a rule that when any Minister resigns, the Emperor's ears are then filled with every possible story to the resigning man's detriment, because he is only too ready to hear them. Frau Schratt proposed to the Emperor Baron Beck and myself. On the former, the Emperor's tone was not at all sympathetic. Of me, he remarked that I was a very intelligent man, and had many friends, but also many enemies. "He ran away from the Thun Ministry, though," said the Emperor. When Frau Schratt objected, he added that it was true that one ought first to know what "Mr." Thun (it is characteristic of the Emperor to refer in that way to anyone he happens not to care for) was doing then. Marchet uttered a most grave warning against further pursuit of the road that had been entered upon in Prague. He pointed out that a policy of this sort amounted to denial of responsibility: under absolute government, in the end, whatever the forms may be, the Emperor is responsible. That Frau Schratt saw.

Vienna, November 15, 1913.

This conversation had a sequel. Frau Schratt related the whole faithfully to the Emperor, and I later heard from two sides (Paul Schulz and Marchet) what passed. The Emperor's opinion of Bienerth is that he gets nothing done. He spoke of me under the impression that I had been Minister of Justice in the Thun Government, whereupon Frau Schratt corrected him—no, Minister of Trade. On which the Emperor: "Will you bet? I do not mind losing to you." The next day, he observed, "You were right: I ought to have known that. For now I remember what he did as Minister of Trade."

Vienna, November 23, 1913.

Josef Herbst, a Bulgarian captain, whose wife is a Viennese, was with me to-day. He took part in all three campaigns. Bulgaria ought to have made peace after Lüle Burgas. Out of consideration for its ally it refrained from making a separate peace. He gives high praise to the Serbian officers and artillery, but does not think so well of their infantry. The Bulgars made great mistakes, but it was not the King but the jealous, ambitious statesmen who were to blame for them. For twenty-five years the King had guided the destinies of his people well, and no one thought of displacing him. Everyone was taking the present elections as an opportunity of clearing himself personally, and for that reason the King was coming off badly, but, the elections once over, the people will settle down to work again: at the same time, the idea of *revanche* will persist. The word in the Balkans was—for Russia or against it. Herbst is to be appointed head of the Bulgarian Press Bureau: he promised to send me all the books and papers I need from Sofia. He asked me to do the like by him.

Vienna, November 25, 1913.

At Paul Schulz' this afternoon I had two hours conversation with King Ferdinand of Bulgaria. Naturally, it was all politics. The King is very striking-looking: he is grey now, but his colour is good, and he seems full of life. He likes to mingle French words and sentences in with his German. He is a great conversationalist: polite, too polite, full of amiable phrases, rather affected, despite an often lurking glance. Lively in talk, he is also an attentive listener: underlining what one says, if it has interested him, or if he wishes to give the impression that it has interested him. At the very beginning of the talk he happened to speak of the report in the *Neue Freie Presse* that he was about to abdicate: with a lot of other personal stuff. He spoke as though he were more amused than annoyed, but seemed surprised that the Foreign Office had not put a stop to tactlessness of this kind. He said that, after eleven months in the field, he had come to Vienna to buy Christmas presents, after being in Koburg and Ebenthal, and wished to have some rest. With a laugh, he told us that he had telegraphed to his son that, according to the papers, he was in a Hungarian Sanatorium! He had sent the telegram *au clair* and in German in order that it might be read by the

King in Rumania (where his telegrams are intercepted) since, in Bucarest, they are *très friand* in the matter of such news. Our political talk ranged over a great variety of topics. He would put a question to me, and then give his own opinion after the fashion of a lecture, on which we then made comments first from one side, then from the other. I reproduce here the main substance of his views as they emerged in sum from our talk.

He asked me searching questions about conditions in Dalmatia and Bosnia. I told him fully: he listened quietly and very attentively. He knows both countries well, and I got the impression that he merely wanted to hear confirmation by me of facts already familiar: an impression confirmed by his interjections. On Bosnia, he said that we had sucked it dry: and of Dalmatia that we were letting it go to rack and ruin. On the first point, I at once demurred, and adduced facts in support of my refutation. He is mainly preoccupied with Rumania, against which he is very bitter. He had always been afraid of a Rumanian attack, but his Ministers had always sought to reassure him, maintaining that Russia would never permit a Rumanian attack on Bulgaria. Rumania was still animated by dreams of expansion. No one in Bucarest talks of Bessarabia, out of consideration for Russia, but everyone thinks of it. They have also got their eyes on Rustchuk and Varna. Maps circulate in Rumania on which the Bukovina and Siebenbürgen are included in their territory. There, the upper classes, the intelligentsia and the professors, are all against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy: not only against Hungary, against Austria, too. The old King is still true to the Triple Alliance, but Ferdinand emphasises the "still." Russia is hard at work in Rumania. However polite the terms of his expression, the King breathes deep wrath against Rumania in all he says.

Apropos of Greek matters, the King can hardly be induced to speak of Germany. It is the Germans who snatched Salonika and Kavalla from the Bulgars: he was quite familiar with the German point of view, as expressed to me by Jagow in March of this year. The Crown Princess of

Greece (now Queen), Emperor William's sister, implored him, the King, in Salonika, most earnestly to leave Salonika to the Greeks, since to do so would safeguard their dynasty. After despising his brother-in-law for years, the Emperor had now sent him the staff of a Field-Marshal. It was not the Greeks but the Bulgarians who conquered Salonika: but for their Thracian victories, the Greeks would never have reached Salonika at all. The Greeks would destroy Austria's trade in Salonika and Kavalla, since they would ally themselves with the French and try to keep Austria out. According to the King, an agreement between Greeks and Serbs was arrived at as early as the first Balkan war: he was reliably informed, during his own stay in Salonika, that a bond had been entered into between the Serbian and Greek Crown Princes. He warns us particularly against the Serbian Crown Prince. He then discoursed at length on Serbia. Not so long ago he had a talk with the King of Italy, who praised the Kara-Georgevićs highly, and advised him, the King, to make an alliance with them. The Serbian officers corps and artillery are excellent. He himself had done Austria the greatest service by destroying the Balkan League. He declared that Austria had encouraged him to attack Serbia: and that he had reasons for counting on our help. He asked me whether I knew Daneff, to which I answered, No: but I told him about the Daneff cult that prevailed in the Ballplatz, where they took him to be a great statesman and called him the Balkan Bismarck. At which the King gave a scornful grin, which, without any need of words, conveyed his low opinion of Daneff. It has always been his own endeavour to be free of Russia, but he had to find support somewhere. Again and again, first by this line and then by that, he came back to a single idea, which I shall set out briefly here. He has nothing but approval for our effort to reach a good understanding with Serbia, since that is necessary for us in view of our South Slavs. He also listened with interest when I told him that Czernin, in Bucarest, desired to use the Rumanian Government as a sort of go-between for the improvement of our relations to Serbia. In which connexion, I enlightened him about Czernin, telling him that he was a man who in no circumstances would lend himself to a policy of intrigue or double-dealing. As to our intention of improving our relations with Serbia via Rumania, he appeared to be already informed, or had at any rate so interpreted Czernin's mission. He had nothing against it. Now, however, came a positively solemn admonition, addressed to me. He said, in any approach to Serbia, we must not forget Bulgaria. He asked whether there were not some notion of an encirclement of Bulgaria, which I was able to deny. To his further question as to the kind of policy we should pursue towards Serbia, I answered: "There are two things to be done; we have got to establish better political relations with Serbia, but, and this above all, to govern our South Slavs differently, so as to counteract the attraction on them of Serbia." In which connexion we came back to Bosnia again. I repeated that while I viewed conditions there as extremely serious, I still thought they could be mended. He opined that would hardly be possible in Croatia. Once, when he was in Agram, the young folk had run after him with Hurrahs! to such an extent that he had to make haste to disentangle himself from the demonstration.

He kept coming back to his point that we must not leave Bulgaria in the lurch. It will revive, its people will work. It is a hardy race, with good nerves and a strong will. Its achievements in the war are well-nigh incredible. With a population of 4 million, 800,000 men enlisted. Nevertheless, the country suffered relatively little; the harvest was excellent, and the women, children, and the old folks brought it in. Frenchmen, visiting the country immediately after the war, were absolutely astonished to see so little signs of it there. Only the portion of the country which was actually invested by the Rumanians suffered severely from that occupation. In the parts of Macedonia which have been assigned to the Serbs, they proceeded in a barbarous way. The Serbs plundered the famous Bulgarian Cloisters and Shrine at Ochrida, removing the library to Belgrade and maltreating the head of the monastery—first they tore out his beard and then they killed him.

Of Germany, he has no good to say. There is no correspondence between German and Austro-Hungarian policy in the Balkans, least of all in Serbia. He knew all about conditions in Belgrade and the way in which the German Consul-General there, Schlieben, has been working against Austria. On the Albanian frontier question, Germany was on the Serbian side, and therefore opposed the cession of Prizren to Albania. Germany is now harvesting economic advantages from its pro-Serbian attitude. I was able to inform the King that merchants in Belgrade prefer German goods to Austrian when they have a choice. This state of things also accounts for the fact that, in Pašić's recent speech, grateful mention was made both of the Entente and of Germany, to the special annoyance of Italy. On Germany the King said, repeatedly, " Do not trust the Germans too far: they go their own way."

The King was concerned to convince me that he is not tied to Russia. The Bulgarian people are fed up with Russia and expect nothing from Russia. I was prepared for this note, and let him talk calmly. He said Russia is making every possible effort to win over Rumania. The Prince of Wied in Albania was a Rumanian influence. He himself has no money, but his wife is rich. The King does not know him; but in Albania money is not enough, unless it is backed by personality of the right type. On the significance of the Gulf of Arta, which is now a purely Greek water, and has room for the whole Triple Entente Fleet, he was quite of my opinion.

Everything he said revealed his strong faith in his own country. Finally, he turned to our political conditions. He does not understand what sort of policy is being pursued in Austria. Despite the hostility between Bulgaria and Serbia, Austria's insensate South Slav policy creates bad feeling towards us in Bulgaria. Always, this Austrian policy is cited as proof of the hostility of the Monarchy to everything South Slav, and supplies Russia with a goad it knows how to use. So, Austria's false South Slav policy is an obstacle in the way of a friendly Bulgarian policy towards the Monarchy. The Balkans have no historic structure, like the States of Europe. Four hundred years of Ottoman rule have thrown all the races in the Balkans together in a subject mass; there is neither any State or any national organisation, no historic law, no recognised national boundaries, but, instead, the whole thing is an incessantly boiling kettle, continually bringing to the surface things no one had ever thought of. Everything there is in flux; that is why the Balkans are so hard to understand and developments there so hard to predict.

These last remarks constitute a short summary of our interchange on this head. Not that the King would admit that the Macedonian Slav is neither Bulgarian nor Serbian: he insisted on claiming that the greater part of Macedonia is Bulgarian by nationality. My view that, in these latter years, the Bulgarians, through their schools and their clergy, have made the Macedo-Slavs into Bulgars, he waived aside briefly but amiably. Finally, we spoke of Aehrenthal. He expressed no judgment, beyond saying in quite general terms that he had been a much bigger man than Berchtold.

Vienna, November 29, 1913.

At Herr Münz', to-day, I made the acquaintance of Carp, the Rumanian statesman. A few days ago he said to Münz, " We are Austria's allies, but not its friends." For which reason I was interested in meeting him. I began by remarking that the Rumanian Speech from the Throne revealed a high degree of self-confidence and proved that Rumania felt itself to be the leading Power in the Balkans. To which Carp: " That was going too far, Rumania did not claim as much as that: it was only anxious that the order and the balance of forces established in the Peace of Bucarest should not be disturbed. There could be no talk of a revision of the Treaty to-day. Anything of that sort would deeply hurt the vanity of the Rumanians." Carp expressed his criticism of our policy in the following comparison—when Bismarck said the Balkans were not worth the bones of a Pomeranian fusilier, he acted in the sense of that remark, and did not intervene: but if one does intervene one must stand up for one's own demands. Austria has no supporters, since, in so far as it intervenes, but fails to act, it does not carry on the policy of a Great Power. Whereupon I asked him why Austria was so disliked in Rumania. To which he replied: that does not date from yesterday. The Rumanians see how their co-nationals are treated in Hungary. That is the root of the trouble. Every party, the Conservative as well as the Liberal, has among its ranks flighty Radical politicians who have no taste for real work and merely fling about them with cheap slogans. These Radicals are to the fore in this. On top of which is the fact that after counting on Austria, when the time came, one looked round—Where is Austria? one asked, and it was not to be seen. Austria's unpopularity is only surpassed by the disfavour of Russia. As a force making for any kind of inclination towards Hungary, Orthodoxy simply does not count. Rumania has an autocephalous Church, and Church questions play no part in public life.

We then talked on domestic conditions in Rumania. There, the Mohammedans have retained their own marriage, family, and inheritance laws, but all other Ottoman legislative institutions have gone. There is no Mulk and no Mirije, and so far as real property is concerned, the Code Napoléon runs. He was astonished to learn that in Bosnia the Old Ottoman law on real property is still in force. Commercial law in Rumania is on the Italian model; civil procedure on the Geneva basis.

Vienna, December 13, 1913.

To-day I had a visit from a well-informed gentleman from Belgrade. He talked of our unpopularity, of the lack of any contact between our diplomatic representatives and representative circles in Serbia, and of the utter uselessness of working, writing memoranda, and sending to the Ministry in the hope that it would take any notice of them and be brought to realise the facts. Not so long ago, Consul Wildner sent in a report, not on demand but on his own initiative, about the commercial connexions between

Czech firms and Serbia and the necessity of promoting them; he sent it in, first, to the Minister, who, at first, was disinclined to send it on, and only, finally, did so on the Consul's stating that, if not, he would send it on himself. It is a well-established maxim of our diplomatic service to report nothing to the Foreign Office which could there be regarded as inconvenient. Some weeks passed without any answer to this report: then came an acknowledgment which contained nothing but the observation that reports ought not to be sent in (as was the case with this one) fastened together with red tape, but with black-yellow!

We also talked about the Friedjung case. Since, it has come to my knowledge, from a Hungarian source, that a Hungarian agent of the name of Horváth, who was later a special Government agent in Munich, had, at the time of the case, been in Belgrade, in close touch with the Serbs. It now appears that this individual routed about very energetically in search of papers that might serve to compromise the Croatian Coalition, and was so busy and so generous with his money that they were fabricated to please him. That this did actually happen via Budapest was told me, at the time, by Szterényi. Whether this Horváth had himself taken part in the forging, I could not discover. It was the opinion of my visitor that it was known in our diplomatic circles that the documents were forged, but that nobody there had the courage to tell Aehrenthal so. The whole thing was a Hungarian plot against the Coalition in Croatia, and Aehrenthal was perhaps just as much its tool as Friedjung in his turn was Aehrenthal's. However that may be, the major responsibility for the Friedjung affair lies with unscrupulousness in Hungary and bureaucratic servility in the Ballplatz.

Vienna, December 15, 1913.

Bernhard Ludwig, a highly intelligent big business man (furniture factory), came to see me. Yesterday, he was in Potsdam, seeing the Prince of Wied, the new Sovereign of Albania, who was ordering the equipment of the Konak in Durazzo from him. Ludwig is going there and wants introductions from me to the Foreign Office and to the

Austrian Lloyd in Trieste. Let us hope these gentlemen will not be awkward again, and force Ludwig to go either to the German or the Rumanian Consul. Everything for Prince Wied is supplied by Rumania. Even the Rumanian Minister here is on the job. The Albanian chiefs here are in touch with Wied, and Ludwig has been having conferences with them. Wied wants to have the Konak done up in style, with electric light and so on, so that the population may see at once that somebody of importance is living there.

Vienna, December 15, 1913.

Paul Schulz sends me a note taken from a pencil letter addressed to him by the King of Bulgaria. On December 10, I made a speech in the Delegations, in which I attempted to deal justly with the Bulgarians. The King expresses his thanks in somewhat exaggerated terms.

Vienna, December 16, 1913.

To-day Schwegel and I paid a call on Andrássy. The initiative for the visit came from the Hungarian side. Andrássy is even less accommodating than Wekerle or Szterényi. He is against the conclusion of the Compromise before the commercial treaties have been signed. The best and most reliable groups in Hungary are, according to him, against making any large concession in relation to the importation of cattle and meat. In the future, it may be possible, when Hungarian industry has grown stronger and the Socialists are represented in the Reichstag. He condemned Aehrenthal's policy, while making allowances for Berchtold's, in view of the inheritance he had to take over. Annexation he regards as having been an error: he would have declared war on Serbia in 1908: our general situation, in his judgment, is bad, if not irretrievably so. In Croatia, the peace that has been concluded is purely superficial. The old unionist national party ought to have been called into life again (with Pejacsević, Tomasić, and Rauch!). His remarks on Bosnia again amounted to just nothing at all. As having been acquired in common, it ought to be administered in common. It would be very difficult to alter the law of 1880. His tone was notably acid on the Rumanian question; he would not hear of any concessions to Rumania. Tisza's negotiations with the Rumanians will lead to nothing. If he makes them any definite concessions, he will have to pay for them. Andrássy does not think that Tisza will last till the election (1915).

In the face of views so short-sighted there was nothing for us to do but be silent and go our ways.

Vienna, December 21, 1913.

A long conversation to-day with Streit, the Greek Minister, now Foreign Minister to his country. There is no natural antagonism between the Monarchy and Greece, but Vienna had displayed unfriendliness to Greece—*e.g.* the plan of handing Salonika over to the Bulgarians! Relations could, however, be made perfectly good, if the Dual Monarchy were now to support Greece in the question of the Islands. It could win a march on the other Powers if it were, now, without waiting for them, to come out on Greece's side in this question. Greece could safeguard the Monarchy's rear against Italy, if it were to come to that. In the long run, the two Slav Balkan States were bound to learn to put up with one another. Russia was behind that policy. Rumania and Greece were of value for Austria. For decades, the trade and money market of the eastern Mediterranean had been centred in Athens. The new territories which have fallen to Greece have likewise been long prepared, commercially, for that to happen.

Munich, December 24, 1913.

Visiting Countess Schlippenbach, I met Councillor Silberstein, a very busy Berlin barrister, who has all sorts of connexions. Unfavourable reports on our Heir are said to be in circulation in Berlin: he is believed to be reserved and double-faced. How far this really is a widespread view, or that of a small circle, I do not know.

Silberstein represents German magnates who have game preserves in the Salzburg district, near to that of the Archduke; their ill opinions of him probably refer back to that.

A Bismarck story. When Bismarck had retired, the Emperor caused a hint to be conveyed to him, through a third party, that he should cease expressing critical views on his successor and his policy. To which Bismarck replied—"When God gives a man office, he also gives him sense. But the Emperor seems to think that, when God takes office away from a man, he also takes his sense away." *Apropos* of the German Emperor, B—— said to Silberstein that, in intercourse with him, there are three stages—first, unbounded admiration: next, distrust of his words and deeds: lastly, pity; and that Emperor William's superficiality is often astonishing. This certainly fits in well enough with what has been told me by various people about his talk in Konopischt, where he preached from the text, "You must stand well with Serbia, enter a tariff union, send in officers to instruct their army and prepare the way for a military convention with them." A typical example of the inconsequential sort of thinking which would fain pluck, right away, a fruit that could only be ripened gradually through years of steady policy.

Vienna, January 16, 1914.

Sefanović-Vilovsky, of the Serbian Civil Service, was here yesterday. Always the old story: we do not understand how to treat these democratic peoples. If only we would treat the Serbs better in the Press! They are easily approachable. It is believed in Serbia that we are carrying on propaganda against them in Albania. Albanian Correspondence calumniates Serbia. And so on, and so on, ran his complaints.

IN BERLIN

PAGES FROM MY DIARY

Berlin, March 10, 1914.

ALTHOUGH I only arrived a few days ago, the kindness of my friends here has already brought me into the thick of political and social life, and given me the chance to see and hear a great deal. Thanks above all to my noble friend Sascha Schlippenbach, I have, despite the shortness of the time, met and talked with the people who count. Almost every day I had lunch and dinner at their house, and always met most interesting people. On the very first day I was here, Count Albrecht Zedtwitz, the commercial attaché of our Trade Ministry, informed me about the present economic condition of Germany. In 1913, the increase in German exports had nearly touched the milliard mark. There is a German-Balkan Trade Association here, a German-English, German-Brazilian, German-French, German-Rumanian, German-Russian, German-South American, and a German-Austro-Hungarian. Moreover, efforts are being made to combine these associations, as a counterpoise to the high protectionist Central Industrialists' Union: efforts which show a tendency favourable to us, were they to succeed. Both Count Zedtwitz, who watches all these things very carefully, and Councillor von Koerner, head of the commercial section of the German Foreign Office, talked to me very fully about the progress made by German world trade. Zedtwitz attributes the expansion to high prices, monetary stringency and the necessity of clearing stocks at any cost; Koerner to a variety of causes; I myself believe that expanding exports are a natural result of the extraordinarily hard work going on here and the skill and adaptability of German travellers, who simply pushed competitors off the field. Certainly, however, a large part is played by Germany's favourable trading position and its favourable commercial treaties. Koerner would not allow that this was a cause of Germany's increasing international trade and was quite decidedly uncommunicative when I made some attempt to learn something of German intentions in the matter of the renewal of the commercial treaties. Germany, in fact, is *beatus possidens*, while we are in the unhappy position of having to strive after revision of our tariff and our treaties. In the coming commercial-political campaign, Germany will be able to take up a defensive position, but is arming against the eventuality of efforts at alterations on the part of others. We, on the other hand, will be in the disadvantageous position, in negotiation, of having, first, to reach an understanding with Hungary on every point, and only proceeding to common bargaining with Germany after that has been done. But this common bargaining of ours is, unfortunately, highly transparent, and affords Germany all sorts of opportunities in negotiation. Further, the representation of the Dual Monarchy here is hopelessly scattered. There is the Embassy, there is the Consulate General, there is further the Commercial Secretary to the Embassy, there is an Austrian and a Hungarian commercial attaché delegated by our Trade Ministry and also one by the Ministry of Agriculture. The commercial attachés are directly subordinate to their respective Governments: all these gentlemen collect information on their own and write reports; all that simply means so many additional opportunities for the watchful and intelligent Germans to keep themselves *au courant* with the various commercial-political tendencies inside the Dual Monarchy.

The day before yesterday, at a luncheon given by Countess Schlippenbach, I got a foretaste of political opinion here. I met von Jagow, President of Berlin Police, and Haymerle, councillor at our Embassy. The former the typical stiff, conservative, ruthless Prussian, with his clean-cut face, hook nose, and bald head. His speech was utterly unlike that of anyone in an official position with us: in the sharpest conceivable contrast to the vague, indefinite manner in which the maintenance of order and authority are spoken of among us. In the sharpest conceivable contrast, too, to the South German manner, as one finds it notably in Alsace. Haymerle made no secret of the fact that he finds our Balkan policy of the last few years unintelligible. He protests against the suggestion that our Ambassadors and envoys were silent about this policy to the chief on the Ballplatz. They had given advice on quite different lines. Notably was this the case with Fürstenberg in Bucarest and Pallavicini in Constantinople while Count Szécsen almost reached the point of rudeness, and Merey in Rome passed it. Szögyény, too, had repeatedly uttered warnings. Austro-Hungarian diplomacy was innocent of responsibility for the perversities of the Ballplatz.

In the afternoon of the day before yesterday I called on Dr. Aschrott, who has a very large acquaintance with lawyers here. The same story as with us—nothing is done in the Reichstag. Bills lie in draft for years: speechifying goes on for ever. Even the political leaders talk on matters they have not mastered. Here there is at least some decorum. When you get down to it, however, Parliament suffers from the same sickness as it does with us. This form is, in fact, outworn, but no one has yet discovered another to take its place.

Towards evening I saw Szögyény, with whom I found the Spanish Ambassador: we talked of Wied and Albania. It is said that Wied does at least realise the gravity of his task; but he is too correct, too European, too *doctrinaire* to meet it. Things will be all right so long as he has money. Afterwards, when the Spanish Ambassador had left, I was alone with Szögyény, and talked to him of Vienna. He is always eager for gossip. I made a rendezvous with him for next day, that we might then go into the Orient Railway question and the commercial treaties in detail. He was kind enough to bid me to the dinner he is giving on Wednesday in honour of the Emperor. In reply to a question that I put to him, as I was in the act of departure, Szögyény said that, without having any positive knowledge on the point, he was also of opinion that we had encouraged the King of Bulgaria to make an attack on Serbia.

Yesterday evening there was a dinner at Sascha's. An old friend of mine was present, Frau Adele von Kurowski, who had her clever daughter with her. Her late husband was, many many years ago, a student at the university of Bonn. She herself belonged to the old Bismarck circle, where she heard much, and, thanks to an admirable mind, also acquired a sound judgment on most things. In her day she was a famous beauty, as still apparent. Further, there were Count Lerchenfeld, the Bavarian envoy, Zimmermann, the Secretary of State, Dr. Solf, the Colonial Minister, and other gentlemen from the Foreign Office. I had a long talk with Lerchenfeld on our policy. The usual story. One is at once up against the difference between the Wilhelmstrasse and the Ballplatz. We are anti-Serb, they are anti-Bulgar, and, in addition, greatly troubled about our relations with Rumania. Lerchenfeld cannot understand why we never came to terms with Serbia: either force or good neighbourliness: the half and half way is not to be understood. Zimmermann, with the superficial *bonhomie* of the Korps-student, is a great expert with official papers: whether he has an equal knowledge of the world I do not know. He has no clear perception of Austro-Hungarian conditions.

He too is for an understanding with Serbia. King Ferdinand of Bulgaria he mistrusts: very intelligent, but not quite reliable. Whatever is said, proposed, or suggested to him goes straight to St. Petersburg, that he may discover whether he cannot get a bit more from them there. For that reason the Foreign Office avoids written communication with him. He regards the position and the future of the Bulgarian dynasty as highly precarious. The Russian rouble plays a great part in Bulgaria nowadays. Of Rumania he talked at length and with grave concern. France is now carrying on a very active agitation in that country. Tardieu of the *Temps* is travelling about giving lectures there, and getting a tremendous reception. Austria-Hungary has made great mistakes with Rumania. At the

Petersburg Conference, whenever there was any talk of compensation for Rumania, Austria-Hungary always came out with demands on behalf of Bulgaria too. According to Zimmermann's picture, we have always fallen between two stools. Berchtold's policy of revision of the Bucarest Peace treaty was a great mistake. Germany is doing everything in its power to heal the breach and bring Rumania and Austria together again. In Berlin, the nomination of Czernin to Bucarest is taken as a sign of our recognition of Rumania, since he is a confidant of the Heir to the Throne —and this has given great satisfaction. No very great familiarity with facts was revealed by his question, how it was that twenty years ago nothing had been heard of Rumanian Irridenta in Siebenbürgen. I explained the position to him, but perceived that he did not see below the surface of the problem. He was obviously at the end of his information so soon as we got on to our internal conditions. He does not think much of Albania, and doubts whether it was the right thing to do. On our trading position in the Balkans, his view is that we required no preferential status, but ought to take advantage, in all our dealings there, of the natural preference given us by our geographical position. Giving up the Sanjak he regards as a grave error. The old King of Montenegro could be bought with money and fair words, but his sons were nothing. The possession of the Sanjak would have made a union of Serbia and Montenegro impossible, and established a connexion with Albania. The second Balkan war was a great piece of luck for Austria, since it had raised up the two non-Slav States in the Balkans. I could trace no sign in his remarks of any loftier conception of politics.

Whether Dr. Solf, the Colonial Secretary, has an importance equal to his own sense of it, I do not know. He speaks out of wide experience and a powerful will. He was in Samoa for twelve years. The other day, he gave a great speech in the Reichstag on the colonies. I am no judge as to the accuracy of all his statements there, but what a difference between him and Bilinski! Solf told us, with calm pride, that a projected railway in East

Africa was ready about 14 months sooner than had been anticipated in the Bill providing for it.

In the general conversation that developed between us, I was struck by the contemptuous tone in which these members of the Government spoke of Parliament and parliamentarians. Here, too, there is a gulf between the bureaucracy and Parliament. The President of the Reichstag was described as being deaf and incapable, Paasche as a mere chatterer, the Social Democrats, naturally, as wretched fellows. Instructive to hear how these high officials judge things in the circle of their intimates. Absolutely no respect for work in Parliament. Solf said that business there was like children in the Tiergarten making sand pies. First this member and then that was cited as a self-styled expert in Colonial or Foreign Affairs, amid great mirth. These gentlemen feel strong and sure of themselves.

The German Emperor also came up in conversation. Theme of general admiration—his rapid faculty of grasping a subject, even in its technical details; his power of following lectures and immediately giving one himself; his astounding wealth of ideas.

Everybody here talks, sooner or later, of our Heir to the Throne. This was the case on the evening in question. Details about him are sought, also about the Duchess and their children. Zimmermann expressed great satisfaction with the relations between Emperor William and Francis Ferdinand. He put the question: Will the Duchess be Empress? I replied, in accordance with the facts, The Duchess will become Queen of Hungary and Empress Consort. "What about the succession?" he then asked. To which I replied: "The issue of the Queen of Hungary can only rule in Hungary on condition that they, as the Pragmatic Sanction prescribes, are likewise rulers in Austria. The succession of the Duchess' children is therefore excluded under the terms of the oath which Francis Ferdinand took before the conclusion of his marriage, in which he renounced the rights of succession of his issue." Zimmermann then said that fresh blood would be all to the good. Here, they take a very realistic view of the matter, and regard the marriage of the heir presumptive as unsatisfactory from the point of view of Austrian interests. It is only too true that we have quite misapplied *Tu felix Austria nube*. In that too we make a mess of things.

This morning I called on Professor Stein, the editor of *Nord und Süd*. He is thinking of having a number devoted to Austria-Hungary, and he wants me to write a section on Bosnia and Herzegovina. After discussing the general standpoint of his number, I agreed to do it. In the afternoon, I visited His Excellency Dr. von Koerner, head of the commercial section of the Foreign Office. He is about to resign his office. Because of, or in spite of that, he was more reserved than ever and I never succeeded in getting at anything of interest to me out of him about the coming treaty negotiations. He showed himself a master in the art of giving evasive answers to-day. Of politics we hardly spoke. France is now in a bad way, militarily also. Now is the moment for war, but nobody thinks of it.

GERMAN VIEWS

Berlin, March 11, 1914.

Dinner yesterday evening at Countess Schlippenbach's. Among the guests were Herr v. Wedel-Piesdorf, President of the Prussian Diet and ex-Minister of the Royal House, ex-Ambassador Baron Mumm, Secretary of State von Jagow, some young gentlemen from the Foreign Office, and some pretty ladies. At table I sat next to the widow of Speck, German Ambassador in Washington, an American, and got on very well with her, although she always kept coming back to a positively touching admiration for Emperor William.

After dinner, a very long and searching conversation with Jagow. He seemed primarily concerned with our relations with Rumania. Germany was using its good offices to improve them, but everything turned on the way in which the Rumanians in Hungary were going to be treated. The Rumanian question in Hungary had existed before, but it was latent. In the last few years it had come to the front, and to-day the Monarchy's only approach to Rumania lies through Hungary. Jagow gave a detailed account of a talk he had had with the Rumanian Minister, Prince Stirbey, who had repeated, again and again, that it was absolutely essential that some sign of good will and readiness to meet them should be given to the Hungarian Rumanians. Otherwise, there was no chance of clearing up Austria-Hungary's relations to Rumania. Jagow attached great importance to this opinion, and kept returning to the point that domestic policy must be so adjusted as to promote a foreign policy on this line, which was the only possible and necessary one. It would be most unfortunate if it were impossible to keep Rumania in the Triple Alliance. What would happen if Rumania were to turn against

Austria? What would the three million Rumanians in Hungary do in that event? The Rumanian Government used its influence with the leaders of the Rumanian movement in Transylvania to induce them to be tractable and helpful in the negotiations with Tisza, and it seems to have produced a certain effect upon them. Jagow spoke with great appreciation of Tisza: he was a real statesman; but he must see that the Monarchy had got to make concessions to the Rumanians. The son of the Rumanian Crown Prince had recently been brought to Berlin by his father and placed in the First Footguards. Life in Germany would certainly have some degree of influence upon the boy, but a journey to Petersburg is also planned for him, and a marriage with one of the Czar's daughters, which would inevitably sterilise it. Jagow kept asking me where Berchtold had got his Bulgarian policy from. He knows perfectly well, as Haymerle told me the other day, and as Szögyény confirmed, that all our ambassadors and foreign representatives had recommended a different policy. In a conversation Jagow had in Vienna with our Emperor, the latter spoke of the watch on the Danube, and it seems as though he had in mind the danger of Rumania and the need of making concessions there. But Jagow seems to have avoided telling the Emperor that his Minister was not taking the right line. Again, the Prince of Hohenzollern was recently with our Emperor on his way through from Bucarest, and entered on the same topic on Germany's behalf: he says that he spoke plainly, but Jagow doubts it, since Princes are apt to speak very cautiously with one another.

We also had a full discussion of our Serbian policy, on which his judgment is the same as it was last year. Austria-Hungary is, in his opinion, making the mistake of looking at everything in the Balkans from the standpoint of its antagonism to Serbia, and adjusting its action in accordance with that. In so doing, it had estimated actual forces wrongly, staking everything on Bulgaria, and the reason it lost the game was this policy of *parti pris*. Austria-Hungary hoped to have Serbia encircled, and went on sticking to a policy of the revision of the Treaty of Bucarest, blind to the fact that everything had altered and that it was now of the last importance for the Monarchy to be on good terms with Greece and Rumania. When I asked him what was the real explanation of the exchange of telegrams between Emperor William and King Carol, which had caused so much annoyance in Vienna, Jagow replied that the situation had reached a point of such discomfort for Germany that there was nothing for it, from its point of view, but the despatch by the Emperor of the famous telegram to the King of Rumania, which had given such umbrage in Vienna. Germany had got to make a *coup* to finish a situation that was quite untenable. He regards the evacuation of the Sanjak as a grave error. If we had held it, and pursued the correct policy by so doing, the Balkan States would have been ready to make concessions to us. In his view, we could have benefited by keeping the Greeks in Salonika and have reduced or prevented altogether the danger of a union between Serbia and Montenegro. That danger threatened now. It was not immediate, so long as the King lived, but he is seventy years old and his sons are nothing, the dynasty is discredited. Montenegrins who go over to America and then return home bring ideas with them which are detrimental to the dynasty. If the union does take place, Serbia will get its access to the sea.

Jagow also stood up for the advice given by Germany to the Dual Monarchy as regards Balkan policy. It is an advantage to the Monarchy that the non-Slav States constitute a majority in the association of Rumania, Greece, and Serbia. Austria-Hungary ought to join this combination. In Rumania, national pride is burning very high. The Rumanians feel themselves the predominant Power in the Balkans and wish to be considered, consulted, and treated with respect. Greece will play a part in the eastern Mediterranean, and there need be no collision there between it and the Monarchy. In relation to Serbia, too, our policy requires to be changed. Berchtold, vacillating, without any opinion of his own, was far too nonchalant.

We also went thoroughly into the question of the Oriental railways. Shortly, he takes the view long held by Schwegel and myself, though in more definite form. He says that he has again and again made urgent representations to Berchtold through the German Ambassador in Vienna—but always in vain. Germany has made sure of the eastern Balkans and the eastern communication routes, which are necessary to it on account of Anatolia. The western communication routes in the Balkans concern it less, and are primarily a matter of Austro-Hungarian interest. No one understands why Austro-Hungary allows the French and the Russians to get in there; politically, there is no understanding it; Austria-Hungary made vehement protests against a Serbian harbour on the Adriatic, because it feared lest it became a Russian harbour, yet now, lo! it is letting the Russians in by the land routes!

On Albania, he was highly sceptical. Wied is an excellent fellow, but too much of a European and a constitutionalist to use the methods that are necessary there. He looks at the whole thing from the standpoint of foreign policy and possible repercussions on the Triple Alliance. There, the rivalry of Austria-Hungary and Italy is staged, *in conspectu omnium*. The representatives of the two States are in open competition: he is afraid lest Italian influence gets the upper hand, since the Italians play their cards better. Our Austrian, Catholic, point of view is impossible in Albania, where only 15 per cent. of the people are Catholic. Germany has to refrain from supporting the Austrian protectorate, since it is fighting the French protectorate over the Catholics everywhere in the Orient. Sixty per cent. of the Albanians are Mohammedans: the core of the State is Mohammedan. In the end, there will perhaps have to be a division between Austria and Italy; the fact that I said that we could not accept that, because of Valona, appeared to make no impression upon him. He merely replied that northern Albania would be worth a great deal to Austria-Hungary, if Montenegro were thrown in.

On trading relations with the Balkans, he expressed the view that there ought to be an agreement between Austria-Hungary and Germany on these questions. I endeavoured to get him to see that, if we were to revise our Serbian policy, Germany ought not to cut across our path commercially. But he would not take this point. He sees no justification for our complaints under this head, and sought to get round them by referring to the mobility of the German merchant as being the main explanation of German trade expansion. The Austrians ought to do the same, and promote political relations with that end in view.

Of the King of Bulgaria he has no high opinion. He is quite unreliable. Further, he thinks that present conditions in the Balkans, though there may be no immediate change, are far from being stabilised for the future. We had a thorough talk on internal conditions in Hungary, as to which he is fully informed, especially from the point of view of the Germans in Hungary. He asked me whether Dr. Samassa (who is in close touch with the German Ambassador in Vienna) really was in close touch and influential with the Germans in Hungary. It surprised me to hear him, like Zimmermann and Koerner, describing the present position of France as bad, both from the financial and the military standpoint. It is for that reason that the present French Government is so yielding. Poincaré has blown nationalism into a flame, and as a result the German army has been increased and the three years service law has had to be introduced in France, at a heavy cost to itself. He has no use for our Vienna newspapers; mere stunt merchants with their perpetual Russian scare-mongering. When I retorted by reminding him of the notorious article in the *Kölnische Zeitung*, he replied that two wrongs did not make a right. The article on "Our Russian Neighbour" in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of the day before yesterday, which was also in a highly pessimistic vein, he attributes to the pen of Count Monts. It interested me to hear Jagow speak in very high terms of Monts, who is again being talked of here for various posts. He has a high opinion of him, but thinks that it is a pity he is so abusive.

Jagow has the best brains of anyone I have met in Berlin this time; he has a fine intelligence and an intimate knowledge of our Austrian conditions—a fact that makes him a veritable black swan here. Finally, he gave me a very lucid summary of his views. Since the last war there has been a great decline both in the influence and the prestige of Russia in the Balkans; the position of the Monarchy ought not to be viewed too pessimistically, and it ought not to let slip the opportunity of taking up a line of policy designed to increase its influence and thereby that of the Triple Alliance. There is no time to lose. The conjunction of Rumania, Serbia and Greece in the firmament offers the opportunity for a new orientation of Austro-Hungarian policy. Pašić is a difficulty, since he is pro-Russian and under the influence of Hartwig. But Rumania is the key position to-day.

Berlin, March 12, 1914.

At Countess Schlippenbach's yesterday, Doctor Wiegand, the archæological director, and Dr. Schmitt came to lunch. They are going to show and explain to us the new Egyptian excavations in the Museum. Life buzzes here, in every department. There are interest, money, work available for every branch of human knowledge; and no waste of energy. Everyone has his own sphere, and in it he lets himself go. There is no excess of taste, and envy and climbing are present as they are everywhere, but real work goes on, there is a genuine interest in the thing itself, and a strong sense of duty, set to authentic achievement.

At Szögyény's dinner for the Emperor at night, there was a brilliant company, mainly military. In addition to the ladies and gentlemen of the Embassy, there were some twenty guests. The Imperial Chancellor, Jagow and Zimmermann from the Foreign Office, Moltke, chief of the General Staff, Tirpitz, Ministers like Dallwitz and Schorlemer, the highest dignitaries of the land and one or two members of the Court. I knew a considerable number of the men already. Many years ago I had spent a couple of most agreeable and merry weeks at St. Moritz in the company of Baron v. Reischach, the Court Chamberlain:

I had often met Schorlemer at Countess Schlippenbach's before, and also knew his father, the well-known member of the Centre Party, von Schorlemer-Alst: recently, I had frequently met the Imperial Chancellor; the Duke of Ratibor had been a student at Bonn in his youth and we exchanged reminiscences of those happy days; I once attended a performance of "Parsifal" at Beyreuth in the company of Count Moltke. So there were pleasant opportunities on all hands.

So far as externals go, no greater contrast can well be imagined than that between our Emperor and Emperor William. They belong to two different generations. There is always a space between our Emperor and the world: Emperor William is a child of this world. It is hard to get near our Emperor in conversation, and even when one succeeds, within limits, in doing so, he always keeps his distance; Emperor William seizes eagerly on any topic that interests him; our Emperor often uses strong expressions of persons and incidents, but, in that, Emperor William has the freedom of a "Korpsstudent," and it is quite impossible to repeat some of the expressions of which he allows himself to make use in the freedom of an intimate circle.

Before we sat down, Emperor William spoke with one or two persons without any of the formality and nice weighing of words employed by our Emperor in like conditions. When the Ambassador presented me, he gave me a very firm hand-shake, saying that it was long since we had met. Soon after dinner, Szögyény again took me up to the Emperor, who talked with me for a very long time. He spoke almost uninterruptedly, in the tone of one delivering a lecture, but allowed me to throw in a word now and then to which he listened attentively, taking up everything that I said. There was hardly one of my observations that he let fall. In the course of this conversation, we came back repeatedly to circumstances with which he is particularly concerned. When I approached him, he instantly laid a hand on my shoulder, saying—"Hark ye, you have got to come to terms with the Rumanians. 'Lord, remember the Athenians!'; so I would cry to the Austrians, 'Remember the Rumanians!'" So, he entered on the main theme of his conversation, to which he harked back again and again. All that I had heard from Jagow, Zimmermann, and others, found the most emphatic echo in these words of the Emperor's. As things now are, everything depends on the way the Rumanians in Hungary are treated. The attitude to be taken by Rumania is one of the most important issues of the day: if it were to be anti-Austria-Hungary, the danger would be great. The Hungarians have got to make certain concessions to the Rumanians. These remarks brought us to Tisza. The Emperor has a very high opinion of him, and regrets that he does not know him personally; to which I replied that very important results might accrue were he, the Emperor, personally to impress the importance of this Rumanian question in foreign policy on the Hungarian Prime Minister and convince him on this point. This the Emperor eagerly took up, saying, "How am I to do that? The last time I was in Vienna, Tisza had departed on the very day before I came: I must have a talk with Szögyény about this." Being near, he was signed to approach, when the Emperor asked him how a meeting between himself and Tisza could be arranged. "Naturally, it only depends on when it seems right to your Majesty." Szögyény, far from showing any delight in his countenance, implied—"I only beg your Majesty to make use of me in this matter." Then, however, the Emperor began praising Tisza, at the expense of other Hungarian statesmen, to such a tune that Szögyény began to try to enter some qualifications, taking Andrássy under his wing, and saying that Apponyi could speak fluently in four languages: whereupon the Emperor remarked that there was apt to be a perilous temptation in that art. He also passed unfavourable comment on Andrássy, whom he reproached with having departed from the programme of his father. Szögyény, in reply, referred him to Andrássy's latest speech in the Delegations, which the Emperor obviously had not read. There were then a few words, between the Emperor and Szögyény, about the former's approaching visit to Vienna.

If we have a prejudice against Serbia, the Emperor appears to have one against Bulgaria. He spoke in most unflattering terms of the King and of the nation. The Bulgars come from the Volga—hence their name—and though pressed southwards by the Asiatic stocks, are bound up with the East and can never be detached from its influence. We then spoke of the Serbian army. He praised the corps of officers and the artillery, put the Serbian army pretty high, and noted that the Serbs had been the first to set foot in Adrianople. On the Serbian question—*i.e.* the relation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to Serbia—his views run close with my own: but his judgment on the situation is superficial and highly optimistic, not to say Utopian. Warming more and more to his subject, he finally declared that we ought to enter a tariff union with Serbia and finally conclude a military convention. We ought to take young Serbs in, at the Theresianum, and educate Serbian officers in our own army, so that the Serbs might stand shoulder to shoulder with the Austrians. I endeavoured to pour some water into his wine. I naturally admitted the justice of the Emperor's fundamental view, but did not conceal from him the difficulties in the way of any sudden turn in policy, on our part, in this direction. In fact the Emperor seizes on a truly grand idea, one that really belongs to the great constitutional ideas of Austria, as applied by Prince Eugene; but leaps over all the necessary intermediate stages and overlooks the hard facts of the present. We were on rather more solid ground when we turned to discuss the federation of Greece, Rumania, and Serbia, for which he is as keen a partisan as his Ministers. He, however, is anxious to include Turkey—and here we have the difference between Berlin and Vienna. Here, the idea is to encircle Bulgaria; with us, Serbia.

The Emperor spoke at length of Orthodoxy, its effect upon a people, and its deficiencies, from the point of view of truth and inward religiousness. The Emperor showed himself well-informed, and I met with views, in the course of his remarks, that I had, in his day, discussed with Harnack. He spoke of France's financial resources as inferior. The yield of taxation in Germany to-day is higher than in France. The latter stands to lose milliards in Mexico, and has promised money, which it cannot pay, to Serbs and Turks. Obviously, these are things that have been said to the Emperor, assuredly not officially, but by persons anxious to get his hearing, who exaggerate in the effort to secure it. He spoke at length on the present Cabinet crisis in Italy. Giolitti is a sharp customer. The time has now come when the Libyan bills have got to be paid and certain unpopular laws passed: so he removes himself, and the good-natured Salandra takes things over for a bit, after which Giolitti will come back again. On the recent expansion of Italy, the Emperor was well-informed, and thoroughly recognised the merits of San Giuliano. I was able to confirm, from my latest impressions of Rome, that San Giuliano was handling the relations of the Monarchy to Italy with great skill. The Emperor then turned to his approaching journey to Vienna and Miramare. He listened while Szögyény and I described the situation and construction of Miramare, and then spoke of Brioni, to which our heir to the throne no longer goes, in consequence of differences between himself and the proprietor of Brioni, Kupelwieser. He recalled, with pride, that it was Koch who had cleaned up the island, and then proceeded to give a vigorous description of a comic scene, when a monkey belonging to Hagenbeck's Zoo there had escaped and appeared among the bathers. The Emperor has a very keen delight in anything humorous or comic, and has a hearty laugh.

A lot about Albania. I got the impression that the Emperor does not take this new State very seriously. When Szögyény suggested that Prince Wied had not begun too badly, he replied: "Above all, he is still there!" He spoke of an *exposé* by an Austrian officer which he had read. So long as the Prince has money, it will be all right, but everyone will want money of him. The Emperor certainly did not appear to have any clear perception of the great social difficulties which have to be overcome in Albania, which have been described by all who really know the country, and which I mentioned to him. Szögyény gave him some facts about religious conditions. I told him about the building of the Konak in Durazzo by Ludwig, the Vienna furniture manufacturer, and he laughed prodigiously when I described how Ludwig had been careful to go to our Foreign Office to make sure of getting his money.

We also talked of various buildings in Berlin. He is rightly proud of the great hall in the new Library, and takes an interest in the smallest detail of things of this sort. When the new Opera House was building, he insisted that there should be a station on the Underground quite near. Szögyény took advantage of the opportunity to ask the Emperor a number of questions, but only got very casual replies. Szögyény asked whether he had news from Russia, whether Sazonov was to go on being Minister, and whether he knew Stürgkh. On the last point, the Emperor gave a very short and dry " Yes " in reply. Finally, the Emperor told us about Livadia and the photographs of it he had seen.

Our lengthy conversation attracted more and more attention from those present. When the Emperor turned from us to one of the other gentlemen, the Imperial Chancellor at once came up to me, saying that the Emperor had certainly had a very good talk with me, on which I gave him a brief account of what had passed. He went with notable eagerness into the Rumanian question, and when I repeated to him my sense of the need of a re-orientation of our foreign policy, he said, quickly and loudly, " Yes, but action also is required." In his judgment of the future of Greece he is all too optimistic. He thinks it depends on whether Greece steadily pursues a sound policy. Szögyény later explained this qualification to me as due to the doubt felt here as to Greece's side-glances at France. Later, I also had some talk with Haymerle. When I told him that, *apropos* of our Serbian policy, the Emperor is entirely of my opinion, he said, " Yes, unfortunately."

Zimmermann, with whom I then went home, discoursed on the old theme that we ought not to treat the small

States so much *de haut en bas*. To-day, the small State was insisting on its equal right to live, and it had to be won by respecting it. It was for Austria to take advantage of its geographical and historic position in the Balkans by acting on these lines. This brought us to the question of diplomatic action in general, and he reported the remark of Lerchenfeld, a warm friend of Austria's, that if Austria had had Prussia's task of holding together the Princes of the Bund, numerous as they were, and small, and vain, they would have made off long ere this. In Frankfurt, in the old Diet days, the case was different. But even then, Austria held the small fry together only through their hatred and fear of Prussia, because in its policy Austria always reckoned only with men's weaknesses and always went wrong when it was a question of dealing with an adversary on his stronger side. The main burden of the work of the Foreign Office is on Zimmermann's shoulders: he reads the papers and masters all the written material. The Emperor had always to be kept in touch with current business, and Zimmermann often has to spend hours reporting to him. Incidentally, he told me a great deal about the Emperor, and praised his width of outlook: he knows everything, is extremely observant, and has an effective, if often rather drastic, method of repeating what he has learnt. He is, however, apt to regard no views as of significance save his own, and while apt at taking in outside impressions, translates them at once into views of his own. The easiest way of getting him to agree to anything is to get him to regard the decision come to as his own.

Berlin, March 13, 1914.

I have been, under the guidance of Dr. Schmitt, with Countess Schlippenbach, Haymerle, and Paul Thun, to the antique collections in the royal Museums. We saw the plaster cast of the Gorgon excavated in Corfu under the Emperor's directions. But the real object of our visit was to see the Egyptian excavations from Tel-el-Amarna, 300 kilometres beyond Thebes. There, the workshop of a sculptor called Tutmes, who worked under Amenophis IV in the 14th century B.C. was discovered, with many clay models in it from the life. The find led to the interesting hypothesis that the stiff, hieratic style of the Egyptian statues was not a primary art form. In truth to nature and individuality, the models found here are of the most amazing realism. The hypothesis put before us was that, from religious motives, these naturalistic studies were worked up into the solemn, hieratic heads, which would then be regarded as conventionalised heads based on studies from life. On this occasion we also paid a brief visit to the Kaiser Friedrich Museum, where we admired the marvellous van der Goes. Wonderful in line, expression, colour, and landscape.

Berlin, March 14, 1914.

Lunched with Count Larisch, secretary to our Legation. In addition to his charming wife, I met a number of members belonging to the Centre Party, Count Praschma, Prince Löwenstein, and Aretin. Count Khuen, son of the Hungarian Minister, seems to be a most intelligent young man, with an extensive knowledge of Hungarian constitutional law, for which, however, he has no great admiration, but with a very limited social outlook. When I asked him whether he moved in Left circles at all (I did not dare to ask him whether he was acquainted with the Social Democrats) his reply was: "That would not do: that would not suit the German Government." Countess Schlippenbach, who was also at the lunch, and whom I accompanied home, told me, however, that it is only the Austro-Hungarian diplomats who confine their social intercourse exclusively to Court circles: members of other embassies are met with everywhere. It is always the same. What I found in Paris, in London, and in Belgrade obtains here, too, with our closest ally. It is no wonder that they see nothing, hear nothing.

I owe many pleasant hours of chat to my old friend, Councillor Aschrott and his wife, who has an intimate knowledge of all that goes on in Vienna: also a most interesting evening, when I met many Members of Parliament of the Left wing. Conversation ranged over many topics, but I was struck by the fact that these representatives seemed to have little pride in their job, and little joy or belief in the activity of the Reichstag.

For many years I have been concerned with the question of social insurance. A visit to the President of the Imperial Insurance Office, Dr. Kaufmann, enlivened me with the hope of some day seeing that goal attained in Austria. I told him that our Council of Labour has long been at work on insurance against old age and invalidity: that we have found the best of good will both among employers and among the workers, who have an exceptionally capable and well-informed representative in Dr. Verkauf. But the whole thing sticks because the Government, on purely party grounds, insists on having compulsory insurance include persons working on their own account (one-man businesses, peasant proprietors)—which makes the whole thing impracticable. If anything is to be done for these groups by way of insurance, it must be on the lines of setting up a special institution for their benefit, as has been attempted in Belgium. Kaufmann was quite of my opinion: he agrees with me in thinking that to attempt to bring these independent people into the ordinary insurance scheme is impracticable and mistaken. He further agrees with me in deploring the way in which political considerations are imported into these strictly practical questions: a tendency he has also got to combat here. Politics enter into everything, settle everything. In the last few years Kaufmann has been largely occupied with the preventive hygiene side of social insurance and has written a most instructive book on the way in which the German system of workmen's insurance has worked protectively against accidents in factories.

Taking all in all, I have once again received an overpowering impression of the force and self-confidence of the men who are in charge here. True, in these days, in conformity with the purpose of my visit, I have been almost exclusively in touch with the traditional guardians of the State here. With them, hard work and a sense of duty dominate. As usual, here in Berlin, self-confidence runs high; at the moment, indeed, excessively high. These men lay down the law, and are little inclined to pay attention to the opinions of others. There is insufficient knowledge of our Austrian conditions, with the result that the difficulties with which we have to contend are under-estimated. Hence, the professorial tone that sounds in nearly all they say. The street life is very noisy; there are crowds in the hotels till far into the night: taste is not the leading note.

EARLY DAYS OF 1914 IN VIENNA

Vienna, March 16, 1914.

VISIT to-day from Ludwig, the furniture manufacturer, who has been installing the palace at Durazzo: he is straight from there, and has had several talks with the Prince. The latter makes a very monosyllabic impression on him, and he finds his German entourage much preoccupied with formalities. At Schwegel's, in the evening, I met General Bolfras, to whom I talked of Berlin. He, too, disbelieves in the possibility of reaching an understanding with Serbia; as for Emperor William's counsels, he thinks they are more readily given than taken. He is a calm, level-headed man, but somewhat affected by the quietism that shrouds the Emperor and his entire entourage.

Vienna, March 22, 1914.

If I were to try to sum up the use I have been able to make, here, of my Berlin impressions, the result would, unhappily, be small. Immediately on my return, I visited Berchtold's first secretary, and gave him a full account of whom I had seen and what I had heard in Berlin. With Berchtold himself, I had no real talk. He listened to everything with his characteristic indifference and nonchalance. His replies amounted to nothing at all, and I found it difficult to get beyond the conventional interchange. When I gave him an arresting description of the keen interest which all the leading men in Berlin, from the Emperor downwards, take in our relations with Rumania, his reply was: " It is easy for Germany to give advice, but we have got the Rumanian Irridenta to deal with." What he really meant by that I could not be sure, since the point of all our Berlin talks was precisely how we were to make our Rumanian Irridenta innocuous. In all probability he did not really hear what I said. There is a mighty difference between a conversation with Berchtold and the interchange of ideas one has with men in Berlin. The questions they put to one, there! But gentlemen here, instead of being glad to have an outsider inform them on things that either confirm, complete, or correct their official intelligence . . . envelop themselves in averted silence. Yes—if only there were anything hidden behind that façade of hauteur! Actually, there is nothing behind it save the contempt of the professional for any man who insists on disturbing his calm, and a real uncertainty of judgment.

To-day I felt this more acutely than ever, often as I have encountered it before. By way of contrast, I met with the most lively interest on the part of Bacquehem, the standing reporter for foreign affairs in the Delegations. He telephoned me at once on hearing that I was back from Berlin, and I had many hours talk with him. He has no good to say of Berchtold, whom he regards devoid of interest and unapproachable. He has given up talking to him and visits him very rarely, since he does not get any such insight into the current course of foreign policy as it is proper for the reporter to the Delegations to have, and was always the case under Goluchowski and Aehrenthal. Bacquehem was recently with the Emperor. The old gentleman is shown everything in the rosiest light. He finds everything is in the best of order. We have carried through our Balkan programme, and our position is quite satisfactory. There is an atmosphere surrounding the Emperor which prevents any ray of reality from getting through to him.

Vienna, April 2, 1914.

So the meeting between the German Emperor and Tisza has been brought off, and his Majesty will have had the opportunity to put the Rumanian question as emphatically and expressly before the Hungarian Premier as he recently did before me. There is much guessing at the substance of this surprising conversation with Tisza. But it is of course at once officially denied that there was any talk of Rumania.

I recently met Silva-Tarouca in Dresden. He told me that the Austrian Social Democratic Party is planning to stage a revolutionary movement, not in Austria, but in Russia, so soon as the critical period of war arrives; this, according to Silva-Tarouca, has been officially communicated to him from Russia, because it is known that he has contacts both with the German Emperor and with Francis Ferdinand. He will have given the news to both of them.

Vienna, May 3, 1914.

Our Ambassador Giskra was recalling to me to-day the time when he was secretary and Thoemmel our Minister in Belgrade, and the manner in which the latter used to treat the Serbs in conversation (in the time of King Alexander). A difference arose about an Austrian vessel on the Save. Avakumović, the Serbian Premier, gave Thoemmel his word that his complaint would be complied with. Whereupon Thoemmel said he had known great liars both in Montenegro and in Turkey, but nowhere had he found such liars as in Serbia. A second example. There was talk, at a dinner-party, about monuments in Serbia. Finally, Thoemmel remarked that the fact was that every monument in Serbia was a monument of the shame of the country. Giskra was present at these conversations. All these things were probably uttered half in jest, half in earnest, otherwise they would have been impossible. But however that was, their tone explains the hatred which we have been sowing there from time immemorial.

VISIT TO BUCAREST IN APRIL 1914

Bucarest, April, 1914.

On April 15 I reached Bucarest via Predeal. I had recently heard so much said about Rumania, that it seemed to me useful for my political education to get a direct impression of men and views on the spot. My visit in the second half of April was somewhat curtailed by the fact that the Greek holidays fell this year in this period, with the result that I failed to meet this and that person whom it would have been useful for me to see and talk with. Nevertheless, I was, on the whole, well satisfied with the result of my journey, which enabled me to take home a lively impression of the state of opinion in Bucarest. Thanks to the great kindness of Dr. Raducanu, to whom I took introductions, I was able, in a short space of time, to meet a large number of interesting persons, was taken into banks and large industrial undertakings, and got an insight into the life there from the most various angles. Dr. Raducanu studied in Berlin under Schmoller and Wagner. is an independent teacher at the University, was occupied with financial work in the Marmorosch Bank, and knows the whole political world of Bucarest. He at once took me to see Bratianu, whom, however, we did not find, though I made an appointment with him for the next day.

A very short stay and even the most casual intercourse with people here soon forces home on one the dominating sense of self-confidence, the rise in national consciousness, and the sense of pride in Roman descent. Wherever one goes, one comes upon signs of this enhanced national feeling, this enhanced vitality. The results of the second Balkan war and the Peace of Bucarest have gone to the people's heads. The little State is stretching and straining: it is determined to be recognised and to expand. People are full of reforming notions, they are making plans for the future, and pulse with hopefulness. A large part of this, whether openly or no, is to be at our expense. There must be no deceiving oneself on that head. Transylvania, the desired, the unreleased, is the substance of everybody's dreams. Some talk openly of the coming of the day that shall unite all Rumanians: others only ask for a cultural union and concessions on the part of the Hungarians: more cautious in their immediate wishes, they sum them up in the phrase "autonomy for Transylvania." But one has only to dig a little deeper to discover that the interpretations of this ambiguous word are manifold, since autonomy, as used by these men, is only conceived of as a transitional stage. Politicians, concerned with the immediate present, assure one that good neighbourly relations with the Monarchy could be secured if only Hungary could make up its mind to treat its Rumanians differently; and they assure one that, in that event, the Kingdom would have no further aspirations. At the same time the remark that the Rumanians would invariably treat the Siebenbürgen Saxons with respect, since they represent a priceless cultural element, reveals their real point of view, since it shows how comprehensive is their conception of what they call "autonomy"—in other words, the predominance of the Rumanians over Siebenbürgen. In any political discussion, one comes upon an unbridgable chasm between them and Hungary. The old Kossuthian idea of a Magyar predominance in the Balkans is raked up in order that it may be passionately denounced. "We seek," so it has been put to me, "to have an unscalable wall against the Magyars, and that the Rumanians in Hungary must constitute." Any idea of bringing Magyars and Rumanians together, as a protective weapon against the South Slavs, seems to me entirely Utopian. The main stream of popular feeling here is against us: in some externals, one feels that more here even than in Belgrade. At present, at all events. But there are changes going on in opinion here too. In the late autumn of 1912, when Conrad von Hötzendorf was here, feeling towards us is said to have been good, and Rumania to have been prepared to go with us. That changed, however, when the French and the Russians were in a position to exploit our mistakes to alienate the Rumanians from us. Our revision policy cut the ground from under us. Other Powers saw that the Treaty of Bucarest would not do, but got out in time, and left things to the future to settle. Berchtold, however, stuck to his revision idea, and was left with "Black Peter" in his hand, at the end of the game.

The Cultural League is a focus of nationalist aspirations. Prominently associated with it are Transylvanian Rumanians. Its real soul is the well-known Professor Jorga. He is accounted a real scholar, and has written many large historical works, including a five-volume history of the Osmans and a history of the Rumanian people which appeared in the Lamprecht collection. Unfortunately, we did not meet Professor Jorga, as he had gone into the country. Dr. Raducanu did, however, introduce me to the secretary of the League, Professor G. Boddan-Duica, a Transylvanian by birth. He plays a very prominent part in the League, and I had many opportunities of talk with him, when he was tireless in explaining and helping me to understand. Like Raducanu, he takes the view that there are no reproaches to be made against Austria, but they both do definitely demand of Hungary freedom for the cultural development of the Rumanians in Siebenbürgen. At the same time, there are certain demands, too, which refer to the Bukovina. The religious endowments, though of Rumanian origin, are now devoted mainly to Slav purposes: the Rumanians always find the Slavs preferred—but all that is only by the way, since, when there is any talk of the attitude of the Monarchy to the kingdom, invariably there appears, as grim and threatening as Banquo's ghost, the figure of the Rumanian in Hungary. What these gentlemen say is that, up to now, Rumania has always been loyal to the Monarchy, gratis: now the time has come when it must get something for it. There is nothing in the wild speeches which are made here, or in the sanguinary articles in the newspapers: there is no desire to be either under Russian or under Austrian influence. It is admitted that the Rumanian peasant in Siebenbürgen is better off than he is in Rumania; but, nationally and culturally, they make the same claims, and these claims have got to be satisfied. If the Deák Language law could be put into operation, that would at least be a beginning.

With the League there is now associated an Institut pour l'Étude de l'Europe Sud-orientale, which is by way of being a non-political body and seeks only to serve as a centre for literary and other cultural efforts. The lectures organised by the Institute are held at the University. Jorga lectures on Albanian literature and history. At the opening of the Institute, the Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian Ministers were present. In this way the League has become the centre of a great intellectual movement, which employs every political, scientific and propaganda method in the service of the Greater Rumanian idea. The more one looks about one here, the more is one conscious of the fact that there are forces at work striving for the unification of all Rumanians, an idea which, where it already exists, is being strengthened, all the time, by a countless number of isolated efforts: or roused where it is as yet slumbering in the sub-conscious. Among reforms, the agrarian question at present occupies the forefront. This, of course, is rather the traditional party spring-board; but Dr. Raducanu gave me an interesting explanation of its actuality. The Rumanian army which occupied Bulgaria received some very instructive education there. From time immemorial, the Bulgarian has come into Rumania as a little man, a vegetable grower, a gardener, and the Rumanian has looked down upon him. But the Rumanians now began to see that, after an appalling and most costly war, the Bulgarian peasant in his villages was far better off than they were in theirs, in which they were working as free peasants. This had a far more profound effect than any phrases. The Rumanian peasant understood the difference, and a desire became active in his mind to achieve similar conditions at home, after all the dangers, endurance, and struggles of the war. Hence, a revival of the agrarian question, which has brought it right to the front again in politics. The Conservatives having been greatly strengthened by the Peace of Bucarest, the Liberals had got to over-trump them, and to that end raised the flag of agrarian reform once more. For which reason, everybody asks whether Bratianu is serious about reform. As everywhere in the Balkans, politics and economics are thoroughly mixed up together. I realised this very plainly during my various interviews in banking and trading circles. Here, too, the Germans are our most formidable competitors: superior to us in adaptability, they enter more readily on transactions, are better informed, undertake more risks, and are represented by much better travellers. Political circumstances combine to help them to get concessions which are refused to us. And for all these reasons the Germans are more fortunate than we are in making deliveries.

Our official representation on the economic side seems to me very poor. The Austrian trade museum has an active representative here, but he does not get on at all with the Consulate. In addition, there is a Hungarian representative, working entirely on his own. Easy to imagine the sort of trade policy that one gets in such circumstances. The outstanding mark of the position is outpaced by Germany all along the line. Our present idea of meeting that is to acquire a preferential trading position in the kingdom. Everyone tells me that there is absolutely no chance of that. When a representative of Austria (Riedl) was here, a short time ago, to make soundings about the possibilities of a tariff union, he soon found his task hopeless, and had at last to hear from Take Jonescu that the Rumanians had no notion of becoming a commercial section of Austria. Majoresco was more diplomatic in his expressions, but the sense was just the same. Our commissioner was not even able to induce the Trade Minister, Xenopol, to establish a committee to study the question.

My conversation with Bratianu was disappointing. He evaded political issues. On the other hand, he abounded in wordy eloquence about cultural and economic conditions and the future of Rumania. I merely record a couple of slogans from a discourse that was distinguished by the utmost liveliness and energy, and contained many apt observations.

The last mobilisation in Rumania had been a great moral and political success. Feeling for the State had entered the consciousness of all sections of the population, and has been notably enhanced where it already existed. Peasants who were not called up had voluntarily offered themselves, and asked why they were not to go too. A hundred years ago, the condition of the Rumanian people was wretched; there has since been an improvement in certain classes, with a resulting intensification of social differences. These have got to be equalised, not, however, by any mere "expropriation" but by general cultural work. The grant of landownership to the peasants was a great social task on the line of *rapprochement* between classes. He attaches great importance to institutions for agricultural credit and co-operation. Such efforts will help to unite the Balkan peoples. A Balkan League, on the lines conceived by Austria, is impossible, but an association for cultural development and against all who would thwart such development is the great objective. The Hungarians —in this matter the stronger party—will not be moved by Governmental measures, or by any policy from Vienna directed by centralising and Conservative interests: but even the Hungarians will have to adjust themselves to a policy of culture, expressive of and blown forward by the great upward lift that is surging through the Balkan peoples, and Hungarian constitutional law may be superior in strength to Austrian, but not to the organised force of a great popular tide. The future is with those who open the gates to it, and with them only.

I also did my best to get a view of economic conditions, and heard much, of a detailed kind, about our trade with Rumania, about Customs differences, the contradictory efforts made by Austrians and Hungarians in this connexion, and the slackness of our Consulate. I have been told that it has for years been the practice here for great firms to submit their trading balances to our Consulate, which has not even the common politeness to acknowledge their receipt by a card. In Bucarest, there are five large Banks, which operate largely with foreign capital, many smaller banks, also an export and import company, the shares of which are preponderatingly in Austrian hands, which does business with Austrian but also with non-Austrian firms. Herr Blank, the head of Marmorosch Bank, is a great financier. He has lived here long and knows the country through and through. He spoke of agrarian reform in a quite unprejudiced manner, and in far more concrete terms than did Bratianu, who never escaped from mere generalities. The Government owns 170,000 hectares, and also disposes of 330,000 more, which belong to the Church and other foundations. This would suffice for many years to come, since, in his judgment, the technical work of valuation, legal transfer, etc., would mean that 6000 hectares was the most that could be transferred in any one year. Payment to the Church and other foundations could be made in bonds, so that there would be no need to appeal to the money market to finance the transaction. In addition, there would be large blocks of land available for voluntary purchase; so that any question of serious dispossession of private property need not arise for many years to come. Bratianu's father created the middle class in Rumania: his son will create a new peasant class. But the grant of land will not settle the question. Blank agrees with Bratianu in holding that the decisive point is the education of the people on the land to work there. The Rumanian works, but not steadily. If he has earned enough by working a couple of days in the week, he stops; not so the Bulgarian, who though he does not work so intelligently, keeps on at it. His judgment of Germany is the one heard everywhere here. Germany is making enormous profits on its export trade in iron, machinery, and electrical goods of all kinds: competitive power is tremendous: where the German merchant scores is in close observation and power to learn—that is how they beat the world. Their diplomacy assists them systematically. The German Minister in Bucarest is concerned, first and foremost, in getting orders for Germany. Recently, Germany got a big tunnelling contract: the German Minister did not think it beneath his dignity to call on the Rumanian Minister and express his thanks to him for the fact. Blank explained the Rumanian taxation and Customs systems to me. He did not, of course, give me a systematic exposition, but everything appeared perspicuous when put by a man of his experience, right in the centre of commercial life for many years, and a party to all that has been done. He is full of confidence in the future of his native land. That is the leading note here; it sounds in everything.

In the judgments passed on the King there is no great variation. After reading the four volumes of his Memoirs, one understands his life work. His careful, often tentative method, his skill in utilising men. This is the view his people take of him. He always takes public opinion into account and the tendencies affecting it; and yields to them. It is no longer possible for him to direct foreign policy in his own sense, as it was in the past; he has to have regard to the views and opinions of his people. I often heard it said that he is not loved: he is respected, considered as just, and called the wise king on every opportunity; but there is no intimate relationship between him and his people. The Press often attacks him in the most unflattering way, and my confidant gave it as his opinion that the King has not got a single personal friend in Rumania: but then, here, there is nothing but calculation and pursuit of political and personal advantage.

I was daily in touch with the gentlemen at our Embassy, Baron Edwin Bourguignon and a Hungarian Count. The former told me that the French Minister, who has a Rumanian wife, sees everybody here; and that he must admit that we Austrians do too little in the way of moving about in intelligent circles.

Czernin was absent during my stay in Bucarest, but I met him on the day before I left and had a long talk with him. In general, he confirmed the accuracy of the impressions I had gained. The Rumanians have got swelled heads; their eyes are on Siebenbürgen, and they are waiting for their chance. Were there to be a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Russia, they would decide which was the stronger and act accordingly. Their animosity against Hungary is very great, and consequently extends to the Monarchy as a whole. Czernin made an urgent appeal to me to speak on this openly in the Delegations, which is my own intention.

THE DELEGATION IN BUDAPEST

The day before yesterday, before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Delegation, I delivered a long speech on our relations to our neighbours. I summarise below the passage in which I dealt with Rumania.

Our relation to Rumania is by no means simple, and the various elements in the question require to be clearly set out. It is not a question of diplomatic relations only. Public opinion and the mood of the people play the decisive part here. In Rumania prevails the greatest possible enthusiasm and readiness to make sacrifices for the nation, together with a high tension of popular energy in the organisation of the new territories, agrarian reform, and military preparedness. Every Government in the Balkans has got to take account of this strong national tendency. In March, in a despatch in the Green Book, Majorescu said: " Aucun Gouvernement Roumain ne pourra résister à la poussée de l'opinion publique." Even more significant was what was said by King Carol the other day to a *Matin* interviewer: wars are made by the peoples, and there are popular currents before which the ruler is powerless. We outsiders are imperfectly informed as to the purely diplomatic relations between the Monarchy and the Rumanians, but certain facts emerge from a comparison of our Red Book with the Rumanian Green Book. These facts have a historic background which is necessary for their understanding. After Plevna, Rumania, despite its war laurels, was in a difficult position, owing to the cession of Bessarabia and the inadequate compensation it received for it in the shape of the Dobrudja without Silistria. From that time dates Rumania's association with the Triple Alliance. Since Andrássy's time we have carefully cultivated our relations with Rumania: all his successors and all our envoys have kept that end in view. This brings us to the autumn of 1912. On October 12, 1912, Rumania promptly declared that it would occupy a strategic line in the Dobrudja so soon as a striking victory was won by the Balkan League. This was the standing theme of all the despatches of the winter of 1912 and 1913. Rumania's demands became more and more insistent, but were met with by nothing but excuses and evasions on the Bulgarian side. What line did the Monarchy then take? Throughout the whole of this period, it made a well-intentioned effort to mediate between Rumania and Bulgaria; in particular, in a despatch of February 1913, it put quite frankly before the Bulgarians the results of their obstinacy, which were then beginning to appear. But this mediation finally failed. For, although by the Protocol of May 9, 1913, an understanding between Rumania and Bulgaria was brought about by the Great Powers, the highly interesting protocols printed in the Green Book, covering the negotiations about the actual fixation of the new boundary line between Bulgaria and Rumania, at the end of June, reveal clearly that the Bulgarians broke off these negotiations on the question of a couple of kilometres near Silistria. On July 3 the Rumanian mobilisation followed, and they proceeded to take, for themselves, more than the Great Powers in Petersburg had assigned to them. Thus, diplomatic action on the part of Austria-Hungary ended in our failure to satisfy any of the parties, and succeeded only in alienating them all. In the course of these transactions, there took place a complete change in Rumanian public opinion towards Austria-Hungary. It is psychologically understandable—what Rumania expected from its association with the Triple Alliance and good relations with the Monarchy was unquestioning support: what it got was mediation, and a mediation that failed. On the top of that came our revision policy, which nobody defends to-day; the efforts of France and Russia to exploit Rumania's disappointment, in the hope of drawing it over to their side; and the attitude of a section of our Press, which exhausted itself in unctuous exhortations and instruction to Rumania. Even so, none of this would have been decisive, by itself.

Another factor played its part: Rumania's attitude to the so-called Rumanian question in Siebenbürgen and Hungary. I pass no judgment here on the Rumanian question in Hungary. I am concerned merely to note a fact, and destroy the illusion that we can have good relations with Rumania while ignoring this question. It is necessary further to establish one other point. I want to utter a warning against assigning exaggerated significance to demonstrations or incitements by the Rumanian Press, in a country in which there is no limitation on the freedom of speech or writing; against confusing demagogic utterances with the views and convictions of serious Rumanian politicians. What these serious people say and assert has got to be listened to and weighed. We must not be blind to the perils that must be involved in a wrong handling by us of our Rumanians; we must not ignore what is now going on in the soul of the entire Rumanian race and there finds expression in the words of their responsible statesmen. The Siebenbürgen question is not a growth of to-day or yesterday; it has long been there, though latent. King Carol records in his Memoirs that he spoke about it with Count Andrássy: the question slumbered, but is now awake, and dominates men's minds. We have got to reckon with a great national stirring and a cultural development going on in the Kingdom of Rumania. That is the factor, that is the fact, to which I refer; and it is one we must not ignore. There is no danger in the Bukovina. If the Rumanians there are skilfully handled, they will remain what they are to-day, a loyal element in our State. But there is danger in conditions in Siebenbürgen and in Hungary. I offer the Hungarians no advice; it is for them to find the way to pacify the Rumanian element; but above all it is for them to seek that way in a serious spirit. For this is no mere Hungarian domestic question: it is a question of foreign policy. Not geographically only, but politically, does the way from Vienna to Bucarest lie through Hungary. If it is barred, Bulgaria will be an asset on the wrong side of our Balkan balance sheet. To say this is to do no more than state an incontrovertible, rock-bottom fact, with which the Monarchy has got to reckon, willy-nilly.

Berchtold, in his reply to me, said just nothing at all.

Vienna, May 15, 1914.

Marquis Bacquehem came to see me yesterday to talk over the debate on foreign policy which is to take place in full session of the Delegations.

He told me a story dating from the Taaffe era and belonging to the year 1890, the year in which a Bohemian Compromise was concluded, but immediately after broke down. In the summer of 1890 Bacquehem was sent to Heinrich Clam at Smečna, to ask him how the Compromise, which was about to break down, could be patched up again. Characteristically, Clam enquired whether he came with or without Taaffe's cognisance: to which Bacquehem replied that every word he should say had Taaffe's authority, and every word spoken in reply would be conveyed by him to Taaffe. Clam then said that the only way to save the Compromise was to make Czech the official language for home use. So it was then agreed between Clam, Rieger, and Zeithammer. Bacquehem then returned, and Taaffe did nothing in the matter.

JUNE DAYS IN VIENNA

Vienna, June 1, 1914.

I HAD a visit to-day from Dr. Velimir Bajkić of Belgrade, who talked for four hours about conditions in Serbia. He took part in the trade treaty discussions of 1904, fought in the recent campaign, and is now commissioned by the Carnegie Endowment to study the economic and social effects of the wars on the Balkan States. He told me a mass of most interesting things, which unfortunately I cannot put down here, since it would take me far into the night to write them out. In the course of our talk there was no specific mention of the fact that, deep in the heart of Serbia, the national ideal and all the hopes connected with it still slumber, but that is the note that sounds through every discussion with Serbia. In general, Bajkić is for a relation to the Monarchy based on mutual advantage. He gave me a full account of the line taken by the various parties and persons on this issue. Closest to it, at the moment, are the Nationalists under Ribarac; and the Young Radicals would be sympathetic enough. Pašić does not seem to have made up his mind; he certainly has not yet given up his dilly dally policy. The export of cattle is not of the first importance for Serbia, but the export of pigs certainly is. It would still be possible to get large concessions in return for an increase in the quota. The export of sheep via Bosnia to the Adriatic would also be useful to Serbia. He was very interesting on the commercial treaty negotiations he had attended in Vienna in 1905; then, so he says, a very close agreement between the Monarchy and Serbia was under way and on the point of being concluded, when the whole thing was smashed by the news that Serbia had entered a Customs Union with Bulgaria.

Now, after, as he puts it, Serbia has gained an external success in the Orient Railways negotiations, it is its duty to itself to give up these delaying tactics and enter into a trade treaty, a railway convention, and a shipping convention with the Monarchy. Like so many others, he too tells me that Rumania is taking a very self-confident and energetic line. Immediately after the Balkan mess came to an end, it entered into a trade treaty with Greece for its supply with bread fruit. Our treaty with Greece is a mere sham.

His description of conditions in Macedonia confirms what I have read. The Macedo-Slav is an intermediate and Bajkić believes that Serbia will assimilate him. There are movements of peoples in the Balkans, actively promoted by the Greeks. He regards the alliance between Rumania, Serbia, and Greece as solid and thinks there are military conventions behind it. In March and April there were influences at work on the side of the Bulgars and the Turks desirous of breaking the peace, but the firm alliance of the three was strong enough to nip them in the bud. In Serbia, everyone has had enough of war. Emigration was partly due to war weariness. Otherwise there would be none from Serbia, where there is no economic reason for it, least of all now where there is ample land in the newly-acquired depopulated territories. There, Üsküb will become an economic centre. *Summa summarum*—the Serbs would now be glad to be on a good economic footing with the Monarchy. Anyhow, the connexion with Austria-Hungary is really indestructible. To-day, Serbia has need of us, since it has got to recover and requires some years of peace and gathering together. In the plains, there is great monetary shortage, but in Belgrade money is easy, prices are rising, speculation is rife. Bajkić says openly that Austria can only pursue one of two policies in Serbia—occupy it or live in friendship with it.

On this point, I had a long talk with Clam in Budapest. He is for the former—*saigner à blanc*. He was greatly under the influence of the Hungarian magnates, who are the only people he sees anything of. In Budapest they are more intransigent than ever *vis-à-vis* the nationalities. Nagy, *rapporteur* for Foreign Affairs in the Hungarian Delegation, told me that if things go on as they are there is nothing for it but to crush the Rumanians once and for all. They believe in war with Russia and regard it as inevitable. Even the Hungarian Ministers talk in that sense.

Vienna, June 4, 1914.

Czernin has been here. He is dissatisfied with the Delegation, because it sanctions the policy of inactivity. With perfect justice he says, If we cannot smash Serbia, we must abandon all prejudices, harbour no more *arrière pensées*, and come to terms with them, and with Rumania likewise. But this view, which is the only sound one, can get no hearing either in Vienna or in Budapest.

Yesterday evening, I had some gentlemen here—Riedl, Wimmer, Thayenthal, with Licht, Urban, Lecher, Freissler, and Redlich from the Reichsrath and Janotta from the Upper House. On the basis of a report I made to them, we had a discussion on commercial policy. I put forth the ideas that Czernin had urged when he was here—our utilising the favourable moment to come to terms with Serbia. Pašić will either go or have to submit. The Serbs need peace and the economic support of the Monarchy. Riedl assured us that he had this goal in view. Redlich once again deplored the ruin of the Empire, the corruption of the Press, and the mindlessness of the Government, and prophesied the worst. Abroad, too little is still made of these internal forces. People say that monarchical power in Austria must be still great, if it can carry on as it is doing under paragraph 14. Elsewhere, anything of that sort would be simply unthinkable. To govern in this fashion seems to the unthinking observer to demonstrate the power of the Crown, and that inspires a certain respect. This is the insecure ground on which the official optimism that Stürgkh cultivates in fact reposes. In the long run, however, Redlich is quite right. If things go on as they are with us, the ground will slip from under the feet of Imperial authority. And all this is being done out of regard for the old sick Emperor. What then? Czernin says that the Archduke will have, in the first few weeks, to show that he intends to rule with the people, and not with a handful of lords. If that really is going to happen, we are going to be most agreeably surprised; and, if he should, in fact, prove to be a reformer, there would certainly be an immediate swing in public opinion. That is, "if" . . .

For him, and for us, it is a life and death question.

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Benko von Boynik, Isidore, Baron: 1846; Commander Austro-Hungarian Navy; "Adlatus" to the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Governor, 1895–1912; d. Agram, 19/4/1925, pp. 22, 23, 110, 165

Berchtold, Leopold, Count: b. 1863; Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 1906–11; Foreign Minister, 1912–15, pp. 47, 133, 135, 143–50, 154–56, 160–62, 165, 166, 170, 179, 183, 187, 192–98, 203, 216, 219, 223, 229, 233, 256, 259, 266, 270, 271, 285, 286, 289, 299

Bethmann Hollweg, Theobald von: b. 1856; German Imperial Chancellor, Prussian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, pp. 155–56, 279–80

Beust, Frederick Ferdinand (Count since 1868): b. 1809; Austrian Foreign Minister, Prime Minister and Imperial Chancellor, 1866–71; d. 23/10/1886, p. 56

Bienerth-Schmerling, Richard (Count since 1915): b. 1863; Austrian Home Secretary, 1906–8; Premier, 1908–11; d. Vienna, 3/6/1918, pp. 53, 59, 92, 96, 105, 188, 206, 221, 250

Bilinski, Leon, Ritter von: b. 1846; Director-General of the Austrian State Railways, 1892–95; Minister of Finance, 1895–97 and 1909–11; Governor Austro-Hungarian Bank, Common Finance Minister, 1912–15; d. Vienna, 15/6/1923, pp. 53, 129, 133, 244, 245, 266

Bismarck, Otto, Prince, Chancellor of the German Empire: pp. 33, 41, 56, 160, 253, 261, 265

Björnson Bjornstjerne: p. 98

Blank, M.: Director of Marmarosch Bank, Bucharest, pp. 293–94

Blondel, C.: French Ambassador, Bucharest, 1907–16, p. 295

Boddan-Duica, G.: p. 289

Bolfras, Arthur, Baron: b. 1838; Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor Francis Joseph; d. Baden, near Vienna, 19/12/1922, p. 284

Boog, Adolf von: Colonel, and

Departmental Head, War Office, 1911–13, p. 161

Boucquoy-Longueval, Karl, Count: b. 1854; Bohemian landowner and member of the Austrian House of Peers; d. Vienna, 9/8/1911, p. 78

Bourguignon von Baumberg, Edwin: b. 1885; Secretary of the Austro-Hungarian Legation, Bucharest, 1911–14, p. 294

Brailsford, H. N.: p. 120

Branting, Karl Hjalmar: b. 1860; leader Social Democratic Party in Sweden, p. 98

Bratianu, J. J. G.: Rumanian politician; Minister of Public Works, 1901; Foreign Minister, 1902–5; Minister for the Interior, 1907–9; Premier, 1909–19, pp. 291, 293

Bratianu, Joan: b. 1821; leader Rumanian Liberals; d. Florida, 16/5/1891, p. 294

Brentano, Lujo: b. 1844; Professor of Economics, Breslau, Strassburg, Vienna, Leipzig, Munich, p. xviii

Budisavljević, Wladimir: Captain of the District of Cattaro, 1907–18, pp. 85, 86

Bülow, Bernhard (Prince since 1905): b. 1849; German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1897; German Imperial Chancellor, 1900–9, pp. 63, 70

Bulić, Franz: Director of the Archæological Museum in Split, pp. 8, 9

Burckhardt, Jakob: b. 1818; historian of art; professor, University of Basle; d. Basle, 8/8/1897, p. 120

Burián von Rajecz, Stephan (Baron since 1900): b. 1851; Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to Greece, 1897–1903; Austro-Hungarian Minister of Finance, 1903–12 and 1916–18; Foreign Minister, 1915–16; d. Vienna, 20/10/1922, pp. 21, 22, 26, 28, 42, 43, 73, 76–77, 188, 191

Call zu Rosenberg und Kulmbach, Friedrich, Baron: b. 1854; President of the Innsbruck Superior Court; d. 27/5/1917, p. 240

Call zu Rosenberg und Kulmbach, Guido, Baron: b. 1849; Austrian Minister of Trade, 1900–15; Ambassador at Tokio, 1909–11, p. 200

Cappelli, Raffaelle Marchese: Italian Minister, 1–26/6/1898; President of the International Institute of Agriculture, Rome, pp. 180, 192

Carl: Austrian Emperor and King of Hungary, 1916–18; *see* Karl.

Carl (Carol) I: Prince, and (from 1881) King of Rumania, 1866–1914; *see* Karol.

Carl Stephan, Archduke: Austro-Hungarian Admiral; b. 1860, p. 10

Carlyle, Thomas: p. 272

Carp, Petrarche: b. 1837; Rumanian statesman; Prime Minister, 1900–11; d. 22/6/1919, pp. 256–57

Cartwright, Sir Fairfax Leighton: British Ambassador, Vienna, 1908–13, p. 61

Chlumecky, Johann (Baron since 1889): b. 1834; Austrian Minister for Agriculture, 1871–75; Trade Minister, 1875–79; President of the Chamber, 1893–97; member of the House of Peers; d. Bad Aussee, 11/12/1924, p. 10

Chlumecky, Leopold, Baron, son of above: b. 1873; member of the Diet of Moravia, p. 141

Chorinsky, Carl, Count: b. 1838; Governor of Salzburg; President of the Superior Court, Vienna; d. Vienna, 10/7/1897, p. 242

Čingrija, Pero: Mayor of Ragusa, p. 85

Clam-Martinitz, Henry, Count: b. 1863; Bohemian landowner and member of the Austrian House of Peers; Prime Minister, 1916–17, pp. 133, 134, 137, 139, 157, 200, 207–15, 299, 301

Conrad von Hötzendorf, Franz (Count since 1918): b. 1852; Chief of the General Staff of the Austro-Hungarian Army, 1906–11 and 1912–17; d. Mergentheim, 25/8/1925, pp. 45, 86, 144, 149–51, 158, 161, 165, 188, 191, 232, 289

Constantine I: King of the Hellenes, 1913–23; m. Sophie, sister of Emperor William II, pp. 183, 204, 231, 253

Coulard-Descos, L.: French Ambassador, Belgrade, 1907–21, pp. 121, 153

Curzon of Kedleston, George Nathaniel, Lord: Viceroy of India, 1899–1906, p. 67

Cuvaj von Ivanska, Edward (Baron since 1913): Ban of Croatia, 1912–13, pp. 135, 162, 202

Cvijić, Jovan: Professor of Geography and Ethnography, University of Belgrade, pp. 118, 144, 145

Czernin, Ottokar, Count: b. 1872; Austrian Minister at Bucharest, 1913–16; Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, 1916–18, pp. 78, 133, 137, 138, 141, 147, 149, 188, 193, 199, 200, 207–15, 253, 254, 266, 294, 302

Dallwitz, Johann von: b. 1855; Minister of State and Prussian Home Secretary, p. 274

Daneff, Stojan: Bulgarian politician; Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, 1901–3; President of the Chamber, 1911–13, pp. 144, 145, 148, 224, 231, 253

Darányi, Ignaz: Hungarian Minister of Agriculture, 1893–1903 and 1906–9, p. 92

Davidović, L.: Serbian Minister of Education, 1904 and 1914–19; Vice-President of the Chamber, 1910–11, pp, 103, 104

Deák, Francis: b. 1803; Hungarian statesman; d. Budapest, 29/1/1876, pp. 249, 290

Denis, Ernest: Professor of History at the Sorbonne; d. Paris, January, 1921, p. 98

Despić, Pero: Serbian merchant in Vienna, p. 87

Dietrichstein zu Nikolsburg, Count v. Mensdorff-Pouilly, Alexander, Prince of: b. 1813; Austrian Foreign Minister, 1854–66; d. Prague, 14/2/1871, p. 156

Dillon, Joseph Emil: correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* in Vienna, p. 203

Dimitrijević, Lazar: editor of the *Dan*, pp. 25, 66–67

Di San Giuliano, Antonio, Marchese: Italian Foreign Minister, 1905–6 and 1910–14; d. 16/10/1924, pp. 171–72, 176, 177, 191, 192, 278

Disraeli, Benjamin (Lord Beaconsfield): pp. 149, 217

Dobernig, Joseph Wolfgang: b. 1862; author, and member of the Austrian Chamber (German People's Party), pp. 143, 241

Draga, Queen of Serbia: pp. 113, 116

Dumba, Constantine Theodore: b. 1856; Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade, 1903–5; Stockholm, 1909–12; Washington, 1913–15, p. 248

Dumreicher v. Oesterreicher, Armand, Baron: b. 1845; writer on technical education; member of the Austrian Chamber up to 1895 (United German Left and of the

House of Peers); d. Ober Mais, 2/11/1908, pp. xx, 180

Durdik, Joseph: b. 1837; professor in Prague from 1860; teacher in philosophy, 1869; professor at the University of Prague, 1874; member of the Diet, 1883–89; d. Prague, 30/6/1902, p. x

Dusan, Stephan: Czar of Serbia, 1336–56, pp. 126, 145

Edward VII: King of Great Britain, 1901–10, pp. 56, 57

Eichler, Edward: Director of Justice in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Government, p. 12

Eisner v. Eisenhof, Angelo: p. 154

Engel v. Mainfelden, August, Baron: Austrian Finance Minister, 1914–15, p. 195

Eötvös de Vasaros Mameny, Joseph, Baron: b. 1813; Hungarian Minister of Education; d. Budapest, 3/2/1871, p. 249

Esterházy, Paul, Count: b. 1863; Director in the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, 1907–12, p. 52

Eugen, Archduke: b. 1863, pp. 199–200, 248

Eulenburg, Philip, Prinz zu: b. 1847; German Ambassador in Vienna, 1894–1902; d. Liebenberg, 17/9/1921, p. 159

Fallières, Clément Armand: President of the French Republic, 1906–13, pp. 54, 55

Fejérváry, Géza, Baron: b. 1833; Austro-Hungarian Infantry General; Hungarian Premier, 1905–6; d. Vienna, 25/4/1914, p. 160

Ferdinand: Prince of Bulgaria from 1887; King (Czar) of the Bulgars from 1908, pp. 183, 227, 233, 251–9, 265, 266, 273, 277

Ferenczy, Ida von: former reader to the Empress Elizabeth, p. 105.

Ferry: member of the French Chamber, p. 153

Fleischer, Richard: b. 1849; editor of the *Deutsche Revue*, p. 223

Florio, Marcus: Austro-Hungarian Rear-Admiral, p. 7

Foá, Dr.: Italian journalist, p. 192

Forgach, John, Count: b. 1870; Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade, 1907–11; Permanent Secretary, Foreign Office, 1913–17, pp. 101, 106–7

Forster, Zdenko, Baron: b. 1860; Head of the Austrian Railway Ministry, 1908–9; Minister of Railways, 1911–16; d. Vienna, 15/1/1922, p. 162

Francis Ferdinand, Archduke: pp. 53, 78, 95, 133, 135, 138, 156, 157–60, 202, 210, 221, 260, 267, 278, 286, 302–3

Francis Joseph I: Emperor and King: pp. 23, 24, 29, 30, 37, 41, 43, 45, 48, 50, 53, 54, 56–58, 71, 72, 92, 126, 149, 156, 159, 161, 169, 176, 183, 198, 202, 206, 219–21, 228–30, 234, 235–37, 238, 249–50, 270, 274–76, 284–85, 302

Franckenstein, Baroness: *see* Passavant.

Frank, Johann: advocate, member of the Croatian Diet, p. 202

Freissler, Dr. Robert: b. 1877; Commercial Secretary; member of the Austrian Chamber (German People's Party), p. 302

Friedjung, Dr. Heinrich: b. 1851; Austrian historian; d. Vienna, 14/7/1920, pp. 40, 69, 96–108, 113, 153, 156, 191, 201, 203, 257–58

Frischauer, Berthold: b. 1851; journalist; d. Vienna, 4/2/1924, p. 191

Fürstenberg, Carl Emil, Prinz zu: b. 1867; Austro-Hungarian Minister in Bucharest, 1911–13; Madrid later, pp. 71, 142, 152, 191, 264

Fürstenberg, Emil, Prinz zu: b. 1876; Legation Secretary to Austrian Embassy in Munich, then Athens, 1913; sent to Petersburg, p. 191

Fürstenberg, Maximilian Egon: b. 1863; member of the Prussian and member and President of the Austrian House of Peers, pp. 70, 71, 125, 150, 155, 158, 160, 162, 170, 183, 184, 191, 220

Fürstenberg, Vincent, Count: b. 1847; d. Ennsegg, 25/12/1896, p. 3.

Galgótzy, Anton: b. 1827; Austro-Hungarian General; later General Inspector of Troops to 1908, d. Vienna, 5/11/1929, p. 129

Gautsch v. Frankenthurn, Paul, Baron: b. 1851; Austrian Minister of Education, 1885–93, 1895–97; Prime Minister, 1897–98, 1907–8, and 1911; d. Vienna, 20/4/1918, p. xviii

Gavrila, Dr. Emil: lawyer in Budapest, pp. 94–95

Gavrilović, Miko: Serbian Minister in Cettinje, 1911–13, later in Sofia, p. 109

George I: King of the Hellenes, 1863–1913, p. 191

Ginzkey, William: great industrialist, member of the Austrian House of Peers, pp. 110, 140

Giolitti, Giovanni: b. 1844, Italian Prime Minister, 1892–99, 1903–5, 1911–14, and 1920–21, pp. 178, 278

Giskra, Carl, Baron: b. 1864; Austro-Hungarian Minister in Sofia, 1909–11, in The Hague, 1911–17; d. Gersau, 24/10/1919, p. 286

Glöckel, Otto: b. 1874; member of the Austrian Chamber (Social Democratic Party), p. 240

Goluchowski, Agenor, Count: b. 1849; Austro-Hungarian Minister in Bucharest, 1887–94; Foreign Minister, 1895–1906; d. Lemberg, 28/3/1921, p. 37

Gortschakow, Alexander Michailovitch, Prince: b. 1798; Russian Foreign Minister, 1856–82; d. Baden-Baden, 11/3/1883, p. 56

Grabmayr, Carl von: member of the Austrian Upper House; President of the Court on Constitutional Law; d. Meran, 24/6/1923, pp. 203, 238

Granville, George Leveson-Gower, Earl: British Foreign Minister, 1851–52, 1870–74, and 1880–85, p. 57

Griesinger, Julius, Baron: German Minister in Belgrade, 1911–14, p. 120

Gross, Gustav, Dr.: b. 1856; Professor of Economics and member of the Austrian Chamber (German Progressive Party); President of the Chamber, 1917–18, p. 204

Guyot, Yves: French politician and writer, p. 98

Hagenbeck, Carl: dealer in animals, p. 278

Hallstein, Dr.: p. 166

Hardinge of Penshurst, Charles: b. 1858; British Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1903–4, 1906–10 and 1916–20; Ambassador in St. Petersburg, 1904–6; Viceroy of India, 1910–16, p. 70

Harnack, Adolf: b. 1851; Protestant theologian; professor at Berlin University from 1889, pp. 169, 188, 203, 277

Harrasowsky, Philip: member of the Supreme Court; d. Vienna, 10/6/1890, p. xv

Harrison, Frederic: Sociologist; Vice-President of the London Library, p. 98

Hartmayer, Hans: correspondent of the *Hamburger Nachrichten.*

Hartwig, N. v.: Russian Minister in Belgrade, 1909–14, pp. 121, 214, 274

Haymerle, Francis, Baron: b. 1874; Secretary of Legation in the Austrian Embassy at Belgrade, 1909, then in Bucharest and Berlin, pp. 113, 119, 263, 264, 270, 279, 280

Haymerle, Heinrich Carl, Baron: b. 1828; third Austrian Plenipotentiary at the Berlin Congress; Foreign Minister, 1879–81; d. Vienna, 10/10/1881, p. 41

Heinold, Carl, Baron: Austrian Minister of the Interior, 1911–15, pp. 201, 230

Helene: Queen of Italy, p. 176

Herbst, Joseph: Bulgarian officer, p. 250–51

Hertling, George, Count: b. 1843; philosophical writer; parliamentarian (Centre Party) Bavarian Prime Minister; d. Ruhpolding, 4/1/1919, pp. 216–17

Hochenburger, Victor: Austrian Minister of Justice, 1909–16, p. 237

Hoenning O'Carroll, Otto, Baron: b. 1861; Austro-Hungarian Minister at Buenos Aires, 1911, p. 192

Hörmann, Constantine: b. 1850; Civil Servant in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1904–10, p. 23

Hohenberg, Maximilian Carl, Prince: b. 1902, p. 95

Hohenberg, Sophie, Duchess of: p. 267

Hohenblum: *see* Simitsch.

Hohenlohe-Schillingfürst, Gottfried, Prinz zu: b. 1867; Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Berlin, 1914–18, p. 188

Hohenlohe-Schillingfürst, Konrad, Princess: p. 205

Hohenlohe-Schillingfürst, Konrad, Prinz zu: b. 1863; Austrian Premier, 1906; Governor of Trieste, 1906–13, pp. 205, 206

Hohenzollern, William, Prince of: b. 1864, p. 270

Hoyos, Alexander, Count: b. 1876; Counsellor of Legation and First Secretary in the Austrian Foreign Office, 1912–16, pp. 141, 156, 219, 228, 284

Hrasnica, Halibey: lawyer in Sarajevo, p. 24

Hussarek, Max, Baron: Austrian Minister of Education, 1911–17; Premier, 1918, p. 221

Hyndman, H. M.: British Socialist, p. 98

Isvolsky, Alexander Petrovitch: b. 1856; Russian Foreign Minister, 1906–10; then Ambassador in Paris, pp. 35, 38, 39, 47, 56, 62, 71

Jagić, Vatroslav: b. 1838; Slav philologist, professor at the Universities of Odessa, Berlin, Petersburg and Vienna (1886–1908): d. Vienna, 5/8/1923, pp. 40, 118, 201

Jagow, Gottlieb von: b. 1863; German Ambassador to the Quirinal, 1909–13; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1913–17, pp. 159, 162, 185–88, 252, 267–74

Jagow, Traugott von: b. 1865; Chief of Police in Berlin, p. 263

Janotta, Heinrich: President of the Troppau Chamber of Commerce; member of Austrian Upper House, p. 302.

Jeftanović, Gligorje: Vice-President of the Serbian Orthodox Church Assembly, pp. 25, 95

Jonescu, Take: Rumanian politician, Finance Minister, 1905, p. 291

Jorga, Nicholaus: b. 1871; professor at the University of Bucharest, historian, pp. 98, 289, 290

JOSEFA, Archduchess: *see* Maria Josefa.

JOVANOVIĆ, Jovan M.: Serbian Minister in Vienna, 1912–14, pp. 148, 197–98

JOVANOVIĆ, Ljuba: President of the Serbian Chamber, 1906–9; member of the Belgrade Academy of Science, p. 116

JUSTH, Julius: President of the Hungarian Chamber, 1905–9, p. 92.

KAEMPF, Dr.: President of the Merchants' Guild in Berlin and of the German Reichstag, p. 267

KÁLLAY, Benjamin de: b. 1839; Common Austro-Hungarian Finance Minister, 1882–1903; d. Vienna, 13/7/1903, pp. xxvi, 11–16, 18, 77, 78, 84, 85, 90, 91, 109, 188

KALNOKY VON KÖRÖSPATAK, Gustav, Count: b. 1832; Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg, 1880–81; Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, 1881–95; d. Prödlitz, 13/2/1898, pp. 33, 248

KANIA, Koloman de: b. 1869; consular officer; served in Vienna Foreign Office, 1905–13, then as Minister in Mexico, pp. 150, 151, 166

KARADZIĆ, Vuk Stefanović: b. 1787; founder of the new Serbian literary language; d. Vienna, 7/2/1864, pp. 114, 117, 118

KARATHEODORI, Alexander Pasha: Plenipotentiary of the Porte at the Berlin Congress, p. 41

KARL: Emperor of Austria, 1916–18, pp. xxviii, 267

KAROL I: King of Rumania, 1866–1914; pp. 183, 227, 228, 251, 252, 271, 293–94

KÁROLYI, Alois, Count: Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Berlin, 1878, p. 41

KATHREIN, Theodore (Baron since 1909): President of the Diet of Tyrol, 1904–16, and President of the House of Deputies in Vienna, p. 11

KATSCHTHALER, Johannes B.: b. 1832; Prince-Archbishop of Salzburg; d. 27/2/1914, pp. 240–42

KAUFMANN, Dr.: President of the Imperial Insurance Office in Berlin, p. 282

KERSCHENSTEINER, Georg: b. 1854; mathematician and educationist; member of the German Reichstag, pp. 217–18, 221

KERZL, Joseph (Ritter von since 1914): b. 1841; Surgeon-General and (1897–1916) personal physician to the Emperor Francis Joseph; d. 22/6/1919, pp. 176, 234

KHEVENHUELLER-METSCH, Rudolf, Count: b. 1844; Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Paris, 1903–10; d. Vienna, 20/10/1910, p. 55

KHUEN-HEDERVÁRY, Alexander, Count: b. 1881; Secretary to the Austro-Hungarian Legation in Berlin, 1913, p. 281

KHUEN-HEDERVÁRY, Carl, Count: b. 1849 Ban of Croatia, 1883–1903; Hungarian Premier, 1903 and 1909–12; d. Budapest, 16/2/1908, p. 136

KIDERLEN-WAECHTER, Alfred von: Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the German Empire; d. 30/12/1912, p. 158

KINSKY VON WICHINITZ UND TETTAU, Carl, Count (Prince since 1904): b. 1858; Counsellor of the Austro-Hungarian Embassy in St. Petersburg, 1898–1903; d. Vienna, 2/12/1919, p. 35

KISS-SCHRATT, Katharina von: b. 1853; actress at the Hofburg Theater, 1884–1900, pp. 159, 166, 249–50

KLEIN, Franz: b. 24/4/1854; head of the Austrian Ministry of Justice from 1905 to 1906; Minister of Justice, 1906–8 and 1916; d. 6/4/1926, pp. xix, xx

Klofać, Vaclav: b. 1868; editor of the *České Slovo*; founder of the National Socialist Party; elected to the Reichsrat, 1901; later senator and leader of the National Socialist Party in Czechoslovakia, p. 190

Koch, Robert: b. 1843; bacteriologist; d. 27/5/1910, p. 278

Koerber, Ernest von: b. 1850; Austrian Minister of Trade, 1897–98; Minister of the Interior, 1899; Premier, 1900–4 and 1916; Common Finance Minister, 1915–16; d. Gutenbrunn near Vienna, 5/3/1919, pp. xxii, 235–36, 239, 249

Koerner, Dr. von: Director of the trade department in the Berlin Foreign Office, pp. 188–89, 263, 267–68, 273

Kopitar, Bartholomaeus: b. 1780; Slavophil; d. Vienna, 11/8/1844, p. 117

Kossuth, Francis: from 1896 leader of the Hungarian Independence Party; Minister of Trade, 1906–9, p. 92

Kossuth, Louis (Lajos): b. 1802; Hungarian politician and Governor of Hungary during the revolution of 1848–49; d. Turin, 20/3/1894, p. 288

Kramář, Dr. Karel: b. 1860; elected to the Austrian Reichsrat, 1891, and to the Bohemian Diet; leader of the Czechish Party; imprisoned during the war and condemned to death; amnestied; after the revolution, first Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918–19; member and leader of the National Democratic Party, pp. 79, 234, 236

Krobatin, Alexander, Baron: b. 1849; Austro-Hungarian War Minister, 1912–17, pp. 137, 144, 150, 160, 165, 169, 216

Kuenburg, Gandolf, Count of: b. 1841; Austrian Minister without portfolio, 1891–92; member of the Upper House; d. Salzburg, 2/3/1921, pp. 200, 241

Kulović, Essad Effendi: p. 24

Kupelwieser, Carl: proprietor of Brioni Island, p. 278

Kurowski, Adele von: p. 265

Kusmanović: representative of the firm of Ginzkey in Belgrade, pp. 110, 111

Kutschera, Hugo, Baron: civil adlatus to the head of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, 1887–1904; d. Vöslau, 1/9/1909, p. 12

Lamsdorff, Wladimir Nicolajevitsch, Count: Russian Foreign Minister, 1900–6, p. 37

Láng, Louis, Baron: Hungarian Minister and member of the Richstag, pp. 136, 137

Larisch von Moennich, Frederic, Count: b. 1875; Austrian Counsellor to Berlin Legation, 1911, p. 281

Latour, Vincent, Count Bailly de: b. 1848; Austrian Minister of Education, 1897–98; d. Vienna, 4/12/1913, pp. 141, 220

Lecher, Dr. Otto: member of Austrian Chamber (German Progressive Party), p. 302

Lehnert, Joseph: Captain, Austrian Navy, pp. 3, 6

Lerchenfeld, Hugo, Count: b. 1843; Bavarian Minister in Berlin; d. 28/6/1925, pp. 265, 270

Licht, Dr. Stephan: lawyer; member of the Austrian Chamber (German Progressive Party), p. 302

Liechtenstein, Edward, Prince: b. 1872, p. 165

Lobkowitz, Ferdinand, Prince: b. 1850; Bohemian landowner; Vice-President of Austrian Upper House; Marshal of Bohemia, p. 230

Löwenstein-Wertheim, Alois, Prince of: b. 1871; member of German Reichstag, p. 281

Lorenzoni, Giovanni: Professor of Economics, p. 174

Ludwig III: Prince Regent, 1912–13; King of Bavaria, 1913–18, p. 277

Ludwig, Bernhard: manufacturer in Vienna, pp. 258, 279, 284

Ludwig, Gustav: President of the Prague Court of Justice, p. xii

Lützow, Heinrich, Count of: b. 1852; Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Rome, 1904–10; member of the Austrian Upper House, pp. 152–53, 203, 221

Luzatti, Luigi: b. 1841; Italian Finance Minister, 1891–92, 1896–98, 1903–5, 1906; Premier, 1910–11, pp. 177, 178, 192

Macchio, Carl, Baron: b. 1859; Permanent Secretary of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, 1909–14, pp. 101, 196

Majorescu, Titus: Rumanian politician; Home Secretary, 1900; Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, 1911–14, pp. 291, 296

Mandić, Dr. Nikola: lawyer; second mayor of Sarajevo; member of the Bosnian Diet (Croat-National Union), p. 24

Mandl, Leopold: b. 1860; writer, author of pamphlet, "The Habsburgs and the Serbian Question," p. 165

Marchet, Dr. Gustav: b. 1846; Austrian Minister of Education, 1906–8; member of Upper House; d. Vienna, 27/4/1916, pp. 157, 166, 170–73, 177, 220, 240–41, 249–50

Maria Josefa, Archduchess: born Royal Princess of Saxony; married Archduke Otto, p. 192

Marković, Bozidar: Professor of Criminal Jurisprudence, University of Belgrade, pp. 102, 103

Maroicić di Madonna del Monte, Ambros, Baron: b. 1856; captain of the district in Cattaro, 1888–93, p. 7

Martin, Dr.: lawyer in Geneva, pp. xii, xiv

Masaryk, Dr. Thomas Garrigue: b. Hodonin (Moravia), 7/3/1850; teacher in philosophy, University of Leipzig, 1878, Vienna, 1879, Prague, 1882; member of the Austrian Chamber; founder of the Independent Party "ceska strana lidova" (Czech National Party); President of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918; re-elected, 1927, pp. 98, 99, 103, 107–8, 145–47, 219

Mataja, Victor: Austrian Minister for Social Welfare, 1917–18, p. 240

Medaković, Bogdan: lawyer; President of the Croatian Diet, p. 102

Mensdorff-Pouilly-Dietrichstein, Albert, Count: b. 1861; Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London, 1904–14, p. 144

Mensdorff-Pouilly, Alexander, Count: *see* Dietrichstein.

Mérey de Kapos-Mére, Kajetan: b. 1861; Permanent Secretary in the Vienna Foreign Office, 1895; Ambassador in Rome, 1910–15, pp. 171, 177–79, 264

Mihanović, Anton: b. 1876; in the Austrian consular staff at Belgrade, Trebizond, and Constantinople, p. 109

Miklos: Hungarian Secretary of State, p. 176

Mikuli, Jacob de: member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Civil Service, finally head of the trade department to 1911, pp. 11, 24

Milan (Obrenović) IV: Prince and, after 1882, King of Serbia, 1868–89, pp. 88, 90, 112, 116

Milos (Obrenović): Prince of Serbia, 1817–39, and 1856–60, pp. 116, 117

Milovanović, Milovan G.: Serbian Minister of Agriculture, 1901–2, Foreign Minister, 1908–9; Prime Minister, 1911–12, pp. 87, 95, 100, 102, 105, 121, 131

Misić, Alois: Guardian of the Franciscan Cloister at Visoko, later Bishop of Mostar, p. 28

Mitis, Oskar, Baron: b. 1874; Director of the Vienna Archives, pp. v, vi

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Montecuccoli, Rudolf, Count: b. 1843; Commander of the Austro-Hungarian Navy, 1904–13; d. Baden near Vienna, 16/5/1922, p. 194

Montenuovo, Alfred, Prince of: b. 1854; Chief Chamberlain to the Emperor Francis Joseph, 1908–16; d. Vienna, 6/9/1927, pp. 176, 234

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Moro, Leopold, Ritter von: landowner; d. Graz, 5/2/1900, p. 11

Mühlberg, Otto von: b. 1843; Under-Secretary of State; Prussian Ambassador to the Vatican, p. 255

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Mumm von Schwarzenstein, Alfons (Baron since 1903): b. 1859; German Ambassador to Tokio, p. 269

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Nicholas II: Czar of Russia, pp. 56–57, 71

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Nostiz-Rieneck, Erwein, Count: b. 1863; Bohemian landowner and member of the Austrian Upper House, pp. 55, 141, 155, 207–15, 223

Novaković, Stojan: Serbian Foreign Minister, 1896–97; President of the Academy of Sciences in Belgrade, pp. 61, 63, 118–19, 145, 165

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Paar, Edward, Count: b. 1837; General Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor Francis Joseph, 1887–1916; d. Vienna, 1/2/1919, p. 176

Paasche, Dr.: Prussian Privy Councillor; first Vice-President of the German Reichstag, p. 267

Pacher, Rafael: b. 1857; writer and editor; member of the Austrian Chamber, p. 230

Paču, D. Lazar: Serbian politician; Finance Minister, 1904–5, 1906–8, and 1912–14, pp. 145, 146

Pallavicini, Johann, Marquess: b. 1848; Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Constantinople, 1906–18, pp. 46, 47, 264

Pasetti von Friedenburg, Mario, Baron: b. 1841; Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Rome, 1895–1904; d. Vienna, 5/5/1913, p. 201

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Passavant, Leopoldine, Baroness: born Baroness Leopoldine Franckenstein; d. Alt-Aussee, 2/8/1918, pp. 141, 201

Patsch, Carl: Director of the Bosnian Institute for Balkan Research, and custodian of the Museum, pp. 84–85

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Pergelt, Dr. Anton: b. 1853; lawyer in Vienna; member of the Austrian Chamber (German Progressive Party), pp. 10, 105

Perić, Zivojin: Professor of Civil Jurisprudence at the University of Belgrade, p. 114

Petar I: King of Serbia, later of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 1903–21; b. 1844; d. Belgrade, 16/8/1921, pp. 88, 111, 121

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Philippovich von Philippsberg, Eugen: b. 1858; Professor of Economics at the University of Vienna; member of the Upper House; d. Vienna, 4/6/1917, p. 140

Pichler, Alexander: Captain of the district in Spalato, 1897–1906; d. Graz, 6/9/1906, p. 18

Pidoll zu Quintenbach, Michael, Baron: b. 1851; director of the Theresian Academy and Consular Academy in Vienna, 1887–1907, p. 240

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Pipeff: deputy to the Sobranje and President of the Chamber of Commerce in Sofia, p. 140

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Prochaska, Oskar: b. 1876; Austro-Hungarian consular officer in Uskub and Prirzen, and Consul there until 1913; pp. 150–54, 195–97

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REDLICH, Dr. Joseph: b. Göding (Hodonin), Moravia, 18/6/1869; professor in the Law faculty of the Vienna University; member of the Austrian Chamber; Finance Minister in 1918; since 1926, professor at the Harvard Law School in Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A., pp. 55, 69, 74, 141, 158 164, 203, 219, 221, 228–30, 241, 302

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SACHS, Dr.: lawyer in Agram, pp. 202–3

SAHINOVIĆ HAMID EKREM: editor of the Young Turk paper *Musilmanska Svijest*, p. 25

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SASONOV, Sergius Dimitrievitch: b. 1861; assistant to the Russian Foreign Minister; from 1920, Minister; d. Nizza, 25/12/1927, p. 270

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Schratt, Katharina: *see* Kiss.

Schulz, Paul: b. 1860; Vice-President of the Austrian Court of Audit of Accounts; d. Kreuzlingen, Switzerland, 4/1/1919, pp. 141, 149, 169, 223, 226, 231, 250, 251

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Schwarzenberg, Carl, Prince: b. 1859; Bohemian landowner and member of the Austrian House of Peers; d. Worlik, 4/10/1913, pp. 49, 141, 200, 201

Schwegel, Joseph (Baron since 1875): b. 1836; in the Austrian Consular Service in Alexandria and Constantinople; Permanent Secretary to the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, 1873–81; member of Austrian Upper Chamber; d. Vienna, 16/9/1914, pp. 40, 41, 105, 147–49, 154–56, 173, 207, 238, 259, 272, 284

Seidler, Friedrich Johann: b. 1875; Secretary to the Austro-Hungarian Legation in Belgrade, 1910–12, p. 119

Sella, Quintino: b. 1827; Italian Finance Minister, 1862, 1864–65, and 1869–73; d. 14/3/1884, p. 177

Seton Watson, Robert William: b. 1875; writer on Austria-Hungary and the Balkans under pseudonym "Scotus Viator" founder and editor of the review *New Europe*, pp. 103, 221

Shek de Vugrovec, Adalbert: in the service of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Government up to 1913; finally, head of the Administration of Justice in Bosnia, pp. 23, 24, 73, 129, 130, 164, 166

Silberstein, Max: lawyer in Berlin, p. 290

Silva Tarouca, Francis, Count of: b. 1858; member of Austrian Upper House, pp. 188, 286

Simitsch de Hohenblum, Alfred: landowner; politician, pp. 131, 136

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Singer, Wilhelm: b. 1847; editor-in-chief of the *Wiener Tageblatt*, p. 222

Šola, Vojislav: landowner in Mostar; member and first Vice-President of Bosnian Diet (Serb National), pp. 25, 164

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Spitzmueller, Alexander: Director of the Austrian Credit Anstalt;

Austrian Finance Minister, 1916–17, pp. 160, 169, 187, 203, 204

STADLER, Joseph: Catholic Archbishop of Sarajevo, 1891–1918, pp. 25, 28, 125, 127, 163

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STEED, Henry Wickham: *The Times* correspondent in Vienna, and, later, editor of *The Times*, 1905–11; author of "The Hapsburg Monarchy," pp. 99, 147

STEFANOVIĆ-VILOVSKY, George, Ritter von: b. 1860; d. Vienna, 8/12/1918, p. 261

STEIN, Ludwig: b. 1859; editor of *Nord und Süd*, p. 268

STEINBACH, Emil: b. 1846; Austrian Minister of Justice, 1886–91; Finance Minister, 1891–93; President of the Supreme Court from 1904; d. 26/5/1907, p. xv, xvi

STEINBEIS, Otto: factory proprietor, pp. 243, 246

STEINBERG: editor of the *Prager Abendblatt*, p. 165

STEINWENDER, Dr. Otto: b. 1847; member of the Austrian Chamber (German People's Party), pp. 171, 219, 241

STEPHAN, Archduke: *see* Carl Stephan.

STERNECK, Maximilian: b. 1829; Admiral, head of the naval section, Austro-Hungarian War Ministry, and Naval Commander; d. Vienna, 5/12/1897, pp. 3–11

STIBRAL, Francis: head of the Austrian Trade Ministry, 1899–1900; Minister of Trade, 1916; member of the Upper House, p. 142

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STIX, Edmund: Director of Buildings, Bosnia, Herzegovinian Government, p. 13

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STOJANOVIĆ, Lubomir: Serbian scholar and politician; secretary, Belgrade Academy of Science, p. 117

STREIT, George: Greek Ambassador in Vienna, 1910–13; then Foreign Minister, p. 260

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SUESS, Edward: b. 1831; geologist, professor, 1857–1901; President of Vienna Academy of Science from 1897; member of Austrian Chamber from 1873; d. Vienna, 26/4/1914, p. 118

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SUSTERSIĆ, Dr. Ivan: b. 1863; lawyer; member of the Austrian Chamber (Slovene People's Party), pp. 204, 234

SVÁTEK, Dr. J. J.: b. 1870; editor, 1893, and editor-in-chief, 1897, of official *Prazske Noviny*, p. 190

SVEHLA, Antonin: b. 1873; member of Bohemian Diet, 1908; leader of the Czech Agrarian Party, 1909; Czechoslovak Home Secretary, 1918–20; Premier since 1922, p. 230

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Szécsen de Temerin, Nicholas, Count: Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Paris, 1910–14; d. Szentlorincz, 18/5/1926, p. 264

Szell, Koloman von: Hungarian Premier, 1896–1903, pp. xxi, 130, 133, 134, 135, 136

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Szterényi, Josef: Secretary, Hungarian Minister of Trade, 1917–18, pp. 130, 137, 168, 169, 207–51

Taaffe, Edward, Count: b. 1833; Austrian Minister of the Interior and Premier, 1879–93; d. Ellischau, 29/11/1895, pp. xv, xix, xx, 249, 299

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Thun und Hohenstein, Francis (Prince since 1911): b. 1847; Austrian Premier, 1898–99; Governor in Bohemia, 1910–15; d. Tetschen, 1/11/1916, pp. xx, xxv, 33, 34, 166, 184, 230, 236, 250

Thun und Hohenstein, Paul, Count: b. 1884; Attaché to the Austro-Hungarian Embassy in Berlin, 1912–14, p. 280

Tirpitz, Alfred (von since 1900): b. 1849; Secretary to the Admiralty; Grand Admiral from 1911, p. 274

Tisza, Koloman: b. 1830; Hungarian statesman; d. 23/3/1902, p. 249

Tisza, Stephen (Istvan), Count: b. 1861; Hungarian Premier, 1903–5 and 1913–17; murdered in Budapest, 31/10/1918, pp. 92, 93, 136, 152, 229, 236, 260, 270, 276, 285

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Urban, Dr. Carl: b. 1/9/1835; member of the Austrian Chamber, and later of the Upper House and of Bohemian Diet; Trade Minister, 1916–17, p. v, 302

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WEDEL, Carl, Count: German Ambassador in Vienna, 1902–7

WEDEL-PIESDORF, Wilhelm von: ex-Prussian House Minister and President of Prussian Upper House, p. 269

WEKERLE, Alexander: b. 1848; Hungarian Finance Minister, 1889–92; Premier and Finance Minister, 1892–95; Premier, 1906–10 and 1917–18, pp. xx, 42, 45, 99, 130, 167, 168, 207–15, 259

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WICKENBURG, Max, Count of: b. 1857; Director, Austrian Ministry of Public Works, 1908–09; Minister of the Interior, p. 240

WIED, William, Prince of: b. 1876; Prince of Albania, 1914; married Sophie, Princess Schönburg-Walderburg, pp. 255, 258, 264, 272, 278, 284

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WILDNER, Heinrich: b. 1879; Austro-Hungarian Consul in Belgrade, 1904–14, pp. 113, 119, 135, 257, 258

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WOLF, Carl Hermann: b. 1862; writer in Vienna; member of Austrian Chamber (German Radicals), pp. 50, 51, 234

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ZICHY, Johann (Janos), Count: b.

1868; Hungarian parliamentarian, founder and leader of the Catholic People's Party, p. 73
Zíchy, Theodore (Tivadar), Count: b. 1847; Austro-Hungarian Minister in Stuttgart, 1894; in Munich, 1896–1905; Vice-President of Hungarian Reichstag, pp. 138, 249
Zimmermann: Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Berlin, pp. 265, 267, 274–80, 284–85

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